HILL v. PSAN PI WD TRUST (2026)

ORDER

On August 6, 2025, in Cumberland County Superior Court, Rakiya Hill (“Hill” or “plaintiff”) filed a complaint against PSAN PI/WD Trust d/b/a “The Takata Airbag Tort Compensation Trust Fund” (“the Trust”) and Bryant Chisholm (“Chisholm” or “defendant Chisholm”) (collectively “defendants”). See Compl. [D.E. 1-1]. Hill alleges a claim against the Trust for negligence and strict liability (claim one) and claims against Chisholm for negligence (claim two), misrepresentation (claim three), and breach of contract (claim four). See id. ¶¶ 63-90.

On September 5, 2025, the Trust removed the action to this court [D.E. 1]. On September 6, 2025, the Trust filed an amended notice of removal with exhibits [D.E. 5]. On October 3, 2025, Hill moved to remand the case [D.E. 15] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 16]. On October 24, 2025, the Trust responded in opposition [D.E. 17]. On November 25, 2025, Hill moved for service by publication and for an extension of time (60 days) to complete service on Chisholm [D.E. 18]. On December 2, 2025, the court granted Hill's motion for service by publication and extension to complete service [D.E. 19]. On January 7, 2026, Hill notified the court that she served Chisholm by publication and filed an affidavit [D.E. 20, 20-1]. As explained below, Hill fraudulently joined Chisholm. Thus, the court dismisses Chisholm from this action, and diversity jurisdiction exists. Accordingly, the court denies Hill's motion to remand.

I.

Honda designed, developed, manufactured, assembled, tested, produced, and distributed the 2003 Acura CL vehicle line, including the 2003 Acura CL (VIN: 19UYA42493A000859) (“Subject Acura”). See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 36. In April 2011, American Honda Motor Co., Inc (“American Honda”) identified a defect in various Honda and Acura vehicles equipped with Takata driver side airbag inflators. See [D.E. 5-2]¶ 9. On August 14, 2015, American Honda initiated NHTSA Safety Recall 15V-320 (“Subject Recall”) for vehicles equipped with the Takata driver side airbag inflators. See id. ¶11. The Subject Acura was included in the Subject Recall. See id.

To locate affected vehicle owners, American Honda requested and received updated registered owner information from state Departments of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”). See id. ¶¶ 7, 12. To ensure continued accuracy of the Subject Recall campaign, American Honda requested and received updated registered owner information from state DMVs every six months. See id. ¶ 13. For the Subject Acura, the North Carolina DMV repeatedly identified Patrick M. Costello (“Costello”) as the registered owner of the Subject Acura from January 2005 until 2023. See id. ¶¶ 12, 14. In 2018 and 2019, American Honda confirmed that Costello owned the Subject Acura through in-person contacts during canvassing efforts. See id. ¶ 15.

In February 2020, Costello told American Honda that he no longer owned the Subject Acura but refused to identify the new owner. See id. In fact, on an unknown date, Costello had sold the Subject Acura to Chisholm. Although Costello sold Chisholm the Subject Acura, the North Carolina DMV reports continued to designate Costello as the Subject Acura's registered owner. See id. ¶ 16. Because the North Carolina DMV and American Honda never identified Chisholm as the registered owner, American Honda never notified Chisholm about the Subject Recall. See id. ¶ 17. Then, in May 2023, Chisholm sold the Subject Acura to Hill. See Compl. ¶ 37. North Carolina DMV records sent to American Honda show that Hill replaced Costello as the registered owner of the Subject Acura in May 2023. See [D.E. 5-2] ¶ 16.

On June 16, 2023, Hill crashed while driving the Subject Acura. See Compl. ¶ 38. The Subject Acura's driver-side airbag deployed, and the “airbag's [Takata] inflator ruptured, exploded, and shot metal shrapnel throughout the vehicle cabin.” Id. ¶ 40. Large pieces of shrapnel struck Hill's head and body, “severely and permanently” injuring Hill. Id. ¶¶ 41–42.

On August 6, 2025, Hill filed a complaint against Chisholm and the Trust in Cumberland County Superior Court. See Compl. On September 5, 2025, the Trust removed the action to this court [D.E. 1]. On October 3, 2025, Hill moved to remand the case [D.E. 15] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 16]. The Trust responded in opposition [D.E. 17] and argues that snap removal and fraudulent joinder offer independent bases for the case to remain in federal court.

II.

The Trust argues that Hill (a North Carolina citizen) failed to serve Chisholm (a North Carolina citizen) before the Trust removed this action to federal court; therefore, the Trust argues that snap removal applies under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), and the action can remain in federal court without a finding of fraudulent joinder.¹

The Trust cannot use snap removal to bypass the complete diversity requirement under section 1332(a). “Snap removal has nothing to do with the complete-diversity requirement. It offers a potential solution to a different problem: the forum-defendant rule.” M & B Oil, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 66 F.4th 1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 2023). Section 1441(b)(2), otherwise known as the forum-defendant rule, keeps a case in state court that is “otherwise removable solely” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) if any “properly joined and served” defendant “is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). Snap removal describes when a defendant removes the case to federal court before the plaintiff “properly․ serve[s]” the forum-defendant. Id. Although the Fourth Circuit has not addressed it, various circuits have upheld snap removal. See Tex. Brine Co. v. Am. Arb. Ass'n, 955 F.3d 482, 485–87 (5th Cir. 2020); Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699, 704–07 (2d Cir. 2019); Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest, Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 151–54 (3d Cir. 2018); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 813 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001).

“[S]nap removal cannot cure a lack of complete diversity.” M & B Oil, Inc., 66 F.4th at 1110; see In re Levy, 52 F.4th 244, 247–48 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam). Under section 1332(a), complete diversity requires “the citizenship of each plaintiff to be different from the citizenship of each defendant,” and “is assessed at the time the action is filed.” Jones v. CertusBank NA, 605 F. App'x 218, 219 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (cleaned up); Hoschar v. Appalachian Power Co., 739 F.3d 163, 170 (4th Cir. 2014); see Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996); Freenort-McMoRan, Inc. v. KN Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428, 111 S.Ct. 858, 112 L.Ed.2d 951 (1991). The plain text of section 1441(b)(2) first requires that the civil action be “otherwise removable solely ․ under section 1332(a) of this title,” meaning complete diversity is a condition to removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). Section 1441(b)(2) “then adds a further limitation based on the citizenship of the defendant. It does not subtract the requirement that the parties be completely diverse.” M & B Oil, Inc., 66 F.4th at 1110; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); see also Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. at 68, 117 S.Ct. 467 (“When a plaintiff files in state court a civil action over which the federal district courts would have original jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, the defendant or defendants may remove the action to federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), provided that no defendant ‘is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought,’ § 1441(b).”). Hill and Chisholm are North Carolina citizens. See Compl. ¶¶ 17, 33; [D.E. 5] ¶¶ 27, 31. Thus, snap removal does not cure the lack of complete diversity and does not permit this case to remain in federal court. See M & B Oil, Inc., 66 F.4th at 1110; In re Levy, 52 F.4th at 247–48.

III.

Next, the Trust argues that “several, independent reasons” show that Hill fraudulently joined Chisholm and that, without Chisholm, complete diversity exists: (1) North Carolina's broad statute of repose for defective products bars Hill's claims against Chisholm; (2) Hill has no intention of securing a verdict against Chisholm because the Trust must pay “the entirety of” any verdict Hill receives; and (3) Hill cannot succeed on the merits of her claims against Chisholm. [D.E. 17] 1–2; see id. at 9–17.

“[F]ederal courts, unlike most state courts, are courts of limited jurisdiction,” that Congress created “with specified jurisdictional requirements and limitations.” Strawn v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 296 (4th Cir. 2008); see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Removal from state court requires the federal district court to have original jurisdiction over the removed action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Enbridee Energy, LP v. Nessel ex rel. Michigan, ––– U.S. ––––, 146 S. Ct. 1074, 1079, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2026); Lontz v. Tharp, 413 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, a defendant generally may remove an action to federal court only if the face of the complaint demonstrates diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); Enbridee Energy, LP, 146 S. Ct. at 1079; Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 n.2, 122 S.Ct. 1889, 153 L.Ed.2d 13 (2002); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987); W. Va. State Univ. Bd. of Governors v. Dow Chem. Co., 23 F.4th 288, 297 (4th Cir. 2022).

In a case removed from state court, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The party seeking removal has the “burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.” Mulcahev v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994); see, e.g., Republican Nat'l Comm. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 120 F.4th 390, 398 (4th Cir. 2024); Hughes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 617 F. App'x 261, 263 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished). “If diversity jurisdiction is challenged, the burden of proof remains on the party invoking federal court jurisdiction, and the citizenship of each real party in interest must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.” Roche v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 373 F.3d 610, 616 (4th Cir. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 546 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 606, 163 L.Ed.2d 415 (2005). “Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, [the court] must strictly construe removal jurisdiction.” Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151: see Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941). “If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary.” Mulcahev, 29 F.3d at 151; see Common Cause v. Lewis, 956 F.3d 246, 252 (4th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). In a case removed based on diversity jurisdiction, the civil action must be between “citizens of different States” and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

The doctrine of fraudulent joinder allows a federal district court to “disregard, for jurisdictional purposes, the citizenship of certain nondiverse defendants, assume jurisdiction over a case, dismiss the nondiverse defendants, and thereby retain jurisdiction.” Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 1999); see, e.g., Skidmore v. Schinke, 171 F.4th 319, 323 (4th Cir. 2026). “To show fraudulent joinder, the removing party must demonstrate either outright fraud in the plaintiff's pleading of jurisdictional facts or that there is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant in state court.” Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up); see Skidmore, 171 F.4th at 324; Weidman v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 776 F.3d 214, 218 (4th Cir. 2015); Turner v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 543 F. App'x 300, 301 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished); Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1993); Higgs v. Brian Ctr. Health & Ret./Windsor, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 3d 439, 446–48 (E.D.N.C. 2019).

To establish that Hill has no possibility of establishing a negligence claim, a misrepresentation claim, and a breach of contract claim against Chisholm, defendants must show that there would be no “glimmer of hope” or even a “slight possibility of a right to relief” against Chisholm in state court. Hartley, 187 F.3d at 426; see Johnson v. Am. Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693, 704 (4th Cir. 2015). Under this standard, the court resolves all doubtful issues of law and fact in Hill's favor. See Skidmore, 171 F.4th at 324; Johnson, 781 F.3d at 704; Hartley, 187 F.3d at 424.

“[T]o determine whether an attempted joinder is fraudulent, the court is not bound by the allegations of the pleadings, but may instead consider the entire record, and determine the basis of joinder by any means available.” AIDS Counseling & Testing Ctrs. v. Grp. W Television, Inc., 903 F.2d 1000, 1004 (4th Cir. 1990) (cleaned up); see Skidmore, 171 F.4th at 324–25; Balt. Cnty. v. Cigna Healthcare, 238 F. App'x 914, 920 (4th Cir. 2007) (unpublished); Boss v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 228 F. App'x 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished); Mayes, 198 F.3d at 464. The court may take judicial notice of documents attached to the notice of removal. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 201; cf. Lolavar v. de Santibanes, 430 F.3d 221, 224 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005).

Hill's motion to remand requires the court to consider Hill's North Carolina state law claims. See Compl. ¶¶ 63–90. Accordingly, this court must predict how the Supreme Court of North Carolina would rule on any disputed state law issue. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Ben Arnold-Sunbelt Beverage Co. of S.C., 433 F.3d 365, 369 (4th Cir. 2005). In doing so, the court must look first to opinions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. See id.; Parkway 1046, LLC v. U.S. Home Corp., 961 F.3d 301, 306 (4th Cir. 2020); Stahle v. CTS Corp., 817 F.3d 96, 100 (4th Cir. 2016). If there are no governing opinions from the Supreme Court of North Carolina, this court may consider the opinions of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, treatises, and “the practices of other states.” Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 433 F.3d at 369 (citation omitted). In predicting how the highest court of a state would address an issue, this court must “follow the decision of an intermediate state appellate court unless there is persuasive data that the highest court would decide differently.” Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391, 398 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 630 & n.3, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988). Moreover, in predicting how the highest court of a state would address an issue, this court “should not create or expand a [s]tate's public policy.” Time Warner Ent.-Advance/Newhouse P'ship v. Carteret-Craven Elec. Membership Corp., 506 F.3d 304, 314 (4th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up); see Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4, 96 S.Ct. 167, 46 L.Ed.2d 3 (1975) (per curiam); Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 1999).

Under North Carolina General Statute § 1-50(a)(6), “No action for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death or damage to property based upon or arising out of any alleged defect or any failure in relation to a product shall be brought more than six years after the date of initial purchase for use or consumption.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(6) (repealed 2009 and replaced with a 12-year time limit in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-46.1). Section 1-50(a)(6) is incorporated into North Carolina's products liability statute, which describes the actions to which section 1-50(a)(6) applies as “any action brought for or on account of personal injury, death or property damage caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formulation, development of standards, preparation, processing, assembly, testing, listing, certifying, warning, instructing, marketing, selling, advertising, packaging, or labeling of any product.” Id. § 99B-1(3); see also Lindsay v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.C., 725 F. Supp. 278, 281 (W.D.N.C. 1989); Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 314 N.C. 44, 50, 332 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1985).

Section 1-50(a)(6) is a statute of repose and sets “a fixed limit after the time of the product's manufacture, sale, or delivery beyond which a plaintiff's claim will not be recognized.” Boudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 340, 368 S.E.2d 849, 856 (1988). A statute of repose “constitutes a substantive definition of, rather than a procedural limitation on, rights.” Davis v. Mobilift Equip. Co., 70 N.C. App. 621, 622, 320 S.E.2d 406, 407 (1984) (citation omitted); Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 426, 302 S.E.2d 868, 872 (1983). Under a statute of repose, “unless the injury occurs within the [defined time] period, there is no cognizable claim.” Davis, 70 N.C. App. at 622, 320 S.E.2d at 407 (citation omitted); Lamb, 308 N.C. at 426, 302 S.E.2d at 872; see Boudreau, 322 N.C. at 341, 368 S.E.2d at 857 (“If the action is not brought within the specified period, the plaintiff “literally has no cause of action,” and “[t]he harm that has been done is damnum absque iniuria—a wrong for which the law affords no redress.” (cleaned up)).

In 2009, North Carolina General Statute § 1-46.1 repealed and replaced section 1-50(a)(6), extending the time to file a claim from six years to twelve years for causes of action accruing on or after October 1, 2009. See S.L. 2009-420, § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 808; see Weiss v. Cont'l Aerospace Techs., Inc., 298 N.C. App. 293, 296, 914 S.E.2d 66, 69 (2025). Under both the current and repealed statutes, the repose period begins to run on “the date of initial purchase for use or consumption.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-46.1(1), 1-50(a)(6); Cacha v. Montaco, Inc., 147 N.C. App. 21, 23–27, 554 S.E.2d 388, 390–92 (2001) (discussing the meaning of “initial purchase for use or consumption”). Thus, for products first delivered or purchased before October 1, 2009, the six-year statute of repose applies. See Weiss, 298 N.C. App. at 296–97, 914 S.E.2d at 69; see, e.g., Robinson v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 209 N.C. App. 310, 315, 703 S.E.2d 883, 886–87 (2011); see also Colony Hill Condo. I Ass'n v. Colony Co., 70 N.C. App. 390, 394, 320 S.E.2d 273, 276 (1984) (recognizing that a statute of repose grants the defendant a vested right not to be sued which cannot be impaired by the retroactive effect of a later statute).

Section 1-50(a)(6) applies to claims that are “based upon” or “aris[e] out of” an alleged defect or failure in relation to a product. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(6) (stating that “[n]o action for the recovery of damages for personal injury ․ or damage to property based upon or arising out of any alleged defect or any failure in relation to a product” (emphasis added)); id. § 1-46.1(a)(1) (same). Section l-50(a)(6)'s generality “indicates that the legislature intended to cover the multiplicity of claims that can arise out of a defective product.” Voel v. LVD Corp., 132 N.C. App. 797, 802, 514 S.E.2d 113, 116 (1999); Colony Hill Condo. I Ass'n, 70 N.C. App. at 395, 320 S.E.2d at 277; see also Nat'l Prop. Invs., VIII v. Shell Oil Co., 950 F. Supp. 710, 713 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (“All products liability claims, regardless of their nature, are subject to this statute.” (emphasis added)); Adams v. A.J. Ballard, Jr. Tire & Oil Co., No. 1CVS1271, 2006 WL 1875965, at *24 (N.C. Bus. Ct. June 30, 2006) (unpublished) (applying section 1-50(a)(6) to claims for “gross negligence, unfair and deceptive trade practices, conspiracy, fraud, and public nuisance” because the claims “all derive from the product liability claims”). For example, contract claims that “aris[e] out of” a defective product are subject to section 1-50(a)(6). See Colony Hill Condo. I Ass'n, 70 N.C. App. at 395–96, 320 S.E.2d at 277 (applying section 1-50(a)(6) to “claims of breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, breach of express warranty, and negligence in design of the fireplace and in failure to warn”).

Hill alleges three claims against Chisholm: negligence (claim two), misrepresentation (claim three), and breach of contract (claim four). As for the Subject Acura, an initial retailer purchased the Subject Acura in 2002 (24 years ago), and Costello became the first registered owner in 2005 (21 years ago). See [D.E. 5-2] ¶ 14. Because the Subject Acura was purchased before October 1, 2009, the six-year statute applies to Hill's products liability claims. See Weiss, 298 N.C. App. at 296–97, 914 S.E.2d at 69; Robinson, 209 N.C. App. at 315, 703 S.E.2d at 886–87. Thus, Hill cannot recover on claims that are “action[s] for the recovery of damages for personal injury ․ based upon or arising out of any alleged defect or any failure in relation to a product.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(6).

As for claims two and three, both claims allege that Chisholm failed to warn Hill about a product defect. See Compl. ¶ 74 (“Chisholm owed a duty to inform Plaintiff about the dangerous condition hidden in the Subject Acura Vehicle.”); id. ¶ 80 (“Chisholm owed a duty to inform Plaintiff about the dangerous condition hidden in the Subject Acura Vehicle.”). Section 1-50(a)(6) dooms these claims. See, e.g., DeVito v. Biomet. Inc., No. 5:23-CV-185, 2024 WL 1289805, at *1, *3 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 2024) (unpublished); Cramer v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 1:20-CV-95, 2021 WL 243872, at *1, *3–4 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 25, 2021) (unpublished); Colony Hill Condo. I Ass'n, 70 N.C. App. at 395–96, 320 S.E.2d at 277. Thus, Hill has no cognizable claim for negligence or misrepresentation against Chisholm.

As for claim four, Hill argues that her breach of contract claim is not a products liability claim under section 1-50(a)(6); therefore, claim four survives against Chisholm, and fraudulent joinder does not apply. See [D.E. 16] 5–6. The court disagrees. Hill's breach of contract claim arises out of an alleged defect in the Takata airbag inflator. In her complaint, Hill alleges that she entered into a contract with Chisholm to purchase the Subject Acura. An “essential material term” of that contract was “that the Subject Acura” was in “good condition and safe to drive,” and Hill contends that Chisholm breached this material term because of the product defect, which resulted in “personal injuries” and property damage. Compl. ¶¶ 86, 90. At bottom, Hill's contract claim against Chisholm is an “action for the recovery of damages for personal injury ․ [and] damage to property based upon [and] arising out of an[ ] alleged defect” in the Takata airbag inflator. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(6). Thus, section 1-50(a)(6) bars Hill's contract claim against Chisholm. See Nat'l Prop. Invs., VIII, 950 F. Supp. at 713; Vogl, 132 N.C. App. at 802, 514 S.E.2d at 116; Colony Hill Condo. I Ass'n, 70 N.C. App. at 395, 320 S.E.2d at 277; Adams, 2006 WL 1875965, at *24; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-1(3) (defining a products liability action as “any action brought for or on account of personal injury, death, or property damage caused by or resulting from the ․ selling ․ of any product” (emphasis added)).

There is no “glimmer of hope” or even a “slight possibility of a right to relief” for Hill's claims against Chisholm in state court. Hartley, 187 F.3d at 426; see Johnson, 781 F.3d at 704. Thus, fraudulent joinder applies, and the court dismisses Chisholm from this case.

Although the court's analysis focused on the complete diversity requirement, section 1332(a) also requires that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). A “defendant's notice of removal need[s] [to] include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89, 135 S.Ct. 547, 190 L.Ed.2d 495 (2014). Furthermore, evidence establishing the amount in controversy is required “only when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant's allegation.” Id. Here, Hill does not contest that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and the Trust plausibly alleges that the amount exceeds that threshold. See [D.E. 5] 9. Thus, all section 1332(a) requirements are met, and diversity jurisdiction exists. Accordingly, the court denies Hill's motion to remand. In light of this conclusion, the court does not address the Trust's additional arguments.

IV.

In sum, the court DISMISSES defendant Chisholm from this action and DENIES plaintiff's motion to remand [D.E. 15].

SO ORDERED. This 14 day of May, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the parties agree that the Trust is diverse from Hill and Chisholm.

JAMES C. DEVER III, United States District Judge