UNITED STATES v. WYNN (2025)

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Javonte Wynn's motion to dismiss (Doc. 142) Count 1 of the superseding indictment in this matter (Doc. 29), a felon-in-possession charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), on the ground that this charge violates his Second Amendment right to bear arms. For the following reasons, the Court will DENY Wynn's motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2012, when he was seventeen years old, Wynn pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, a class C felony. (See Doc. 194, at 2; Doc. 194-2.) According to the victim's testimony at Wynn's juvenile transfer hearing, the assault arose out of an encounter between the victim and a group of six people, including Wynn, when the victim was looking to buy some marijuana. (See Doc. 194-1, at 4–10.) Though it is not entirely clear from the record how the assault unfolded, the victim's testimony indicates that (1) he and his brother initially approached the group of six, having observed Wynn holding marijuana in his hand, to inquire about a purchase; (2) the entire group walked away from the victim, but Wynn returned alone and again engaged in discussion with the victim about the marijuana; (3) while the victim was speaking with Wynn, two other men approached the victim from behind, and one of them pointed a shotgun at him; and (4) a physical confrontation ensued in which the victim and his brother attempted to defend themselves, and the victim was shot with a nine-millimeter pistol. (See id. at 6–11, 13.) The victim testified that Wynn did not have a weapon. (See id. at 19.)

Wynn has several more convictions. In 2014, he pled guilty to facilitation of robbery, a class D felony. (See Doc. 194-4.) According to the affidavit of complaint, four armed men including Wynn were in a vehicle and pulled up near the victim, and then one of the men (not Wynn) got out of the vehicle with a handgun and demanded property from the victim. (See Doc. 194-3.) In 2017, Wynn pled guilty to a violation of Tennessee's felon-in-possession statute, a class E felony.¹ (See Doc. 154-2, at 1–4.) In 2019, Wynn pled guilty to misdemeanor reckless endangerment. (See Doc. 194-6.) The defense questions the validity of this conviction on the ground that the affidavit of complaint—though it indicated that Wynn fired several rounds from a firearm into a wooded area—did not indicate that any other person was close enough to the wooded area to be within the “zone of danger,” which is an element of reckless endangerment under Tennessee law.² (See Doc. 194, at 4–5) (citing State v. Fox, 947 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Doc. 194-3.) Wynn also has at least one other misdemeanor conviction for possession of a controlled substance. (See Doc. 194, at 2.)

The present federal indictment charges that Wynn knowingly possessed a firearm on February 1, 2023. (See Doc. 29.) On that day, according to the arrest report, a bystander called 911 and reported witnessing a motor vehicle accident on N. Holly Street and Oak Street; the bystander further reported that, immediately following the accident, the driver of one of the vehicles, whom he described as a Black male wearing black and later identified as Wynn, emerged from the vehicle and discarded a gun. (See Doc. 154-1.) Police officers then arrived and arrested Wynn. (See id.) When the responding officer interviewed the bystander at the scene, the bystander relayed the following factual allegations: (1) the driver of a red SUV, Mr. Sylvestor Taylor, was driving north on N. Holly Street when a black Dodge Charger, driven by Wynn, ran through a stop sign on Oak Street and collided with Taylor's SUV, causing both vehicles to crash into a fence; (2) Wynn then emerged from the Dodge Charger with a gun, which he discarded under a nearby Chevy Impala; and (3) when Wynn was exiting the crashed vehicle, the bystander “initially thought Mr. Wynn was going to start shooting so he ran behind cover.” (See id.)

On November 1, 2023, in Count 1 of the superseding indictment, a grand jury charged Wynn with possessing a gun as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Doc. 29, at 1.) On October 17, 2024, Wynn moved to dismiss the § 922(g)(1) charge on the grounds that it violates the Second Amendment both on its face and as applied to him. (See Doc. 142.) Wynn's motion further contended he was entitled “to a determination as to whether he is sufficiently dangerous” to be lawfully prosecuted under § 922(g)(1) under United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024), and requested an evidentiary hearing on the issue. (See id. at 1.) This Court set the hearing, but Wynn later filed a notice withdrawing his request and expressing that he wished instead to present written evidence along with his reply brief. (See Docs. 162, 179, 180.) The motion to dismiss is now ripe for review and, per Wynn's notice withdrawing his request for a hearing (Doc. 179), the Court proceeds to decide the motion on the written record.

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), also known as the felon-in-possession statute, it is unlawful for a person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to ship, transport, possess, or receive “any firearm or ammunition” with a connection to interstate or foreign commerce.

Motions to dismiss § 922(g)(1) charges implicate an evolving landscape of Second Amendment jurisprudence. In New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the Supreme Court introduced a two-part test for challenges to gun regulations: (1) courts must first ascertain whether “the Second Amendment's plain text covers” the conduct the regulation would restrict (if it does not, the regulation is constitutional and the inquiry ends here); (2) if the Second Amendment's plain text does apply, “the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct,” and the “government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.” 597 U.S. 1, 24, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022). Two years later, in United States v. Rahimi, the Supreme Court clarified that a challenged gun regulation need not have a “historical twin,” or be a “dead ringer” for a Founding-era law, to satisfy the Bruen inquiry. 602 U.S. 680, 692, 144 S.Ct. 1889, 219 L.Ed.2d 351 (2024). At issue in Rahimi was the respondent's Second-Amendment challenge to his conviction (after a guilty plea following the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss) for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which criminalizes possession of firearms or ammunition while under a domestic-violence restraining order. See id. at 689, 144 S.Ct. 1889. The Supreme Court held § 922(g)(8) was constitutional as applied to Rahimi, and it concluded with this narrow rule: “An individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.” Id. at 702, 144 S.Ct. 1889.³

Following Rahimi, the Sixth Circuit held that § 922(g)(1) is “constitutional on its face and as applied to dangerous people.” Williams, 113 F.4th at 662–63. It reasoned, applying the Bruen test, that (1) felons are included among “the people” whose rights the text of Second Amendment protects, see id. at 649; and (2) § 922(g)(1) is consistent with the Nation's history and tradition of firearm regulation provided that a defendant “has an opportunity to make an individualized showing that he himself is not actually dangerous,” id. at 663. If a defendant can “[meet] his burden ⁴ to demonstrate that he is not dangerous” in an as-applied challenge,⁵ the Second Amendment will bar his § 922(g)(1) prosecution. Id. at 657. Courts hearing these challenges “must focus on each individual's specific characteristics,” which “necessarily requires considering the individual's entire criminal record—not just the predicate offense for purposes of § 922(g)(1),” “as well as other judicially noticeable information.”⁶ Id. at 658–59, 660.

To guide these individualized determinations, Williams outlines a tripartite framework categorizing past convictions according to their probative value for assessing dangerousness: The first category, consisting of “crimes against the person,” includes “dangerous and violent crimes like murder, rape, assault, and robbery.” Id. at 658. The second category, “while not strictly crimes against the person,” consists of crimes that “inherently pose[ ] a significant threat of danger,” such as drug trafficking and burglary. Id. at 658, 663. Williams considers past offenses in both the first and second categories very probative of dangerousness, suggesting a defendant “in either of these categories will have a very difficult time, to say the least, of showing he is not dangerous.”⁷ Id. at 663. The third category includes “crimes that pose no threat of physical danger, like mail fraud, tax fraud, or making false statements,” id. at 663; these crimes, the Williams court suggested, will not tend to support findings of dangerousness, see id. at 659. Notwithstanding this framework, the Williams court emphasized that it did not “mean to suggest that courts facing as-applied challenges must find ‘categorical’ matches to show a defendant is dangerous,” and it instructed instead that dangerousness determinations should be “fact-specific, depending on the unique circumstances of the individual defendant.” Id. at 660.

To this Court's knowledge, as of the date of this order, district courts in the Sixth Circuit have issued approximately 65 rulings on motions to dismiss bringing as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) charges under Williams. Every one of these motions has been denied.⁸

III. ANALYSIS

Wynn brings facial and as-applied challenges to his § 922(g)(1) charge. (See Doc. 142.) As to the facial challenge, Wynn acknowledges that § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional under Williams, but he wishes to preserve the issue for appeal. (See id. at 1, 7–17.) Thus, because Williams is binding circuit precedent that is dispositive on this issue, the Court need not consider Wynn's facial challenge further, and it will not grant dismissal on this ground. See 113 F.4th at 662–63. The Court thus moves to Wynn's as-applied challenge, which requires an individualized analysis of his dangerousness under Williams and consideration of several distinct issues related to its application.

A. Evidence of Past Convictions

While Williams clearly contemplates a fact-intensive review of a defendant's past convictions, this inquiry presents certain difficulties in practice. For one thing, in order to look beyond the statutory definitions of a defendant's prior crimes and ascertain their unique probative value, as Williams requires, see id. at 660, a court must rely on the submissions of the parties, which might not provide a full view of a defendant's past crimes as they appeared before the courts where the original convictions were obtained.⁹ This problem may be exacerbated for past convictions that were obtained by guilty pleas (as the vast majority of criminal convictions are), as a guilty plea requires only minimal information about the factual circumstances of the conduct at issue. Furthermore, just as guilty pleas tend to elicit minimal information about crimes as compared to jury trials, they are not subject to the same evidentiary scrutiny as jury trials. As a result, sources that might provide more factual context for convictions obtained via guilty pleas, such as presentence investigation reports, may risk sacrificing accuracy or even infringing on Due Process. As another district court explained,

Williams says that dangerousness determinations should be “fact specific” and should consider the “details of [a defendant's] specific conviction.” This suggests that perhaps the Court should delve deeper into the underlying facts of Morris's carjacking conviction. But here, all of the facts in the record for that conviction come from an “Agent's Description of the Offense” in a state presentence investigation report (PSR). The Court has reservations about accepting all information in a state PSR at face value, especially because those portions that simply restate a police report verbatim may contain untested accusations and hearsay. This would be a far cry from the “judicially noticeable information” that Williams deems appropriate to consider.

United States v. Morris, 2025 WL 224685, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 16, 2025) (citations omitted).

Here, the Court has some information about Wynn's criminal history, and that information includes evidence of serious misconduct. He has pled guilty to several felonies—including, notably, two counts of aggravated assault and one count of facilitation of robbery. (See Docs. 194-2, 194-4.) Williams names both assault and robbery as examples of category-one offenses that, because they are “crimes against the person,” will tend to be highly suggestive of dangerousness. 113 F.4th at 658.¹⁰ In each case, Wynn's guilty pleas were accepted by courts and constituted admissions that he was guilty of offenses that, by their statutory definitions, involve at least some risk of physical harm to the body of another. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101 (assault), § 39-13-401 (robbery), § 39-11-403 (facilitation). As to Wynn's facilitation conviction, furthermore, while § 39-11-403 defines facilitation as a lesser-included offense of the primary offense, with a lower level of culpability, facilitation of robbery is still a crime against the person and, thus, likely still a category-one offense. See Williams, 113 F.4th at 658. In the years following these category-one convictions, Wynn also pled guilty to violating Tennessee's felon-in-possession statute,¹¹ as well as misdemeanors including reckless endangerment and possession of a controlled substance. (See Doc. 154-2, at 1–4; Doc. 194, at 2; Doc. 194-6.)

The record before the Court contains limited evidence of the factual circumstances that led to Wynn's guilty pleas. In total, the parties have submitted the following: (1) copies of the judgments for each of Wynn's felony convictions, as well as the misdemeanor reckless-endangerment conviction (Docs. 154-2, 194-2, 194-4, 194-6); (2) as further context for the aggravated-assault convictions, an excerpt of Wynn's juvenile transfer hearing containing the victim's testimony (Doc. 194-1); and (3) as further context for the facilitation-of-robbery conviction, copies of the affidavit of complaint and Wynn's petition to enter a guilty plea (Docs. 194-3, 194-5).

The Court has considered the probative value of the victim's testimony from Wynn's 2012 juvenile transfer hearing. Defense counsel argues, and the Court agrees, that the testimony paints a rather flimsy picture of the nature and extent of Wynn's participation in the assault. (See Doc. 194, at 2–3.) For instance, the victim testified that he could not see whether Wynn had a weapon, and it is generally unclear from the testimony what actions Wynn took personally to cause a reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. See (id.); Knight v. United States, 936 F.3d 495, 500 (6th Cir. 2019) (defining assault); (Doc. 194-1, at 19). But this can only go so far, because the purpose of a juvenile transfer hearing is not to adjudicate guilt or innocence. In the context of a transfer hearing (which is a forum to decide whether it is appropriate to proceed against a juvenile in adult court, and no more), a prosecutor simply has a lesser incentive to put on proof. Thus, the Court is not convinced it can construe the transcript of the victim's testimony at Wynn's transfer hearing as representative of the extent of the evidence for dangerousness relating to Wynn's aggravated-assault convictions.¹² However, to the extent the defense argues certain facts about Wynn's past convictions are mitigating, the Court construes Williams as permitting consideration of those facts insofar as they are probative of Wynn's dangerousness. See 113 F.4th at 660.

B. Age of Past Convictions

Must the Court conclude a defendant is forever dangerous once he is dangerous at a certain point in time? This is a difficult question to answer in any context, whether in the abstract or as a court assesses a unique human being. Perhaps the more pertinent question is whether, assuming a person's criminal history demonstrates he was dangerous at some point, that finding is sufficient to deprive him of his Second Amendment rights permanently. Rahimi suggests it may not be: “An individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.” 602 U.S. at 702, 144 S.Ct. 1889 (emphasis added). Williams does not expressly address whether permanent felon disarmament is constitutional, nor does it address how courts should weigh the passage of time when evaluating the probative value of past convictions. See 113 F.4th at 657–63. By this Court's accounting, a majority of courts applying Williams have likewise understood it to be silent on these issues. See, e.g., United States v. Pickett, 757 F. Supp. 3d 813, 818 (M.D. Tenn. 2024) (“Williams did not provide guidance about whether, and to what extent, the Court should weigh factors such as the age of the defendant's conviction ․”); United States v. Buford, 2024 WL 5239444, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 27, 2024) (“Williams gives no specific guidance as to whether, in making the dangerousness decision, district courts should give less weight to convictions for violent crimes which occurred long ago.”). Based on the guidance Williams does provide, though, it seems permissible for courts to consider factors such as the age of a conviction and evidence of a defendant's subsequent rehabilitation as part of “the unique circumstances of the individual defendant.” Id. at 660.¹³

At the same time, the dozen-or-so Sixth Circuit cases that have applied Williams to as-applied challenges thus far have produced some conflicting guidance on these points. A few have suggested that Williams did find permanent felon disarmament under § 922(g)(1) is constitutional. See United States v. Morton, 123 F.4th 492, 498 n. 2 (6th Cir. 2024); United States v. Gailes, 118 F.4th 822, 829 (6th Cir. 2024). Yet Morton and Gailes base this characterization not on any specific language from Williams but, rather, on the fact that nothing in the text of § 922(g)(1) itself suggests a time limit—unlike, notably, the section upheld in Rahimi, which by design disarms persons who are currently subject to domestic-violence restraining orders. See Morton, 123 F.4th at 496 n. 1 (“it is unclear whether Rahimi’s reasoning depended on the temporary nature of the firearm deprivation under § 922(g)(8)”); Gailes, 118 F.4th at 829.

To be clear, the constitutionality of permanent disarmament and the question of how courts should consider the age of convictions are distinct; but they are also closely related, because, if one construes Williams as permitting consideration of the age of convictions or a defendant's subsequent rehabilitation, that implies that a felon who is disarmable at one point in time may not be disarmable later. The problem here may arise in part from a tension between statutory text or intent and in-practice enforcement: even insofar as § 922(g)(1) can be construed to disarm felons permanently, felon disarmament is enforced by prosecution, which in this context (because § 922(g)(1) convictions lead to relatively short sentences) yields temporary results. For instance, assume a felon faces multiple § 922(g)(1) charges over many years. To the Court's understanding, Williams’s historical analysis, as well as its guidance for as-applied challenges, implies that a defendant must be afforded “an opportunity to make an individualized showing that he himself is not actually dangerous” every time he is charged with a § 922(g)(1) offense. See 113 F.4th at 663. This reading is consistent with Williams’s reliance on the Colonial-era practice of disarming loyalists until they could demonstrate, often by swearing loyalty oaths to the Colonies, that they were no longer “dangerous to the fledgling revolutionary project.” Id. at 653–54.¹⁴

Notwithstanding the characterizations of Morton and Gailes, other Sixth Circuit cases suggest it may be appropriate for courts to give less weight to older convictions on Williams review. For instance, in United States v. Watson, the defendant challenged his § 922(g)(1) charge on the grounds that his burglary conviction was twelve years old and that his more recent convictions did not demonstrate dangerousness. See 2025 WL 833246, at *2 (6th Cir. March 17, 2025). The Sixth Circuit disagreed with Watson because it found his more recent criminal history was sufficient to show his dangerousness (particularly because it included a conviction for first-degree domestic violence), without reaching his argument regarding the age of the burglary conviction. See id. (“Watson's other convictions, which include burglary and operating a vehicle while intoxicated, provide other potential evidence of dangerousness, but we need not explore their underlying facts, as the facts already discussed sufficiently show that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Watson.”). In other cases, including in one of its first post-Williams decisions, United States v. Goins, the Sixth Circuit has relied on probation or parole status as evidence of continued dangerousness. See 118 F.4th 794, 804 (6th Cir. 2024) (“Goins's record reveals a dangerous pattern of misuse of alcohol and motor vehicles, often together ․ Moreover, and most importantly, at the time Goins possessed the firearm in 2021, he was in violation of a condition of his four-year state probation term.”). Judge Bush wrote separately in Goins, concurring in the judgment that Goins's conviction under § 922(g)(1) was constitutional, to express that he viewed Goins's probation status alone as dispositive and had doubts as to whether Goins's criminal history would have been sufficient were he not still on probation.¹⁵ See id. at 805–08.

More recently, in United States v. Ronald Norvale Williams,¹⁶ the Sixth Circuit considered the as-applied constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) to a defendant whose criminal history was both very serious and very old. See 2025 WL 1089531, at *1 (6th Cir. April 11, 2025). Ronald Norvale Williams was convicted of first- and second-degree murder in 1987, when he was eighteen years old, and sentenced to life without parole; some years later, after his sentence had been converted to a term of years, he was released on parole with a condition prohibiting him from possessing a firearm; then in 2023, while still on parole, he was indicted for a § 922(g)(1) violation. See id. The Ronald Norvale Williams court contemplates that some past offenses, like that defendant's murder convictions, may indeed be too serious to overcome on Williams review even with time and rehabilitation: “Williams responds to his inescapable past by pointing to his exemplary disciplinary record.” Id. at *2. Yet in lieu of committing to this possibility, Ronald Norvale Williams relies on the defendant's parolee status to augment his aged criminal history, reasoning that “even if we were persuaded that Williams's rehabilitation could outweigh his prior murder convictions, his parolee status—and the condition that he not possess a firearm—combined with his prior felony murder convictions support our holding.” Id. (citing Goins, 118 F.4th at 804–05).

Cases like Watson, Goins, and Ronald Norvale Williams reflect a common-sense view that the probative value of once-dangerous conduct may decrease over time—an instinct that many other district courts applying Williams have shared. See United States v. Jennings, 754 F. Supp. 3d 763, 771 (E.D. Mich. 2024) (“Jennings committed one violent crime, but it deserves little weight due to its age.”); United States v. Green, No. 23-CR-20506, 2024 WL 4469090, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 10, 2024) (noting that the age of a 13-year-old conviction suggests it should not be weighed heavily); United States v. Bell, 755 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1000 (E.D. Mich. 2024) (noting the probative value of a concealed-weapon conviction from over thirty years ago “is likely weak”); Buford, 2024 WL 5239444 at *6 (“Common sense ․ strongly suggests [violent crimes committed long ago] should be given less weight”).

Here, Wynn's most serious convictions are also the oldest on his record: class-C convictions for aggravated assault from 2012 and a class-D conviction for facilitation of robbery from 2014. (Docs. 194-2, 194-4.) While he has been convicted of other, less serious crimes in the ensuing years, his last category-one offense was the 2014 facilitation of robbery. (Id.); see Williams, 113 F.4th at 658. Viewing Wynn's criminal history as a whole, it appears the seriousness of his offenses has generally decreased over time. (See Doc. 154-2.) At the same time, Wynn has not offered any affirmative evidence of rehabilitation in the years since his most serious crimes; the Court does not know, for instance, if he has pursued any formal education or training, maintained employment, sought counseling, or taken other steps toward rehabilitation and reintegration. (See Docs. 142, 194.) Particularly in the absence of such evidence of rehabilitation, Wynn's 2019 reckless-endangerment conviction is cause for concern. (See Doc. 194-6.) Furthermore, even to the extent the age of the assault and robbery convictions may lessen their impact, numerous courts have considered similar-aged, or older, crimes on Williams review. See, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 2024 WL 4615853, at *1, *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 2024) (finding § 922(g)(1) constitutional as applied to the defendant based primarily on convictions for aggravated robbery in 2002 and robbery in 2014). Thus, the Court is not convinced the age of Wynn's most serious crimes alone is sufficient for him to prevail under Williams.

C. Youthful-Offender Status

A separate yet related issue is a defendant's age at the time of a past offense. This Nation's criminal legal system generally recognizes juvenile offenders as less culpable, and more capable of rehabilitation, than adult offenders who engage in the same conduct. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (ruling the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments bar the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (ruling the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments bar the imposition of life-without-parole sentences for juveniles who commit non-homicide offenses). See also Fed. R. Evid. 609(d) (imposing special restrictions on the admissibility of juvenile adjudications as impeachment evidence). As the Supreme Court explained in Graham,

As compared to adults, juveniles have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility; they are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure; and their characters are not as well formed. These salient characteristics mean that [i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption. ․ [D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence. Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of irretrievably depraved character than are the actions of adults.

560 U.S. at 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Furthermore, there is reason for courts to take some of the same considerations into account for young-adult offenders, as research shows the human brain continues to mature through the mid-twenties and that individuals under age twenty-five are significantly more likely to engage in reckless behaviors. See Rebecca Ballard DiLoreto, Shared Responsibility: The Young Adult Offender, 41 N. Ky. L. Rev. 253, 266 (2014); Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1055, 1108 (2010); see also U.S. Sent'g Comm'n, The Effects of Aging on Recidivism Among Federal Offenders (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2017/20171207_Recidivism-Age.pdf (finding rates of recidivism decline consistently with age).

Williams offers no guidance on how courts making dangerousness determinations should weigh offenses committed when the defendant was a juvenile or young adult. See 113 F.4th at 657–62; see also Pickett, 757 F. Supp. 3d at 818 (observing “Williams did not provide guidance about whether, and to what extent, the Court should weigh factors such as ․ how old the defendant was at the time of the conviction”). Given the immaturity and decreased culpability of young offenders, however, common sense suggests juvenile and youthful offenses will tend to be less probative of dangerousness than adult offenses. See United States v. Green, 2024 WL 4469090, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 10, 2024) (“The court is cognizant that an offense committed while still a minor is generally considered to have less probative value to determining the present characteristics of a person.”).

Here, Wynn committed his most serious offenses at the ages of seventeen (aggravated assault) and nineteen (facilitation of robbery). This fact suggests a lower level of culpability, particularly since he did not act alone in either the aggravated assaults or the facilitation of robbery and, as the Supreme Court has observed, young offenders tend to be “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Thus, the Court is convinced that Wynn's age during his category-one offenses mitigates their probative value at least somewhat as to his dangerousness at present. See Williams, 113 F.4th at 658–60.

D. Previous Felon-in-Possession Offenses

How should courts weigh previous felon-in-possession convictions? In Williams itself, the Sixth Circuit noted Williams had one previous felon-in-possession conviction and suggested that it alone (apart from his older category-one convictions) would have been sufficient to support his pending § 922(g)(1) prosecution when, “[in the previous felon-in-possession] case, he agreed to stash a pistol that was used to murder a police officer.” 113 F.4th at 662. In Morton, the Sixth Circuit similarly considered the specific facts of a previous felon-in-possession conviction in finding the defendant was dangerous: “Among other offenses, Morton was previously convicted for wanton endangerment and possessing a firearm as a felon after he shot at his ex-girlfriend and her family, and then showed up at her house a few weeks later and verbally harassed her with a gun on his person.” 123 F.4th at 499. These portions of Williams and Morton suggest a past felon-in-possession conviction can support a current § 922(g)(1) prosecution when the underlying circumstances of that conviction indicate dangerousness; in both cases, the firearms possessed were used in ways that inflicted or risked physical harm to other human beings. See Williams, 113 F.4th at 662; Morton, 123 F.4th at 499.

It is less clear, however, how courts should evaluate past felon-in-possession convictions when the underlying conduct did not involve violent behavior. But there is serious reason to doubt whether such a conviction can render a subsequent § 922(g)(1) prosecution constitutional, especially when the previous conviction predates Williams. Consider these two hypothetical cases of challenged § 922(g)(1) prosecutions:

• Case A: Some years ago, Defendant A was convicted of mail fraud, a category-three felony under Williams, 113 F.4th at 659, in circumstances involving no violence or threat thereof. Subsequently, after completing his sentence, Defendant A was found with a gun in his home (this was the extent of the conduct) and convicted of a § 922(g)(1) violation. Now, after completing that sentence, he has another § 922(g)(1) charge pending against him.

• Case B: Some years ago, Defendant B was convicted of robbery, a category-one felony under Williams, 113 F.4th at 658, when he confronted the victim while wielding a household hammer and demanded the victim's wallet. Subsequently, after completing his sentence, Defendant B was found with a gun in his home (this was the extent of the conduct) and convicted of a § 922(g)(1) violation. Now, after completing that sentence, he has another § 922(g)(1) charge pending against him.

Assume that each defendant's previous § 922(g)(1) conviction predates Williams. Defendant A's previous § 922(g)(1) conviction might have been unconstitutional in retrospect under the Williams framework, as his only predicate offense at the time was a nonviolent, category-three mail fraud. See 113 F.4th at 659 (“we trust district courts will have no trouble concluding that many [category-three] crimes don't make a person dangerous”). Still, the conviction was valid at the time, and it remains on Defendant A's record. Perhaps, at worst, one could say Defendant A's previous § 922(g)(1) conviction demonstrates a willingness to break the law, as he knew he had committed felony mail fraud and chose to possess a gun nonetheless; but such reasoning cannot be enough to disarm him in 2025 because the very fact of Williams’s tripartite framework presumes that not all illegal conduct is sufficient for the Government to infringe on a felon's Second Amendment rights. See id. at 657–58. And unlike in Williams and Morton, there are no facts about Defendant A's § 922(g)(1) conviction that would indicate dangerousness (the gun he possessed was not used in another crime, nor did he use it in a dangerous manner). See Williams, 113 F.4th at 662; Morton, 123 F.4th at 499. It would be no surprise for a court to rule that, in Case A, the new § 922(g)(1) prosecution is unconstitutional under Williams.

Case B is rather more difficult. Defendant B committed a category-one offense that involved a threat of violence (a household hammer, though likely less dangerous than a gun, can be used to inflict severe harm). See id. at 658. Still, the Williams court declined to decide whether the existence of a category-one conviction is dispositive, and, as the Court has explained, Defendant B's past robbery conviction alone may not be sufficient to disarm him indefinitely. See id. As a result, it is unclear how a court should weigh the § 922(g)(1) conviction that was obtained against Defendant B after his category-one conviction—but before Williams—when he never had an opportunity to contest the as-applied constitutionality of that charge.¹⁷ Arguably, given that this Nation's history and tradition of firearm regulation requires such “an opportunity to make an individualized showing” that a defendant is not dangerous, id. at 663, it may offend Due Process for a court to even consider a previous § 922(g)(1) conviction that was obtained without a dangerousness assessment. These problems are even more pronounced when (1) a category-one or -two conviction is very old and/or (2) the defendant was very young at the time. For instance, say Defendant B committed the robbery in 1991 when he was seventeen years old, completed his sentence without incident, showed many positive signs of rehabilitation and reintegration in the ensuing years, and then was convicted of violating § 922(g)(1) in 2019. It is plausible under these facts that, had Defendant B been able to raise a Williams challenge in 2019, he could have shown he was not dangerous, rendering that first § 922(g)(1) conviction unconstitutional. But still, as with Defendant A's unconstitutional-in-retrospect § 922(g)(1) conviction, Defendant B's 2019 conviction remains on his record—could a court now cite that pre-Williams felon-in-possession conviction as evidence of a continued pattern of dangerous criminal behavior involving weapons?

While such an extreme case is not before the Court, Wynn's criminal history does bear some similarities to that of Defendant B. Having been convicted of three category-one crimes—two counts of aggravated assault in 2012 and one count of facilitation of robbery in 2014—Wynn was convicted in 2017 of violating Tennessee's felon-in-possession statute. (See Doc. 154-2.) While Wynn was young at the time of his category-one convictions, those convictions were also relatively recent at the time of his felon-in-possession prosecution. (See id.) Yet regardless of how Wynn might have fared in a dangerousness determination in 2017 (even assuming he would have fared poorly), that conviction was obtained without the opportunity for individualized review that Williams requires. See 113 F.4th at 663. An additional problem here is that the Court lacks any information about the factual circumstances of Wynn's 2017 conviction. Unlike in Williams or Morton, there is no evidence in the record suggesting Wynn used the firearm he possessed in a manner that suggests dangerousness, see Williams, 113 F.4th at 662; Morton, 123 F.4th at 499; he may have merely kept a firearm in his home, as in Cases A and B. Therefore, because (1) Wynn's 2017 felon-in-possession conviction predates Williams and (2) the record contains no information about its underlying circumstances, the Court will not consider that conviction in deciding the present motion.

E. Allegations Relating to the Present Charge

Finally, to what extent can courts consider factual allegations pertaining to the conduct charged in the present § 922(g)(1) prosecution? In one recent case, United States v. Fordham, the Sixth Circuit appears to suggest courts may consider “the offense conduct involved in the present offense.” 2025 WL 318229, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025). The defendant in Fordham was charged with violating § 922(g)(1) when he allegedly committed robbery and then shot at a victim who, having pulled his own firearm, had shot the defendant to defend himself. See id. at *1. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that this alleged conduct, “which involved Fordham robbing two people at gunpoint and shooting a firearm during the commission of the armed robbery,” in combination with his prior category-one and -two convictions (including one previous robbery), supported a finding of dangerousness. Id. at *5.

Notwithstanding Fordham, however, the Court has serious reservations about considering allegations about the present offense conduct—for at least three reasons. First, Williams itself instructs that an as-applied review of § 922(g)(1) charges may be based on “any evidence of past convictions in the record, as well as other judicially noticeable information.” 113 F.4th at 660. Williams, in other words, does not appear to contemplate courts considering allegations about the present offense conduct, as such allegations about the underlying circumstances of a § 922(g)(1) charge will not typically be judicially noticeable at the motion-to-dismiss stage (indictments, for instance, do not often detail the underlying facts of a charge).¹⁸

Second, considering factual allegations about the present offense is inconsistent with the logic of Williams. The Williams court's holding that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional “as applied to dangerous people,” 113 F.4th at 663, necessarily implies that a person who has committed a felony must be dangerous before he can be prohibited from possessing a firearm under the statute. Consider this hypothetical: Defendant C has one prior category-three conviction, for felony wire fraud, and, after completing his sentence for that conviction, he obtains a firearm. At this point, Defendant C's possession of the firearm is likely constitutional, because committing felony wire fraud typically does not make a person dangerous, see id. at 659; assume a court would have therefore found Defendant C non-dangerous and dismissed a § 922(g)(1) charge had he been prosecuted after obtaining the firearm. Now say that, subsequent to his lawful purchase, Defendant C uses his firearm to threaten a person when he gets into an argument at a bar. Under these facts, Defendant C can probably be charged with felony assault, but the Court questions whether he can also be charged with a § 922(g)(1) violation for possessing the gun during the assault. Given that Defendant C's possession would have been lawful at least up until the moment of the assault, hanging a felon-in-possession charge on his contemporaneous conduct—however dangerous it was—seems contrary to Williams.

Third and finally, the act of considering such allegations may raise Due Process concerns. In Section A of this opinion, the Court discussed why it may be problematic for district courts hearing Williams motions to consider certain sources of information about the underlying facts of past convictions that, in addition to not being judicially noticeable, may provide incomplete or otherwise unreliable accounts of those convictions. Such risks are particularly pressing with respect to past convictions that were obtained by guilty pleas and were therefore never subject to the fact-finding rigors of jury trial. See supra at –––– – ––––; Morris, 2025 WL 224685, at *3 (noting a law enforcement agent's account of a past offense from a state PSR may be unreliable and outside the realm of “other judicially noticeable information” under Williams). The same concerns and more are implicated when the Government proffers allegations about the underlying facts of a pending § 922(g)(1) charge as evidence of its as-applied constitutionality—more, that is, because conviction has not yet occurred. Considering such allegations, typically found outside the indictment, would allow the constitutionality of the charge to turn on conduct of which a defendant has not yet been found guilty. As compared to defendants facing, say, alleged facts about a past crime that were never found by a jury (because the defendant pled guilty, as most defendants do), a defendant challenging a pending § 922(g)(1) charge has not yet waived his right to a jury trial. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, then, there is serious reason to doubt whether considering allegations about the underlying facts of the charged offense could comport with Due Process.

Here, the Government invites the Court to consider underlying factual allegations about the car crash that led to Wynn's arrest for the current § 922(g)(1) charge. (See Doc. 154, at 1, 4.) It cites to statements of the bystander, one Mr. Garnsen Kras, as recorded in the Arrest Report, whom police interviewed at the scene after he witnessed the crash—namely that the “witness ‘ran behind cover’ because he ‘thought Mr. Wynn was going to start shooting.’ ” (Id. at 1 (quoting Doc. 154-1 (“Arrest Report”).) The Government then construes Mr. Kras's account of the accident as evidence of Wynn's continued dangerousness: “Wynn asserts that he never ‘menaced anyone’ with his handgun, but the evidence tells a different story. After he got in a car crash, he pulled out a handgun and made a witness run for cover out of fear that Wynn was going to start shooting.” (Id. at 4 (citations omitted).) The Government does not suggest this information is judicially noticeable, nor does it make any affirmative argument under Williams for why it may be considered on Wynn's motion to dismiss. (See id.)

The Court has serious doubts about whether it can consider the allegations in the Arrest Report under either Williams or the Due Process Clause, both for the general reasons outlined above and under these specific circumstances. For one thing, Mr. Kras's statements in the Arrest Report are arguably hearsay, offered by the Government to prove that Wynn posed a danger to Mr. Kras in that moment when he emerged from the car and Mr. Kras took cover.¹⁹ (See id. at 4.) It is also not clear what exactly transpired when Wynn allegedly emerged from the car with his gun. (See Doc. 154-1.) For example, the Arrest Report does not state that Wynn pointed his gun at Mr. Kras or at anyone else; indeed, it is not clear from the report that Wynn was even aware of Mr. Kras's presence at the scene. (See id.) Without such context, it is difficult to ascertain why Mr. Kras allegedly reacted in the way he did to seeing Wynn with a gun. For instance, perhaps Mr. Kras is a person who would be inclined to take cover whenever he saw a stranger holding a gun; this would not make Mr. Kras unreasonable, but it also would not make Wynn dangerous. Thus, even to the extent that Williams does permit consideration of allegations about the underlying facts of Wynn's pending § 922(g)(1) charge, the Court is not convinced that the alleged facts in the Arrest Report should carry much, if any, evidentiary weight.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Court has struggled with how to appropriately evaluate Wynn's dangerousness, and thus the as-applied constitutionality of the § 922(g)(1) charge against him, under Williams. Wynn's criminal history includes three category-one convictions (two for aggravated assault and one for facilitation of robbery), which alone is powerful evidence of dangerousness, as well as a more recent conviction for misdemeanor reckless endangerment. See Williams, 113 F.4th at 658. On the other hand, Wynn's category-one convictions are not particularly recent, and he committed them at seventeen and nineteen years old in the company of other offenders, which would tend to suggest some reduced culpability and, with it, a lower degree of probative value as to his lasting dangerousness. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011. There is also some evidence to suggest Wynn played a relatively minor role in the conduct that led to his category-one convictions (though the Court is also aware the written record before it may offer a less-than-complete picture of the evidence that led to those convictions).

All this notwithstanding, it is Wynn's burden under Williams to demonstrate he is not dangerous, see 113 F.4th at 657, and the Court finds he has failed to satisfy that burden. The Court is convinced, at least, that Wynn is less dangerous than the mere fact of his having three category-one convictions on his record would suggest, particularly based on his young age at the time of those crimes and the evidence suggesting his involvement in them was relatively minor. Yet Williams suggests it would take exceptional circumstances for a defendant who has committed category-one or -two crimes to satisfy his burden in an as-applied challenge. See id. at 663 (“An individual in either of these categories will have a very difficult time, to say the least, of showing he is not dangerous.”).²⁰ Here, especially given Wynn's more recent conviction for reckless endangerment and the absence of affirmative evidence of rehabilitation or reintegration, the Court is not convinced he has satisfied his burden.²¹

Accordingly, Wynn's motion to dismiss (Doc. 142) Count 1 of the superseding indictment is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Government's response states that “Wynn has twice been convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon.” (Doc. 154, at 3.) However, the copy of Wynn's record the Government attaches to demonstrate these convictions shows (a) an original judgment for this charge listing an arrest date of “3/23/2016” and an indictment date of “1/25/2017,” then (b) an amended judgment for the same charge listing identical dates (the latter judgment omitting two fees listed in the original, perhaps indicating a decision to waive those fees). (Doc. 154-2.) Based on this information, the Court believes that Wynn's record includes one felon-in-possession conviction, not two. Even two, however, would not change the Court's analysis.

2.   These alleged facts are based on Wynn's representations about the affidavit of complaint in the reply brief (Doc. 194); he attached a copy of the reckless-endangerment judgment (Doc. 194-6), which contains no factual details, but did not attach a copy of the affidavit of complaint.

3.   The Supreme Court framed this as a narrow constitutional holding—“we conclude only this”—in the sense that it “did not ‘undertake an exhaustive historical analysis ․ of the full scope of the Second Amendment.’ ” Id. (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 31, 142 S.Ct. 2111).

4.   Williams does not specify which burden of proof applies in this context. See id. at 657–63.

5.   Williams contemplates that “district courts addressing as-applied challenges need not be the sole mechanism by which the case-by-case determination [of dangerousness] may be made,” noting, for instance, that a statutory regime exists under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms to authorize felons to possess firearms. Id. at 661. Observing, however, that such a program “remains practically unavailable” due to a longstanding lack of congressional funding and that no other alternative exists, Williams embraces as-applied challenges to safeguard “non-dangerous felons’ Second Amendment rights.” Id.

6.   Williams says little about the outer limits of what “other judicially noticeable information” beyond a defendant's criminal record may be considered, though it does mention, as an example, the Rahimi court's consideration of a state-court-issued civil restraining order. Id. at 660; see id. at 658 n.12.

7.   The Williams court expressly reserves ruling on whether a crime in the first category is dispositive, though it finds it “hard to see how someone who commits such a dangerous and violent act may overcome the presumption that they are dangerous.” Id. at 658.

8.   There are too many such cases to list here. In coming to the approximately-65 figure, the Court counted only those motions to dismiss citing Williams that (a) moved to dismiss charges brought under § 922(g)(1) specifically (not counting motions seeking dismissal of charges brought under other provisions of § 922(g)); and (b) brought as-applied challenges (not counting motions that brought facial challenges only). These results also do not include the numerous orders on habeas petitions in this circuit that have cited Williams since it was issued; still, the Court also reviewed those, and each such habeas petition has been denied. These results do, however, include a small number of motions to reconsider denials of motions to dismiss § 922(g)(1) charges, where the motions for reconsiderations were filed after Williams was issued, including one where the defendant's only past conviction was for making a false statement to an FBI officer (a category-three crime under Williams). See United States v. Fein, No. 1:24-cr-58, 2025 WL 1120005, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2025).

9.   This may be true despite the best intentions and diligence of counsel. Particularly when a Williams review requires investigation of state-court convictions, federal attorneys on both sides may have trouble accessing relevant records.

10.   Nonetheless, the defense argues that “all of Mr. Wynn's prior convictions belong in category three, because none of the underlying conduct demonstrates that Mr. Wynn committed a crime against the body of another person, or that he engaged in inherently dangerous [conduct].” (Doc. 194, at 5.) The Court is not convinced, as it interprets Williams as mandating that any assault offense is a category-one offense. See 113 F.4th at 658. This reading is consistent with the opinion's establishment of categories of crimes as examples to illustrate each level of its tripartite structure (e.g., “murder, rape, assault, and robbery”; “mail fraud, tax fraud, or making false statements”) without elaboration regarding the underlying details of the offense (Williams could have said, for instance, “assault when the defendant possessed a deadly weapon,” but it did not). See id. at 658, 663. This reading is also consistent with applications of Williams thus far, as the Court is aware of no precedents from the Sixth Circuit or other district courts that support adjusting the category level of a prior conviction based on the particular conduct at issue. What Williams contemplates instead is that, although all assaults are category-one crimes, not all assaults are equally probative of dangerousness. See id. at 660.

11.   The Court will discuss specific issues pertaining to this conviction in Section D. See infra at –––– – ––––.

12.   Defense counsel appears to go further in portions of the reply brief by suggesting that some of Wynn's convictions, including the aggravated assaults, may have been invalid. Specifically, the reply brief suggests Wynn may not have been factually guilty of (1) the two counts of aggravated assault, because the facts alleged at the transfer hearing did not suggest Wynn had the requisite intent to commit assault on the theory that, inter alia, he may not have known the armed assailants who came up behind the victim intended to attack him; (2) the facilitation of robbery conviction, on the theory that Wynn may have been a mere passenger in the car and not involved in the robbery; and (3) the reckless-endangerment conviction, on the theory that no person was within the zone of danger of Wynn's fire. (See Doc. 194, at 3–5.)The validity of Wynn's past convictions is not before the Court (this is not a habeas proceeding), and the Court does not believe it would be permissible or appropriate to grant a Williams motion on the ground that it finds the defendant's past convictions invalid or not supported by sufficient evidence.

13.   This reading would also be consistent with the factors courts consider when applying 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to motions for compassionate release or sentence reductions, which likewise require individualized examination of a defendant's post-conviction history. Indeed, the Williams court likens dangerousness determinations to applications of the § 3553 factors. See 113 F.4th at 657.

14.   Consider some further implications here. If indeed Williams permits or even requires that a defendant be offered the same opportunity to bring an as-applied challenge to subsequent § 922(g)(1) prosecutions, that means that the same felon (1) could be lawfully convicted at one point in time, after a court found he was dangerous on a Williams motion, then (2) after completing his sentence, perhaps some time after the predicate felony that led to that earlier § 922(g)(1) charge, could prevail on a second Williams motion; in this scenario, the lawful disarming of the defendant in the earlier § 922(g)(1) prosecution will not have been permanent. (The same sequence might result if a person who has previously been convicted of violating § 922(g)(1), having completed his sentence long ago, later brings a pre-enforcement as-applied challenge on the basis that he plans to purchase a firearm should he be found non-dangerous under Williams.) The Court finds this interpretation—that Williams permits felons to bring as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) at multiple points in time—to be more consistent with both Rahimi’s focus on temporary disarmament based on dangerousness and Williams’s own insistence on individualized, fact-intensive review. See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 702, 144 S.Ct. 1889; Williams, 113 F.4th at 660.If it is the case, though, that a felon gets only one bite at the Williams apple, a few problems may arise. Such a rule could create an undesirable chilling effect in which defendants might refrain from asserting their Second Amendment rights (even when a colorable case for non-dangerousness might exist) out of a hope that they might fare better under Williams review in the future. It is also unclear whether, in such a scenario, a defendant's failure to raise on as-applied challenge to a first § 922(g)(1) charge could constitute waiver. On the other hand, consider a felon who brings an as-applied challenge to a first § 922(g)(1) charge and prevails; if that felon were to become dangerous in the future, surely it would defeat the point of both Williams and the statute if that first holding would then shield him from subsequent § 922(g)(1) prosecutions.

15.   In his concurrence, Judge Bush conducted a separate Bruen analysis and concluded the Nation's history and tradition of firearm regulation supports only temporary disarmament of offenders like Goins: “the evidence suggests our nation's history and tradition do not support permanent disarmament because of prior convictions related to drunkenness or the misuse of drugs when, as here, the earlier illegal conduct did not involve a firearm.” Id. at 805. While reasonable minds may disagree on what a given body of historical evidence shows, this concurrence is of a piece with the Supreme Court's hesitance to embrace permanent disarmament in Rahimi. See 602 U.S. at 702, 144 S.Ct. 1889.

16.   The Court refers to this case using the defendant's full name to avoid confusion.

17.   Much like Schrödinger's famous paradox, in which a cat is considered simultaneously dead and alive while confined in an unopened box, a § 922(g)(1) conviction that was not subject to Williams review at the time may be considered indicative of both dangerousness and non-dangerousness. To the extent one believes Defendant B was dangerous at the time of the robbery and remained dangerous at the time he acquired the gun, his possession might be construed as evidence of continued dangerousness. Alternately, to the extent Defendant B might have become non-dangerousness by the time he acquired the gun (perhaps under the circumstances the Court posits in the following analysis), the prior, pre-Williams § 922(g)(1) conviction will have no probative value for dangerousness at all. But either way, since the prior § 922(g)(1) was never subjected to Williams review (and thus remains, as it were, unopened) its probative value remains unclear.

18.   Notably, Fordham does not purport to enlarge the scope of what district courts may consider on Williams review, nor does it comment on whether the allegations it considers about the underlying facts of the defendant's § 922(g)(1) charge might be judicially noticeable. See 2025 WL 318229 at *4–5.

19.   Wynn also did not have an opportunity to confront Mr. Kras; though, even assuming arguendo that the Confrontation Clause applies in this context, he likely would have waived his confrontation rights when he waived his dangerousness hearing. (See Docs. 179, 180.) It is also not clear whether the Rules of Evidence apply to dangerousness determinations under Williams. See 113 F.4th at 657–63. Nonetheless, to the extent that Mr. Kras's statements can be considered hearsay, that is reason to doubt their reliability and probative value.

20.   Recall that Williams does not specify which burden of proof applies, see id. at 657–63; still, for purposes of this motion, the Court assumes it is preponderance of the evidence.

21.   In reaching this conclusion, the Court gives no weight to Wynn's existing felon-in-possession conviction. The Court also does not reach the issue of whether to consider allegations about the underlying circumstances Wynn's of present § 922(g)(1) charge, specifically those drawn from the Arrest Report.

TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE