JENNA JOHLIN THOMPSON v. WSFX LLC (2026)

ORDER

On November 17, 2023, Jenna Johlin-Thompson (“Johlin-Thompson” or “plaintiff”) filed this action against WSFX LLC (“WSFX” or “defendant”) for religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. and failure to accommodate in violation of Title VII. See [D.E. 1] ¶¶ 35–40. On February 2, 2024, WSFX moved to dismiss Johlin-Thompson's complaint [D.E. 12]. On June 7, 2024, the court granted WSFX's motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. See Johlin-Thompson v. WSFX LLC, 736 F. Supp. 3d 328 (E.D.N.C. 2024). On June 27, 2024, Johlin-Thompson filed an amended complaint [D.E. 26]. On August 8, 2024, WSFX moved to dismiss the amended complaint [D.E. 29]. On November 18, 2024, the court granted WSFX's motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with prejudice [D.E. 32, 33]. On July 28, 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed this court's order and judgment. See Johlin-Thompson v. WSFX LLC, No. 24-2165, 2025 WL 2104984 (4th Cir. July 28, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished).

On January 27, 2026, Johlin-Thompson, proceeding pro se, moved for relief from judgment [D.E. 42] and filed an affidavit in support with exhibits [D.E. 43]. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). On February 17, 2026, WSFX responded in opposition [D.E. 44]. On April 9, 2026, Johlin-Thompson replied [D.E. 45]. As explained below, the court denies Johlin-Thompson's motion for relief from judgment.

I.

Under Rule 60(b), a moving party must first demonstrate that (1) her motion is timely, (2) she has a meritorious claim or defense, and (3) the nonmoving party will not suffer unfair prejudice from setting aside the judgment. See, e.g., Clear Touch Interactive, Inc. v. Ockers Co., 171 F.4th 715, 728 (4th Cir. 2026); Allen v. Stein, 165 F.4th 272, 288–89 (4th Cir. 2026); United States v. Welsh, 879 F.3d 530, 533 (4th Cir. 2018); Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 412 n.12 (4th Cir. 2010); Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Gray, 1 F.3d 262, 264 (4th Cir. 1993); Werner v. Carbo, 731 F.2d 204, 206–07 (4th Cir. 1984). If the moving party meets her initial burden, then the moving party must “satisfy one of the six enumerated grounds for relief under Rule 60(b).” Gray, 1 F.3d at 266; see Daulatzai v. Maryland, 97 F.4th 166, 178 (4th Cir. 2024); Welsh, 879 F.3d at 533.

Johlin-Thompson seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (3), (6), and (d)(3). See [D.E. 42] 4–5; [D.E. 43] 1. To demonstrate that her motion is timely under Rule 60(b), Johlin-Thompson must show that she moved for relief “within a reasonable time,” and for motions under Rule 60(b)(1) and (3), “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1); see Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton Tr. for Vista-Pro Auto., LLC, 146 S. Ct. 579, 583 (2026); Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533 (2022) (“All [Rule 60(b) motions] must be filed within a reasonable time.” (quotation and citation omitted)). The one-year time limit for motions brought under Rule 60(b)(1) and (3) “is an outer limit of what may be timely.” United States v. Williams, 56 F.4th 366, 370 (4th Cir. 2023).

Johlin-Thompson concedes in her reply brief that her motion is untimely under Rule 60(b)(1) and (3). See [D.E. 45] 4 (“Thompson acknowledges that ․ her motion was filed January 27, 2026, and is untimely [under Rule 60(b)(1) and (3)].”). Johlin-Thompson filed her motion over a year after this court entered judgment. See [D.E. 32, 33, 42]. Johlin-Thompson's appeal did not toll Rule 60(c)(1)'s one-year time limit. See, e.g., Tool Box, Inc. v. Ogden City Corp., 419 F.3d 1084, 1088–89 (10th Cir. 2005); Wyche v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., 332 F.R.D. 109, 113–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (collecting cases); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(2). Thus, Johlin-Thompson's motion fails under Rule 60(b)(1) and (3).

As for Johlin-Thompson's motion under Rule 60(b)(6), the motion also is untimely. The Fourth Circuit has held that “a Rule 60(b) motion is not timely brought when it is made three to four months after the original judgment and no valid reason is given for the delay.” McLawhom v. John W. Daniel & Co., 924 F.2d 535, 538 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (collecting cases); see Ho Won Jeong v. Cabrera, 799 F. App'x 185, 186 (4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (unpublished) (affirming district court's denial of Rule 60(b)(3) motion when made 11 months after judgment); Nat'l Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 47 F.3d 667, 669 (4th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (affirming district court's denial of Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) motion when made over a year after judgment); Johnson v. Goodwin, 691 F. Supp. 3d 711, 715 (M.D.N.C. 2023) (holding that Rule 60(b) motions were untimely when filed more than 14 months after judgment). Johlin-Thompson filed her motion for relief from judgment over a year after the court entered judgment and has not provided a valid reason for the delay. Thus, Johlin-Thompson did not file her motion within a reasonable time.

Alternatively, a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used to avoid the time limits of Rule 60(b)'s other provisions when the request for relief falls under Rule 60(b)'s other provisions. See, e.g., Kemp, 596 U.S. at 533–39; Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993) (describing Rule 60(b)(1)–(5) as “mutually exclusive” of Rule 60(b)(6)); Williams, 56 F.4th at 373; Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 500 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

Johlin-Thompson states that she did not understand the legal import of certain documents she possessed when her attorney filed her original and amended complaints until after the court dismissed her amended complaint. See [D.E. 42] 3–4; [D.E. 45] 4–5. Johlin-Thompson's mistake or inadvertence falls under Rule 60(b)(1), and she cannot use Rule 60(b)(6). See Kemp, 596 U.S. at 533–39; Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 507 U.S. at 393; Williams, 56 F.4th at 373; Aikens, 652 F.3d at 500.

Next, Johlin-Thompson accuses WSFX of litigating the case “based on structural falsehoods.” [D.E. 45] 5; see [D.E. 42] 4–5.¹ This argument rests on alleged fraud by an opposing party and is not an “other reason” under Rule 60(b)(6). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); see, e.g., Kemp, 596 U.S. at 533–39; Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 507 U.S. at 393; Williams, 56 F.4th at 373; Aikens, 652 F.3d at 500. Accordingly, Johlin-Thompson's motion does not state grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), and Johlin-Thompson's motion fails under Rule 60(b)(6).

As for Johlin-Thompson's motion under Rule 60(d)(3), Rule 60(d)(3) provides that the court may set aside a judgment at any time for “fraud on the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3). Such motions “permit[ ] a court to exercise its inherent equitable powers to obviate a final judgment after one year for fraud on the court.” Fox ex rel. Fox v. Elk Run Coal Co., Inc., 739 F.3d 131, 135–36 (4th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). Fraud on the court is distinct from ordinary fraud, and the doctrine must be “construed very narrowly” to prevent litigants from circumventing the time restrictions applicable to motions under Rule 60(b). Id. at 136 (citation omitted); Great Coastal Exp., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 675 F.2d 1349, 1356 (4th Cir. 1982). Fraud on the court requires “an intentional plot to deceive the judiciary” and must “touch on the public interest in a way that fraud between individual parties generally does not.” Fox, 739 F.3d at 136. Fraud between the parties, even if it rises to the level of perjury or fabricated evidence, is “not adequate to permit relief as fraud on the court” under Rule 60(d)(3). Id.; Great Coastal, 675 F.2d at 1357. Johlin-Thompson must “prove the misconduct complained of by clear and convincing evidence.” McLawhorn, 924 F.2d at 538 (citation omitted).

Johlin-Thompson has not demonstrated fraud on the court by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Fox, 739 F.3d at 136; Great Coastal, 675 F.2d at 1357. Thus, Johlin-Thompson's motion fails under Rule 60(d)(3).

II.

In sum, the court DENIES plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment [D.E. 42].

SO ORDERED. This 19 day of May, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   WSFX moved to dismiss Johlin-Thompson's complaints under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See [D.E. 12, 29]. WSFX's motions properly outlined the factual and legal deficiencies of Johlin-Thompson's complaints. Johlin-Thompson's accusations are meritless. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–63 (2008).

JAMES C. DEVER III United States District Judge