KRISTA TIMIKA WALKER v. STATE OF TEXAS (2026)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pro se plaintiff Krista Timika Walker applied to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. 6, and the court withheld service of process for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), Dkt. 15. Her complaint, Dkt. 1, should be dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Walker sued the State of Texas; Greg Willis, a prosecutor; Andrea Thompson, a judge; Debbie Harrison, a court-appointed attorney; and Mathew Carpenter, a peace officer. Dkt. 1. (Later, Walker attempted to file what appeared to be an amended complaint and a supplemental complaint. Dkts. 18, 19. But those filings do not cure the deficiencies in her original complaint, and Walker did not obtain leave of court to file them, see Dkt. 15 at 3 (stating that “Walker may not file any amendments or supplements to the complaint without court approval”), so the court will disregard them.)

According to the complaint, Walker was involved in eviction proceedings related to a property infested with black mold. Dkt. 1 at 2. Later, an allegedly retaliatory arrest warrant was issued against her (the complaint does not explain the nature of the alleged retaliation), and “a Constable” contacted her employer, “falsely claiming [that she] had made a terroristic threat.” Id. She was arrested “without being shown a physical warrant” and jailed overnight. Id. At some point, she was apparently criminally charged, because she alleges that her court dates were cancelled; she was “improperly subjected to a bond forfeiture”; she was detained at the courthouse; and she was appointed an attorney, Harrison, who “also act[ed] as an assistant district attorney.” Id.

Based on those allegations, Walker seeks injunctive relief and damages for “Defamation (Libel and Slander),” “False Imprisonment,” “Violation of Constitutional Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983),” “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress” (“IIED”), and “Malicious Prosecution.” Id. at 3.

SCREENING STANDARD

Although the court must liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Perez v. United States, 312 F.3d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2002), dismissal of a complaint filed in forma pauperis is required if it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint that is “duplicative of a pending or previous lawsuit” is malicious. Potts v. Texas, 354 F. App'x 70, 71 (5th Cir. 2009). That is so even when the plaintiff “raised new claims,” so long as those claims “grow out of the same allegations” presented in the prior or pending suit. Id. A court may dismiss a duplicative case as either malicious or frivolous. See id.; Silva v. Stickney, No. 3:03-cv-2279-D, 2005 WL 2445433, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2005) (explaining that a court “may appropriately dismiss an in forma pauperis action as frivolous ․ when the action ‘seek[s] to relitigate claims which allege substantially the same facts arising from a common series of events which have already been unsuccessfully litigated by the IFP plaintiff’ ” (quoting Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1989)).

Claims without an arguable basis in law or fact are also frivolous. See, e.g., Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing between factual and legal frivolousness). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law when it “is grounded upon an untenable, discredited, or indisputably meritless legal theory, including alleged violations of a legal interest that clearly does not exist.” Brown v. Allen, No. 3:16-cv-214-N-BN, 2016 WL 2855581, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2016) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1989); Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999)). In reviewing claims for legal frivolousness, the court may reject wholly conclusory claims, Bilbrew v. Johnson, 239 F. App'x 49, 51 (5th Cir. 2007), or those that fail to comply with the pleading standard requiring a short and plain statement demonstrating entitlement to relief, Harris v. DOJ, 680 F.2d 1109, 1110 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). And when screening for factual frivolousness, the court need not “accept without question the truth of the plaintiff's allegations,” even when the allegations “cannot be rebutted by judicially noticeable facts.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Instead, if the complaint's “factual contentions are clearly baseless”—such as “claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios” or situations that are “wholly incredible”—the court may dismiss the claims sua sponte. Id. at 32–33 (cleaned up).

The court must also determine whether any complaint not deemed frivolous or malicious “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii). The immunity inquiry generally folds into the frivolousness analysis. Cf. Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that “[a] claim against a defendant who is immune from suit is frivolous because it is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory”). But a defendant's immunity acts as an independent basis for § 1915(e) dismissal when a plaintiff seeks damages. See Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d 75, 76 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Boyd v. Bigers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).

Likewise, the plaintiff's failure to state a claim may alone support dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and in contrast to the frivolousness analysis just noted, a court must “accept[ ] all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). To survive that scrutiny, the complaint must allege facts sufficient to establish plausible, rather than merely conceivable, claims for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Claims are facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” such that there is “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). By contrast, claims are “implausible on [their] face when ‘the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’ ” Harold H. Hugins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

DISCUSSION

To survive dismissal, Walker's complaint must allege facts supporting claims against the named defendants that raise a right to relief above a speculative level. See Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d 534, 537–38 (5th Cir. 2018). Except for Harrison, Walker's court-appointed attorney, none of the individual defendants are mentioned by name. But liberally construing the complaint, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the court will assume that Thompson was the judge assigned to Walker's criminal case; Willis the prosecutor in that case; and Carpenter either the police officer who arrested her, the constable who told her employer that she made a terroristic threat, or both. The complaint cannot survive as to any of those defendants, and Walker cannot properly sue the State.

To the extent Walker seeks injunctive relief, she lacks standing because the facts alleged in the complaint describe only past actions and harm. Dkt. 19 at 1–3. Standing to seek injunctive relief requires the plaintiff to show that she is suffering ongoing harm or is likely to suffer future harm and that the requested injunction would redress that harm. Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355, 361 (5th Cir. 2003). Walker requests an injunction ordering the return of her fingerprints, mugshot, and FBI report; the “deletion of all related records”; and a prohibition of “further retaliation or unlawful disclosures.” Dkt. 1 at 3. But she has standing to seek none of those things. She has not articulated how the first two redress any injury she is suffering or is likely to suffer, and she has not shown an ongoing risk of injury that would give her standing to seek the third.

Immunity bars Walker's claims against Thompson and Willis. Judges enjoy absolute immunity for “acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, ․ even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Prosecutors are likewise immune if their “actions are ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’ ” Loupe v. O'Bannon, 824 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). Even liberally construing the complaint, Walker alleges only that Thompson, Willis, or both caused an arrest warrant to issue, her bond forfeiture, and cancellation of court appearances. See Dkt. 1 at 2. All of those fall within Thompson's and Willis's immunities.

Walker's § 1983 claims against Harrison cannot survive because a court-appointed attorney is not a state actor within the meaning of that statute. Vera v. Bd. of Judges of Jud. Dist. of Nueces Cnty., 260 F. App'x 664, 666 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)). And the State cannot be sued for damages under § 1983, Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989), or for intentional torts, Graham v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 288 F. Supp. 3d 711, 748 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (citing City of Watauga v. Gordon, 434 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tex. 2014)).

As a law-enforcement officer, Carpenter enjoys qualified immunity from suit under § 1983, and arresting Walker under a facially valid warrant does not overcome that immunity. Soto v. Ortiz, 526 F. App'x 370, 375 (5th Cir. 2013). And if Carpenter was the person who “falsely claim[ed] [Walker] had made a terroristic threat,” Dkt. 1 at 2, that allegation would not be actionable under § 1983. Walker's defamation claim could not be actionable under § 1983 absent an allegation of harm, other than stigma, arising from Carpenter's defamation, as opposed to her arrest two days later. Singh v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-1120-RP, 2019 WL 1324135, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2019) (explaining the “stigma plus” test). No such allegation appears in the complaint.

That leaves Walker's state-law tort claims for defamation, false imprisonment, IIED, and malicious prosecution against Carpenter and Harrison. See Connolly v. Reed, No. 5:08-cv-00882-FB, 2009 WL 10702848, at *24 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2009) (recognizing that false imprisonment and IIED are state-law claims), report and recommendation adopted, 2009 WL 10702846 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2009); Smith v. Dallas County, No. 3:04-cv-0493-B, 2005 WL 350819, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2005) (malicious prosecution), report and recommendation adopted, 2005 WL 1017874 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2005); Marshall v. Dall. Morning News, No. 3:03-cv-1172-G, 2003 WL 21355966, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2003) (defamation). Walker faces a jurisdictional obstacle as to those claims.

The court's jurisdiction is based only on federal-question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction. Dkt. 1 at 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The court's supplemental jurisdiction allows it to hear state-law claims that share a “common nucleus of operative fact” with the claims over which it has original jurisdiction. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). But a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ․ if ․ the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). It usually should. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988) (stating that dismissal of all the federal claims in a case is “a powerful reason to choose not to continue to exercise jurisdiction” over pendent state-law claims). Because none of Walker's federal claims survives, the court should decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims.

Because the State, Thompson, and Willis are immune from suit, Walker's claims against them should be dismissed with prejudice. See Matherly v. Louisiana, 3 F.3d 436, 1993 WL 346908, at *3 (5th Cir. Aug. 11, 1993); Guerrero v. Barlow, 494 F.2d 1190, 1191 (5th Cir. 1974); Yeddula v. Andrews, No. 4:26-cv-00166, 2026 WL 948635, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2026). But a pro se plaintiff is usually entitled to an opportunity to amend, Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), so Walker should be allowed to amend her complaint as to Carpenter and Harrison to the extent that her claims against Carpenter would support supplemental jurisdiction over her claims against Harrison—who, as noted, cannot be sued under § 1983.

RECOMMENDATION

It is RECOMMENDED that Walker's claims against the State, Thompson, and Willis, be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and that her claims against Carpenter and Harrison be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Walker should be granted leave to amend her complaint within 14 days of the entry of a memorandum adopting this report and recommendation, if any. If she fails to do so, the case should be dismissed with prejudice.

* * *

Within 14 days after service of this report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A party is entitled to a de novo review by the district court of the findings and conclusions contained in this report only if specific objections are made. Id. § 636(b)(1). Failure to timely file written objections to any proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report will bar an aggrieved party from appellate review of those factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, except on grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from 10 to 14 days).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 3rd day of September, 2026.

Bill Davis United States Magistrate Judge