JAMEHL HARVILLE v. JUDGE GEORGE FLINT (2026)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pro se plaintiff Jamehl Harville applied to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. 4, and the court withheld service of process for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), Dkt. 5. His complaint, Dkt. 1, should be dismissed.

SCREENING STANDARD

Although the court must liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Perez v. United States, 312 F.3d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2002), dismissal of a complaint filed in forma pauperis is required if it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint that is “duplicative of a pending or previous lawsuit” is malicious. Potts v. Texas, 354 F. App'x 70, 71 (5th Cir. 2009). That is so even when the plaintiff “raised new claims,” so long as those claims “grow out of the same allegations” presented in the prior or pending suit. Id. A court may dismiss a duplicative case as either malicious or frivolous. See id.; Silva v. Stickney, No. 3:03-cv-2279-D, 2005 WL 2445433, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2005) (explaining that a court “may appropriately dismiss an in forma pauperis action as frivolous ․ when the action ‘seek[s] to relitigate claims which allege substantially the same facts arising from a common series of events which have already been unsuccessfully litigated by the IFP plaintiff’ ” (quoting Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1989)).

Claims without an arguable basis in law or fact are also frivolous. See, e.g., Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing between factual and legal frivolousness). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law when it “is grounded upon an untenable, discredited, or indisputably meritless legal theory, including alleged violations of a legal interest that clearly does not exist.” Brown v. Allen, No. 3:16-cv-214-N-BN, 2016 WL 2855581, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2016) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1989); Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999)). In reviewing claims for legal frivolousness, the court may reject wholly conclusory claims, Bilbrew v. Johnson, 239 F. App'x 49, 51 (5th Cir. 2007), or those that fail to comply with the pleading standard requiring a short and plain statement demonstrating entitlement to relief, Harris v. DOJ, 680 F.2d 1109, 1110 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). And when screening for factual frivolousness, the court need not “accept without question the truth of the plaintiff's allegations,” even when the allegations “cannot be rebutted by judicially noticeable facts.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Instead, if the complaint's “factual contentions are clearly baseless”—such as “claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios” or situations that are “wholly incredible”—the court may dismiss the claims sua sponte. Id. at 32–33 (cleaned up).

The court must also determine whether any complaint not deemed frivolous or malicious “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii). The immunity inquiry generally folds into the frivolousness analysis. Cf. Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that “[a] claim against a defendant who is immune from suit is frivolous because it is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory”). But a defendant's immunity acts as an independent basis for § 1915(e) dismissal when a plaintiff seeks damages. See Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d 75, 76 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Boyd v. Bigers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).

Likewise, the plaintiff's failure to state a claim may alone support dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and in contrast to the frivolousness analysis, a court must “accept[ ] all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). A complaint must allege facts sufficient to establish plausible, rather than merely conceivable, claims for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Claims are facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” such that there is “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). By contrast, claims are “implausible on [their] face when ‘the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’ ” Harold H. Hugins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

DISCUSSION

Harville sued Judge George B. Flint, Collin County, and the State of Texas, seeking a public apology and damages paid in pure gold and silver. Dkts. 1 at 2–3, 1-3 at 2–3. The complaint asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various constitutional violations arising from Harville's extradition to Michigan on a warrant for unpaid child support. Dkts. 1-1 at 1–2 (describing the basis of Harville's claims); id. at 3–4 (delineating the rights that Harville alleges were violated). Judge Flint presided over Harville's extradition hearing, and according to the complaint, he was biased and made an unconstitutional ruling. Id. at 1–2. Harville views the State and County as vicariously liable for Judge Flint's actions. See id. at 2.

None of those defendants can be liable on the claims Harville asserts. Judge Flint enjoys absolute immunity for “acts committed within [his] judicial jurisdiction, ․ even when [he] is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Harville's allegations, that Judge Flint acted with bias and ruled unconstitutionally, fall within the scope of that immunity, and Collin County cannot be liable for his conduct. Burns v. Mayes, 369 F. App'x 526, 531 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “[a] local judge acting in his or her judicial capacity is not considered a local government official whose actions are attributable to the county” (quoting Krueger, 66 F.3d at 77)). The State is also immune. Section 1983 does not waive States' sovereign immunity, so they cannot successfully be sued for damages under that statute. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). “Apologies ․ are not remedies that courts can order,” Strittmatter v. Briscoe, 504 F. Supp. 2d 169, 176 (E.D. Tex. 2007), and nothing in the complaint suggests ongoing harm that could entitle Harville to injunctive relief, see Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355, 361 (5th Cir. 2003).

Although a pro se plaintiff is usually entitled to an opportunity to amend his complaint, Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), dismissal with prejudice is warranted if the plaintiff has already pleaded his best case, Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999). No set of facts could entitle Harville to relief on the claims he asserts against the defendants he sued, so no amendment could cure the defects in his complaint. That makes dismissal with prejudice warranted. Yeddula v. Andrews, No. 4:26-cv-00166, 2026 WL 948635, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2026).

RECOMMENDATION

It is RECOMMENDED that the complaint, Dkt. 1, be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

* * *

Within 14 days after service of this report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A party is entitled to a de novo review by the district court of the findings and conclusions contained in this report only if specific objections are made. Id. § 636(b)(1). Failure to timely file written objections to any proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report will bar an aggrieved party from appellate review of those factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, except on grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from 10 to 14 days).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 31st day of August, 2026.

Bill Davis United States Magistrate Judge