SHANE PAMELA HARTT PAMELA HARTT INDIVIDIUALLY v. EVADALE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT STEVEN HYDEN (2025)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Before the Court is Defendants Evadale Independent School District (“Evadale ISD” or “the District”) and Steve Hyden's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. [Dkt. 17]. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises out of allegations of employment and disability discrimination. [Dkt. 13]. The Hartts have a daughter, J.H., who receives special education services with Evadale ISD for a specific learning disability and dyslexia. Id. at ¶ 17. Pamela Hartt (“Hartt”) was employed by the District as a Career and Technical Education (“CTE”) teacher from July 1, 2015, to May 31, 2022. Id. at ¶ 15.

A. Events Leading to the End of Pamela Hartt's Employment with Evadale ISD

In or around the Fall of 2021, Hartt began having concerns about J.H.’s education, prompting her to notify Evadale ISD of her intent to file for a due process hearing with the Texas Education Agency (“TEA”) in January 2022. Id. at ¶¶ 18–19. Shortly thereafter, she was alerted by Principal Holli Farias that she was being demoted from the high school campus to the middle school campus at the decision of Hyden, the District's Superintendent at the time. Id. at ¶¶ 20–21. Hartt was told that the reason for her demotion was allegedly due to “overstaffing” and under-enrollment in her courses. Id. at ¶ 22. She alleges, however, that she had high levels of enrollment compared to the two other male CTE teachers who frequently had lower enrollment numbers than she, even when combined. Id. She further claims that she was demoted in or around the same time that Evadale ISD was in the process of hiring two other male employees who previously had sexual relationships with Evadale ISD students. Id. at ¶ 23.

Around the time of her demotion, Hartt alleges she began to experience sexual harassment at the hands of Hyden. Id. at ¶ 24. Around the first week of March 2022—after Hartt requested a hearing and was demoted—Hyden entered her classroom and told her something along the lines of “[i]f you want to resolve the issues with your daughter, I can use some sexual favors.” Id. at ¶ 25. On about March 9, 2022, Hyden again entered Hartt's classroom and said something like “[t]here are other ways to get [J.H.’s] case resolved, if you want to perform for me.” Id. at ¶ 26. Hyden also threatened her, saying that he “can ruin [her] like ‘that’ ” with the snap of his fingers. Id. at ¶ 27. Additionally, around that same time, Hyden and Kevin Brewster (a School Resource Officer at the time) watched Pamela through her classroom door window supposedly to intimidate her into dropping the hearing proceedings with the TEA. Id. at ¶ 28.

Further around that time in March 2022, Hartt printed and filled out a scholarship application for her son from the Education First Federal Credit Union's website. Id. at ¶¶ 29–30. She submitted the application to the front office at Evadale High School for a signature by Ms. Chism, who oversaw the senior scholarship program. Id. at ¶ 31. On about March 31, 2022, Hartt received the signed scholarship paperwork, believing Ms. Chism's signed the application, and she submitted it on behalf of her son. Id. at ¶¶ 32–33. Shortly thereafter, on April 28, 2022, Hartt was notified that she was being placed on paid administrative leave pending an investigation as she was accused of forging Ms. Chism's signature. Id. at ¶ 34. As a condition of her leave, she was verbally ordered not to contact anyone associated with Evadale ISD, including parents and students. Id. at ¶ 36. She was ordered in writing not to discuss the investigation or allegations and was required to turn in her keys to prevent access to her classroom. Id. at ¶ 37. Around this time, Hyden allegedly submitted a complaint with the Texas State Board for Educator Certification (“SBEC”) against Hartt's teaching license related to the forgery allegations without notifying the District School Board. Id. at ¶ 39.

Before being placed on leave, Hartt received a new employment contract on or about April 19, 2022, with a deadline for her signature on April 29, 2022. Id. at ¶ 40. The unsigned contract was in her classroom at the time she was placed on leave on April 28, 2022. Id. Because she surrendered her classroom key and was prohibited from contacting anyone at Evadale ISD, she did not reach out to anyone about her contract and was unable to sign and return it. Id. at ¶¶ 41–44. She alleges that she was “strong armed” by Hyden into resigning after being framed for forgery. Id. at ¶ 44. Hartt was later cleared of the forgery allegations after completing a forensic handwriting test but was never offered a new renewal contract. Id. at ¶ 45. Her employment with Evadale ISD ended in May of 2022. Id. at ¶ 46.

B. Events After Pamela Hartt's Employment with Evadale ISD

Hartt alleges that as late as November 2022, Hyden filed a second complaint against her teaching license with SBEC, the proceedings of which were open and ongoing as of the filing of the amended complaint. Id. She further alleges that Hyden urged Brewster to seek criminal penalties against Hartt for the forgery for which she had been cleared. Id. at ¶ 47. Hartt also claims that Hyden stalked her around Evadale and neighboring towns into December 2022. Id. at ¶¶ 47–48. Hyden stalked her by following her into the grocery store, when picking up her children, and while driving in an intimidating manner. Id. at ¶ 48. In November 2022, Pamela's brother was elected to Evadale ISD's Board, and she alleges that Hyden resigned that same night. Id. at ¶ 50. In June 2023, Hartt learned that Hyden filed a third complaint against her teaching license with the TEA. Id. at ¶ 51.

C. Procedural Background

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs filed a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on or about August 21, 2023. Id. at ¶ 53. Around January 10, 2024,¹ the EEOC issued Pamela a right to sue letter within ninety days. Id. at ¶ 56. Plaintiffs filed the present suit against Evadale ISD and Hyden on February 20, 2024. [Dkt. 1]. Plaintiffs filed their live first amended complaint on June 28, 2024. [Dkt. 13]. On July 12, 2024, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, arguing failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [Dkt. 17].² Plaintiffs filed their response. [Dkts. 23].³ The motion is ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007). While the Court must accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, it will “not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010). “The Court's review is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain enough well-pleaded facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: ․ a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ․”). A claim is “plausible on its face” when the well-pleaded facts allow the Court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

III. DISCUSSION

In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege the following on behalf of J.H. against Evadale ISD: (1) liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments through the District Board's unconstitutional policies, procedures, and practices; (2) liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to train and supervise staff; and (3) disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Pamela Hartt individually alleges in her own capacity the following against Evadale ISD: (1) liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments through the District Board's unconstitutional policies, procedures, and practices; (2) liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to train and supervise staff; (3) associational disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and (4) violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Tile VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq. Pamela Hartt also individually in her own capacity alleges the following against Hyden: (1) common law intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); (2) sexual harassment under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code; and (3) sex discrimination under Chapter 106 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

In response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs do not oppose the dismissal of all claims brought on behalf of J.H. [Dkt. 23 at ¶ 4]. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Shane and Pamela Hartt as next friends of J.H., their daughter. Pamela Hartt remains a party for purposes of the Court's analysis of her individual claims.

Hartt does not oppose the dismissal of the following claims against Evadale ISD: (1) Pamela's First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to train and supervise staff. Id.⁴ Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES these claims against Evadale ISD. Finally, Pamela Hartt does not oppose the dismissal of the following claims against Hyden: (1) violation of Chapter 106 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code; and (2) Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. Id. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES these claims against Hyden.⁵

Therefore, Pamela Hartt's live claims include: (1) liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment through the Board's unconstitutional policies, procedures, and practices against Evadale ISD; (2) violations of Title VII against Evadale ISD; (3) associational disability discrimination under the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against Evadale ISD; and (4) IIED against Hyden. The Court next addresses each claim.

A. Liability of Evadale ISD

The Court first turns to Hartt's federal claims against Evadale ISD. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion as to Evadale ISD.

i. Monell Claim for § 1983 Liability

Next, the Court addresses Hartt's allegations against Evadale ISD for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 creates a private right of action for redressing the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law.” Olabisiomotosho v. City of Hous., 185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82 (1984)); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute “is not itself a source of substantive rights; it merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.” Olabisiomotosho, 185 F.3d at 525 (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)). “To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Lefall v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994)). Claims brought under § 1983 against government entities are commonly known as Monell claims. “Municipalities are not liable for the unconstitutional actions of their employees under respondeat superior.” Groden v. City of Dall., 826 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). But that does not mean municipalities are immune from § 1983 liability. See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (concluding that municipalities and local government units are among those “persons” who may be sued under § 1983). Monell and its progeny have provided that to hold a municipality liable under § 1983, “the unconstitutional conduct must be directly attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur; isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability.” Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted) (collecting cases).

Here, Hartt claims that Evadale ISD violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights. [Dkt. 13 at ¶¶ 62–64]. Hartt particularly claims that Evadale ISD's Board (1) failed to ensure that its policies and procedures that protect her constitutional rights were followed, and (2) fostered and permitted an environment that turned a blind eye to Hyden's behavior toward Hartt. Id. at ¶¶ 65–66. In other words, Hartt alleges that Evadale ISD advances an “official custom” theory of Monell liability.

To establish an official custom theory, “a plaintiff must show that (1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “The three attribution principles identified here—a policymaker, an official policy and the ‘moving force’ of the policy—are necessary to distinguish individual violations perpetrated by local government employees from those that can be fairly identified as actions of the government itself.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578. Here, the Parties do not dispute that Evadale ISD's policymaker is the school district's board of trustees. Compare [Dkt. 17], with [Dkt. 23].⁶ Evadale ISD primarily argues that Hartt failed to plausibly allege the existence of an official policy. [Dkt. 17 at 7–9].⁷

Official municipal policy includes (1) “the decisions of a government's lawmakers,” (2) “practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law,” and (3) “the acts of its policymaking officials.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). The first type of official policy is typically contained in a promulgated statement, ordinance, or regulation. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579. Here, Hartt does not identify or describe an official policy or regulation that was the moving force behind her constitutional violations;⁸ instead she alleges that Evadale ISD “fostered and permitted an environment” where it “turned a blind eye” to Hyden's actions against her, namely retaliation and sexual harassment. [Dkt. 13 at ¶ 66].

In the absence of allegations of a written or promulgated policy, a policy may nevertheless be “evidenced by custom,” which the Fifth Circuit has defined as “ ‘a persistent, widespread practice of [municipality] officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy[.]’ ” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579 (quoting Webster v. City of Hous., 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). To plausibly plead a custom, “a plaintiff must do more than describe the incident that gave rise to his injury.” Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2018); see also Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., 948 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2020) (same). “Where prior incidents are used to prove a pattern, they ‘must have occurred for so long or so frequently that the course of conduct warrants the attribution to the governing body of knowledge that the objectionable conduct is the expected, accepted practice of city employees.’ ” Peterson, 588 F.3d at 850 (quoting Webster, 735 F.2d at 842). Here, the Court finds that the complaint does not contain sufficient facts to support a “custom” of fostering an environment that permitted retaliation and sexual harassment. Hartt does not allege that there was a pattern or custom of such an environment that warrants attribution to Evadale ISD as some sort of expected and accepted practice by several members of the District community. See id. Specifically, Hartt does not allege any instances of other teachers who were victims of sexual harassment or retaliation, and she alleges only one other District employee, Kevin Brewster, who engaged in her sexual harassment. See generally [Dkt. 13]; Peña, 879 F.3d at 622 (“[A] plaintiff must do more than describe the incident that gave rise to his injury.”).

In her response, Hartt advocates for a third type of policy—actions by a policymaker—whereby the Board's failure to act in the face of knowledge of Hyden's behavior constituted ratification. [Dkt. 23 at ¶ 23]. Liability under Hartt's theory may arise “when the municipality's policymakers condone or otherwise adopt the creation of a custom by knowingly ratifying the illegal or unconstitutional actions of subordinate, non-policymaking employees.” Santibanes v. City of Tomball, 654 F. Supp. 2d 593, 611 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (citing Turner v. Upton Cnty., 915 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff relies on this theory when she cannot, as here, demonstrate an official policy or a persistent, widespread practice of an underlying constitutional violation. Id. Thus, the “policy” is essentially “turning a blind eye to the unconstitutional conduct” of government employees. Id. at 612. Even a single unconstitutional decision or incident ⁹ may give rise to liability when a policymaker ratifies a subordinate's decision. Webb v. Town of Saint Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2019). “If the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final.” Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127. The Fifth Circuit summarized this theory in the context of school districts:

For example, if a school board—a policymaker under Monell—approves a superintendent's decision to transfer an outspoken teacher, knowing of the superintendent's retaliatory motive for doing so, the governmental entity itself may be liable; but if the school board lacks such awareness of the basis for the decision, it has not ratified the illegality and so the district itself is not liable.

Milam, 113 F. App'x at 626 (citing Beattie v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595, 603–05 (5th Cir. 2001)). The Fifth Circuit has limited the theory of ratification to “extreme factual situations.” Peterson, 588 F.3d at 848 (foreclosing the ratification theory against a municipality when the police chief found no wrongdoing for plaintiff's claims of unlawful detention and excessive force when officers struck his knee to restrain him). Compare Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 170 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding ratification where officers “poured” gunfire into a truck, killing an innocent occupant), with Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding no ratification where an officer shot a fleeing suspect in the back). Additionally, liability will not be imposed when a policymaker merely fails to investigate the basis of the subordinate's discretionary actions. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 130. “Therefore, unless the subordinate's actions are sufficiently extreme—for instance, an obvious violation of clearly established law—a policymaker's ratification or defense of his subordinate's actions is insufficient to establish an official policy or custom.” World Wide, 591 F.3d at 755 (first citing Peterson, 588 F.3d at 848; and then citing Grandstaff, 767 F.2d at 170)).

Here, the Court finds Hartt failed to plead the ratification theory of Monell liability because she did not allege any facts indicating that the Board approved Hyden's conduct. The most that the complaint alleges is that she contacted a member of the Board on one occasion regarding Hyden's harassment presumably after she was no longer employed with the District. [Dkt. 13 at ¶ 49].¹⁰ However, the complaint is still devoid of facts that the Board ratified Hyden's behavior by approving it and the basis for it.¹¹ ,  ¹²

Because Hartt failed to properly allege the existence of an official policy, she cannot state a claim for liability under Monell. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion as to her § 1983 claims.

ii. Title VII Claims

Evadale ISD moves to dismiss Hartt's Title VII claims for failure to timely file her charge of discrimination with the EEOC. [Dkt. 17 at 11–12].¹³

Title VII claims are subject to strict time limitations. Namely, an employee must file her EEOC charge within either 180 or 300 days after the allegedly unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). “[B]efore a plaintiff can commence a civil action under Title VII in federal court, she must file a timely charge with the EEOC, or with a state or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from the alleged unlawful employment practice.” Dao, 96 F.3d at 789 (first citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); and then citing Cruce v. Brazosport Indep. Sch. Dist., 703 F.2d 862, 863 (5th Cir. 1983)). As summarized by the Supreme Court,

Title VII directs that a charge shall be filed with the EEOC by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurs. For complaints concerning a practice occurring in a State or political subdivision that has a fair employment agency of its own empowered to grant or seek relief, Title VII instructs the complainant to file her charge first with the state or local agency. The complainant then has 300 days following the challenged practice, or 30 days after receiving notice that state or local proceedings have ended, whichever is earlier, to file a charge with the EEOC. If the state or local agency has a “worksharing” agreement with the EEOC, a complainant ordinarily need not file separately with federal and state agencies. She may file her charge with one agency, and that agency will then relay the charge to the other.

Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 544 (2019) (cleaned up) (citations and quotations omitted). The Texas Workforce Commission and the EEOC have a worksharing agreement. See Boyd v. Canadian Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 2:21-CV-95-Z-BR, 2022 WL 837933, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2022) (citing Tex. Admin. Code § 819.76), report and recommendation adopted 2022 WL 837195 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2022). Accordingly, a plaintiff, as here, has 300 days after the unlawful employment practice to file a charge with the EEOC. Id. (citing Garcia v. City of Amarillo, No. 2:18-CV-95-Z-BR, 2020 WL 4208060, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 22, 2020), aff'd 836 F. App'x 318 (5th Cir. 2021)).

Here, Hartt filed a charge directly with the EEOC on August 21, 2023. [Dkt. 13 at ¶ 53]. The Parties disagree as to the date of the latest unlawful employment practice that triggers the clock for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. On one hand, Defendants argue that the latest possible date was May 31, 2022, Hartt's final day of employment at Evadale ISD. [Dkt. 17 at 11]. On the other hand, Hartt argues that the latest possible date was sometime in November 2022, when Hyden—still in his position as Superintendent—filed a second complaint against Hartt's license and continued harassing her. [Dkt. 23 at ¶ 33]. The Court agrees with Defendants.

The Title VII clock for filing a charge with the EEOC begins to tick 300 “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (emphasis added). Under Title VII, an unlawful employment practice includes (1) “fail[ure] or refus[al] to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ․ sex[,]” and (2) “limit[ing], segregate[ing], or classify[ing] his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's ․ sex[.]” Id. § 2000e-2(a); see also id. § 2000e-3 (listing other unlawful employment practices, such as discrimination against an employee for participating in a proceeding under Title VII and publishing notices or advertisements that indicate a preference based on a protected characteristic). These unlawful employment practices do not include actions by an employer against a former employee after the latter no longer works for the former; rather these actions must affect the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. Id. Based on the statutory text, none of the proscribed conduct applies after an employee has been discharged.

Based on the Court's interpretation of Title VII, it concludes that the last possible date of unlawful employment practices by either Evadale ISD or Hyden is May 31, 2022, Hartt's last day of employment with the District. By filing with the EEOC on August 21, 2023, Hartt filed her charge 447 days after the conclusion of her employment, far exceeding the 300-day statutory requirement and barring these claims as a matter of law.¹⁴ Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion as to Hartt's Title VII claims.

iii. Disability Discrimination Claims

Here, Hartt claims associational disability discrimination under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. [Dkt. 13 at ¶ 69].

“Title II of the [ADA], like § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, provides that individuals with disabilities shall not ‘be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.’ ” Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 220–21 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (footnotes omitted). Title II specifically prohibits disability discrimination “in the provision of public services.” Id. at 223; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”). In contrast, § 504 “prohibits disability discrimination by recipients of federal funding.” Frame, 657 F.3d at 223; see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (providing that no qualified individual with a disability “shall, solely by reason of his or her disability be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ․”). “A primary purpose of Title II was to extend the reach of the Rehabilitation Act to all public entities, regardless of whether or not they receive federal funds.” Wagner, 939 F. Supp. at 1309 (quotation omitted).

Here, Hartt alleges that she has a derivative claim of associational disability discrimination. [Dkt. 13 at ¶ 69]. Beginning with the ADA, Title I—not Title II—prohibits an employer from “excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4). The plain statutory language in Title II, however, does not explicitly extend to the employment context, and the Fifth Circuit has concluded that “Title II does not create a cause of action for employment discrimination.” Taylor v. City of Shreveport, 798 F.3d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 2015).¹⁵

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, in contrast, clearly incorporates Title I's standards to determine whether there has been disability discrimination: “The standards used to determine whether [§ 504] has been violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination under [§ 504] shall be the standards applied under [T]itle I of the [ADA] ․” 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); see Taylor, 798 F.3d at 283 (“Unlike Title II of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act incorporates many of Title I's prohibitions on employment discrimination by reference ․”); see also, e.g., Garcia v. Oceans Healthcare, L.L.C., No. 2:22-CV-00219, 2023 WL 6393885, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2023) (extending the concept of associational disability discrimination in the ADA to the Rehabilitation Act because both statutes define disability with substantially the same terms). Because there are no filing requirements under the Rehabilitation Act ¹⁶ and the statute appears to contemplate the incorporation of an associational disability discrimination claim, the Court will proceed with a substantive analysis of it.

The Fifth Circuit has yet to recognize a cause of action for associational disability discrimination. See Besser v. Tex. Gen. Land Off., 834 F. App'x 876, 886 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Spencer v FEI, Inc., 725 F. App'x 263, 267 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); Grimes v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., 505 F. App'x 376, 380 n.1 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). However, without recognizing the existence of the cause of action, it has indicated that a prima facie case would require the plaintiff to allege: “(1) her qualification for the job, (2) an adverse employment action, (3) the employer's knowledge of the employee's disabled relative, and (4) that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable inference that the relative's disability was a determining factor in the employer's adverse action.” Grimes, 505 F. App'x at 380. Although the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are substantially similar, “[t]he only additional requirement for a Rehabilitation Act cause of action is the alleged discrimination must be solely by reason of the disability, instead of just a motivating factor as is required by the ADA.” Garcia, 2023 WL 6393885, at *4 (citation and quotation omitted).

Here, the Parties dispute whether Hartt plausible alleged the fourth element. [Dkt. 17 at 14–15; Dkt. 23 at ¶¶ 41–44]. To satisfy this element under the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff must allege that her employer unlawfully discriminated against her because of her relations’ disability. See, e.g., Besser, 834 F. App'x at 886 (finding that the plaintiff failed to allege facts that supported a reasonable inference that someone else's disability was a determining factor in her termination, such as her employer's expression of animosity regarding the disability or that it played a role in her termination); Grimes, 505 F. App'x at 380 (finding no prima facie case because plaintiff on summary judgment could not provide evidence that “her son's disability was a determining factor in her termination”). Defendants argue that Hartt pleads at best that her complaints and threats to file a due process complaint on behalf of her daughter caused Hyden's behavior and other adverse employment actions. [Dkt. 17 at 14–15]. The Court agrees. The complaint is devoid of facts suggesting that Hyden or Evadale ISD began harassing and retaliating against her because of J.H.’s learning disability and dyslexia. Hartt does not appear to argue to the contrary. In fact, her response states that Hartt “was a victim of a retaliation for her advocacy directly after filing a complaint on behalf of her daughter with the TEA.” [Dkt. 23 at ¶ 44]. Hartt does not allege or argue that she was subjected to adverse employment actions because her daughter is disabled.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion on Hartt's disability discrimination claims.

B. Liability of Hyden

The remaining issue is whether Hartt plausibly alleged an IIED claim against Hyden. [Dkt. 17 at 17–18, 19–20].

i. Hartt's IIED Claim for Actions Occurring During Hyden's Employment at Evadale ISD

Hyden argues that the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) bars Hartt's IIED claim to the extent her allegations against him are premised on actions he committed in the scope of his role as Superintendent for Evadale ISD. Id. at 17–18. “In Texas, sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction for lawsuits in which the state or certain governmental units have been sued unless the state consents to suit.” Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. 2004) (collecting cases). The Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) “provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id. (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 101.001 to 101.109). A Texas governmental entity is immune from suit unless the TTCA expressly waives immunity. Id. More specifically, the TTCA waiver does not apply to claims “arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort[.]” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.057(2). Therefore, the TTCA “expressly preserves governmental immunity for intentional tort ․ claims.” Ripley v. Bexar Cnty., Civil No. SA:21-CV-00333-OLG, 2023 WL 11832439, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2023) (first citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 101.025(b), 101.057(2); and then citing Humphreys v. City of Ganado, 467 F. App'x 252, 256–57 (5th Cir. 2012)).

Section 101.106 of the TTCA controls the plaintiff's election of remedies depending on the entity or person he or she sues. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.106. Two subsections are relevant to the Court's analysis: subsection (e), which governs when a plaintiff sues both the governmental unit and a governmental employee, and subsection (f), which governs when a plaintiff files suit against an employee of the government acting in the scope of his employment.

Subsection (e) states: “[i]f a suit is filed under this chapter ¹⁷ against both a governmental unit ¹⁸ and any of its employees,¹⁹ the employees shall immediately be dismissed on the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.106(e) (emphasis added). “[I]f a plaintiff brings virtually any state common law tort claim against both a governmental unit and its employees, § 101.106(e) will allow the employee defendants to be dismissed if the governmental unit so moves.” Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 658–60). Thus, a plaintiff's IIED claim must be dismissed against the governmental unit and its employee.

Subsection (f) states:

If a suit is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based on conduct within the general scope of that employee's employment and if it could have been brought under this chapter 20 against the governmental unit, the suit is considered to be against the employee in the employee's official capacity only.

Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 101.106(f). The subsection further states that “[o]n the employee's motion, the suit against the employee shall be dismissed unless the plaintiff files amended pleadings dismissing the employee and naming the governmental unit as defendant on or before the 30th day after the date the motion is filed.” Id. (emphasis added) Accordingly, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the defendant is an employee of a governmental unit; (2) the defendant is acting within the general scope of her employment; and (3) the suit could have been brought under the TTCA against the governmental unit.” Ferguson v. Dunn, No. 1:16-CV-00272, 2018 WL 2656990, at *14–15 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2018) (Hawthorn, J.) (citation omitted) (finding immunity barred an IIED claim), report and recommendation adopted 2018 WL 2670673 (E.D. Tex. June 1, 2018) (Crone, J.), aff'd 803 F. App'x 808 (5th Cir. 2020). As construed by the Texas supreme court, § 101.106(f) applies to any tort claim brought against an employee of a governmental unit acting within the scope of his employment. Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 375; see also Tipps v. McCraw, 945 F. Supp. 2d 761, 768 (W.D. Tex. 2013). (“[F]or the purposes of § 101.106(f), a tort action could have been brought under the [TTCA] regardless of whether the Act waives immunity for the tort action.” (quotation and citation omitted)). “The statute strongly favors dismissal of governmental employees.” Tipps, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 766 (citing Waxahachie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 181 S.W.3d 781, 785 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.)).

Here, on the one hand Hartt brings an IIED claim against Hyden “in his individual capacity,” not Evadale ISD, which would presumably arise under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 101.106(f). [Dkt. 13 at ¶ 72]. On the other hand, Hartt alleges that Evadale ISD “is responsible for the acts, omissions[,] and customs of ․ Hyden ․ pursuant to the theory of Respondeat Superior.” Id. at ¶ 77. This latter theory would arise under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 101.106(e). Regardless of whether Hartt asserts an IIED claim against both Evadale ISD and Hyden or against just Hyden, Hartt's IIED claim for actions occurring while Hyden was employed with the District is barred under the TTCA. IIED is a tort that “arises under” the TTCA, which means that it does not waive immunity. See Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 658–60 (stating that all state common law torts “arise under” the TTCA for purposes of subsection (e)); Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 375 (stating that all state torts “arise under” the TTCA for purposes of subsection (f)). If Hartt intended to bring an IIED claim against both Evadale ISD and Hyden under § 101.106(e), she is barred from so doing. See Bustos, 599 F.3d at 463. Similarly, if Hartt intended to being an IIED claim against only Hyden under § 101.106(f), such claims are barred under the TTCA. See Ferguson, 2018 WL 2656990, at *14–15; Tipps, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 768.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Hartt's IIED claim is barred under the TTCA for his actions during the scope of Hyden's employment at Evadale ISD.

ii. Hartt's IIED Claim for Actions Occurring After Hyden's Employment at Evadale ISD

Under Texas law, “IIED is not available as a form of relief if the alleged emotional distress stems from conduct that is covered by other existing statutory or common-law remedies.” Luce v. Newtron Grp., LLC, No. 1”17-CV-00026-KFG, 2018 WL 6421694, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2018) (Giblin, J.) (citing Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 816 (Tex. 2005)); see also Mejia v. Ayala, No. 3:21-CV-0587-D, 2021 WL 6063583, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2021). A plaintiff, therefore, cannot assert statutory causes of action as IIED claims “just because those avenues may now be barred.” Creditwatch, 157 S.W.3d at 816 (citing Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004)). Hartt's allegations underlying her Title VII and IIED claims are identical, and just because the Title VII is time-barred here does not mean that Hartt can pursue an IIED claim. See Creditwatch, 157 S.W.3d at 816; Hoffman-La Roche, 144 S.W.3d at 447.

Even if her claim was not preempted, it still fails substantively. To state a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must allege “(1) [the defendant] acted intentionally or recklessly; (1) [his] conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) [his] actions caused her emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe.” Kroger Tex. Ltd. P'ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788, 796 (Tex. 2006) (first citing Hoffman-La Roche, 144 S.W.3d at 445; and then citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. 2003)). Here, Hyden primarily disputes the third element, whether the conduct was extreme and outrageous. [Dkt. 17 at 19–20]. The conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Brewerton v. Dalrymple, 997 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. 1999) (quotations and citation omitted). For purposes of this element, “the fact that an action is intentional, malicious, or even criminal does not, standing alone, mean that it is extreme or outrageous.” Id. at 215. Thus, for example, “even though conduct may violate Title VII as sexual harassment, it does not necessarily become intentional infliction of emotional distress under Texas law.” Prunty v. Ark. Freightways, Inc., 16 F.3d 649, 654 (5th Cir. 1994).

Here, the Court finds that Hartt's allegations of Hyden's post-employment actions are not sufficient for a finding of “extreme and outrageous” conduct. Hartt alleges that, after his resignation as Superintendent in November 2022, Hyden continued sexually harassing and stalking her into December 2022: he drove very close to her bumper and followed her to the grocery store, to pick up her children from school, and outside of town. [Dkt. 13 at ¶ 48]. Furthermore, Hartt alleges that in June of 2023, she learned that Hyden filed another complaint against her license either right before or right after his resignation. Id. at ¶ 51.²¹ Unfortunately for Hartt, most allegations of Hyden's harassing behavior occurred while he was still the Superintendent of Evadale ISD, and the TTCA bars liability for intentional torts occurring in the scope of employment. See supra, Section III.B.i. Additionally, Hyden's post-employment actions relevant for the Court's consideration do not rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous” necessary. Courts have rejected IIED claims for conduct more egregious than what Hartt suffered here, even where inappropriate sexual contact occurred. See Garza v. AAA Cooper Transp., No. 5:20-CV-1, 2020 WL 10867683, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2020) (finding no IIED when the plaintiff's supervisor made sexual advances after withdrawing her bonus, communicated suggestive comments about her appearance, and on one occasion touched her stomach and groped her breast); Rogers v. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 304CV0367G, 2004 WL 1531819, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 7, 2004) (finding no IIED when the plaintiff's supervisor made sexual comments, relentlessly asked her to go on dates with him and travel with him, and firing her after she rebuked his advances). But see Skidmore v. Precision Printing and Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 613 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that a jury could conclude that the plaintiff's supervisor's persistent comments and sexual touching occurring over an extended period of time constituted IIED).

The Court wishes to emphasize that it does not condone Hyden's alleged abhorrent conduct that clearly made Hartt feel unsafe and uncomfortable. Unfortunately, for Hartt, his post-employment conduct does not rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous” to warrant relief under an IIED claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion as to the claims against Hyden.

IV. CONCLUSION

It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint [Dkt. 17] is hereby GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

It is further ORDERED that all Court dates and deadlines are hereby VACATED and that all pending motions herein are DENIED AS MOOT.

This constitutes a FINAL JUDGMENT, and the Clerk is INSTRUCTED to close this matter.

SIGNED this 13th day of March, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The complaint states that the EEOC issued the right to sue letter on January 10, 2023. Id. at ¶ 56. The Court believes this was a typographical error, as Pamela did not file her charge with the EEOC until August 21, 2023. Id. at ¶ 53.

2.   Defendants also seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction under Plaintiffs’ claim under Chapter 106 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Id. at 18. As discussed below, Plaintiffs agreed with Defendants’ assessment and dropped those claims. [Dkt. 23 at ¶ 3]. Therefore, the Court does not brief the relevant legal standard for a 12(b)(1) motion.

3.   The Court notes that Defendants’ reply brief [Dkt. 26] is two pages too long in violation of Local Rule 7(a)(1). E.D. Tex. Civ. R. 7(a)(1) (stating that reply briefs to dispositive motions “shall not exceed ten pages, excluding attachments”). Accordingly, the Court only considered the first ten pages of the brief.

4.   Hartt indicates that she wishes to keep her supervisory liability claims alive. Id. The Court construes this to mean that she wishes to keep her Monell liability claim alive under a ratification theory of § 1983, as her substantive analysis advocates for this theory of recovery. See id. at ¶¶ 24–29.

5.   In their response, Plaintiffs indicate that they brought a libel and slander claim against Hyden in addition to their IIED claim. Id. at ¶ 2. However, no such claims for libel and slander exist in the complaint. See generally [Dkt. 13]. Accordingly, the Court finds that the only live claim against Hyden is the IIED claim.

6.   This is for good reason. “[T]he identification of policymaking officials is a question of state law.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988). Under Texas law, the policymaking official for independent school districts is the board of trustees, not the superintendent. Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1993).

7.   Evadale ISD does not argue in its motion that Hartt failed to plead a constitutional violation. See generally [Dkt. 17]. In its reply, however, Evadale ISD attempts to argue that Hartt failed to plead a constitutional violation. [Dkt. 26 at 1–2]. Because the Court finds that Hartt failed to plead an official policy sufficient for a finding of Monell liability, it need not address whether she plausibly alleged the violation of a constitutional right.

8.   In fact, Hartt alleges that the Board “had a number of written policies and procedures to protect Plaintiffs from violations of their rights” that were based on well-developed federal law. [Dkt. 13 at ¶ 65]. Hartt alleges that Evadale ISD failed to follow these policies and procedures. Id.

9.   The Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit have recognized that a single incident or decision by a policymaker may give rise to municipality liability under certain circumstances. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.”); see also Milam v. City of San Antonio, 113 F. App'x 622, 626 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Municipalities can also be liable, in certain situations, for single episodes of conduct that are not part of any pattern of illegality.”); Worsham v. City of Pasadena, 881 F.2d 1336, 1342 (5th Cir. 1989) (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]f an official who has final policymaking authority in the area at issue violates federal law either by promulgating a rule of general applicability, or by ordering or undertaking a particular action on a single occasion, the municipality is subject to § 1983 liability for the acts of the official.”). Generally, “this ‘single incident exception’ is extremely narrow and gives rise to municipal liability only if the municipal actor is a final policymaker.” Valle v. City of Hous., 613 F.3d 536, 542–43 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Bolton v. City of Dall., 541 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2008)) (finding no single-incident liability because the city actor, a SWAT captain, did not act in a policymaking capacity). Thus, a municipality may be held liable for “single instances of conduct perpetrated by the policymakers themselves.” Milam, 113 F. App'x at 626 (emphasis added). In Praprotnik, however, the Supreme Court articulated a scenario where a non-policymaking employee may be held liable for a single incident, such as when a subordinate makes a decision in the form of a policy statement that is expressly approved by the policymaker or where a superior ratifies a subordinate's illegal conduct. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127, 130 (1988). This means, therefore, that under a ratification theory, “a single incident that is ‘an obvious violation of clearly established law’ attaches liability when ratified by policymakers.” Harper v. McAndrews, 499 F. Supp. 3d 312, 321 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (Payne, J.) (quoting World Wide St. Preachers Fellowship v. Town of Columbia, 591 F.3d 747, 755 (5th Cir. 2009)). Here, Hartt alleges that she was sexually harassed several times at the hands of Haynes, not just a “single incident,” but the Court still proceeds with a ratification analysis for these occurrences.

10.   In fact, Hartt's allegation of Hyden's first complaint to the Texas State Board for Educator Certification specifically indicated that Hyden submitted that complaint without notifying the Board, meaning the Board did not know of this instance of behavior. Id. at ¶ 39.

11.   One allegation indicates that Hyden “with the support of the School Bard,” retaliated by removing her from her teaching position. Id. at ¶ 1. However, as indicated above, Hartt dropped her First Amendment retaliation claim, leaving only Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims open for recovery under § 1983. Furthermore, the allegation is vague because it is unclear to the Court whether the Board's “support” was behind Hyden's retaliation or the decision to remove Hartt from her position.

12.   In her response, Hartt argues that because Evadale is a small town where “everybody knew everybody's business,” the Board must have known of Hyden's actions. [Dkt. 23 at ¶¶ 25, 27]. This argument is conclusory and speculative, which the Court cannot accept under Rule 12(b)(6). Gentilello, 627 F.3d at 544.

13.   Defendants also move to dismiss Hartt's ADA claim for the same reason. It is true that Title I claims under the ADA, which govern employment discrimination, follow the procedural requirements of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (adopting Title VII's procedures for timely filing an EEOC charge for ADA claims); see also Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he ADA incorporates by reference the procedures applicable to actions under Title VII,” including § 2000e-5). However, Title II of the ADA incorporates the procedural requirements set forth in the Rehabilitation Act, which has no filing requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (incorporating the procedures set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 794a, the latter of which follows the procedures set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Wagner v. Tex. A&M Univ., 939 F. Supp. 1297, 1308 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (“Unlike Title I, which adopts the procedures set forth in Title VII requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies, Title II adopts the remedies, procedures, and rights as set forth in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794a. The Rehabilitation Act, from which Title II of the ADA draws it procedures and remedies, does not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies. (citations and quotations omitted)). Here, Hartt filed her associational disability discrimination claim under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, meaning there are no EEOC filing requirements. See [Dkt. 13 at ¶ 69].

14.   Hartt offers two additional reasons why her claims are not barred, even if she did not timely file her EEOC charge. First, she argues that her failure to timely charge her claims with the EEOC “was not a bar and that [she] could file a complaint in federal court even when not having gone through the EEOC complaint process.” [Dkt. 23 at ¶ 32]. In support of this assertion, Hartt cites Fort Bend, 587 U.S. at 548–51. There, the Supreme Court distinguished between jurisdictional prescriptions and non-jurisdictional claim-processing rules. Id. at 548–49. Hartt is correct that the Supreme Court concluded that a failure to timely file a Title VII charge with the EEOC does not constitute a jurisdictional bar because federal courts exercise jurisdiction over Title VII actions pursuant to federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. at 550. However, the Supreme Court also indicated that Title VII's charge-filing requirement is a mandatory processing rule and an affirmative defense available to defendants if timely raised. Id. at 549, 551. It concluded that “a rule may be mandatory without being jurisdictional, and Title VII's charge-filing requirement fits that bill.” Id. at 552. Accordingly, Title VII's requirement to timely file an EEOC charge is a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit in federal court. See id. at 547, 553 (affirming the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the charge requirement is a prudential prerequisite to a federal lawsuit).Second, Hartt argues that her EEOC charge was timely because of the continuing violations doctrine. The continuing violations doctrine is a federal common law doctrine that governs accrual and extends the limitations period on an otherwise time-barred claim. Heath v. Bd. of Supervisors for S. Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 850 F.3d 731, 740 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 136 (5th Cir. 2003). “Under the continuing violations doctrine, ․ a plaintiff is relieved of establishing that all of the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred within the actionable period, if the plaintiff can show a series of related acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations period.” Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 279 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). If “an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability.” Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Based on this doctrine, Hartt argues that Hyden's actions in November 2022 are still actionable because Hyden continuously engaged in similar conduct while she was employed, meaning that the charge-filing clock did not start ticking until November 2022. [Dkt. 23 at ¶¶ 34–35]. Unfortunately, Hartt has this backwards. The only conduct that contributed to her Title VII claims that fall within the 300-day period was Hyden's November 2022 actions; however, as already discussed, his behavior is not actionable because they occurred after Hartt's employment relationship with Evadale ISD ended. Therefore, the continuing violations doctrine does not apply here.

15.   As discussed supra note 13, even if Hartt brought her associational discrimination claim under Title I of the ADA, it would be dismissed as untimely for failure to comply with the EEOC filing requirements.

16.   See supra note 13.

17.   The Texas supreme court has interpreted “under this chapter” broadly to encompass tort claims for which the government both waives and does not waive immunity. As stated in Garcia, “[b]ecause the Tort Claims Act is the only, albeit limited, avenue for common-law recovery against the government, all tort theories alleged against a governmental unit, whether it is sued alone or together with its employees, are assumed to be under [the Tort Claims Act] for purposes of section 101.106.” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653 658–60 (Tex. 2008) (quotation and citation omitted).

18.   A “governmental unit” includes “a political subdivision of [Texas], including any ․ school district[.]” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.001(3)(B). Hartt sued Evadale ISD, which is “a school district organized under the laws of the State of Texas.” [Dkt. 13 at ¶ 8]. Accordingly, Evadale ISD is a “governmental unit” relevant to this statute.

19.   An “employee” is someone “who is in the paid service of a governmental unit by competent authority, but does not include an independent contractor, an agent or employee of an independent contractor, or a person who performs tasks the details of which the governmental unit does not have the legal right to control.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.001(2). Hartt alleges that Hyden served as Evadale ISD's Superintendent during most of the relevant time period until he resigned around November 2022. [Dkt. 13 at ¶¶ 12–13]. Accordingly, the Court finds that Hyden was an employee of Evadale ISD until about November 2022.

20.   The Texas supreme court extended Garcia’s interpretation of “under this chapter” to subsection (f). Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 378–79 (Tex. 2011) (“Although we have not applied the same rule to section 101.106(f) before today, the statutory text suggests we should.”).

21.   In her response, Hartt adds further allegations not mentioned in her complaint, such as that Hyden followed her to the bathroom at a sporting event, waiting for her to exit. [Dkt. 23 at ¶ 48]. However, because these allegations were not presented in her complaint, the Court may not consider them on a motion to dismiss. See Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2000) (“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto” unless the defendant attaches a document in its motion to dismiss that the plaintiff refers to in her complaint and is central to her claim).

Michael J. Truncale United States District Judge