TAMMY SIMPSON v. AMERISAVE MORTGAGE CORPORATION (2004)

ORDER

Tammy Simpson sued Amerisave Mortgage Corporation in state court. Dkt. 3. Amerisave removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Dkt. 1.

Having reviewed the jurisdictional allegations in the notice of removal, the court questions its jurisdiction sua sponte. See Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 548 (2019). To avoid remand, Amerisave must file an amended notice of removal that alleges facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction.

The notice of removal seeks to establish subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 based on diversity of the parties' citizenships. Dkt. 1 at 4. Section 1332 requires “complete diversity.” MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019). In other words, “all persons on one side of the controversy [must] be citizens of different states than all persons on the other side.” Id.

“Because federal courts have limited jurisdiction, parties must make ‘clear, distinct, and precise affirmative jurisdictional allegations’ in their pleadings.” Id. (quoting Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988)). The requisite allegations differ based on the type of party.

A natural person is domiciled, and therefore a citizen, where he or she has his or her true, fixed, and permanent home. Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954). “[A]n allegation of residency alone ‘does not satisfy the requirement of an allegation of citizenship.’ ” MidCap, 929 F.3d at 313 (quoting Strain v. Harrelson Rubber Co., 742 F.2d 888, 889 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)); see Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 424 (1939) (explaining that citizenship of a natural person requires not only “[r]esidence in fact” but also “the purpose to make the place of residence one's home”).

Under those authorities—which, once again, demand “clear, distinct, and precise affirmative jurisdictional allegations,” Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1259—the allegations in the notice of removal, Dkt. 1 at 4, are deficient. They do not allege facts necessary to support the conclusion that Simpson is a citizen, rather than just a resident, of Texas. Specifically, they presume, based on an address in Simpson's state-court pleading, that Simpson is a citizen of Texas. See Dkt. 1 at 4 (“Plaintiff is domiciled in Little Elm, Texas. See Complaint, p. 2, signature block (Exhibit 2).”). The referenced complaint does not state even that Simpson resides at that the listed address, much less that she has the intent to make that residence her home. See Dkt. 3 at 1–2. Amerisave must allege Simpson's citizenship—not merely her place of residency. See Texas, 306 U.S. at 424; MidCap, 929 F.3d at 313.

A party may amend defective allegations of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1653 so long as “diversity jurisdiction was not questioned by the parties and there is no suggestion in the record that it does not in fact exist.” Leigh v. NASA, 860 F.2d 652, 653 (5th Cir. 1988). That is the case here, so the court will grant Amerisave leave to amend its notice of removal for the limited purpose of alleging facts necessary to establish diversity jurisdiction. This order does not license Amerisave to amend its notice for any other purpose or in any other respect. Further, because the court expects parties to assist it in assessing jurisdiction, the court expects Simpson to provide Amerisave any information it may need to sufficiently amend. The parties should therefore confer as needed.

It is ORDERED that, by Monday, February 17, 2025, the parties must confer and: (1) Amerisave must file an amended notice of removal that fixes the problem identified in this order; (2) the parties must file a joint status report explaining the status of the jurisdictional inquiry; or (3) Amerisave must file a status report explaining any inability to comply with requirements (1) or (2).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 7th day of February, 2025.

Bill Davis United States Magistrate Judge