KARSAN PARMAR v. GOOGLE LLC (2026)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pro se plaintiff Karsan Parmar sued six defendants, including Google LLC and YouTube, LLC, Dkt. 1, and moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), Dkt. 6. The motion should be denied.

BACKGROUND

According to the complaint, the factual allegations in which are assumed to be true at this stage, Parmar owns a collection of rare Gujarati music recordings that he has been digitizing and uploading to YouTube (which is owned by Google) since 2014. Dkt. 1 at 17; see Univ. of Pa., Dep't of S. Asian Studies, The Gujarati Language, https://www.southasia.upenn.edu/languages/explore -languages/gujarati-language (explaining that “Gujarati is a major Indo-Aryan language ․ spoken primarily in the western Indian state of Gujarat and by large diaspora communities across the world”). In 2022, one or more of the defendants uploaded Parmar's recordings to its own YouTube channel, identifying the recordings as copyrighted and belonging to “Saregama India Limited.” Dkt. 1 at 19–21. One or more defendants also began selling copies of Parmar's recordings on other platforms. Id. at 23.

Parmar alleges that he twice wrote to the managing director of defendant Saregama India Ltd., each time receiving an automatic response acknowledging his message. Id. at 25. Parmar also contacted YouTube, which he says acknowledged that he owns the recordings in question. Id. at 26. Nonetheless, YouTube's content-management system incorrectly identified Saregama India as the true owner of the recordings, resulting in copyright claims against Parmar's channel. Id. at 28; see YouTube Help, Learn About Copyright Claims, https://support.google.com/youtube/ answer/6013276 (describing “copyright claims,” which “may be automatically generated when an uploaded video matches another video (or segment of a video) in YouTube's Content ID system” and can result in the uploaded video being blocked from being viewed, monetized, or tracked). Eventually, YouTube terminated Parmar's channel for copyright infringement. Id. at 31.

Parmar sued and moved for a TRO, asking the court to order Google and YouTube to reinstate his channel with the copyright strikes against the channel cleared or suspended and to preserve the relevant records. Dkt. 6 at 2; see YouTube Help, Understand Copyright Strikes, https://support. google.com/youtube/answer/2814000 (explaining that a “copyright strike” occurs when “content [is] removed due to a legal copyright removal request”). Parmar asserts four causes of action. The first two arise under 17 U.S.C. § 1202(a)–(b), provisions governing copyright-management information. Id. at 48–53. The third arises under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), a provision creating liability for misrepresenting that material infringes on a copyright. Id. at 53–54. The fourth is a breach-of-contract claim. Id. at 55–56.

INJUNCTIVE-RELIEF STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs TROs and preliminary injunctions. There are four prerequisites to obtaining that type of relief. The movant must demonstrate

(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunction might cause the defendant; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public interest.

Affiliated Pro. Home Health Care Agency v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 282, 285 (5th Cir. 1999); see Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that the same standard governs issuance of TROs and preliminary injunctions).

A TRO is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy.” Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 360 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985)). The party seeking it must “unequivocally show the need for its issuance,” Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1997), by introducing sufficient evidence to justify the granting of injunctive relief, PCI Transp. Inc. v. Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 546 (5th Cir. 2005). The movant must prove each of the four elements before injunctive relief will be granted. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). The decision to grant or deny a TRO is within the court's discretion. Id.

DISCUSSION

None of Parmar's claims supports a TRO. First, Parmar cannot show entitlement to an injunction under § 512(f) because that statute makes the defendants liable, if at all, only for “damages, including costs and attorneys' fees.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). It does not authorize injunctive relief. Biosafe-One, Inc. v. Hawks, 524 F. Supp. 2d 452, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 15B John A. Gebauer, et al., American Jurisprudence § 216 (2d ed.); cf. Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 977 n.39 (5th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that another statute providing for damages but not equitable relief does not authorize equitable relief). So § 512(f) cannot support a TRO. See Ojiambo v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., No. 4:25-cv-01295-SDJ-BD (E.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2025), Dkt. 11 at 6–8. Parmar appears to recognize that; he does not base his TRO motion on his § 512(f) claim. See Dkt. 6 at 6–7.

As to each of his other claims, Parmar cannot show that he will suffer irreparable harm if his YouTube channel is not restored without copyright strikes. In his TRO motion, Parmar argues that damages cannot adequately redress his alleged injury because the injury “does not fall on [him] alone.” Dkt. 6 at 8. He explains that his channel was the only place that “Gujarati families in India and the diaspora, folk and devotional singers, teachers, and researchers of early Indian recorded music” could hear his unique recordings. Id.

But Parmar has not explained why he would have Article III standing to seek injunctive relief based on alleged injuries to third parties. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (stating that “a party ‘generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties’ ” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). Nor has he explained “why alternatives would not ameliorate or eliminate the irreparable harm” he alleges. Boyd v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 3:21-cv-1004-G (BT), 2022 WL 3904980, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2022) (citing Arbitron Co. v. Phx. Broad. Corp., No. 1:97-cv-04355-MBM-HBP, 1997 WL 452020, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1997)), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3925374 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2022). Specifically, he has not explained why he cannot give interested third parties access to his recordings by establishing a new YouTube channel, distributing his recordings through another platform, or building his own website. See Boyd, 2022 WL 3904980, at *7 (finding that a prisoner was not irreparably harmed when “the defendants revoked his right to correspond by traditional mail and telephone with his daughter ․ because alternative means of communication exist, namely, e-mail”); Kohr v. City of Houston, No. 4:17-cv-1473, 2017 WL 6619336, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2017) (finding that a city ordinance that prohibited camping in public places did not cause irreparable harm to unsheltered homeless people because “alternative living arrangements are available”). And according to the complaint, the recordings remain accessible on other YouTube channels. Dkt. 1 at 29.

In Glendora v. Malone, the producer of a public-access cable television program sued the program's broadcaster over planned changes that would have “impose[d] substantial new burdens on her in distributing her program to the same audience that she now enjoys.” 911 F. Supp. 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 101 F.3d 1393 (2d Cir. 1996). The court recognized that the plaintiff's “show [would] be less visible” but found no irreparable harm because “there [was] no way to predict how great the burdens on [the plaintiff] may [have been] or to estimate the changes in the distribution of her program that may [have] occur[ed].” Id. Likewise, Parmar's recordings may be less visible if he reposts them on a different part of the internet pending the resolution of this case. But that alone does not constitute irreparable harm. See Kifle v. YouTube LLC, No. 21-cv-01752-CRB, 2021 WL 1530942, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2021) (stating that, “[i]f YouTube were engaging in copyright ․ infringement, the proper remedy would be an order requiring YouTube to take the steps necessary to stop engaging in copyright ․ infringement” and adding that “[a]n order that also requires YouTube to restore [the plaintiff]'s channel would be impermissibly overbroad” (quotation marks omitted)).

Parmar also argues that he is excluded from access to evidence because the termination of his channel leaves relevant documents and data in the defendants' “exclusive control and subject to [their] own retention schedules.” Dkt. 6 at 8. But he gives no information about the defendants' retention schedules. Nor does he explain why normal discovery would be inadequate.

Parmar's delay in seeking relief, notwithstanding his explanation for it, see id. at 10–11, also “militates against the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Urb. Edge Network Inc. v. Webber Mktg. & Consulting, LLC, No. 3:22-cv-02021-M, 2023 WL 2825697, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2023) (quoting Daily Instruments Corp. v. Heidt, 998 F. Supp. 2d 553, 570 (S.D. Tex. 2014)). Although YouTube terminated his channel on May 27, 2026, Parmar did not seek relief until August 31, 2026, more than three months later. Dkt. 1 at 56; see Urb. Edge, 2023 WL 2825697, at *2 (explaining that “[c]ourts have considered anywhere from a three-month delay to a six-month delay enough to ‘militate against’ issuing injunctive relief”).

Parmar has not shown a need for a preservation order, either. His motion requests an order that Google and YouTube “preserve all existing records relevant to this action,” noting that most of the relevant records are in their control. Dkt. 6 at 9–10. But he has offered no reason to believe that any records are likely to be lost, altered, or destroyed in the absence of a preservation order. Without that, he cannot show the necessary risk of irreparable harm. See Clark v. Elmore, No. 4:25-cv-01072-ALM-BD, 2026 WL 1091996, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2026) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26).

For all of those reasons, Parmar is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of a TRO. The court therefore need not consider the remaining TRO elements. Sharing Servs. Glob. Corp. v. Oblon, No. 4:20-cv-989-SDJ, 2021 WL 3410670, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2021).

RECOMMENDATION

It is RECOMMENDED that the motion for a TRO, Dkt. 6, be DENIED.

* * *

Within 14 days after service of this report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A party is entitled to a de novo review by the district court of the findings and conclusions contained in this report only if specific objections are made. Id. § 636(b)(1). Failure to timely file written objections to any proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report will bar an aggrieved party from appellate review of those factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, except on grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from 10 to 14 days).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 3rd day of September, 2026.

Bill Davis United States Magistrate Judge