JANE DOE v. G6 HOSPITALITY LLC G6 HOSPITALITY IP LLC G6 HOSPITALITY PROPERTY LLC G6 HOSPITALITY PURCHASING LLC G6 HOSPITALITY FRANCHISING LLC MOTEL OPERATING LP KISAN INC (2025)

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE PROPOSED TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT DR. KATHRYN SUTTON

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Local Rules of Court for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges, the district court referred (doc. #123) Defendant Kisan, Inc.'s Motion to Exclude Proposed Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert Dr. Kathryn Sutton (doc. #120)¹ to the undersigned magistrate judge for review and disposition. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); E.D. TEX. LOC. R. CV-72. Having now considered the motion, the response thereto, and the oral argument, the court finds that the motion is DENIED in part.

I. Background

This case arises under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), which provides victims of sex trafficking a civil remedy against the perpetrators and beneficiaries of their trafficking. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Plaintiff Doe (C.L.F.) filed this action to recover for alleged harm she experienced from being trafficked at a Motel 6 in Wichita, Kansas, that she claims was owned and operated by the Defendants. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 1, 8, 16–17.) At present, only C.L.F.'s beneficiary liability claim is live.²

On July 11, 2025, Defendant Kisan, Inc. (Kisan) filed the pending motion (doc. #120), seeking to exclude the testimony of Dr. Katy Fowler Sutton, one of C.L.F.'s designated expert witnesses. C.L.F. filed her response on July 28, 2025. (Doc. #136.) Kisan replied on August 4, 2025. (Doc. #149.) On August 7, the undersigned held a hearing with the parties to consider various motions including this one. At the hearing, the undersigned ruled from the bench on some of the motions (see doc. #156), but reserved ruling on this motion in light of the oral arguments presented by counsel.

II. Applicable Law

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits those “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to offer their opinion testimony on matters within their specialized knowledge or skills so long as the proponent demonstrates to the court by a preponderance of the evidence that

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert's opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

FED. R. EVID. 702(a)–(d).

Under Rule 702, the trial court is tasked with a “general ‘gatekeeping’ obligation” to “ensure that any and all [expert] testimony ․ is not only relevant, but reliable.” Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)). Expert testimony is relevant when the reasoning or methodology employed by the expert “can be applied to the facts in issue.” Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593). The reliability inquiry “requires more than a glance at the expert's credentials; the court must also ensure that the expert has reliably applied the methods in question.” Harris v. FedEx Corp. Servs., Inc., 92 F.4th 286, 303 (5th Cir. 2024). To assess reliability, a court considers “(1) whether the expert's theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the challenged method; and (4) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.” Williams v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 143 F.4th 593, 597–98 (5th Cir. 2025). This list of factors is “not a ‘definitive checklist or test,’ ” and the analysis is “flexible.” Id. at 598; see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152–53 (explaining how “whether Daubert's specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine”). Notably, “the court's main focus should be on determining whether the expert's opinion will assist the trier of fact,” and the “helpfulness threshold is low.” Puga v. RCX Sols., Inc., 922 F.3d 285, 294 (5th Cir. 2019).

Recently, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules amended Rule 702 to “clarify” the admissibility standard for expert testimony. FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory comm.'s note to 2023 amends. The proponent must demonstrate “by a preponderance of the evidence” that all Rule 702 requirements are met before the court can admit expert testimony. Id. This was not a change in the law, however. See id. (“Nothing in the amendment impose[d] any new, specific procedures.”). The amendment was “simply intended to clarify” the standard because some courts had “incorrectly” analyzed admissibility “by the more permissive Rule 104(b) standard.” Id. According to the committee, this clarification was needed since “many courts have held that the critical questions of the sufficiency of an expert's basis, and the application of the expert's methodology, are questions of weight and not admissibility.” Id. Even so, “[s]ome challenges to expert testimony will [continue to] raise matters of weight rather than admissibility” because “once the court has found it more likely than not that the admissibility requirement has been met, any attack by the opponent will go only to the weight of the evidence.” Id. And this clarified standard “does not require perfection.” Id. (“Proponents do not have to demonstrate to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessments of their experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that their opinions are reliable.”).

Still, in acting as gatekeeper, “the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.” Puga, 955 F.3d at 294 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory comm.'s note to 2000 amend.). A court is not permitted to “supplant[ ] the jury's fact-finding role” nor “replace the adversary system.” Id. “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. The gatekeeping role “is limited to ensuring that the evidence in dispute is at least sufficiently reliable and relevant to the issue so that it is appropriate for the jury's consideration,” nothing more. Sneed v. Crown Equip. Corp., No. 23-CV-743, 2025 WL 449330, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2025) (quoting United States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 330 (5th Cir. 2022)). Importantly, the 2023 Amendment does not “require[ ] the court to nitpick an expert's opinion in order to reach a perfect expression of what the basis and methodology can support.” FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory comm.'s note to 2023 amends. It just instructs courts to “not permit the expert to make claims that are unsupported by the expert's basis and methodology.” Id.

III. Analysis

Kisan and the G6 Defendants seek to exclude Dr. Sutton's opinions that

(1) C.L.F. meets the criteria of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and other specified trauma-and-stressor-related disorders; and

(2) C.L.F.'s PTSD is caused by her having been sex-trafficked rather than any other previous traumatic experiences.

(Doc. #120 at 2, 6–7.) Defendants claim that these opinions should be excluded because they are both irrelevant and unreliable.³ (Doc. #120 at 5, 6.) As the relevance objection is general and pertains to both opinions, the court first handles that issue. The court then addresses the reliability of each opinion Defendants want excluded. Finally, the court sets the permissible scope of Dr. Sutton's testimony.

A. Relevance

Defendants argue that the testimony of Dr. Sutton is inadmissible because it is irrelevant.⁴ (Doc. #120 at 5.) According to Defendants, the fatal flaw in Dr. Sutton's report is that “[t]he word ‘motel’ does not appear.” (Id.) Worse yet, the report states that C.L.F.'s alleged trafficking was “facilitated by social media platforms.” (Id.) In this case, the alleged trafficking occurred only at motels owned and operated by Defendants, and C.L.F. “met her trafficker at a gas station,” not on social media. (Doc. #1 at 6–7.) This might be problematic as expert testimony must be connected to “the facts of the case.” FED. R. EVID. 702(d); Knight, 482 F.3d at 352. But these issues do not render Dr. Sutton's testimony irrelevant.

Rule 702's relevance prong “is a liberal one.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. To be relevant and “assist the trier of fact,” Puga, 922 F.3d at 293, the “expert testimony proffered in the case” need only “be sufficiently tied to the facts of the case.” United States v. Kuhrt, 788 F.3d 403, 420 (5th Cir. 2015). While a report based on social-media-facilitated sex trafficking at no specific locations may not be tied to the facts of this case, Dr. Sutton's report is. Dr. Sutton interviewed C.L.F. for 5 hours and 12 minutes. (Doc. #125-1 at 1.) During that time, Dr. Sutton and C.L.F. discussed C.L.F.'s early life in detail, C.L.F.'s experiences during the alleged trafficking, and C.L.F.'s recovery in recent years. (Id. at 2–4). They specifically talked about her “thoughts and feelings” associated with the alleged trafficking, and Dr. Sutton collected enough information to provide diagnoses of and recommended treatments to C.L.F. (Id. at 5, 8–9, 10–11.)

Further, in her deposition Dr. Sutton explicitly confirmed that she tied her interview with C.L.F. to the facts of this case. Dr. Sutton used the complaint during the interview to “refer specifically to the incident[s] in question” at the motels in issue. (Docs. #136 at 5; #136-2 at 14.) When asked if they discussed the relevant motels “where [C.L.F.] had a traumatic experience,” Dr. Sutton responded: “Yes.” (Doc. #136-2 at 15.) During the interview, Dr. Sutton ensured to “very specifically explain to C.L.F. what events [she was] referring to.” (Id.) In the court's view, Dr. Sutton's methodology was “sufficiently tied to the facts of the case.” Kuhrt, 788 F.3d 420. Her testimony is relevant under Rule 702.

As to the report's issues with mentioning social media and not mentioning motels, the answers in Dr. Sutton's deposition testimony overcome them. However, given the otherwise barebones report notes (docs. #125-4 at 4–11; #97), as well as the error in the referral reason (doc. #125-1 at 1), the court suggests that Dr. Sutton exercise extra due diligence in the future.

B. Reliability

Defendants assert that the two opinions they want stricken should be excluded because they are unreliable. To Defendants, Dr. Sutton's opinions are not the product of a reliable methodology and do not reflect a reliable application of psychology to the facts of the case. FED. R. EVID. 702(c), (d). (Doc. #120 at 6.) The court addresses each opinion's reliability in turn.

1. Dr. Sutton's diagnosis of C.L.F.'s PTSD and other trauma disorders

Defendants object to Dr. Sutton's opinion that C.L.F. meets the criteria for PTSD and other specified trauma-and-stressor-related disorders. (Docs. #120 at 6; #125-1 at 10.) In short, Defendants take issue with this conclusion because they claim that Dr. Sutton used the incorrect psychological test for assessing PTSD, and that Dr. Sutton's diagnosis is provably incorrect.

First, Defendants argue that Dr. Sutton's diagnosis is unreliable because she “did not follow accepted medical practice in selecting or administering tests” for PTSD in her interview of C.L.F. (Doc. #120 at 10.) Defendants rely heavily on the reports of their own expert witness, Dr. Matthew Norman, M.D., to claim that Dr. Sutton's choice and implementation of diagnostic tests renders her opinions unreliable. (Doc. #120 at 7–14.) While Dr. Sutton used numerous tests in her interview with C.L.F. (doc. #125-1 at 2), Defendants take greatest issue with her use of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory, Fourth Edition (MCMI-IV), and with her approach to the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale for DSM-V (CAPS-5). (Doc. #120 at 10–13.) Additionally, the Defendants nitpick numerous other aspects of Dr. Sutton's methodology, but all those arguments boil down to the same claim—that Dr. Sutton could have done better. (See Docs. #120 at 10, 12–14; #125-2 at 29–39; #125-3 at 4–20.)

The court understands Defendants' stance, but ultimately their attacks are best left for “[v]igorous cross-examination.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. To admit Dr. Sutton's testimony, C.L.F. “need not prove to th[is court] that the expert's testimony is correct;” she simply must “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony is reliable.” Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998). And here, even with its alleged flaws, Dr. Sutton's opinion that C.L.F. meets the criteria for PTSD is reliable by a preponderance of the evidence.

Though the court's analysis is “flexible,” this issue generally resolves under the Daubert factors. Williams, 143 F.4th at 598. Dr. Sutton's opinion “can be ․ tested” as other medical professionals like Dr. Norman can also assess whether C.L.F. suffers from PTSD, either using the same or different tests as Dr. Sutton. Id. at 597. The MCMI-IV has certainly “been subjected to peer review and publication”—the parties provided a plethora of published pieces on the past and present uses of the exam to this court. (Docs. #120 at 11–12; #136 at 8–9.) It is the subject of many scientific articles, which is precisely why the following factor might cause some difficulty. The MCMI-IV has a documented “rate of error.” Williams, 143 F.4th at 598. (Doc. #120 at 11–12 (citing Pincus & Krueger, Theodore Millon's Contributions to Conceptualizing Personality Disorder, 97 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 537–540 (2015); Choca & Grossman, Evolution of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory, 97 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 541–549 (2015)).)

However, the MCMI-IV's rate of error is only noticeable in certain situations. Defendants and Dr. Norman both point out that the MCMI-IV is “valid only when the examinee is assumed to be suffering from a diagnosable mental disorder.” (Doc. #120 at 11.) They assert that the test carries a “high” false-positive rate in forensic settings. (Id.) But even if so, the MCMI-IV remains “generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.” Williams, 143 F.4th at 598. As of 2024, the earlier MCMI-III remains of “the most used tools for forensic [mental health evaluation] purposes.” (Doc. #149-2 at 70.) This claim comes from the very study Defendants cite to argue that Dr. Sutton's chosen test renders her testimony unreliable. (See id. (citing Paulino et al., Personality assessment inventory (PAI) in forensic and correctional settings: A comprehensive review, 103 J. FORENSIC & LEGAL MED. 102661, at 1 (2024)).) Psychologists may one day discover that the MCMI is no longer reliable, but as long as it remains heavily used in their field the court finds no reason to make that discovery for them.

This court notes that other courts have addressed this exact issue and concluded the same. See Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n (EEOC) v. Citizens Bank, No. CV 19-362, 2023 WL 2446319, at *4–*7 (D.R.I. Mar. 10, 2023); Ngatuvai v. Lifetime Fitness, No. 2:16-CV-39, 2020 WL 5441442, at *22 (D. Utah Sept. 10, 2020). The EEOC court dealt with reliability objections to an expert's use of the MCMI-III. The instant case deals with the MCMI-IV, but the EEOC expert conducted his examination in 2021 and the objections largely echo those here—cites to scientific studies about the validity of the test in non-clinical settings. See 2023 WL 2446319, at *5–*6. Yet, that court read the literature in the same way as this court: “At best, the EEOC's citation to the literature establishes only that there has been extensive study of and debate regarding the use of the MCMI[ ] for forensic evaluations.” Id. at *6. There may be better tests, but the MCMI-IV remains reliable under Rule 702 and Daubert.⁵

Defendants also find fault with Dr. Sutton's administration of the CAPS-5, specifically her failure to use the Life Events Checklist (LEC-5) during CAPS-5 Step 1. (Doc. #120 at 11.) They say that because Dr. Sutton did not use the LEC-5 for the Step 1 inquiry, her opinions are unreliable to the point of inadmissibility. But CAPS-5 allows the practitioner to administer the LEC-5 or some “other structured trauma screen” to begin. (Doc. #125-4 at 5.) Dr. Sutton's report, as noted, details information about C.L.F.'s history of trauma gleaned from the hours-long interview Dr. Sutton conducted of C.L.F., which in the court's view qualifies as a structured trauma screen.⁶

In sum, the court will not strike Dr. Sutton's PTSD diagnosis because Dr. Norman says she did it wrong. Dr. Sutton's conclusion is the product of reliable methods, and is rooted in the facts of the case. Dr. Sutton's diagnosis is reliable, even if not “perfect[ ].” FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory comm.'s note to 2023 amends.

Second, Defendants argue that Dr. Sutton's diagnosis of C.L.F. with PTSD is unreliable because Dr. Sutton's conclusion contains conflicting diagnoses. (Doc. #120 at 13.) Although the court is not supposed to assess the final “conclusions that [experts] generate,” a downright conflicting diagnosis would give reason for the court to ensure that there is an “adequate fit between the data and the opinion proffered.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; Moore, 151 F.3d at 276.

Dr. Sutton's opinion is that C.L.F. meets the criteria for PTSD and other specified trauma-and-stressor-related disorders. (Docs. #120 at 6; #125-1 at 10.) However, as Defendants point out, the DSM-5-TR specifically notes that “Other Specified Trauma-and-Stressor-Related Disorder” is a diagnosis reserved for individuals who “do not meet the full criteria for PTSD.” (Docs. #120 at 13; #125-3 at 15.) This would be concerning, but Dr. Norman himself admits that a “clinician could justify both if there are clearly separate, distinguishable symptom presentations.” (Doc. #125-2 at 35 n.10.) It might be “rare,” but it is possible. (Id.) As such, the court does not accept that Dr. Sutton's “conflicting diagnoses” (doc. #120 at 13) are so unreliable that they defy the “methods and procedures of science.” Sneed, 2025 WL 449330, at *3.

In sum, as to opinion 1, Dr. Sutton's conclusion that C.L.F. meets the criteria for PTSD and other trauma-and-stressor-related disorders, Defendants' motion is denied.

2. Dr. Sutton's opinion that sex-trafficking, not other traumatic experiences, caused C.L.F.'s PTSD

Defendants also take issue with Dr. Sutton's opinion that C.L.F.'s “history of trafficking,” not any of her other previous traumatic experiences, caused her PTSD. (Docs. #120 at 7–10, 13–14; #125-1 at 10–11.) They want the opinion stricken because it is the product of unreliable methodology, namely: that Dr. Sutton failed to “perform a complete differential diagnosis.” (Doc. #120 at 7.) More specifically, Defendants fault Dr. Sutton for not ruling out all potential stressors that could have caused C.L.F.'s PTSD. (Id. at 8–9.) Yet Dr. Sutton did just that.

As Dr. Sutton noted in her report (and as Defendants state in their motion), the stressors with potential to cause PTSD for C.L.F. other than her trafficking experiences are the death of her grandmother, her placement in foster care, the incarceration of her first child's father, her abusive relationship circa 2020, and apparent substance abuse. (Id. at 8; Doc. #125-1 at 10–11.) Defendants claim that Dr. Sutton only ruled out C.L.F.'s grandmother's death and her placement in foster care before declaring that C.L.F.'s trafficking experiences were the sole cause of her PTSD. (Doc. #120 at 9.) Dr. Sutton certainly did rule those stressors out; she concluded “within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty” that C.L.F.'s PTSD responses are associated with her history of trafficking, not the “grief” she experienced from her grandmother's death or foster care. (Doc. #125-1 at 11.) Now Dr. Sutton did not explicitly rule out all potential causes, but her report evidences that she was aware of these other stressors when opining on the cause of C.L.F.'s PTSD. (See doc. #125-1 at 2–4.) While Dr. Sutton should improve her recordkeeping and notetaking as it pertains to conducting diagnoses for litigation, her extensive experience with evaluations, her five-hour interaction with C.L.F., her deposition testimony, and the conclusions in her report all favor reliability here.⁷ Accordingly, the court finds that the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates the reliability of Dr. Sutton's opinion that C.L.F.'s PTSD symptoms were caused by her trafficking-related traumatic experiences, not others. Defendants' attacks pertaining to differential diagnoses are better suited for vigorous cross-examination. Cf. Jones v. Halliburton Co., No. 4:07-CV-2719, 2011 WL 1841148, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 13, 2011). However, the court's finding of reliability as to both opinions is not the end of this matter.

C. Scope

Defendants are right to point out that Dr. Sutton is not permitted to opine on ultimate legal issues. (Doc. #120 at 2.) Though Dr. Sutton can testify as to her opinion that C.L.F.'s PTSD was caused by the trafficking-related trauma discussed during the evaluation, Dr. Sutton may not characterize any incidents C.L.F. experienced as “sex trafficking.” Dr. Sutton's report and testimony is rife with her calling the incidents C.L.F. discussed “sex-trafficking.” (Docs. #120 at 3; #125-1 at 1.) Dr. Sutton calls C.L.F. a “survivor[ ] of sex trafficking.” (Doc. #125-1 at 11.) She also refers to C.L.F.'s former boyfriend as her “trafficker.” (Id. at 3.) And Dr. Sutton repeatedly notes that C.L.F. was “trafficked” and “sex-trafficked.” (Id. at 4, 5.) But Dr. Sutton may not characterize these incidents as sex trafficking or trafficking, call C.L.F.'s boyfriend her trafficker, or claim that C.L.F. was sex trafficked or trafficked. See Doe (E.M.B.) v. G6 Hosp. et al., 9:23-cv-173 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2025), ECF No. 130 at 7–9.

Dr. Sutton is free to discuss the trauma-causing incidents related to her from C.L.F. during the evaluation, but only in permissible ways. The court is aware that these incidents necessarily involve sex or even commercial sex, but the testimony is permissible so long as it does not characterize any experiences or incidents as sex trafficking or trafficking. The parties are familiar with adjacent litigation where this court discussed its rationale for why explicit labels of trafficking are impermissible. See id. So, Dr. Sutton may provide her opinion that C.L.F. suffers from PTSD and other trauma disorders, and she may provide her opinion as to what caused C.L.F.'s PTSD.⁸ But in describing these causes, she must keep her descriptions within the limitations set forth above and in line with this court's prior ruling in E.M.B. 9:23-cv-173, ECF No. 130 at 7–9.

IV. Order

Accordingly, Defendant Kisan, Inc.'s Motion to Exclude Proposed Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert Dr. Kathryn Sutton (doc. #120) is DENIED in part. Dr. Sutton may offer both opinions in testimony, subject to the restrictions set forth in Section III, C.

IT IS SO ORDERED

SIGNED this the 20th day of August, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendants G6 Hospitality, LLC; G6 Hospitality IP, LLC; G6 Hospitality Property, LLC; G6 Hospitality Purchasing, LLC; G6 Hospitality Franchising, LLC; and Motel 6 Operating, LP; collectively the “G6 Defendants;” joined Defendant Kisan in arguing this motion. (See Doc. #129.)

2.   As noted in a previous order (doc. #121 at 2 n.1), on December 9, 2024, the district court partially granted Kisan's motion to dismiss (doc. #37), resulting in dismissal of C.L.F.'s 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) perpetrator liability claim. (Doc. #75 at 31–33, 37.) The court allowed C.L.F. to file an amended complaint within 14 days from the date of its order and replead that claim, but the docket does not reflect that C.L.F. availed herself of that opportunity. (Id. at 37.)

3.   As C.L.F. states in her response, Defendants “do[ ] not explicitly argue Dr. Sutton is unqualified.” (Doc. #136 at 4.) The court agrees with that characterization of Defendants' arguments, and otherwise finds that Dr. Sutton, as a practicing Clinical Psychologist with experience testifying as an expert witness, is qualified to opine on her diagnoses of C.L.F. (See id. at 4–5; Doc. #136-1 at 1–5.)

4.   The court reads Defendants' appeal to Rule 26(a)(2)(B) as going towards this general relevance objection (see doc. #120 at 5). They cite the rule only to raise the failure of Dr. Sutton's report to mention any motels, which goes to the relevance of her testimony. Although they re-cite the rule and ask the court to strike C.L.F.'s exhibits in their reply, the undersigned will not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Tran Enters., LLC v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 627 F.3d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir. 2010); E.D. TEX. LOC. R. CV-7(f).

5.   The EEOC court found it noteworthy that the expert there used the MCMI “in conjunction with other sources of data.” 2023 WL 2446319, at *6. As noted here, Dr. Sutton performed numerous other tests with and conducted an interview of C.L.F. in conjunction with the MCMI. (Doc. #125-1 at 2.)

6.   The court would like to point out that Defendants want an expert's testimony stricken because she questionably messed up a single step of one of the various tests she performed. In Ngutuvai, the court dealt with an objection to an expert who conducted two tests (the MCMI-IV and PCL-5, both of which Dr. Sutton performed here) but not a third (the CAPS-5). There, the court still found that expert's testimony reliable because those two tests paired with an interview were sufficient. 2020 WL 5441442, at *22. Here, there were seven tests paired with an interview. (Doc. #125-1 at 2.)

7.   Similarly, Dr. Sutton's efforts are more than sufficient to distinguish cases Defendants rely on such as In re Silica Products Liability Litigation. 398 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005). In Silica, the 12 doctors that had diagnosed over 8,000 patients largely did not even personally examine those patients they diagnosed. Id. at 633. The data used by the doctors was collected by non-medical professionals and there was absolutely no documentation of any evidence supporting the doctors' diagnoses there. See id. at 622–36. Here, Dr. Sutton's conclusions are based on her own observations. This is not “Lawyers Practicing Medicine.” Id. at 632.

8.   To the extent Defendants object that Dr. Sutton will testify to “vocational opinions” (doc. #120 at 4), the court finds no issue. Dr. Sutton may opine on how the PTSD symptoms affect C.L.F.'s daily life as long as Dr. Sutton's conclusions are based on the information she gathered during her personal observation of C.L.F.

Christine L Stetson UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE