JOSE JUAN MORALES ARREOLA 22027 479 v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2026)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Proceeding pro se, Jose Juan Morales-Arreola filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The motion, which was referred to me for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended disposition, should be denied.

BACKGROUND

Morales-Arreola was charged by indictment with one count of reentry of a deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). Crim. ECF Dkt. 1. The indictment included a notice of penalty advising Morales-Arreola that if his removal “was subsequent to a conviction for commission of three or more misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against the person, or both, or a felony other than an aggravated felony,” the penalty was not more than 10 years of imprisonment and that if his “removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony,” the penalty was not more than 20 years of imprisonment. Id. at 2; see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1), (2). He pled guilty to count one without a plea agreement. Crim. ECF Dkts. 31–35. The presentence report (“PSR”) noted that the maximum term of imprisonment was 10 years under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) based on his prior felony convictions and calculated the United States Sentencing Guidelines range as 100 months to 120 months of imprisonment. Dkt. 37 at 13. At sentencing, Morales-Arreola confirmed that the PSR had been translated into Spanish, that he had reviewed it, that he had an opportunity to discuss it with counsel, that he understood it, that it “adequately cover[ed] [his] background,” and that he was “satisfied” with its accuracy. Dkt. 45 at 2–3. He was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment. Crim. ECF Dkt. 48. His appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal as frivolous. Crim. ECF Dkt. 50; United States v. Morales Arreola, No. 22-40079, 2022 WL 17175841 (Nov. 22, 2022).

Morales-Arreola filed the present § 2255 motion in April 2023. Dkt. 1. The government filed a response, asserting that Morales-Arreola's claims lack merit. Dkt. 4. Morales-Arreola filed a reply. Dkt. 5.

LAW

I. 28 U.S.C. § 2255

“Section 2255 does not offer recourse to all who suffer trial errors. It is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised on direct appeal and ․ would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Capua, 656 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (citation omitted). For that reason, a § 2255 motion is “fundamentally different from a direct appeal.” United States v. Drobny, 955 F.2d 990, 994 (5th Cir. 1992). “Once [a] defendant's chance to appeal has been waived or exhausted,” a federal court is “entitled to presume he stands fairly and finally convicted.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982); accord United States v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 2001).

“For a collateral attack under § 2255, a distinction is drawn between constitutional or jurisdictional errors on the one hand, and mere errors of law on the other.” United States v. Pierce, 959 F.2d 1297, 1300–01 (5th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks omitted). The former may be challenged under § 2255; the latter may not be. United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[a] section 2255 movant who fails to raise a constitutional or jurisdictional issue on direct appeal waives the issue for a collateral attack on his conviction, unless there is cause for the default and prejudice as a result”).

More specifically, a § 2255 movant is entitled to relief only if he can establish that “(1) his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) the sentencing court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” United States v. Seyfert, 67 F.3d 544, 546 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). A § 2255 motion based on “conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics” or “contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible” “is subject to summary dismissal.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To prevail on a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a § 2255 movant must show that (1) his attorney's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the ineffective assistance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–89 (1984); United States v. Segler, 37 F.3d 1131, 1137 (5th Cir. 1994).

Under the first prong, the movant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Seyfert, 67 F.3d at 547. Because it is easy to second-guess counsel's performance after a conviction or adverse sentence, a fair assessment of performance requires reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's conduct from his perspective at the time, rather than indulging the “distorting effects of hindsight.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. As such, counsel is strongly presumed to have performed adequately and made decisions using reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 690; see also Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 228 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that scrutiny of counsel's performance should be highly deferential and that a court should be careful not to second-guess counsel's legitimate strategic choices). “In essence, the Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to reasonable, but not perfect, representation of counsel.” United States v. Valdez, 973 F.3d 396, 404 (5th Cir. 2020); Boyd v. Estelle, 661 F.2d 388, 389 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981) (explaining that the right to counsel does not require errorless counsel; instead, a criminal defendant is entitled to reasonably effective assistance). And it should go without saying that counsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing to make frivolous arguments. See Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2002).

Under the second prong, a movant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A movant must “affirmatively prove,” not just allege, prejudice. Id. at 693. And when a movant pleads guilty, he must also show that, but for trial counsel's alleged deficient performance, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57–59 (1985).

Courts need not address both Strickland prongs if one of them is dispositive; nor must the court address the prongs in a certain sequence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim” on “prejudice” rather than “performance” grounds, or vice versa, then “that course should be followed.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Morales-Arreola asserts ineffective assistance in connection with his guilty plea. He alleges that trial counsel told him he would receive a sentence of three to four years of imprisonment and failed to “fully explain” that his prior convictions “would be used to enhance” his sentence. Dkt. 1 at 8–9.

A valid guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects, including claims of ineffectiveness of counsel, except as it relates to the voluntariness of the plea. United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 441 (5th Cir. 2008); Smith v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1983). For a plea to be knowing and voluntary, “[t]he defendant must have a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.” United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted). If the record establishes that the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea, yet voluntarily chose to plead guilty, the rudimentary demands of a fair proceeding and a knowing, voluntary plea were satisfied. Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 1980). “The consequences of a guilty plea, with respect to sentencing, mean only that the defendant must know the maximum prison term and fine for the offense charged. As long as [the defendant] understood the length of time he might possibly receive, he was fully aware of his plea's consequences.” Barbee v. Ruth, 678 F.2d 634, 635 (5th Cir. 1982) (quotation marks omitted).

The defendant's representations, along with those of his lawyer and the prosecutor, and any findings by the judge in accepting the plea “constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73–74. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of truthfulness, and a defendant bears a heavy burden to show that his plea was involuntary after testifying to its voluntariness in open court. Id. at 74; Deville v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 654, 659 (5th Cir. 1994). Similarly, official documents are “entitled to a presumption of regularity and are accorded great evidentiary weight.” United States v. McDaniels, 907 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hobbs v. Blackburn, 752 F.2d 1079, 1081 (5th Cir. 1985)). Although a defendant's attestation of voluntariness at the time of the plea is not an absolute bar to later contrary contentions, it places a heavy burden on him. United States v. Diaz, 733 F.2d 371, 373–74 (5th Cir. 1984).

The record demonstrates that Morales-Arreola's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. At the change-of-plea hearing, Morales-Arreola admitted that he understood the charge and would waive certain constitutional rights by pleading guilty. ECF Dkt. 46 at 6, 7–8. He also stated that he understood the penalties he faced—specifically, not more than two years of imprisonment, but if his removal “was subsequent to a conviction for commission of three or more misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against the person, or both, or a felony other than an aggravated felony,” not more than 10 years of imprisonment, and if his “removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony,” not more than 20 years of imprisonment. Crim. ECF Dkt. 46 at 8–9. He further admitted that he had an opportunity to review the sentencing guidelines with counsel and understood that they were not binding on the court; that no one had forced or threatened him to plead guilty; that he wanted to plead guilty only because he was guilty of the charge; that he understood that if he pled guilty, he would likely be deported after serving his sentence and would never be able to become a United States citizen; that he had sufficient time to review and discuss his case with counsel; that he was satisfied with counsel's representation and advice; and that he reviewed the factual basis with counsel before he signed it and that everything contained in the factual basis was true and that he had no changes to it. Id. at 9–11, 14. Counsel and the government confirmed that they were satisfied that there was a factual basis to support the charge, and Morales-Arreola's counsel confirmed that she had sufficient time to review the case with him. Id. at 15.

By signing the factual basis, Morales-Arreola acknowledged that he read the factual basis or had it read to him, that he discussed the factual basis with counsel, that he fully understood the contents of the factual basis, and that he “agree[d] without reservation that it accurately describe[d] the events and [his] acts.” Crim. ECF Dkt. 34 at 2. Counsel (a federal defender other than the one who represented Morales-Arreola at the change-of-plea hearing) also signed the factual basis, acknowledging that he had read and reviewed it with Morales-Arreola and that, based on his discussion with Morales-Arreola, he was satisfied that Morales-Arreola understood the factual basis. Id.

The court found that Morales-Arreola was fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea and was aware of the nature of the charges and consequences of the plea; that the guilty plea was supported by an independent factual basis establishing each of the essential elements of the offense; and that the guilty plea was made freely, knowingly, and voluntarily and was not the result of force, threats, or promises. Crim. ECF Dkt. 32 at 1–2; Crim. ECF Dkt. 35.

Morales-Arreola has provided no independent evidence sufficient to overcome his sworn testimony in open court, the representations of counsel and the government, and the findings of the court in accepting his plea. See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73–74; Deville, 21 F.3d at 659. He never attempted to withdraw his guilty plea. And he did not complain at sentencing that the sentence exceeded what his counsel had told him. As such, the record shows that Morales-Arreola's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.

“A guilty plea is not rendered involuntary by the defendant's mere subjective understanding that he would receive a lesser sentence. In other words, if the defendant's expectation of a lesser sentence did not result from a promise or guarantee by the court, the prosecutor or defense counsel, the guilty plea stands.” Daniel v. Cockrell, 283 F.3d 697, 703 (5th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001). Morales-Arreola provides no evidence of when and where a promise of a lesser sentence was made, nor does he identify a witness to any alleged promise. See United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a prisoner seeking habeas relief based on an alleged promise must prove “(1) the exact terms of the alleged promise, (2) exactly when, where, and by whom the promise was made, and (3) the precise identity of an eyewitness to the promise”). Furthermore, “a guilty plea is not rendered involuntary because the defendant's misunderstanding was based on defense counsel's inaccurate prediction that a lesser sentence would be imposed.” Id.

Morales-Arreola has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). His word alone is insufficient to meet that burden. And as the Supreme Court has instructed, “[c]ourts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney's deficiencies. Judges should instead look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant's expressed preferences.” Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 369 (2017). That evidence confirms that Morales-Arreola is not entitled to relief.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Morales-Arreola also argues that he “had issues that were appealable” but that appellate counsel failed to consult with him. Dkt. 1 at 12. That claim, too, fails.

A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is reviewed under Strickland's performance and prejudice prongs. Henderson v. Quarterman, 460 F.3d 654, 665 (5th Cir. 2006). A movant alleging ineffective appellate representation “must first show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable in failing to find arguable issues to appeal—that is, that counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous issues and to file a merits brief raising them” and then “demonstrat[e] prejudice. That is, he must show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's unreasonable failure to file a merits brief, he would have prevailed on his appeal.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000).

Morales-Arreola does not identify any issue that appellate counsel should have raised in a merits brief. His claim is conclusory and therefore fails to demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice. See Green v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029, 1042 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that mere conclusory allegations in support of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are insufficient to raise a constitutional issue). The record shows that appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, and the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as frivolous after reviewing the record and brief. There is nothing to suggest that appellate counsel's decision to file an Anders brief was improper or that he was prejudiced. See United States v. Randle, No. CIV.A. H-14-721, 2015 WL 418148, at *15 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2015) (stating that “[t]he law is clear that the filing of an Anders brief does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CR H-10-788-4, 2016 WL 3640062 (S.D. Tex. July 8, 2016).

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a proceeding under § 2255 “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). Although Morales-Arreola has not yet filed a notice of appeal, the court will address whether he would be entitled to a certificate of appealability. See Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a district court may rule on a certificate of appealability sua sponte because “the district court that denies a [movant] relief is in the best position to determine whether the [movant] has made a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right on the issues before the court. Further briefing and argument on the very issues the court has just ruled on would be repetitious.”).

A certificate of appealability may issue only if a movant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Supreme Court explained the requirements associated with that showing in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), and Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). In a case in which “a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits,” the movant must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, or that “the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327. And “[w]hen the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484; see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (reflecting that the certificate-of-appealability requirement applies equally in the habeas and § 2255 contexts).

In this case, it is respectfully recommended that reasonable jurists would neither debate the denial of Morales-Arreola's constitutional claims nor find that the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed.

RECOMMENDATION

It is RECOMMENDED that the motion, Dkt. 1, be DENIED and that the case be dismissed with prejudice. It is also RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability be DENIED.

* * *

Within 14 days after service of the magistrate judge's report, any party may serve and file specific written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific.

Failure to file specific, written objections will bar the party from appealing the unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from 10 to 14 days).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 17th day of June, 2026.

Bill Davis United States Magistrate Judge