DAVID ALARID v. HON WILL BIARD (2026)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pro se plaintiff David J. Alarid sued Judge Will Biard; Judge R. Wesley Tidwell; Judge Gary Young; Stephanie Harris; Clyde P. Crews Jr.; the City of Paris, Texas; Russell J. Chalk; and Magdalena Evans under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, and for rescission of a deed, violations of the Texas Constitution, conversion, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dkt. 1 at 1, 7–11, 42–51. He also moved for emergency injunctive relief, asking the court to (1) stay enforcement of a state-court order, (2) require that the proceeds of any foreclosure sale conducted under that order be escrowed and not disbursed, and (3) stay enforcement of a contempt order and capias warrant. Dkt. 2 at 3. He requested a hearing on the motion. Id. The motion should be denied, and a hearing is not warranted.

BACKGROUND

Alarid's complaint, whose well-pleaded factual allegations are assumed to be true at this stage, describes a “decade-long, coordinated scheme” between defendants in Lamar and Travis Counties, Texas, to deprive him of a commercial real estate portfolio, a residential property, and $8,000 in cash. Dkt. 1 at 3. The facts relevant to his motion for injunctive relief are that his residential property was conveyed to defendant Chalk via an allegedly invalid deed, id. at 5, and that Chalk filed a lawsuit for possession of the property in a state court in Travis County, id. at 34. The state court rendered judgment against Alarid and ordered him to file a supersedeas bond if he wanted to prevent issuance of a writ of possession. Id. at 35. Meanwhile, in another state-court proceeding in Lamar County, defendant Tidwell, an allegedly biased judge, “signed a contempt order against” Alarid and ordered him to convey assets to a receiver “under threat of a 180-day capias.” Id. at 32.

LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs temporary restraining orders (“TROs”) and preliminary injunctions. There are four prerequisites to obtaining that type of relief. The movant must demonstrate

(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunction might cause the defendant; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public interest.

Affiliated Pro. Home Health Care Agency v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 282, 285 (5th Cir. 1999); see Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that the same standard governs issuance of TROs and preliminary injunctions). The decision to grant or deny an injunction lies within the court's discretion. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985).

DISCUSSION

I. Requests for Injunctive Relief

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Alarid's first two requests for injunctive relief. As to the third, Alarid cannot show an imminent risk of irreparable harm. All three requests should therefore be denied.

A. First two requests

When a state trial court errs, the error “is to be reviewed and corrected by the appropriate state appellate court,” not a federal court. Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994). The Rooker–Feldman doctrine generally stays a federal district court's hand when “(1) a state-court loser; (2) alleg[es] harm caused by a state-court judgment; (3) that was rendered before the [federal] district court proceedings began; and (4) the federal suit requests review and reversal of the state-court judgment.” Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 871 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2017) (referencing D.C. Ct. of Apps. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the doctrine, T.M. v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 146 S. Ct. 1739, 1748 (2026), and held that it bars federal relief when plaintiffs “seek review of state-court judgments, regardless of whether those judgments are final trial-court judgments or those of a State's highest court,” id. at 1752.

Alarid's first two requests for injunctive relief relate to a March 23, 2026, state-court order enforcing the Travis County judgment against him. Dkt. 2 at 3 (asking this court to stay enforcement of that order (and any writ of possession that could be issued based on it) and order that any proceeds of, or relating to, the property addressed by the order be escrowed and not disbursed). Because this case was filed after the judgment that supported that order was rendered, see Dkt. 1, the first three Rooker–Feldman elements are satisfied. Further, the basis of Alarid's request for injunctive relief is that the underlying state-court judgment should never have been rendered because it was premised on a void deed. See Dkt. 2 at 2. Granting the relief Alarid seeks would effectively require this court to review and reverse the state court's judgment, so the fourth element is satisfied, too. See Price v. Porter, 351 F. App'x 925, 926–27 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine barred a claim arising from a state-court proceeding in which the plaintiff alleged that the judge should have recused himself and explaining that the doctrine applies when the claims the plaintiff asserts are “inextricably intertwined with a state judgment” (quotation marks omitted)).

Alarid's complaint preemptively asserts that, for four reasons, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not bar his claims. Dkt. 1 at 12–14. Whether that assertion is accurate with respect to some of the claims asserted in the complaint (a question the court need not reach at this stage), it is not accurate as to the injunctive relief he seeks in his emergency motion.

First, Alarid argues that the doctrine does not bar suits for independent injuries predating state-court judgments. Id. at 13. But his motion for injunctive relief does not ask this court to remedy any such alleged injury. As just noted, it seeks an order from this court blocking specified consequences of a state-court judgment.

Second, Alarid argues that the doctrine does not apply to “[c]onflict-tainted judgments.” Id. But his complaint alleges that the judges in Lamar County—not Travis County—have conflicts of interest, e.g., Dkt. 1 at 3–4, and the judgment underlying his request for injunctive relief was rendered by a Travis County judge, not a Lamar County judge, Dkt. 1 at 35; see Dkt. 1-1 at 17 (final page of the judgment).

Third, Alarid notes that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not bar federal review of void state-court judgments. Dkt. 1 at 13; see Burciaga, 871 F.3d at 385. But in Texas, “[a] judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. 2010) (quoting Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005), with quotation marks omitted). “[T]he fact that a judgment may be erroneous does not render it void.” Ex parte La Rocca, 282 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1955). Alarid alleges that the Lamar County order, which will be discussed next, is void because it was issued without jurisdiction, and he further alleges that the deed preceding the Travis County judgment and subsequent bond order, see Order at 2, Alarid v. Chalk, No. 08-25-00296-CV (Tex. App.—El Paso May 1, 2026), pet. for writ of mandamus denied, No. 26-0431 (Tex. June 19, 2026), was void. But he does not allege that the Travis County judgment itself was void or entered without jurisdiction. He alleges only that the judgment was erroneous because it enforced a void deed. Dkt. 1 at 35. That kind of allegation is for state appellate courts to resolve. See Dkt. 1-1 at 22–26 (El Paso Court of Appeals' order just cited denying Alarid's request to stay the Travis County bond order because Alarid failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion and Texas law prohibits a court from staying an eviction unless a supersedeas bond is filed).

Fourth, Alarid argues that some of his claims do not seek review of a state-court judgment, so the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not bar them. Dkt. 1 at 13–14. But again, his first two requests for injunctive relief arise from, and are inextricably intertwined with, a state-court judgment, so they are barred by Rooker–Feldman. See Price, 351 F. App'x at 926–27.

Because the Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars Alarid's first two requests for injunctive relief, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to grant them. See T.M., 146 S. Ct. at 1748; Grace v. Everhome Mortg. Co., No. 3:13-cv-4563-B, 2014 WL 12531164, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2014) (citing Morris v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 443 F. App'x 22, 24 (5th Cir. 2011)). The court should therefore not reach Alarid's merits argument that he meets the elements necessary to support the requests. Dkt. 2 at 2.

B. Third request

Alarid's third request is for an order “staying enforcement of the contempt order and capias in Lamar County Cause No. 90984 as against [him].” Dkt. 2 at 3. That request should also be denied.

Alarid's complaint repeatedly alleges that the state court ordered him to convey assets to a receiver “under threat of a 180-day capias,” Dkt. 1 at 4, 9, 32, 47, an allegation that makes it unclear whether a capias warrant exists or has merely been threatened. (The complaint attaches neither the alleged asset-conveyance order nor a capias warrant.) But even if a warrant exists, the mere possibility of future harm is not enough to merit injunctive relief, see Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985), and to the extent the risk is that Alarid will be required to appear in court and transfer assets, a monetary award could remedy any injury he might suffer, see Dennis Melancon, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 703 F.3d 262, 279–80 (5th Cir. 2012).

The complaint does allege that one of the defendant judges signed a contempt order. Dkt. 1 at 32. But it does not describe the effect of that order; why it is void or unlawful; or why, if it is, Alarid could not obtain (or try to obtain) relief from it in state court. See supra Part I.A. In any event, Alarid does not allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action arising from the contempt order, see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and injunctive relief cannot be granted based on a complaint that fails to state a claim, Starrett v. City of Richardson, 766 F. App'x 108, 112 (5th Cir. 2019). The court therefore need not consider the remaining elements necessary to obtain injunctive relief. See Sharing Servs. Glob. Corp. v. Oblon, No. 4:20-cv-989-SDJ, 2021 WL 3410670, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2021).

II. Request for a Hearing

If a movant “cannot show that factual disputes exist regarding the required elements, and cannot introduce evidence sufficient to justify granting the motion, a hearing on the requested injunctive relief is unnecessary.” Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 360 (5th Cir. 2009); see Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 1996). Alarid is not entitled to the relief he seeks as a matter of law, see supra Part I, so no hearing is required or warranted.

RECOMMENDATION

It is RECOMMENDED that Alarid's emergency motion for injunctive relief, Dkt. 2, be DENIED.

* * *

Within 14 days after service of this report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A party is entitled to a de novo review by the district court of the findings and conclusions contained in this report only if specific objections are made. Id. § 636(b)(1). Failure to timely file written objections to any proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report will bar an aggrieved party from appellate review of those factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, except on grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from 10 to 14 days).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 31st day of July, 2026.

Bill Davis United States Magistrate Judge