NADINE FLOOR COMPANY INC v. VERONICA JORDAN (2026)

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Nadine Floor Company, Inc., sued Veronica Jordan and Derick Jordan in state court under state law. Dkt. 3 at 8–16. Proceeding pro se, the Jordans removed the case to this court, asserting federal-question jurisdiction. Dkt. 1. Nadine Floor moved to remand the case to state court, Dkt. 6; see Dkts. 12 (combined filing including response), 13 (duplicate of Docket 12), and the Jordans moved for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery, Dkt. 8; see Dkts. 10 (response), 11 (reply), 14 (sur-reply).

The Jordans also moved to strike Nadine Floor's motion to remand, Dkt. 7; see Dkts. 9 (response), 12 (combined filing including reply), 13 (duplicate of Docket 12), and a sur-reply, Dkt. 15; see Dkt. 18 (response). Nadine Floor moved to strike the Jordans' combined response to its motion to remand and reply in support of their motion to strike that motion. Dkt. 16; see Dkts. 19 (response), 20 (reply). (The Jordans created some confusion on the docket by using incorrect procedural labels to describe the components of that filing; this combined order and report uses the correct labels.)

The court will deny the motions to strike. It will recommend that the motion to remand be granted and that the motion for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery be denied.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

According to the state-court petition, the parties signed a contract in May 2024 for Nadine Floor to remodel the Jordans' home. Dkt. 3 at 2. As a disabled veteran, Derick Jordan applied for, and was approved for, home-renovation financial support under the Department of Veterans Affairs' (“VA's”) “Specially Adapted Housing (‘SAH’) Grant Program.” Id. The program covered the costs of “labor, materials[,] and services for the remodel of the Jordans' real property.” Id.

The VA approved the project plans and construction contract. Id. at 3. Nadine Floor was to conduct the renovation in stages, and the VA was to make payments after each stage was completed. Id. at 3. But according to Nadine Floor, shortly after construction commenced, Veronica Jordan “took control of the remodeling” and made “demands that were for work outside of the original Construction Contract and plans.” Id. That type of work required VA-approved “change orders” to authorize payment to Nadine Floor. Id. at 5. The VA eventually approved the change orders, “provided both parties signed [them.]” Id. When the Jordans refused to sign the orders, the VA withheld payments to Nadine Floor. Id. at 5–6.

For months, Nadine Floor and the Jordans disputed the change orders and remodeling work. Id. In January 2025, the VA “issued a Cease and Desist Notice calling for the end of all construction, inspections, and payments for the Contract pending resolution of the Change Orders.” Id. at 6. According to Nadine Floor, “[t]he construction work at the Jordans' real property is ‘substantially complete,’ ” but “[the Jordans] have not paid and continue to refuse to pay the amounts due and owing under the Construction Contract.” Id. at 6–7. In February 2025, Nadine Floor filed a mechanic's lien on the Jordans' property and sought the money due. Id. at 7. Then, as noted, it sued the Jordans in state court, see id.; Dkt. 6 at 2, and the Jordans removed the case to this court, Dkt. 1.

II. Procedural History and the Parties' Contentions

In November 2025, Nadine Floor moved to remand the case to state court. Dkt. 6. It argues that the Jordans cannot assert federal-question jurisdiction for a contract dispute between private parties. Id. at 1. It also contends that the Jordans untimely removed the case eight months after the inception of the state-court lawsuit to prevent the state-court judge from sanctioning them. Id. at 2. Nadine Floor faults the Jordans for relying on extraneous documents outside of the state-court petition to assert federal jurisdiction. Id. at 3. It argues that remand is appropriate because the Jordans: (1) do not claim diversity jurisdiction; (2) base federal-question jurisdiction on ancillary, irrelevant matters; (3) have not established federal-question jurisdiction or complete federal preemption; and (4) filed a procedurally improper notice of removal. Id. at 4–14. It contends that, because it is the master of its own pleading, which raises only state-law claims, the Jordans cannot overcome the presumption in favor of remand. Id. at 5–6. Finally, it asks the court to impose sanctions. Id. at 15.

The Jordans respond by arguing that Nadine Floor failed to serve its corrected motion to remand. Dkt. 12 at 1–4. They claim that, despite consenting to receive electronic notifications of court filings, Dkt. 2, they never received the motion and ask the court to strike it, Dkt. 12 at 1–2.

Substantively, the Jordans argue that “[Nadine Floor's] claims implicate VA regulatory obligations, federal oversight of construction, and federal funding controls.” Id. at 4. According to them, “[those] issues require interpretation of federal law and satisfy the Grable test for substantial federal questions.” Id.; see Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 310 (2005) (holding that “the national interest in providing a federal forum for federal tax litigation is sufficiently substantial to support the exercise of federal-question jurisdiction over” a suit between nondiverse parties that lacked a federal cause of action but involved claims of title to land obtained at a federal tax sale and raised a disputed issue of federal title law). In particular, they assert that Nadine Floor's claims rest on “whether the work complied with [the VA's] accessibility guidelines; whether VA personnel properly approved or withheld payment; whether VA's Cease and Desist was proper; and whether [their] alleged conduct violated SAH-program requirements.” Id. at 5 (bullet points and quotation marks removed). And they argue that “[t]his is not an ordinary private dispute” but rather a dispute “anchored in a federal benefits program.” Id. at 6–7. They also suggest that Nadine Floor contradicted itself in a state-court proceeding; that the cases it relies on are misapplied, distinguishable, and irrelevant; and that it should be admonished. Id. at 6–8.

While the motion to remand was pending, the Jordans moved for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery. Dkt. 8. They argue that discovery is needed to establish that the SAH-disbursement agreement, not the construction contract, governs this action. Id. at 4. They seek discovery to: “[1] [c]larify the true SAH contract structure; [2] [e]stablish the VA's control over payment, inspection, and project approval; [3] [d]etermine [Nadine Floor]'s status and conduct as a federal SAH vendor/contractor; and [4] [e]xpose misrepresentations and omissions that go directly to the existence of federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 2. They also suggest that removal is proper based on federal-question and federal-officer jurisdiction. Id. at 3; see 28 U.S.C §§ 1331, 1442.

In response, Nadine Floor asserts that the Jordans' motion “represents another ploy to escalate the time and resources that Plaintiff and the judicial system have been required to devote to this dispute.” Dkt. 10 at 1. It notes that, during the nearly nine months this case was pending in state court, the Jordans filed over 20 motions, conducted written discovery, and attempted to prevent Nadine Floor from obtaining discovery. Id. Nadine Floor contends that “[j]urisdictional discovery is not warranted in a fact-based contractual dispute” and that “[t]here is no need for jurisdictional discovery when this is not a diversity case, does not involve joinder of other parties, and does not concern the amount in dispute.” Id. at 2. Further, it notes that the state-court judge already determined that the construction contract governs the dispute, id.; reiterates that the Jordans, not the VA, remain obligated to pay on the contract, id. at 3; and argues that the Jordans' discovery requests go to the merits instead of to jurisdiction, that the Jordans already have the documents they seek, that jurisdictional discovery would be disruptive and counter to the Jordans' burden to establish jurisdiction upon removal, that the Jordans' cited authorities are distinguishable and inapplicable, and that the discovery requests are duplicative and objectionable, id. at 3–7.

In reply, the Jordans accuse Nadine Floor of misconduct in the state discovery process, Dkt. 11 at 1, and argue that its second amended petition introduced new federal allegations, id. at 1–2. In their view, that entitles them to discovery. They go on to challenge Nadine Floor's cited authority, id. at 3–4, and accuse Nadine Floor of misrepresenting facts to the court, id. at 4–5. They also argue that Nadine Floor's motion to remand created additional federal issues and that federal-officer removal requires jurisdictional discovery. Id. at 5–6.

In its sur-reply, Nadine Floor argues that the court should not consider the Jordans' exhibits or arguments raised for the first time in their reply. Dkt. 14 at 1. It clarifies what discovery was produced in the state-court proceedings and argues that the Jordans' filings are inconsistent. Id. at 3–4.

LAW

I. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, ․ which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). When in doubt, the court must “presume[ ] that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Id.

Two statutes authorize the lion's share of federal-court litigation: 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which gives federal courts jurisdiction over cases that arise under federal law, and 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which establishes federal courts' “diversity” jurisdiction. See Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 26 (2025). “ ‘Arising under’ jurisdiction—more often known as federal-question jurisdiction—enables federal courts to decide cases founded on federal law.” Id. “A suit most typically falls within that statutory grant ‘when federal law creates the cause of action asserted.’ ” Id. (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013), which distinguished Grable and held that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases “arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,” did not mandate a federal forum for “a state law claim alleging legal malpractice in the handling of a patent case,” id. at 253–56, 264–65); see Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936) (noting that, to bring a case within § 1331, “a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action”). “On rare occasions, the grant also covers a suit containing state-law claims alone, because one or more of them necessarily raises a substantial and actually disputed federal question.” Royal Canin, 604 U.S. at 26 (cleaned up); see Grable, 545 U.S. at 314.

“Either way, the determination of jurisdiction is based only on the allegations in the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint—not on any issue the defendant may raise.” Royal Canin, 604 U.S. at 26. “That longstanding rule makes the complaint—the plaintiff's own claims and allegations—the key to ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.” Id. “If the complaint presents no federal question, a federal court may not hear the suit.” Id.; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 78 (reflecting that, in Texas state court, a petition is the equivalent of a complaint in federal court, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a)(1)).

II. Motions to Strike

Motions to strike are generally disfavored. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057 (5th Cir. 1982). “[A] motion to strike should be granted only when the pleading to be stricken has no possible relation to the controversy.” Augustus v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Escambia Cnty., 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962). “A disputed question of fact cannot be decided on [a] motion to strike,” and “when there is no showing of prejudicial harm to the moving party, the courts generally are not willing to determine disputed and substantial questions of law upon a motion to strike.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. The Parties' Motions to Strike

The Jordans challenge the timeliness of the motion to remand, Dkt. 4, which Nadine Floor first attempted to file 21 days after the notice of removal was filed, Dkt. 1. Although the clerk of court struck that initial motion as deficient, Docket Entry for Nov. 7, 2025, Nadine Floor filed a sufficient version of it five days later, Dkt. 6. The Jordans' motion to strike the corrected motion as untimely, Dkt. 7, lacks merit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (providing that “[a] motion to remand [a] case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a)” and adding that, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded”).

The Jordans' assertion of a defect in service of the motion to remand, see Dkt. 12 at 1–3, likewise lacks merit. The Jordans claim that they never received electronic notification of the motion's filing and suffered prejudice as a result. But even if they did not receive the motion immediately, they did eventually have notice of it and responded. See Dkts. 12, 13. They have not shown the prejudice necessary to warrant striking the motion to remand. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Riley, No. 1:19-CV-00279, 2020 WL 10618173, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2020) (denying a motion to strike because “[n]o prejudice exists when a litigant has had the opportunity to file a substantive response”).

As noted, Nadine Floor moved to strike the Jordans' combined response to its motion to remand and reply in support of their motion to strike the motion to remand. Dkt. 16; see Dkts. 12, 13 (duplicate). The court will strike the duplicate filing, Dkt. 13. As to the remaining one, Dkt. 12, Nadine Floor points to procedural irregularities but does not show prejudice. The court will consider the Jordans' combined filing in the interest of justice.

Finally, the Jordans ask the court to strike Nadine Floor's sur-reply, Dkt. 14, to their motion to conduct jurisdictional discovery, Dkt. 8; see Dkt. 15. They assert that a sur-reply may be filed only with leave of court, Dkt. 15 at 1–2, but they are wrong about that. Although the court need not wait for a reply or sur-reply before ruling on a motion, “[a] sur-reply responding to issues raised in the reply may be served and filed within seven days from the date the reply is served.” Loc. R. CV-7(f). Nadine Floor served its sur-reply, Dkt. 14, within seven days of the Jordans' reply, Dkt. 11, and it did not need leave of court to do so.

II. Nadine Floor's Motion to Remand

If a plaintiff files an action in state court over which a federal court could exercise jurisdiction, the defendant may remove the action to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The removing party bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper.” Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). In determining whether removal was proper, a court considers “the claims in the state court petition as they existed at the time of removal,” and “[a]ny ambiguities are construed against removal.” Id. As such, if a defendant removes an action over which the federal court cannot exercise jurisdiction, the federal court must remand the case to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Royal Canin, 604 U.S. at 38.

Nadine Floor did not assert any cause of action created by federal law, and the Jordans have not shown that federal law preempts any of Nadine Floor's state-law claims. And even though § 1331 can, on rare occasion, cover a state-law claim, it may do so only when the claim “necessarily raises a substantial and actually disputed federal question.” Royal Canin, 604 U.S. at 26 (cleaned up); see, e.g., Bd. of Comm'rs of Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth.-E. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 850 F.3d 714, 723, 725–26 (5th Cir. 2017) (involving state-law negligence and nuisance claims that could not be resolved “without a determination whether multiple federal statutes create[d] a duty of care that [did] not otherwise exist under state law”). That is not the case here.

For the first time in their motion to conduct jurisdictional discovery, the Jordans argue that their notice of removal raised “federal-contractor jurisdiction,” presumably under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Dkt. 8 at 1–2. But the notice of removal was instead based on federal-question jurisdiction. It stated that “[r]emoval is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action arises under the laws of the United States,” Dkt. 1 at 2, and asked this court to “assume jurisdiction ․ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441,” id. at 5.

In any event, the Jordans could not properly invoke § 1442(a)(1), which provides that “[a] civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced in a State court and that is against or directed to any of” several defendants, including “[t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States,” “may be removed by them” (emphasis added). See Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Par., 146 S. Ct. 1052, 1057 (2026) (noting that § 1442(a)(1) “authorizes an officer or ‘person acting under that officer’ to remove state suits ‘for or relating to any act under color of such office’ ”); see also FTC—Final Touch Constr. of Colo., Inc. v. Kelly, No. 23-cv-01348-GPG-STV, 2023 WL 9232941, at *2–3 (D. Colo. Nov. 14, 2023) (concluding that § 1442 did not support removal of a state-court suit brought by a private construction contractor, paid through the VA's SAH grant program, against a homeowner to recover unpaid work), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 399257 (D. Colo. Jan. 22, 2024).

Diversity jurisdiction would be another possible basis for adjudication in this federal forum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Royal Canin, 604 U.S. at 26. But the Jordans did not attempt to, and unlikely could not, invoke it. See MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining that, “[t]o properly allege diversity jurisdiction under § 1332, the parties need to allege ‘complete diversity,’ ” meaning that ‘all persons on one side of the controversy [must] be citizens of different states than all persons on the other side’ ” (quoting McLaughlin v. Miss. Power Co., 376 F.3d 344, 353 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam))); Dkt. 3 at 1 (state-court petition suggesting that all parties are citizens of Texas).

The Jordans are left, then, with the jurisdictional theory they alleged in their notice of removal: federal-question jurisdiction. That theory fails based on the absence of a federal cause of action, a substantial federal issue, or federal preemption. Remand is therefore required, so the court need not reach Nadine Floor's other arguments.

A. The absence of either a federal cause of action or a substantial federal issue

“A plaintiff is the master of his complaint” and, as such, may choose to “allege only state law causes of action, even when federal remedies might also exist.” Port of Corpus Christi Auth. of Nueces Cnty. v. Port of Corpus Christi L.P., 57 F.4th 432, 438–39 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 737 F.3d 78, 89 (5th Cir. 2013)). As such, “[a] defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under federal law, thereby selecting the forum in which the claim shall be litigated.” Hood, 737 F.3d at 89.

Here, the state-court petition raised no federal cause of action. Dkt. 3. Nadine Floor sued the Jordans for breach of contract, foreclosure on a mechanic's lien, interference with contract, unjust enrichment, money had and received, conversion, common-law fraud, misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, and statutory fraud. Dkt. 3 at 8–16. Those are all state-law claims. See Sawyer v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 754 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 2014) (fraud and fraudulent inducement); Fortune v. Idaho Hous. & Fin. Ass'n, No. 4:24-CV-00316-ALM-BD, 2026 WL 183614, at *3–7 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2026) (breach of contract, money had and received, fraud, conversion, and unjust enrichment), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 532974 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2026); Cellport Sys., Inc. v. Harman Int'l Indus. Inc., No. 4:22-CV-808-SDJ, 2024 WL 1337338, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2024) (tortious interference with contract); Mascot Bldg. Servs. Inc. v. Iowa Concrete LLC, No. 3:22-cv-01755-M, 2022 WL 17566357, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2022) (foreclosure on a mechanic's lien); Earl v. Boeing Co., 611 F. Supp. 3d 345, 359 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (fraud by misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation); Ginsburg v. ICC Holdings, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-2311-D, 2017 WL 5467688, at *18 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2017) (statutory fraud); see Dkt. 3 at 16 (citing Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 27.01).

So to secure a federal forum, the Jordans would need to show that at least one of those state-law claims “necessarily raises a substantial and actually disputed federal question.” Royal Canin, 604 U.S. at 26 (cleaned up). They cannot.

The Jordans argue that Nadine Floor's claims “implicate VA regulatory obligations, federal oversight of construction, and federal funding controls. These issues require interpretation of federal law and satisfy the Grable test for substantial federal questions.” Dkt. 12 at 4. According to the Jordans, “[t]his is not an ordinary private dispute. It is a federally funded, federally supervised program governed by federal statutes and federal administrative decisions. Resolution of [Nadine Floor's] claims cannot occur without interpreting these federal rules.” Id. at 6.

But as Nadine Floor correctly explains, “[t]his dispute is not about veteran benefits or veteran issues. It is a contract dispute between Nadine Floor Company, Inc.[,] and Veronica and Derick Jordan centered on a Construction Contract to remodel the Jordans' residence.” Dkt. 6 at 1. The petition's references to Derick Jordan's veteran status and VA grant “are made as part of the factual basis of the petition but are ancillary and not federal jurisdictional issues.” Id. at 3.

The contract at the center of this dispute was between Nadine Floor and the Jordans. Dkt. 3 at 8. The VA was not a party to it and has never been a party to the case. Id.; Dkt. 6 at 3. And the Jordans do not identify any federal authorities necessary to resolution of the issues presented. The case is like Gunn, 568 U.S. at 253–56, 264–65, not Grable, 545 U.S. at 310. See Kelly, 2023 WL 9232941, at *4–5 (noting that defendants positioned similarly to the Jordans in this case “point[ed] to little more than the involvement of federal funds and a letter from a VA official outlining conditions for the receipt of those federal funds as grounds for the exercise of federal jurisdiction” and finding that “federal question jurisdiction cannot rest on such grounds”); Sewell v. MDM Servs. Corp., No. 12–3019, 2013 WL 2100526, at *2 (E.D. La. May 14, 2013) (explaining that the party invoking the court's jurisdiction “cannot transform his state law claims into a federal question merely by referencing [a defendant's] possible status as a disabled veteran pursuant to federal law”).

B. The absence of federal preemption

As noted, the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” which Royal Canin restated, “provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). But “[a]n exception to [that] rule arises when Congress ‘so completely preempt[s] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.’ ” Elam v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gutierrez v. Flores, 543 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 2008)). “Under the complete preemption doctrine, ‘what otherwise appears as merely a state law claim is converted to a claim “arising under” federal law for jurisdictional purposes because the federal statute so forcibly and completely displaces state law that the plaintiff's cause of action is either wholly federal or nothing at all.’ ” Id. (quoting New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois, 533 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2008)). In assessing whether complete preemption exists, “[t]he party asserting federal preemption has the burden of persua[ding]” the court, id. at 802, that “Congress intended the federal cause of action to be the exclusive cause of action for the particular claims asserted under state law,” id. at 803 (quoting Barrois, 533 F.3d at 331).

In their response to the motion to remand, the Jordans do not discuss the complete-preemption doctrine. See Dkt. 12. They just assert, incorrectly, that Nadine Floor's claims raise a federal question. See supra Part II.A. The Jordans have failed to carry their burden of persuasion. See Jackson v. Herbert, No. 25-692, 2025 WL 2733636, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 25, 2025); Young v. ILD Techs., LLC, No. SA-11-CA-1000-FB, 2012 WL 13029579, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2012).

III. The Jordans' Request for Jurisdictional Discovery

The Jordans request leave to conduct limited discovery to: (1) clarify the housing project's contract structure; (2) establish the VA's control over the project; (3) determine Nadine Floor's status as a federal vendor/contractor; and (4) expose purported misrepresentations and omissions. Dkt. 8 at 2. The request should be denied.

District courts have discretion to control the methods of determining their jurisdiction, Opelika Nursing Home, Inc. v. Richardson, 448 F.2d 658, 667 (5th Cir. 1971), and may permit discovery to determine facts necessary to establish or defeat jurisdiction, Unified 2020 Realty Partners, L.P. v. Proxim Wireless Corp., No. 3:11-cv-0861-D, 2011 WL 2650199, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2011). “[T]he party opposing dismissal and requesting discovery ․ bear[s] the burden of demonstrating the necessity of discovery,” Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Davila v. United States, 713 F.3d 248, 264 (5th Cir. 2013)), and if “the requested discovery is not likely to produce the facts needed to withstand a Rule 12(b)(1) motion,” Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 342 (5th Cir. 2009), the court should not authorize it, Monkton, 768 F.3d at 434; see NL Indus., Inc. v. OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 558, 566 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (noting that “jurisdictional discovery places an undue and unnecessary burden on the parties” when its proponent supports the request by mere “conjecture, speculation, or suggestion”).

This case was pending in state court for nearly nine months before the Jordans removed it. Dkt. 6 at 2. And while it was there, the parties exchanged discovery. Id. at 4–5. As Nadine Floor notes, if the Jordans believe that “a certain document controls” and serves as the basis for federal-question jurisdiction, “they should already have it.” Dkt. 10 at 5. That assertion is reasonable, given the history of this case, and the Jordans have failed to show that jurisdictional discovery is necessary. See HMO La. Inc. v. Gupta, No. 21-522, 2021 WL 2678933, at *6 (E.D. La. June 30, 2021) (denying a request for information regarding how payments were made because it would not change the court's conclusion that remand was required).

IV. Attorneys' Fees

Nadine Floor moved for an award of its attorneys' fees incurred in litigating the motion to remand. Dkt. 6 at 15. Although “[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal,” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), an award of attorneys' fees on a motion to remand is not automatic, Thomas v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 751 F. App'x 538, 539–40 (5th Cir. 2018). “Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney's fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). “If the removing party ‘could conclude from th[e] case law that its position was not an unreasonable one’ at the time of removal, then it had an objectively reasonable basis for removal.” Thomas, 751 F. App'x at 540 (quoting Valdes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 2000)).

In its motion to remand, Nadine Floor asks the court to sanction the Jordans for improper removal. Dkt. 6 at 15. It argues that the Jordans “lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal and removal was filed for the sole purpose of further delaying the state court proceedings and to avoid payment of an award for sanctions in the State Court.” Id. According to Nadine Floor, “[the Jordans'] removal was just one more act in a long history of noncompliance.” Id.

As noted, the Jordans asserted federal-question jurisdiction as the basis for removal. Dkt. 1 at 2. Although that assertion fails, see supra Part II, the Jordans are proceeding pro se in an action that includes some federal components. Few cases offer guidance in this exact scenario. See Kelly, 2023 WL 9232941, at *1–6; Denson v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 946 F. Supp. 470, 472 n.6 (S.D. Miss. 1996). As such, it is possible that a pro se litigant in the Jordans' position could reasonably believe that removal was proper.

To the extent Nadine Floor seeks fees and costs based on the timing of the notice of removal, that argument is also insufficient to support a sanctions award. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1),

[t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.

But if the initial pleading did not support removal, “a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” Id. § 1446(b)(3).

Nadine Floor argues that the Jordans had to seek removal within 30 days of the filing of their third amended counterclaim. Dkt. 6 at 12. Nadine Floor contends that, in that pleading, the Jordans mentioned federal claims for the first time, triggering the 30-day removal deadline. Id. It also suggests that various other pleadings filed before its second amended petition would have started the 30-day clock. Id. at 12–13. But Nadine Floor does not provide copies of any of those pleadings. It has therefore not shown that the Jordans' notice of removal was untimely, so an award of attorneys' fees and costs is not warranted. See Kelly, 2023 WL 9232941, at *6 n.6 (declining to recommend an award of costs and attorneys' fees); Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Smith, No. 3:13–cv– 1091–K–BN, 2013 WL 1759521, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2013) (noting that, because the defendants were proceeding pro se, attorneys' fees were not warranted), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 1763479 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2013); Young, 2012 WL 13029579, at *3 (denying a fee request).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

It is ORDERED that:

1) the Jordans' duplicative filing, Dkt. 13, is STRUCK;

2) the motions to strike, Dkts. 7, 15, 16, are DENIED.

It is RECOMMENDED that:

1) Nadine Floor's motion to remand, Dkt. 6, be GRANTED to the extent it seeks remand to state court and DENIED to the extent it seeks attorneys' fees and costs;

2) the Jordans' motion to conduct jurisdictional discovery, Dkt. 8, be DENIED; and

3) the case be REMANDED to the 493rd Judicial District Court of Collin County, Texas.

* * *

Within 14 days after service of this report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A party is entitled to a de novo review by the district court of the findings and conclusions contained in this report only if specific objections are made. Id. § 636(b)(1). Failure to timely file written objections to any proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report will bar an aggrieved party from appellate review of those factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, except on grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from 10 to 14 days).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 16th day of June, 2026.

Bill Davis United States Magistrate Judge