ALDARRIS ELLIOTT v. CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE (2026)

ORDER

On September 23, 2025, Aldarris Elliott (“Elliott” or “plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in Cumberland County Superior Court against the City of Fayetteville (“the City” or “defendant”) and others. See [D.E. 1-3] 4–22. On November 2, 2025, Elliott amended the complaint naming only the City. See [D.E. 1-4]. Elliott alleges a Monell claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of his due process rights, “including his liberty interest in familial association and the right to a fundamentally fair process of justice,” and a gross negligence claim under North Carolina law. Id. at 3. Elliott's claims arise from the Fayetteville Police Department's (“FPD”) alleged failure to investigate properly the murders of Elliott's brother and cousin and the subsequent acquittal of one defendant charged with the murders. See id. Elliott seeks damages and injunctive relief. See id. at 3–4.

On November 5, 2025, the City removed the action to this court based on federal question jurisdiction. See [D.E. 1] 1–3. On November 7, 2025, Elliott moved for leave to file a first amended complaint. See [D.E. 10]. On November 18, 2025, Elliott moved for leave to file a second amended complaint. See [D.E. 11].

On November 25, 2025, the City moved to dismiss Elliott's amended complaint and filed a memorandum in support. See [D.E. 12, 13]; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2), (6). On November 25, 2025, the City responded in opposition to Elliott's motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. See [D.E. 16]. That same day, Elliott responded in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss and in support of his motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. See [D.E. 17]. On December 1, 2025, the City responded in opposition to Elliott's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. See [D.E. 18].

On December 2, 2025, Elliott replied in support of his motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. See [D.E. 19]. On December 4, 2025, the City replied in support of its motion to dismiss Elliott's amended complaint. See [D.E. 21].

On December 5, 2025, Elliott moved to file a sur-reply in support of his motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. See [D.E. 22]. On December 10, 2025, Elliott moved to file supplemental authority. See [D.E. 24].

As explained below, the court grants the City's motion to dismiss the federal claim in Elliott's amended complaint, denies as futile Elliott's motions for leave to file his first and second amended complaint, denies Elliott's motion to file a sur-reply, grants Elliotts' motion to file supplemental authority, and remands Elliott's state law claim to Cumberland County Superior Court.

I.

On May 31, 2023, a shooting occurred in Fayetteville. Aljerez Elliott (Elliott's brother) and Alzy Diamond (Elliott's cousin) died at the scene. See [D.E. 1–4] 2. The FPD responded and collected physical evidence. See id. Despite an alleged FPD policy to process homicide scenes for physical evidence and to submit such physical evidence to the SBI laboratory for analysis, the FPD failed to submit collected evidence to the SBI laboratory for testing. See id.

Police arrested and charged two suspects for the murders. See id. at 6. One defendant pleaded guilty. See id. The other defendant went to trial and was acquitted. See id. After the acquittal, the defendant's defense lawyer attributed the acquittal to the prosecutor's failure to present forensic evidence from the murder scene. See id. at 8.

Elliott contends that the FPD's failure to submit the physical evidence from the crime scene to the SBI laboratory reflects a custom of misconduct within the FPD. See id. at 2. In support of this alleged custom of misconduct, Elliott cites unrelated alleged police officer misconduct in October 2023 and November 2023. See id. at 2, 48–52. One instance involved an officer allegedly releasing confidential police information to allow a suspect to avoid detection. See id. at 48. The other instance involved an officer allegedly dealing drugs. See id. at 49–52. According to Elliott, these incidents demonstrate the City's “deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its citizens.” Id. at 2. According to Elliott, the “City knew or should have known that its failure to adequately train, supervise, and discipline its police force had created a culture where such constitutional violations were not just possible, but likely.” Id.

II.

The City moves to dismiss Elliott's amended complaint. The standard used to evaluate the sufficiency of a pleading is flexible, and “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Erickson, however, does not “undermine [the] requirement that a pleading contain ‘more than labels and conclusions.’ ” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–83 (2009); Seabrook v. Driscoll, 148 F.4th 264, 269–70 (4th Cir. 2025); Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566 U.S. 30 (2012); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255–56 (4th Cir. 2009); Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).

To state a claim under section 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); N.C. All. for Retired Ams. v. Hirsch, 741 F. Supp. 3d 318, 334 (E.D.N.C. 2024). A section 1983 plaintiff also must plausibly allege the personal involvement of a defendant. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Monell, 436 U.S. at 691–94; Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985); Hirsch, 741 F. Supp. 3d at 334.

When a municipal entity is sued—directly or in an official-capacity suit—the plaintiff must plausibly allege that a “policy or custom” attributable to the municipal entity caused the violation of the plaintiff's federally protected rights. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–05 (1997); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–94; King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 223 (4th Cir. 2016); Owens v. Balt. City State's Att'ys Off. 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014); Santos v. Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 725 F.3d 451, 469–70 (4th Cir. 2013); Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218–19 (4th Cir. 1999). “Monell's ‘policy or custom’ requirement applies in [section] 1983 cases irrespective of whether the relief sought is monetary or prospective.” Los Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 39 (2010). There are four ways in which liability for a policy or custom may arise:

(1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that manifests deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens; or (4) through a practice that is so persistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.

Lytle, 326 F.3d at 471 (cleaned up).

A violation results from a municipal entity's policy or custom if the violation resulted from “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690: see City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121–23 (1988). Even if a section 1983 plaintiff can identify the requisite final policymaking authority under state law, a municipality is not liable simply because a section 1983 plaintiff can “identify conduct attributable to the municipality.” Riddick v. Sch. Bd. of Portsmouth, 238 F.3d 518, 524 (4th Cir. 2000). Instead, a section 1983 “plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving force behind the injury alleged.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 (cleaned up); see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389–90 (1989); Riddick, 238 F.3d at 524. Thus, to avoid imposing respondeat superior liability on municipalities, a section 1983 plaintiff must show that “a municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 411; see Harris, 489 U.S. at 392; Riddick, 238 F.3d at 524; Carter, 164 F.3d at 218–19.

“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.” Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) abrogated on other grounds by Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593 (4th Cir. 2023). Deliberate indifference requires “proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action” or inaction. Brown, 520 U.S. at 410. Moreover, even if a section 1983 plaintiff can show the requisite culpability, a section 1983 plaintiff also must show “a direct causal link between the municipal action [or inaction] and the deprivation of federal rights.” Id. at 404.

Elliott asserts a Monell claim against the City for the failure to train and supervise police officers resulting in an alleged violation of his due process right to a fair process of justice and familial association. See [D.E. 1–4] 3–4. Training policy deficiencies can include (1) “express authorizations of specific unconstitutional conduct,” (2) “tacit authorizations” of such unconstitutional conduct, and (3) failures to adequately “prohibit or discourage readily foreseeable conduct in light of known exigencies of police duty.” Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1390 (4th Cir. 1987). No matter the theory alleged, a plaintiff must identify “a specific deficiency” in training or supervision, “rather than general laxness or ineffectiveness in training” or supervision. Id.; see Moore v. Barnes, 802 F. Supp. 3d 792, 851 (E.D.N.C. 2025); McDowell v. Grimes, No. CV GLR-17-3200, 2018 WL 3756727, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2018) (unpublished).

Elliott fails to identify a specific training or supervision deficiency. Notably, Elliott admits that the FPD has specific policies about processing murder scenes and submitting collected evidence to the SBI laboratory for analysis. See [D.E. 1–4] 2. Elliott does not contend that these policies authorized unconstitutional conduct. Rather, Elliott contends that the officers who processed the murder scene of his brother and cousin failed to follow these policies on one occasion. An isolated incident of alleged misconduct or incompetence by subordinate employees does not suffice to establish a custom or practice under section 1983. See, e.g. City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (plurality opinion); Randall v. Prince George's Cnty., 302 F.3d 188, 206–07 (4th Cir. 2002); Carter, 164 F.3d at 219–20; Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994); Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390; Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 1984); Avery v. Burke Cnty., 660 F.2d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1981).

Elliott also fails to plausibly allege a constitutional violation of his due process rights. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 411; Harris, 489 U.S. at 392; Cooper v. City of Wheeling, 169 F.4th 220, 227 (4th Cir. 2026); Riddick, 238 F.3d at 524; Carter, 164 F.3d at 218–20. As for Elliott's due process claim, Elliott has no legally cognizable interest in the criminal prosecution or non-prosecution of another. See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Thus, Elliott lacks standing to sue for an alleged inadequate police investigation leading to an allegedly unsuccessful prosecution. See, e.g., Lefebure v. D'Aquilla, 15 F.4th 650, 654–55 (5th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases); Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2015); Dohaish v. Tooley, 670 F.2d 934, 936 (10th Cir. 1982); Harris v. Fambro, No. 5:22-CV-381, 2024 WL 716059, at *5–6 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 21, 2024) (unpublished). Moreover, even if the police processed the crime scene and submitted the evidence to the SBI laboratory, Elliott does not plausibly allege that the evidence would have linked the acquitted defendant to the crime scene or that the police could control how a prosecutor used the evidence. As for familial association, Elliott presumably is referring to his desire to associate with his deceased brother and cousin. But no matter how the FPD processed the crime scene, Elliott's brother and cousin would still be dead.

Elliott also fails to plausibly allege deliberate indifference or causation. See, e.g., Brown, 520 U.S. at 410; Moore, 802 F. Supp. 3d at 851. Even viewing Elliott's amended complaint most favorably to him, Elliott fails to state a Monell claim.

As for Elliott's motions for leave to file a first and second amended complaint, Elliott may amend his complaint “only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The court must “freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. But a court need not grant leave to amend where the proposed amendment is futile. See, e.g., Save Our Sound OBX, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 914 F.3d 213, 227–29 (4th Cir. 2019). An amendment is futile if the amendment would fail to state a claim. See, e.g., id.

The court has reviewed Elliott's proposed first and second amended complaints. The proposed amended complaints are futile. As discussed, Elliott seeks to recover damages from the City for the alleged violation of his due process right to receive “a fundamentally fair process of justice” arising from the prosecution of the person or persons who murdered his brother and cousin. See [D.E. 1–4] 3–4. He also mentions his right to familial association. See id. But Elliott has no legally cognizable interest in the criminal prosecution of another or the adequacy of a police investigation. See, e.g., Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 69: Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 654–55; Rossi, 790 F.3d at 735; Dohaish, 790 F.3d at 735. Because Elliott does not plausibly allege an underlying constitutional violation against the City, “there can be no municipal liability” under Monell. Grayson, 195 F.3d at 697. Moreover, Elliott's proposed official capacity claim against Officer Dustin Arnett adds nothing. See, e.g., Graham, 473 U.S. at 165–66. Likewise, Elliott's additional information from random Internal Affairs Reports adds nothing to the analysis about whether Elliott plausibly alleged a policy or custom, a failure to train and supervise, a constitutional violation, deliberate indifference, or causation. He has not.

Because Elliott's proposed Monell claim in his first and second amended complaints fails to state a claim, the proposed amendments are futile. See, e.g., Save Our Sound OBX, Inc., 914 F.3d at 227–29. Thus, the court denies Elliott's motions for leave to amend.

The City removed the action to this court based on federal question jurisdiction. See [D.E. 1] 1–3. The court has dismissed Elliott's federal claim. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Elliott's state-law claim and remands the action to Cumberland County Superior Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Koyal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 31–32 (2025); Carnegie-MellonUniv. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Kovachevich v. Nat'l Mortg. Ins. Corp., 140 F.4th 548, 556 (4th Cir. 2025): Henderson v. Harmon, 102 F.4th 242, 251 (4th Cir. 2024); ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376, 394 (4th Cir. 2012); Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995).

III.

In sum, the court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss [D.E. 12], DISMISSES plaintiff's federal claim in the plaintiff's amended complaint, DENIES as futile plaintiff's motions for leave to amend his amended complaint [D.E. 10, 11], DENIES plaintiff's motion to file a sur-reply [D.E. 22], GRANTS plaintiff's motion to file supplemental authority [D.E. 24], and REMANDS plaintiff's state law claim to Cumberland County Superior Court.

SO ORDERED. This 16 day of July, 2026.

JAMES C. DEVER III United States District Judge