DAGIM MELKA v. OFFICER JESSIE KATOULOUS (2026)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pro se plaintiff Dagim Melka sued multiple defendants, Dkt. 1, and applied to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. 3. The court will recommend that the complaint be dismissed in part.

SCREENING STANDARD

Although the court must liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings, see Flanagan v. LaGrone, No. 9:16-cv-00059-MHS, 2016 WL 4163557, at *1 (E.D. Tex. July 6, 2016) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Perez v. United States, 312 F.3d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2002)), dismissal of a complaint filed in forma pauperis is required if it “[1] is frivolous or malicious; [2] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or [3] seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint that is “duplicative of a pending or previous lawsuit” is malicious. Potts v. Texas, 354 F. App'x 70, 71 (5th Cir. 2009). That is so even when the plaintiff “raised new claims,” so long as those claims “grow out of the same allegations” presented in the prior or pending suit. Id. A court may dismiss a duplicative case as either malicious or frivolous. See id.; Silva v. Stickney, No. 3:03-cv-2279-D, 2005 WL 2445433, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2005) (explaining that a court “may appropriately dismiss an in forma pauperis action as frivolous ․ when the action ‘seek[s] to relitigate claims which allege substantially the same facts arising from a common series of events which have already been unsuccessfully litigated by the [in forma pauperis] plaintiff’ ” (quoting Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1989)).

Claims without an arguable basis in law or fact are also frivolous. See, e.g., Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing between factual and legal frivolousness). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law when it “is grounded upon an untenable, discredited, or indisputably meritless legal theory, including alleged violations of a legal interest that clearly does not exist.” Brown v. Allen, No. 3:16-cv-214-N-BN, 2016 WL 2855581, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2016) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1989); Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999)). In reviewing claims for legal frivolousness, the court may reject wholly conclusory claims, Bilbrew v. Johnson, 239 F. App'x 49, 51 (5th Cir. 2007), or those that fail to comply with the pleading standard requiring a short and plain statement demonstrating entitlement to relief, Harris v. DOJ, 680 F.2d 1109, 1110 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). And when screening for factual frivolousness, the court need not “accept without question the truth of the plaintiff's allegations,” even when the allegations “cannot be rebutted by judicially noticeable facts.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Instead, if the complaint's “factual contentions are clearly baseless”—such as “claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios” or situations that are “wholly incredible”—the court may dismiss the claims sua sponte. Id. at 32–33 (cleaned up).

The court must also determine whether any complaint not deemed frivolous or malicious “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii). The immunity inquiry generally folds into the frivolousness analysis. See Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that “[a] claim against a defendant who is immune from suit is frivolous because it is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory”). But a defendant's immunity acts as an independent basis for § 1915(e) dismissal when a plaintiff seeks damages. See Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d 75, 76 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Boyd v. Bigers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Likewise, the plaintiff's failure to state a claim may alone support dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and in contrast to the frivolousness analysis just noted, a court must “accept[ ] all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). To survive that scrutiny, the complaint must allege facts sufficient to establish plausible, rather than merely conceivable, claims for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Claims are facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” such that there is “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). By contrast, claims are “implausible on [their] face when ‘the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’ ” Harold H. Hugins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

DISCUSSION

The complaint names nine defendants, but it makes allegations against only two named defendants and an unnamed partner of one of those defendants. Dkt. 1. To state a claim for relief, a complaint must allege facts against each of the named defendants that raise a right to relief above a speculative level. Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 2018). Because Melka has entirely failed to plead factual allegations against Corinne Mason, Brandy Douglas, Gabriel Ogueri, Latreese Ellis, Joyce Vandertuin, and Stacey Kemp, dismissal of the claims against those defendants is appropriate.

Melka's claims against the unnamed partner of defendant Jason Smith should also be dismissed. For the most part, “[f]ictitious party practice is not permitted in federal court.” Alexander v. City Police of Lafayette, No. 6:11-cv-01749 SEC P, 2019 WL 2345083, at *6 (W.D. La. Feb. 27, 2019) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 2334196, (W.D. La. May 29, 2019); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (stating that “[t]he title of [a] complaint must name all the parties”); Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 112 F.3d. 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997). Because courts lack personal jurisdiction over fictitious defendants, claims asserted against them can be dismissed sua sponte. See King v. Forest, No. 3:08-cv-1405-L, 2008 WL 4951049, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2008). Defendants must be adequately identified for purposes of service of process.

Melka should, however, be given leave to amend. See Wiggins v. La. State Univ.-Health Care Servs. Div., 710 F. App'x 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2017) (noting that a pro se plaintiff should be given the opportunity to plead his or her best case before dismissal). To survive dismissal, any amendment must set out sufficient factual detail for the court to determine whether, taken as true, the complaint states one or more claims on which relief can be granted.

RECOMMENDATION

It is RECOMMENDED that Melka's claims against Mason, Douglas, Ogueri, Ellis, Vandertuin, Kemp, and the unnamed partner of Smith be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Melka should be granted leave to amend the complaint within 14 days of the entry of a memorandum adopting this report and recommendation, if any.

* * *

Within 14 days after service of this report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A party is entitled to a de novo review by the district court of the findings and conclusions contained in this report only if specific objections are made. Id. § 636(b)(1). Failure to timely file written objections to any proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report will bar an aggrieved party from appellate review of those factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, except on grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from 10 to 14 days).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 16th day of April, 2026.

Bill Davis United States Magistrate Judge