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James S. DEW, et al., Plaintiffs, v. E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
On July 13, 2026, trial will begin in this case. See [D.E. 286] 1. On May 22, 2026, E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company (“DuPont”), The Chemours Company, and The Chemours Company FC, LLC (collectively, “defendants”) filed 16 motions in limine [D.E. 306, 308, 310, 312, 315, 317, 325, 328, 330, 332, 334, 336, 338, 341, 343, 346] and memoranda in support [D.E. 307, 309, 311, 314, 316, 318, 327, 329, 331, 333, 335, 337, 339, 342, 344, 347]. On June 5, 2026, trial plaintiffs Patsy Davis, Richard Davis, Annie Stevens, John Stevens, Allison Pini, and Sandra Riggins Branch (collectively, “plaintiffs”) responded in opposition [D.E. 348, 349].
On May 22, 2026, plaintiffs filed ten motions in limine [D.E. 313] and a memorandum in support [D.E. 319]. On June 5, 2026, defendants responded in opposition to plaintiffs' motions in limine three, four, seven, nine, and ten [D.E. 368]. Defendants state that they do not oppose plaintiffs' motions in limine one, two, five, six, and eight. See id. at 2 n.1. As explained below, the court denies defendants' first motion in limine, denies without prejudice defendants' second motion in limine, grants in part and denies in part defendants' third motion in limine, grants defendants' fourth motion in limine, denies without prejudice defendants' fifth motion in limine, grants defendants' sixth motion in limine, denies defendants' seventh motion in limine, denies defendants' eighth motion in limine, grants defendants' ninth motion in limine, denies without prejudice defendants' tenth motion in limine, grants in part and denies in part without prejudice defendants' eleventh motion in limine, grants in part and denies in part defendants' twelfth motion in limine, grants in part and denies in part defendants' thirteenth motion in limine, grants defendants' fourteenth motion in limine, grants defendants' fifteenth motion in limine, denies defendants' sixteenth motion in limine, grants plaintiffs' unopposed motions in limine, and denies plaintiffs' third, fourth, seventh, ninth, and tenth motions in limine.
I.
A court should grant a motion in limine to exclude evidence only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds. See, e.g., Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-275, 2011 WL 5439156, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 8, 2011) (unpublished); Wilkins v. Kmart Corp., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1218–19 (D. Kan. 2007); Hawthorne Partners v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1400–01 (N.D. Ill. 1993); see generally 21 Wright & Miller's Federal Practice & Procedure § 5046 (2d ed. 2026). This principle applies because “a court is almost always better situated during the actual trial to assess the value and utility of evidence.” Wilkins, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 1218; see Hawthorne, 831 F. Supp. at 1400–01; cf. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984) (noting that courts are “handicapped in any effort to rule on subtle evidentiary questions outside a factual context”). A court's ruling on a motion in limine “is subject to change when the case unfolds, particularly if the actual testimony differs from what was contained in the [moving party's] proffer.” Luce, 469 U.S. at 41.
Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 402; Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 178 & n.3 (1997). “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403; see Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180. The court has “broad discretion” to weigh the probative value of evidence against the other considerations embodied by Federal Rule of Evidence 403. United States v. Sanders, 107 F.4th 234, 255 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1434 (2025); see Gibbons v. Gibbs, 167 F.4th 131, 141 (4th Cir. 2026); United States v. Hart, 91 F.4th 732, 743 (4th Cir. 2024); Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F.3d 339, 349–50 (4th Cir. 2014); PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 125 (4th Cir. 2011). The court “must assess the proponent's need for admission of the evidence in the full evidentiary context of the case.” Carnell Constr. Corp. v. Danville Redev. & Hous. Auth., 745 F.3d 703, 719 (4th Cir. 2014).
As for unfair prejudice, “[t]he mere fact that the evidence will damage the [party's] case is not enough—the evidence must be unfairly prejudicial, and the unfair prejudice must substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.” PBM Prods., 639 F.3d at 124 (citation omitted); see BMG Rts. Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 881 F.3d 293, 313 (4th Cir. 2018), abrogated on other grounds by Cox Commc'ns, Inc. v. Sony Music Ent., 146 S. Ct. 959 (2026); United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 730 (4th Cir. 2006). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial “when there is a genuine risk that the emotions of a jury will be excited to irrational behavior, and this risk is disproportionate to the probative value of the offered evidence.” PBM Prods., 639 F.3d at 124 (cleaned up); see McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 980 F.3d 937, 972–77 (4th Cir. 2020) (affirming relevance of a parent company's finances in nuisance case to assessing feasibility of mitigation measures, but holding that district court should have bifurcated trial “given the irrelevance of the parents' financial information to the amount of punitive damages”).
II.
A.
Defendants move to exclude evidence about defendants' Washington Works facility in Parkersburg, West Virginia. See [D.E. 306]. Defendants used perfluorooctanoic acid (“PFOA,” also known as “C8”) for manufacturing at Washington Works, and plaintiffs do not seek to recover for PFOA contamination. See [D.E. 307] 2. Defendants argue that evidence about defendants' PFOA production activities at the Washington Works plant is irrelevant, inadmissible character evidence under Rule 404(b)(1), and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. See id. at 1.
Plaintiffs respond that they seek to use evidence about PFOA at Washington Works “to demonstrate what DuPont understood relating to PFAS, including their potential to cause contamination of drinking water and when they understood such matters.” [D.E. 348] 2. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that information about PFOA contamination was available to defendants when they discharged the PFAS at issue in this litigation into the area surrounding Fayetteville Works. See id. at 2–3. Plaintiffs also cite various documents and deposition testimony suggesting that defendants relied on their experience with PFOA at Washington Works to inform their behavior concerning GenX and other PFAS at Fayetteville Works. See id. at 2–6.
Some Washington Works evidence may be relevant to defendants' knowledge if the evidence shows that defendants considered PFOA and Washington Works when making decisions about GenX and Fayetteville Works. See id. at 3–5; cf. Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403. This evidence may be relevant to the jury's consideration of whether defendants breached their duty to plaintiffs and whether defendants' actions were unreasonable.
As for defendants' arguments under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1), Rule 404(b) “is an inclusionary rule.” United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 574 (4th Cir. 2011); see United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 994–95 (4th Cir. 1997); Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) must meet Rule 403's balancing test. See United States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 327 (4th Cir. 2009). For prior act evidence to be admissible, “(1) [t]he evidence must be relevant to an issue,” (2) “necessary in the sense that it is probative of an essential claim or element of the offense,” (3) “reliable,” and (4) the “evidence's probative value must not be substantially outweighed by confusion or unfair prejudice in the sense that it tends to subordinate reason to emotion in the fact-finding process.” Westfield Ins. Co. v. Harris, 134 F.3d 608, 614 (4th Cir. 1998) (cleaned up); see United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 493 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 296–97 (4th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiffs' cited bases are non-character purposes. And, as explained above, evidence about PFOA and Washington Works may be relevant. The remaining elements of the test and defendants' concerns about the risk of confusing the jury and wasting time cannot be evaluated without reference to specific evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Furthermore, defendants' epidemiology expert Dominik D. Alexander, Ph.D. relies on studies which rely on data from Washington Works employees. See, e.g., [D.E. 289-4] 45–47, 72–73, 76–77, 82, 88–89, 101. The court will not waste time during the trial with extensive evidence about PFOA and Washington Works. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Nonetheless, evidence of defendants' activities involving PFOA at Washington Works is not inadmissible on all possible grounds. Thus, the court denies defendants' first motion in limine.
B.
Defendants move to exclude evidence that plaintiffs did not produce during discovery. See [D.E. 308]. Defendants argue that plaintiffs failed to produce certain documents despite being responsive to certain requests for productions. See [D.E. 309] 1–4. Defendants apparently assert that every cited document was responsive to a request for production (“RFP”). See id. at 2–3. Specifically, defendants cite RFPs 2, 3, 16, and 17. Defendants' RFP 2 states “Any Documents upon which You have relied to allege that You have suffered any economic damage, economic injury, or economic loss that You claim was caused by the incidents claimed in Your Complaint and/or the Defendants' alleged actions.” [D.E. 309-1] 7. Defendants do not describe what responsive documents plaintiffs failed to produce. Defendants' RFP 3 states “Any Documents upon which You have relied to allege that You have suffered any property damage, property injury, or property loss that You claim was caused by the incidents claimed in Your Complaint and/or the Defendants' alleged actions.” Id. Defendants do not describe what responsive documents plaintiffs failed to produce. Moreover, defendants' list of RFPs attached to their motion does not contain RFPs 16 or 17. See generally [D.E. 309-1]. Thus, the court denies without prejudice defendants' second motion in limine. If defendants have more specific arguments about specific documents, they can make proper objections at trial.
C.
Defendants move to exclude evidence, argument, testimony and reference to “PFAS from sources other than [d]efendants' Fayetteville Works facility.” [D.E. 311] 1; see [D.E. 310]. Defendants mention PFOA and PFOS as the chemicals that should be excluded. See [D.E. 311] 4. Plaintiffs agree that plaintiffs “are not alleging [that] PFOA or PFOS emitted from Fayetteville Works contaminated their properties.” [D.E. 348] 8.
The court grants the motion regarding any allegation that PFOA or PFOS contaminated plaintiffs' properties. But the court agrees with plaintiffs that the “jury can easily understand that PFOA and PFOS are predecessors to GenX” and that plaintiffs are not seeking to recover for PFOA and PFOS. Id. at 9. Thus, the court grants in part and denies in part defendants' third motion in limine.
D.
Defendants move to exclude “all evidence, argument, testimony, and reference” about plaintiffs' physical ailments. [D.E. 312] 1; [D.E. 314] 1. Defendants argue that such evidence is irrelevant, misleading, and likely to confuse the jury, because plaintiffs do not seek to recover for personal injuries and such evidence may lead the jury to infer that PFAS exposure caused the ailments. See [D.E. 314] 2–5. Plaintiffs admit that they do not seek to recover for personal injuries, but contend that evidence of their ailments “help[s] explain how they use—or avoid using—the water in their homes, why certain [p]laintiffs are especially concerned about exposure to chemicals for which they do not know a safe level, and how contamination has affected the use and enjoyment of their property.” [D.E. 348] 9.
Plaintiffs' physical ailments and their belief that PFAS contamination caused the ailments are irrelevant to plaintiffs' nuisance, negligence, and trespass claims. And whatever minimal relevance such evidence may have (if at all) is substantially outweighed by a risk of exciting the jury “to irrational behavior, and this risk is disproportionate to the probative value of the offered evidence.” PBM Prods., 639 F.3d at 124 (cleaned up); Fed. R. Evid. 403. Thus, the court grants defendants' fourth motion in limine. Moreover, to the extent that plaintiff Richard Davis is unavailable due to poor health and old age, Patsy Davis may state those facts. Furthermore, the court will consider relevant stipulations the parties have entered about Richard Davis's absence.
E.
Defendants move to exclude evidence about the settlement agreement DuPont reached in a West Virginia class action about alleged PFOA contamination from the Washington Works facility. See [D.E. 315]; [D.E. 316] 1–2; [D.E. 316-1] 2–42; see also In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Inj. Litig., No. 2:13-MD-2433, 2025 WL 474225, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2025) (unpublished); Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 253 F.R.D. 365, 369 (S.D. W. Va. 2008). Defendants state that plaintiffs' exhibit list contains a document entitled “C8 Science Panel Background Information on Lawsuit Settlement.” [D.E. 316] 3. As part of the Leach settlement, the parties agreed that a panel of three epidemiologists would research “diseases among the communities exposed to C-8 [(PFOA)] in the water districts around Washington Works.” In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Inj. Litig., 54 F.4th 912, 918 (6th Cir. 2022). The panel “reported Probable Link findings as defined in the Leach Agreement for six diseases: kidney cancer, testicular cancer, thyroid disease, ulcerative colitis, diagnosed high cholesterol, and pregnancy-induced hypertension and preeclampsia” and found no probable link with about 50 diseases. Id. at 919.
Defendants argue that evidence of PFOA is irrelevant, that the stipulations of DuPont in the Leach settlement agreement are inadmissible, and that plaintiffs should not be permitted to “make any suggestion that the Leach settlement or the Science Panel recognized that PFOA in drinking water is capable of causing disease at concentrations of 0.05 ppb.” [D.E. 316] 5; see id. at 3–5. Plaintiffs respond that they will not tell the jury that “(1) DuPont agreed in the Leach settlement not to contest that it is ‘probable’ that exposure to PFOA is capable of causing certain illnesses and (2) the Leach settlement established a causal link between PFOA and certain illnesses at concentrations of 0.05 ppb.” [D.E. 348] 10. Plaintiffs argue, however, that the C8 science panel's findings are relevant because plaintiffs intend to argue DuPont's knowledge of PFOA and its potential health effects should have informed defendants' decisions about GenX at Fayetteville Works. See id. at 11–12.
The court grants defendants' motion insofar as it relates to the two points on which plaintiffs state they will not offer Leach settlement evidence. As explained, depending on the context, evidence about PFOA and Washington Works may be relevant. Although the court doubts the evidence's admissibility and is concerned about wasting time and confusing the issues, the court cannot determine the admissibility of the documents without hearing the evidence in context at trial. See, e.g., In re Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:18-CV-3487, 2023 WL 3568128, at *3 (D.S.C. May 19, 2023) (unpublished) (denying without prejudice similar motion in limine about Leach settlement evidence); Fed. R. Evid. 403. Thus, the court denies without prejudice defendants' fifth motion in limine.
F.
Defendants move to exclude plaintiffs from offering lay witness opinion testimony about stigma damages. See [D.E. 317] 1; [D.E. 318] 1–4. Specifically, plaintiffs Richard and Patsy Davis stated during their depositions that their property carries a stigma related to PFAS contamination. See [D.E. 318-2] 3; [D.E. 318-3] 3.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, “[i]f a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness's perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701; cf. Gallagher v. S. Source Packaging, LLC, 568 F. Supp. 2d 624, 632–33 (E.D.N.C. 2008). “The modern trend favors the admission of opinion testimony, provided that it is well founded on personal knowledge as distinguished from hypothetical facts and susceptible to specific cross-examination.” MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Wanzer, 897 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir. 1990) (cleaned up); see Lord & Taylor, LLC v. White Flint, LP, 849 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 155–56 (4th Cir. 2006); BlackRock Eng'rs, Inc. v. Duke Energy Progress, LLC, No. 7:15-CV-250, 2019 WL 4267863, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 9, 2019) (unpublished). “[A]ny part of a witness'[s] testimony that is based upon scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702 is governed by the standards of Rule 702 and the corresponding disclosure requirements of the Civil and Criminal Rules.” Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment.
“Courts indulge a common-law presumption that a property owner is competent to testify on the value of his own property.” Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 542 (4th Cir. 2007); see Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 0.47 Acres of Land, 853 F. App'x 812, 814 (4th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished). The rationale for the presumption is the property owner's “special knowledge of the property.” United States v. 68.94 Acres of Land, 918 F.2d 389, 398 (3d Cir. 1990). To be admissible, a landowner's testimony about the value of property “must rely on a valid foundation, not speculation or conjecture.” Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 0.32 Acres of Land, 127 F.4th 427, 433 (4th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted); see 0.47 Acres of Land, 853 F. App'x at 815; Williams v. Mosaic Fertilizer. LLC, 889 F.3d 1239, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 2018) (excluding lay opinion testimony about value of plaintiff's home where plaintiff's opinion about valuation was “pure speculation” because “[t]hat a home is contaminated does not necessarily make it valueless”).
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a valid foundation for an opinion about the impact of stigma on the value of their properties. Indeed, during their depositions, plaintiffs based their opinions on talk in the community and do not cite evidence tethering their value opinions to the real estate market or any other means of assessing property value. See [D.E. 318-2] 3 (Richard Davis); [D.E. 318-3] 3 (Patsy Davis); cf. Williams, 889 F.3d at 1250 (explaining that plaintiff's opinion was inadmissible because she did not “allege she tried to sell her home or spoke with an appraiser or real estate agent to ascertain its value”). Thus, the court grants defendants' sixth motion in limine.
G.
Defendants move to exclude all evidence, testimony, and argument about the EPA's maximum contaminant levels for PFAS. See [D.E. 325] 1. A maximum contaminant level (“MCL”) is the “maximum permissible level of a contaminant in water which is delivered to any user of a public water system.” 42 U.S.C. § 300f(3). Plaintiffs are not users of a public water system. The water on their properties is not subject to the EPA's MCLs. See [D.E. 348] 15 (“Plaintiffs do not dispute that the relevant MCLs do not strictly apply to their property from a regulatory standpoint.”). Defendants argue that evidence about the EPA's MCLs is irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and cumulative. See [D.E. 327] 5–9.
MCLs may be relevant to assess the reasonableness of plaintiffs' decisions and are not clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds. See Silicon Knights, 2011 WL 5439156, at *1; Wilkins, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 1218–19; Hawthorne, 831 F. Supp. at 1400–01. Thus, the court denies defendants' seventh motion in limine.
H.
Defendants move to exclude evidence about plaintiff's' fear of disease. See [D.E. 328] 1. Defendants argue that North Carolina law does not permit plaintiffs to recover damages for fear of disease absent an independent cause of action and cite Curl v. American Multimedia, Inc., 187 N.C. App. 649, 654 S.E.2d 76 (2007). See [D.E. 329] 4–9. In Curl, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants contaminated their water wells with harmful chemicals. See 187 N.C. App. at 651, 654 S.E.2d at 78. The plaintiffs alleged causes of action for negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, nuisance, trespass, and res ipsa loquitor. See id. On appeal, the plaintiffs asked the court to recognize causes of action for inflicting a lost chance of continued health, invasion of personal autonomy, and “the instilling of fear of cancer or other deadly disease” despite failing to plead the causes of action in their complaint. Id. at 655, 654 S.E.2d at 80–81. The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs' arguments and declined to recognize the new causes of action without legislative approval. See id. at 656, 654 S.E.2d at 81.
In In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litigation, the plaintiffs lived near swine farms operated by defendants and brought nuisance and negligence claims. See No. 5:15-CV-13, 2017 WL 5178038, at *11 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 8, 2017) (unpublished). The plaintiffs alleged that the nuisance caused a reasonable fear of disease and adverse health effects. See id. at *10. Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law on those claims and argued that such damages are not recoverable under North Carolina law. See id. The court distinguished Curl because, unlike the Curl plaintiffs, the Swine Farm plaintiffs “claim[ed] concern about, and fear of, disease and adverse health effects as evidence of their discomfort and annoyance, for purposes of proving both liability and damages for the nuisance.” Id. at *11. And “discomfort and annoyance damages are recoverable for a nuisance.” Id.
Like the Swine Farm plaintiffs, plaintiffs seek to introduce evidence of their fear of disease to prove nuisance liability and damages. Cf. McKiver, 980 F.3d at 955 (noting that district court relied on “longstanding” North Carolina authorities to reject defendants' argument that plaintiffs could not recover annoyance and discomfort damages); Thomason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 142 N.C. 300, 55 S.E. 198, 203–04 (1906) (approving jury instruction in nuisance case that jury could find nuisance, in part, if it found defendants operated a railroad near plaintiffs' house in manner that “kept the plaintiffs in constant dread and fear”). Whether that evidence and the other trial evidence satisfies plaintiffs' burden of proving nuisance liability and damages is a question for the jury. Accordingly, the court rejects defendants' argument.
Defendants also argue that scientific evidence belies plaintiffs' fear of disease, such that no evidence can establish that plaintiffs' fear of disease is reasonable. See [D.E. 329] 7–9. As explained, a plaintiff may recover discomfort and annoyance damages for nuisance. The court will not weigh the disputed evidence on a motion in limine. Defendants may cross-examine plaintiffs about their alleged annoyance from a fear of disease and the reasonableness of such fear. The jury will decide whether plaintiffs' annoyance rose to the level of a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of their properties. Thus, the court denies defendants' eighth motion in limine.
I.
Defendants move to preclude reference to PFAS as “forever chemicals.” See [D.E. 330] 1. Defendants argue that the term “forever chemicals” is “misleading, inflammatory, and unnecessary to a discussion of the facts.” [D.E. 331] 2; see Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403. Plaintiffs respond that the term accurately describes the environmental persistence of PFAS and forecast trial evidence to that effect. See [D.E. 349] 4–8.
Using “forever chemicals” to describe the variety of substances at issue in this case has no probative value. Moreover, even if the term had minimal probative value, the probative value is substantially outweighed by a risk of confusing the issues, wasting time, and unfairly prejudicing defendants. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. The parties and their witnesses will use specific terms to refer to specific chemical substances during this trial, and the term “PFAS” to refer to the substances generally. Thus, the court grants defendants' ninth motion in limine.
J.
Defendants move to exclude evidence, argument, testimony, and references to water discharges of PFAS from Fayetteville Works into the Cape Fear River. See [D.E. 332] 1. Defendants argue that evidence of water discharges is irrelevant, a waste of time, and unfairly prejudicial because no evidence demonstrates that water-discharged PFAS have reached plaintiffs' properties. See [D.E. 333] 2–5. Plaintiffs respond that they “do not intend to argue that PFAS discharged into the Cape Fear River caused the contamination of [p]laintiffs' private wells.” [D.E. 349] 8. But plaintiffs argue that reference to water discharges from Fayetteville Works are relevant to describing how plaintiffs discovered PFAS in their private wells and to documents and testimony that may reference the Cape Fear River. See id. at 8–9.
The court grants the motion insofar as it relates to evidence, argument, testimony, and references to causation arguments about water discharges from Fayetteville Works into the Cape Fear River. Evidence, argument, testimony, and references to water discharges from Fayetteville Works into the Cape Fear River may be relevant to how plaintiffs discovered PFAS in their private wells. The court will evaluate the evidence in the proper context at trial. Thus, the court denies without prejudice defendants' tenth motion in limine insofar as it relates to non-causation evidence, argument, testimony, and references to water discharges of PFAS from Fayetteville Works into the Cape Fear River.
K.
Defendants move to exclude evidence, argument, testimony, and references to the Chemours-DuPont 2015 spin-off transaction and subsequent transactions, including indemnification obligations between defendants and subsequently created corporate entities. See [D.E. 334] 1. In 2015, DuPont “spun off its performance chemicals business, creating Chemours, a new publicly traded company named The Chemours Company, once wholly owned by DuPont.” [D.E. 335] 2. Defendants predict that plaintiffs “will impermissibly inject into the trial arguments that DuPont spun off its fluoroproducts business to escape its liabilities or that DuPont undercapitalized Chemours during the 2015 spin-off.” Id. Defendants argue that evidence or argument about the 2015 spinoff is irrelevant to liability and to punitive damages. See id. at 3–5. Defendants also argue that any probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice in confusing and misleading the jury and portraying DuPont as an abuser of the corporate form. See id. at 6. Defendants acknowledge, however, that “the jury can and should be informed that Chemours in 2015 assumed ownership and operation of the Fayetteville Works facility.” Id. at 2.
Plaintiffs represent that they “do not intend to present a fraudulent transfer theory to the jury.” [D.E. 349] 10. The court agrees that plaintiffs will not present a fraudulent transfer theory. Thus, the court grants defendants' motion insofar as it relates to an alleged fraudulent transfer (i.e., DuPont's motivation for the spinoff or that the spinoff left Chemours undercapitalized). But the court denies the motion insofar as it relates to all evidence about the spinoff. For example, the jury can be informed that Chemours in 2015 assumed ownership and operation of the Fayetteville Works facility. The court will evaluate any other evidence on this topic in the proper context at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403. Accordingly, the court grants in part and denies without prejudice in part defendants' eleventh motion in limine.
L.
Defendants move to exclude evidence about the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”). See [D.E. 336] 1. Specifically, defendants move to exclude (1) evidence, argument, testimony, and reference about the EPA's 2005 suit against DuPont for PFOA discharges at Washington Works, (2) argument that defendants violated the TSCA or a consent order issued under the TSCA by “releasing into the environment hexafluoropropylene dimer acid and its ammonium salt (collectively, ‘HFPO-DA’) generated at Fayetteville Works as a byproduct,” and (3) “all evidence, argument, testimony, and reference concerning the [EPA's] 2019 Notices of Violation concerning compliance with a 2009 Consent Order related to the manufacture of HFPO-DA.” [D.E. 337] 1–2.
Plaintiffs do not intend to offer any evidence about the EPA's 2005 lawsuit against DuPont for PFOA discharges at Washington Works or to introduce into evidence the EPA's February 13, 2019 notice of violation letter. See [D.E. 349] 11–12. Thus, the court grants defendants' motion on those two issues. To the extent that plaintiffs seek to introduce other evidence about EPA notices of violations at Fayetteville Works that are not cited in defendants' motion, the court denies without prejudice the motion. Plaintiffs will notify the court and defendants about any such evidence before seeking its admission at the trial. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403.
As for the parties' arguments about byproduct releases, defendants argue that plaintiffs are legally incorrect if they suggest that the TSCA consent order restricted the production or release of “byproduct HFPO-DA.” [D.E. 337] 9. Defendants state that they produced HFPO-DA as a primary product at the polymer processing aid facility and complied with their obligations under the TSCA consent order. See id. at 3, 9. Plaintiffs disagree and argue that “there is a large quantity of GenX that was released from intentionally manufactured compounds that would simply NOT fall into the ‘byproduct’ exception.” [D.E. 349] 12.
At present, the court will not resolve the parties' factual dispute about the production of HFPO-DA and GenX at Fayetteville Works, and whether that production did or did not fall into an exception to the TSCA or consent order. Cf. [D.E. 368] 10–11 (opposing plaintiffs' motion about byproduct evidence on the grounds that the court should not resolve factual disputes on a motion in limine). The court will evaluate the admissibility of such evidence when presented in context at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403. Thus, the court grants in part and denies in part defendants' twelfth motion in limine.
M.
Defendants move to exclude evidence about alleged harms to tenants who currently reside or previously resided on plaintiff Sandra Riggins Branch's rental property. See [D.E. 338] 1. Sandra Riggins Branch (“Branch”) owns property at 21 and 37 W. Shaw Mill Road in St. Pauls, North Carolina. See [D.E. 98] 5. Branch rents the 21 W. Shaw Mill Road property to tenants. See [D.E. 349] 14. Defendants argue that the court should exclude evidence about “any alleged harm to the use and enjoyment of her rental property by her tenants.” [D.E. 339] 2. Plaintiffs respond that they do not seek to recover on behalf of Branch's tenants but contend that evidence about the 21 W. Shaw Mill Road property is relevant to determining Branch's “own property-based injuries.” [D.E. 349] 14.
The court grants defendants' motion in part as it relates to harm to Branch's tenants and not to Branch. As the owner of the rental property, however, Branch has an interest in the property separate from the temporary interests of her tenants. Thus, the court denies defendants' thirteenth motion in limine to the extent it seeks to exclude all reference to Branch's tenants. The court will evaluate the admissibility of such evidence when presented in context at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403. Thus, the court grants in part and denies in part defendants' thirteenth motion in limine.
N.
Defendants move to exclude evidence, argument, testimony, and reference to animal testing using C8 (PFOA) that DuPont conducted. See [D.E. 341] 1. Defendants argue that PFOA is not at issue in this case and the studies are not relevant because the studies relate to dosages that are dissimilar to the concentrations of PFAS on plaintiffs' properties. See [D.E. 342] 1–4. Plaintiffs respond that they “will not present animal studies to prove causation of disease.” [D.E. 349] 15. Plaintiffs argue, however, that the PFOA animal studies are relevant to show defendants' knowledge and liability for punitive damages. See id.
Plaintiffs do not seek to recover for any PFOA contamination on their properties. Any marginal relevance such studies may have is substantially outweighed by a risk of unfair prejudice, wasting time, and confusing the issues. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. The risk of unfair prejudice and confusion is exacerbated because the dosages used in animal studies are dissimilar to the concentrations on plaintiffs' properties, and evidence, argument, testimony, and reference to such studies will unnecessarily devote time and attention to the characteristics of PFOA, a compound for which plaintiffs do not seek to recover. Thus, the court grants defendants' fourteenth motion in limine.
O.
Defendants move to exclude evidence of a substance called “fluoromalonate.” [D.E. 343] 1. Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion. See [D.E. 349] 16. Thus, the court grants defendants' fifteenth motion in limine.
P.
Defendants move to exclude argument that the jury may consider defendants' present releases of PFAS to air and water when determining (1) negligence, (2) an aggravating factor to award punitive damages, and (3) a factor relevant to determining the amount of punitive damages. See [D.E. 346] 1; [D.E. 347] 1–6 & n.1. Defendants cite a 2019 consent order (entered between Chemours and the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality) and Chemours's Clean Air Act (“CAA”) permits and state that Chemours is “legally permitted to emit from Fayetteville Works some amount of PFAS into the air.” [D.E. 347] 2. Therefore, defendants argue, the jury cannot consider evidence that comports with the consent order and permits to determine negligence liability, whether to award punitive damages, and as a factor in determining the amount of punitive damages, if any, to award. See id. at 3–6.
As for defendants' negligence arguments, regulatory or statutory compliance does not conclusively determine the exercise of due care. See Collingwood v. Gen. Elec. Real Est. Equities, Inc., 324 N.C. 63, 67–68, 376 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1989); Boyd v. L.G. DeWitt Trucking Co., 103 N.C. App. 396, 404, 405 S.E.2d 914, 920 (1991); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C (1965) (“Compliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precautions.”); cf. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (“[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure ․”). Thus, the court denies defendants' motion as it relates to negligence.
As for defendants' arguments about the jury's consideration of regulatory compliance for purposes of punitive damages, defendants cite Ferrante v. Westin St. John Hotel Co., 559 F. Supp. 3d 492 (E.D.N.C. 2020), aff'd, No. 20-1322, 2022 WL 396022 (4th Cir. Feb. 9, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished). In Ferrante, the court analyzed the law of the United States Virgin Islands and held that the defendant's foreclosure on plaintiffs' interest in two vacation properties “complied with governing law.” Id. at 508; see id. at 506. Because “[l]awful conduct is not ‘outrageous,’ ” the court granted summary judgment against plaintiffs' on their claim for punitive damages. Id. at 508.
Defendants' reliance on Ferrante is misplaced. Ferrante involved the substantive law of the United States Virgin Islands, not North Carolina. See id. at 506. Moreover, the court stated that lawful conduct could not be outrageous for punitive damages purposes under the law of the United States Virgin Islands only after it held that the Ferrante defendant lawfully foreclosed on plaintiffs' property under Virgin Islands foreclosure law and the relevant provisions of the parties' contracts. See id. at 506–08. Unlike the defendant in Ferrante, the jury will determine whether defendants substantially and unreasonably interfered with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property. Furthermore, defendants do not cite any other authority under North Carolina law for the proposition that regulatory or statutory compliance always insulates a defendant from punitive damages liability in a trespass or nuisance case, and one other court has rejected the same contention in a nuisance case. See Ben Artis v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, No. 7:14-CV-237, 2019 WL 1103406, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 8, 2019) (unpublished). Thus, although the court is not resolving whether the issue of punitive damages will go to the jury, the court denies defendants' sixteenth motion in limine.
III.
Plaintiffs filed an omnibus motion in limine about ten topics. See [D.E. 313]. Defendants do not oppose five of those topics: evidence relating to plaintiffs' legal representation, reference to the Nix class action and that plaintiffs opted out of the class action, evidence that plaintiffs did not file insurance claims about PFAS contamination on their properties, evidence that trial plaintiffs John and Annie Stevens did not receive a permit for or encase one of the wells on their property, and evidence that PFAS has been detected in public drinking water. See [D.E. 313] 1–2; [D.E. 368] 1–2 & n.1. Thus, the court grants plaintiffs' motion on the five unopposed topics. Next, the court assesses the five disputed topics.
A.
Plaintiffs move to exclude evidence of a lawsuit in North Carolina state court between defendants and Cumberland County, North Carolina, and plaintiffs' properties' future connection to public water. See [D.E. 313] 2; [D.E. 319] 3–6.1 Plaintiffs argue that such evidence is irrelevant, speculative, and outweighed by unfair prejudice, jury confusion, and waste of time. See [D.E. 319] 3–6. Defendants respond that the evidence is probative of plaintiffs' claims for future damages. See [D.E. 368] 4–6.
Evidence that plaintiffs may not need to incur certain future costs is probative of plaintiffs' claims for future damages. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that such evidence is inadmissible on all possible grounds. See Silicon Knights, 2011 WL 5439156, at *1; Wilkins, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 1218–19; Hawthorne, 831 F. Supp. at 1400–01. Thus, the court denies plaintiffs' third and fourth motions in limine.
B.
Plaintiffs move to exclude evidence, testimony, or argument about “the utility, social value, economic importance, sector-specific importance, or other importance of products manufactured at Fayetteville Works.” [D.E. 319] 8; see [D.E. 313] 2. Plaintiffs' nuisance claims require the jury to assess the utility, social value, and importance of defendants' activities. See, e.g., N.C. Pattern Jury Instr. (Civ.) § 805.25 (directing the jury to consider, in part, “the nature, utility and social value of the defendant's operation” when determining if the substantial interference with use and enjoyment was unreasonable); Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 618, 124 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1962) (“The circumstances which are to be considered by the jury in determining whether or not defendant's conduct is unreasonable include ․ the nature, utility and social value of defendant's operation ․”). Such evidence also may be relevant to the jury's determination of punitive damages if that issue goes to the jury. Cf. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-35(2)(a), (h). Thus, the court denies plaintiffs' seventh motion in limine.
C.
Plaintiffs move to exclude statements about the state of mind, knowledge, or motive of regulatory bodies. See [D.E. 313] 2; [D.E. 319] 10–11. Defendants oppose the motion “to the extent [it] is an attempt to prevent [d]efendants from presenting testimony, evidence, or argument about what [d]efendants provided or told regulatory bodies.” [D.E. 368] 9.
The court will properly apply the Federal Rules of Evidence at trial and rule on objections to specific evidence at trial. Thus, the court denies without prejudice plaintiffs' ninth motion in limine.
D.
Plaintiffs move to exclude testimony that all GenX compounds released from the Vinyl Ethers manufacturing unit at Fayetteville Works were byproducts. See [D.E. 313] 2; [D.E. 319] 11–13. Defendants respond that the plaintiffs improperly ask the court to decide a factual issue (i.e., whether GenX compounds were released as byproducts from the Vinyl Ethers manufacturing unit at Fayetteville Works). See [D.E. 368] 10–13.
The parties dispute whether defendants released GenX compounds as byproducts from the Vinyl Ethers manufacturing unit at Fayetteville Works. The jury will resolve the parties' factual dispute. Thus, the court denies plaintiffs' tenth motion in limine.
IV.
In sum, the court DENIES defendants' first motion in limine [D.E. 306], DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE defendants' second motion in limine [D.E. 308], GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendants' third motion in limine [D.E. 310], GRANTS defendants' fourth motion in limine [D.E. 312], DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE defendants' fifth motion in limine [D.E. 315], GRANTS defendants' sixth motion in limine [D.E. 317], DENIES defendants' seventh motion in limine [D.E. 325], DENIES defendants' eighth motion in limine [D.E. 328], GRANTS defendants' ninth motion in limine [D.E. 330], DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE defendants' tenth motion in limine [D.E. 332], GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE defendants' eleventh motion in limine [D.E. 334], GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendants' twelfth motion in limine [D.E. 336], GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendants' thirteenth motion in limine [D.E. 338], GRANTS defendants' fourteenth motion in limine [D.E. 341], GRANTS defendants' fifteenth motion in limine [D.E. 343], DENIES defendants' sixteenth motion in limine [D.E. 346], and GRANTS plaintiffs' first, second, fifth, sixth, and eighth motions in limine and DENIES plaintiffs' third, fourth, seventh, ninth, and tenth motions in limine [D.E. 313].
SO ORDERED. This 2 day of July, 2026.
FOOTNOTES
1. Plaintiffs' motion does not relate to trial plaintiff Branch. Branch's property is connected to public water. See [D.E. 319] 5 n.1.
JAMES C. DEVER III, United States District Judge
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Docket No: No. 5:18-CV-73-D
Decided: July 02, 2026
Court: United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina.
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