JUSTIN MAJORS 28372 078 v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2026)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

With the assistance of counsel, Justin Majors filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The motion, which was referred to me for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended disposition, should be denied.

BACKGROUND

Majors was charged by indictment with conspiracy to kidnap in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1201(a)(1), (c), (count one); interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1952(a)(2), (3) (counts two and three); and conspiracy to launder proceeds of an unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (count four). Crim. ECF Dkt. 1. He signed a waiver of venue and pled guilty without a plea agreement to all four counts. Crim. ECF Dkts. 159–64. In discussing the applicable sentencing guidelines, the court imposed a two-level “vulnerable victim” enhancement in accordance with United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3A1.1(b)(1) and confirmed that the guidelines supported a sentence of life imprisonment. Crim. ECF Dkt. 280 at 21–22. Majors was sentenced to 540 months of imprisonment on count one, 240 months of imprisonment on count two, 60 months of imprisonment on count three, and 240 months of imprisonment on count four, to run concurrently. Crim. ECF Dkt. 262. Majors appealed, challenging the substantive reasonableness of his below-guidelines 540-month sentence. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. United States v. Majors, No. 20-40699, 2022 WL 118968 (Jan. 12, 2022).

Majors filed the present § 2255 motion in April 2023. Dkt. 1. The government filed a response, asserting that Majors's claims are without merit or procedurally barred. Dkt. 5. Majors filed a reply, Dkt. 8, and supplemental authority, Dkt. 10.

LAW

I. 28 U.S.C. § 2255

“Section 2255 does not offer recourse to all who suffer trial errors. It is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised on direct appeal and ․ would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Capua, 656 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (citation omitted). For that reason, a § 2255 motion is “fundamentally different from a direct appeal.” United States v. Drobny, 955 F.2d 990, 994 (5th Cir. 1992). “Once [a] defendant's chance to appeal has been waived or exhausted,” a federal court is “entitled to presume he stands fairly and finally convicted.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982); accord United States v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 2001).

“For a collateral attack under § 2255, a distinction is drawn between constitutional or jurisdictional errors on the one hand, and mere errors of law on the other.” United States v. Pierce, 959 F.2d 1297, 1300–01 (5th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks omitted). The former may be challenged under § 2255; the latter may not be. United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[a] section 2255 movant who fails to raise a constitutional or jurisdictional issue on direct appeal waives the issue for a collateral attack on his conviction, unless there is cause for the default and prejudice as a result”).

More specifically, a § 2255 movant is entitled to relief only if he can establish that “(1) his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) the sentencing court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” United States v. Seyfert, 67 F.3d 544, 546 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). A § 2255 motion based on “conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics” or “contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible” “is subject to summary dismissal.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To prevail on a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a § 2255 movant must show that (1) his attorney's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the ineffective assistance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–89 (1984); United States v. Segler, 37 F.3d 1131, 1137 (5th Cir. 1994).

Under the first prong, the movant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Seyfert, 67 F.3d at 547. Because it is easy to second-guess counsel's performance after a conviction or adverse sentence, a fair assessment of performance requires reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's conduct from his perspective at the time, rather than indulging the “distorting effects of hindsight.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. As such, counsel is strongly presumed to have performed adequately and made decisions using reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 690; see also Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 228 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that scrutiny of counsel's performance should be highly deferential and that a court should be careful not to second-guess counsel's legitimate strategic choices). “In essence, the Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to reasonable, but not perfect, representation of counsel.” United States v. Valdez, 973 F.3d 396, 404 (5th Cir. 2020); Boyd v. Estelle, 661 F.2d 388, 389 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981) (explaining that the right to counsel does not require errorless counsel; instead, a criminal defendant is entitled to reasonably effective assistance). And it should go without saying that counsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing to make frivolous arguments. See Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2002).

Under the second prong, a movant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A movant must “affirmatively prove,” not just allege, prejudice. Id. at 693. And when a movant pleads guilty, he must also show that, but for trial counsel's alleged deficient performance, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57–59 (1985).

Courts need not address both Strickland prongs if one of them is dispositive; nor must the court address the prongs in a certain sequence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim” on “prejudice” rather than “performance” grounds, or vice versa, then “that course should be followed.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Knowing and Voluntary Guilty Plea and Waiver of Any Objection to Venue

Majors alleges that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because his trial counsel (1) failed to “effectively” and “adequately” convey the plea agreement offered by the government, (2) failed to effectively explain the “ramifications” of the guidelines enhancements on his sentence, (3) “significantly and misleadingly underestimated the anticipated sentence,” and (4) ignored his objections to the “accuracy of certain portions” of the factual basis. Dkt. 1 at 5.

When, as here, a defendant pleads guilty, the court must confirm that the plea is knowing and voluntary. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). “The defendant must have a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.” United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted). If the record establishes that the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea, yet voluntarily chose to plead guilty, the rudimentary demands of a fair proceeding and a knowing, voluntary plea were satisfied. Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 1980). “The consequences of a guilty plea, with respect to sentencing, mean only that the defendant must know the maximum prison term and fine for the offense charged. As long as [the defendant] understood the length of time he might possibly receive, he was fully aware of his plea's consequences.” Barbee v. Ruth, 678 F.2d 634, 635 (5th Cir. 1982) (quotation marks omitted).

The defendant's representations, as well as those of his lawyer and the prosecutor, and any findings by the judge in accepting the plea, “constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73–74. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of truthfulness, and a defendant bears a heavy burden to show that the plea was involuntary after testifying to its voluntariness in open court. Id. at 74; Deville v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 654, 659 (5th Cir. 1994). Similarly, official documents are “entitled to a presumption of regularity and are accorded great evidentiary weight.” United States v. McDaniels, 907 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hobbs v. Blackburn, 752 F.2d 1079, 1081 (5th Cir. 1985)). Although a defendant's attestation of voluntariness at the time of the plea is not an absolute bar to later contrary contentions, it places a heavy burden on him. United States v. Diaz, 733 F.2d 371, 373–74 (5th Cir. 1984).

Majors's contention that his guilty plea and his waiver of any objection to venue were not knowing and voluntary is belied by the record. At the change-of-plea hearing, Majors admitted, among other things, that he understood the charges, the consequences of pleading guilty, and the penalties he faced; that no one had forced, threatened, or coerced him to plead guilty; that he was pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty of the charges; that he read and reviewed the factual basis with counsel before he signed it and that everything contained in the factual basis was true and correct and that he had no “changes or corrections”; that he had a “full and fair opportunity” to talk with counsel about the facts of the case, the case discovery, and any possible defenses to the charges; that he was satisfied with counsel's representation and advice in connection with his case and his decision to enter an open plea; that he discussed with counsel how the guidelines might be used or applied in his case, and after that discussion, he understood that the guidelines were not mandatory but “merely discretionary”; that he understood the district court's discretion to sentence him up to the statutory maximum of life imprisonment; that he understood that the guidelines range could not be determined until after completion of the presentence investigation report and therefore “any estimate” given by counsel, the government, or “anyone” about “where [he] might fall in the Guidelines” was only an “estimate”; and that he understood that if he received a sentence “more severe” than the one he had expected, he would still be bound by the guilty plea and would have no right to withdraw it. Crim. ECF Dkt. 281 at 5–7, 10, 15–21, 24.

Near the end of the plea hearing, the judge said to Majors: “tell me in your own words, what did you do in this case? What was your role?” Crim. ECF Dkt. 281 at 24. Those questions led to the following exchange:

THE DEFENDANT: I left Oklahoma and went to Colorado to meet with my family. And they -- when I got there, they told me that I could make a lot of money if I robbed this house. And it was supposed to be an empty house. There wasn't supposed to be anybody there.

And when I went to the house, I found a woman there and I didn't hurt her or anything like that, you know. I just told her that we were just going to take the money and leave. And that's what I did. I took the money and I left.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Majors, can I clarify something? You said you drove from Oklahoma to Colorado? Did you drive from Oklahoma or did you drive from Texas?

THE DEFENDANT: I -- that was all mixed up in the beginning. I – I'm not trying to mess up anybody's paperwork, but I mean, it's not been accurate from the beginning. I rented a car from Texas because my car broke down, and then, I went home to Oklahoma.

I didn't -- and then a week later, I left from Oklahoma to Colorado. And I mean, I guess I traveled through Texas, so it's all the same, but I live in Oklahoma. I'm not even from Texas.

[Off-the record bench conference]

THE COURT: ․

Mr. Majors, we left off discussing the Factual Basis in your case. And I asked for you to tell me in your own words, sir, what you had done in the particular case.

And you indicated that you had driven from Oklahoma. And obviously, the indictment reflects and the Factual Basis reflects that you drove from Texas to Colorado.

And so, you took a step back from the microphone and talked with your counsel about the case. And the question is whether or not venue is appropriate here in the Eastern District of Texas.

And at this time, I'm going to hear from the Government on the issue of venue.

MR. TATUM: And, Your Honor, in this case, we think that venue would still be appropriate in that the car that was used to commit the crime did originate in Texas, and did go to Oklahoma, and then was used from Oklahoma to Colorado.

Even if there was a delay in time that the car spent in Oklahoma, I mean, because the car is the basis of the interstate activity in this case.

Nevertheless, we are agreeing and fine with doing a waiver of venue in this case.

Id. at 25–26.

Majors was presented with the waiver of venue, which stated:

I understand that the offense alleged in the Indictment occurred in the Eastern District of Texas and/or Oklahoma. I understand that the government must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was committed. I have discussed this matter with my attorney, Brian O'Shea, and I expressly waive any objection or defense to the Indictment on the grounds that it would be barred by lack of venue.

Dkt. 163 at 1. By signing the waiver, Majors acknowledged that he had read and discussed it with counsel, that he fully understood its contents, and that he knowingly and voluntarily agreed to it. Id. Counsel also signed the waiver, acknowledging that he read and discussed it with Majors and that he was satisfied that Majors fully understood its contents and knowingly and voluntarily agreed to it. Id. at 2.

The court then sought to determine whether Majors's waiver of venue was knowing and voluntary:

THE COURT: All right, so Mr. Majors, the Government believes that venue is still appropriate here in the Eastern District of Texas.

And just to clarify so you understand, the Government has to prosecute an offense in the district in which it occurred.

And so, the basis for it occurring here in the Eastern District is that the vehicle originated in the state of Texas.

Now given the facts as you have raised them, the Court had a concern and inquired whether venue was appropriate. And you and your counsel at this time have provided a document to me that is entitled “Waiver of Venue.”

And so, remembering you're under oath, Mr. Majors, I'm just going to ask you to confirm, is this your signature on this document?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right, and so, this document is entitled “Waiver of Venue.” And what it says is that you have discussed the issue of venue with your counsel.

And to the extent there are any problems with venue, that venue is not appropriate in the Eastern District of Texas, that it is appropriate in Oklahoma or Colorado instead, that you desire to waive any defense related to the Eastern District of Texas possessing venue.

Do you understand, that's what this document says?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Okay, so do you fully understand that venue is not jurisdictional and it is a defense that can be waived?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: However, in order for it to be waived, the waiver has to be knowing, voluntarily, and intelligently given.

Basically, you have to understand the circumstances that give rise to the waiver that you are providing. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Have you and your counsel at this time had a full and fair opportunity to discuss the issue of venue and that venue is a defense in your case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: And so, do you feel fully informed regarding each of the locations where venue would be appropriate in connection with these charges that are pending against you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: And having had your counsel explain the issue of venue to you and the consequences of waiving venue, is that what you desire to do at this time is to waive the defense of venue?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Have any threats or promises been made to you to induce a waiver of venue in this case?

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.

THE COURT: And so, you of your own free will desire to waive venue to the extent there are any problems with it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right, at this time then, the Court will find that the waiver of venue, to the extent necessary, is knowingly and voluntarily given.

And with that, I'm going to ask both the Government and Defense counsel to confirm two things. First off, that each of them feel that venue is appropriate here, but that to the extent that venue is not, that there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of venue, and that further, there is a Factual Basis to support this -- the plea to each of the pending counts.

Mr. Tatum?

MR. TATUM: Yes, Your Honor the Government affirms both of those items.

THE COURT: And Mr. --

MR. O'SHEA: Yes, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. O'SHEA: -- as to both.

THE COURT: Thank you. Do each of you believe that the Court has complied with the requirements of Rule 11 here today?

MR. TATUM: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. O'SHEA: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Majors, sir, have you understood everything that's gone on here today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Do you have any questions whatsoever?

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.

THE COURT: Do you want a further opportunity to talk with your lawyer before I take your plea?

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.

THE COURT: And then, Mr. O'Shea, I'm just going to have you confirm that you in fact gone over each of the documents we've discussed here today with your client, including specifically the Consent, the Factual Basis, as well as the Waiver of Venue?

MR. O'SHEA: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: In your opinion, he understands each of those documents?

MR. O'SHEA: Yes.

THE COURT: And following all of your communications with your client, you join and agree in his decision to enter an open plea to each of Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this indictment?

MR. O'SHEA: I do, Your Honor.

Dkt. 281 at 26–30.

By signing the factual basis, Majors acknowledged that he read and discussed the factual basis and the indictment with counsel, that he fully understood the contents of the factual basis, and that he “agree[d] without reservation that it accurately describe[d] the events and [his] acts.” Crim. ECF Dkt. 161 at 3. Counsel also signed the factual basis, acknowledging that he had read and reviewed the factual basis and the indictment with Majors and that, based on his discussion with Majors, he was satisfied that Majors understood the factual basis and the indictment. Id.

The court found that the guilty plea was supported by an independent factual basis establishing each of the essential elements of the offenses; that, to the extent any defense related to venue could be asserted, Majors waived the defense; that Majors was aware of the nature of the charges and consequences of the plea; and that the guilty plea was made freely, knowingly, and voluntarily and was not the result of force, threats, or promises. Crim. ECF Dkt. 162 at 3–5.

Majors has provided no independent evidence supporting the merits of his allegations sufficient to overcome his sworn testimony in open court, the representations of counsel and the government, and the findings of the court in accepting the plea. See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73–74; Deville, 21 F.3d at 659. And the official plea documents—affirming that Majors knowingly and voluntarily waived venue and entered a guilty plea—carry “great evidentiary weight.” McDaniels, 907 F.3d at 371. As such, the record shows that Majors's guilty plea, including his waiver of venue, was knowing and voluntary. Majors has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). His word alone is insufficient to meet that burden. And as the Supreme Court has instructed, “[c]ourts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney's deficiencies. Judges should instead look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant's expressed preferences.” Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 369 (2017). That evidence confirms that Majors is not entitled to relief.

II. Intervening Change in Law

Majors next asserts that “[a] material change in [the] law has arisen since [his] conviction.” Dkt. 1 at 6. He claims that “there have been district and circuit court rulings that have challenged the vague and expansive language of the kidnapping statute,” 18 U.S.C. § 1201, “and have reversed convictions holding that alleged conduct did not constitute ‘kidnapping’ under the statute.” Id. But his § 2255 motion does not cite or reference any such decision.

In his reply and supplemental pleading, Majors references several cases from other jurisdictions: United States v. Murphy, 100 F.4th 1184 (10th Cir. 2024), United States v. Jackson, 24 F.4th 1308 (9th Cir. 2022), and Cardozo v. United States, 315 A.3d 658 (D.C. 2024). Dkt. 8 at 12; Dkt. 10 at 8–9. Any change in the law in those jurisdictions does not constitute a change in Fifth Circuit law, which controls here. See Alexander v. United States, No. 3:17-CR-0437-L(1), 2023 WL 5298689, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2023); see also United States v. Diamond, 430 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that authority from one circuit court does not bind another).

III. Waiver of Venue

In grounds three and four, Majors challenges the validity of the waiver of venue. He argues that the government committed prosecutorial misconduct by failing to provide him with adequate time to review the waiver before he signed it and that counsel was ineffective for not properly advising him regarding the waiver. Dkt. 1 at 8–9. Each of those assertions fails.

A. Alleged prosecutorial misconduct

Majors's prosecutorial-misconduct claim is procedurally barred due to his failure to raise it on direct appeal. See Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 227; see also See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994) (explaining, in the similar context of habeas corpus, that “[w]here the petitioner—whether a state or federal prisoner—failed properly to raise his claim on direct review, the writ [of habeas corpus] is available only if the petitioner establishes ‘cause’ for the waiver and shows ‘actual prejudice’ ”). When a defendant has procedurally defaulted a challenge by failing to raise error properly on direct appeal, the claim may be raised in a § 2255 motion only if the defendant can first demonstrate (1) cause and prejudice, or (2) that he is “actually innocent” of the crime for which he was convicted. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998).

Majors does not allege that he is actually innocent. He pled guilty, after all. And he cannot satisfy the cause-and-actual-prejudice exception to excuse his failure to raise his prosecutorial-misconduct claim on direct appeal. In that regard, even if the court were to assume that cause exists to excuse the procedural default, Majors does not demonstrate that he would suffer actual prejudice because he fails to establish a meritorious claim of prosecutorial misconduct in connection with the waiver of venue.

To prove a claim for prosecutorial misconduct, Majors would have to show that the conduct complained of so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). As discussed above, the record shows that Majors “had a full and fair opportunity to discuss the issue of venue” with counsel, reviewed the waiver of venue with counsel before signing it, understood the waiver, and knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver. Dkt. 281 at 26–30. Nothing in the record suggests that the government prevented Majors from having adequate time to review the waiver. He has not demonstrated that any prosecutorial misconduct occurred.

B. Alleged ineffective assistance of counsel

The record likewise belies Majors's contention that his waiver of venue was not knowing and voluntary because counsel failed to adequately advise him “as to its contents, explain his Constitutional rights associated with venue and jurisdiction, and any possible objections or motions related to such rights, prior to his signing.” Dkt. 1 at 9.

Again, the record demonstrates that, before signing the waiver, Majors reviewed and discussed its contents with counsel and that he understood it; that the court reviewed the waiver of venue with Majors; and that Majors knowingly and voluntarily agreed to it. See supra Part I. Majors has provided no independent evidence supporting the merits of his allegations sufficient to overcome his sworn testimony in open court; the representations of his counsel; and the findings of the court in accepting the plea, which included a finding that Majors waived venue. See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73–74; Deville, 21 F.3d at 659. Furthermore, the signed waiver of venue—affirming that Majors knowingly and voluntarily agreed to it—carries “great evidentiary weight.” McDaniels, 907 F.3d at 371. Majors has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors with respect to the waiver of venue, he would not have pled guilty and instead would have insisted on going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

C. Supplemental authority

In his supplemental filing, Majors asserts that United States v. Chavarria, 140 F.4th 1257 (10th Cir. 2025), “renders all of his convictions invalid for lack of nexus to interstate commerce” and that, “if his case were correctly placed in the Tenth Circuit, his convictions should have been vacated,” Dkt. 10 at 2. He also cites other Tenth Circuit decisions in support of that argument. Id. at 10.

Those efforts also fails. Tenth Circuit case law is not binding on this court, and for the reasons already explained, any argument concerning improper venue is procedurally barred or was waived. See Baeza v. United States, 543 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir. 1972). Furthermore, venue is not a jurisdictional issue and is therefore not cognizable under § 2255. United States v. Parker, No. SA-08-CR-292-FB, 2011 WL 13291657, at *27 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. SA-08-CR-292-FB, 2012 WL 13094602 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2012). Majors knowingly and voluntarily waived venue and pled guilty to all four counts in the indictment. Any argument that depends on his belated venue challenge is foreclosed.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a proceeding under § 2255 “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). Although Majors has not yet filed a notice of appeal, the court will address whether he would be entitled to a certificate of appealability. See Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a district court may rule on a certificate of appealability sua sponte because “the district court that denies a [movant] relief is in the best position to determine whether the [movant] has made a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right on the issues before the court. Further briefing and argument on the very issues the court has just ruled on would be repetitious.”).

A certificate of appealability may issue only if a movant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Supreme Court explained the requirements associated with that showing in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In a case in which “a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits,” the movant must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. And “[w]hen the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (reflecting that the certificate-of-appealability requirement applies equally in the habeas and § 2255 contexts).

In this case, it is respectfully recommended that reasonable jurists would neither debate the dismissal of Majors's § 2255 motion on procedural grounds nor find that the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed.

RECOMMENDATION

It is RECOMMENDED that the motion, Dkt. 1, be DENIED and that the case be dismissed with prejudice. It is also RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability be DENIED.

* * *

Within 14 days after service of the magistrate judge's report, any party may serve and file specific written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific.

Failure to file specific, written objections will bar the party from appealing the unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from 10 to 14 days).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 4th day of June, 2026.

Bill Davis United States Magistrate Judge