KELLY WALL v. MOUNTAIRE FARMS INC (2026)

ORDER

On January 27, 2025, Kelly Wall (“Wall” or “plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Mountaire Farms Inc. (“MFI” or “defendant”) [D.E. 1]. Wall alleges (1) associational disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 et seq. (claim one) and (2) retaliation and interference in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (claim two). See id. at 6–7.

On October 9, 2025, each party moved for summary judgment and filed a memorandum in support, a statement of material facts, and an appendix. See [D.E. 20 to 23] (MFI); [D.E. 24 to 27] (Wall). On October 30, 2025, each party responded in opposition. See [D.E. 28] (MFI); [D.E. 32] (Wall). On November 13, 2025, each party replied. See [D.E. 35] (MFI); [D.E. 36] (Wall).

On October 30, 2025, MFI moved to strike evidence discussed in Wall's motion for partial summary judgment [D.E. 30] and filed a memorandum and exhibit in support [D.E. 31]. On November 20, 2025, Wall responded in opposition [D.E. 37]. On December 4, 2025, MFI replied [D.E. 38]. As explained below, the court grants in part MFI's motion to strike, grants MFI's motion for summary judgment, and denies Wall's motion for partial summary judgment.

I.

MFI moves to strike three pieces of evidence that Wall submitted in support of her motion for partial summary judgment: (1) WALL0009, an exhibit showing an email exchange on August 9, 2023, between Sanchez and Wall (“August 9 email”) submitted at docket entries 27-1 and 34-1, (2) the North Carolina Employment Security Commission (“NCESC”) decision about Wall's employment termination, and (3) Wall's damages calculations submitted at docket entries 27-6 and 34-6. See [D.E. 31] 2–5. “A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact [about a motion for summary judgment] cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Courts “may not consider inadmissible evidence on a motion for summary judgment.” Giles v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 59 F.4th 696, 704 (4th Cir. 2023).

As for WALL0009, MFI argues that Wall cannot authenticate the email, making it inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a). See [D.E. 31] 2–3. In support, MFI notes that the email is altered. See id.

Evidence must be authentic to be admissible. To establish that evidence is authentic, a proponent must “produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). “The district court's role is to serve as gatekeeper in assessing whether the proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation from which the jury could reasonably find that the evidence is authentic.” United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 2009); see United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370–71 (4th Cir. 1992); Fed. R. Evid. 104(b).

MFI's and Wall's versions of the August 9 email differ in multiple ways. But one sentence is critical. In MFI's version, the sentence reads, “Please remember if you have to be out of work to care for your mother get in touch with me and your supervisor.” [D.E. 23-2] 54. In Wall's version, the sentence reads, “Please remember if you have to be out of work to care for your mother get in touch with me and I will send emails to plant manager, superintendent and supervisor.” [D.E. 27-1] 2.

In Wall's response to MFI's statement of material facts, Wall agreed that the original email told Wall to “get in touch with [Sanchez] and [her] Supervisor” (Gallagher) when she needed to take intermittent FMLA leave. Def.'s Stmt. Material Facts (“DSMF”) [D.E. 22] ¶ 37; see Pl.'s Response to Def.'s Stmt. Material Facts (“PRSMF”) [D.E. 33] ¶ 35. Furthermore, Wall forwarded the August 9 email to six external email recipients on August 10, 2023, and the forwarded email is MFI's version. See [D.E. 23-2] 63. Moreover, during her deposition, Wall admitted that MFI's version of the August 9 email was the version she received and responded to on August 10, 2023. See id. at 18–19. Because Wall admits that WALL0009 is not the authentic version of the August 9 email from Sanchez, the document is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a). Thus, the court strikes WALL0009 and relies on MFI's version of the August 9 email.

As for the NCESC decision, Wall uses the decision to support her claim that MFI lacked at legitimate reason to terminate her employment. MFI responds that the NCESC decision is inadmissible. See [D.E. 31] 4–5. The court agrees with MFI. See Manning v. Alamance Cnty., No. 1:15-CV-290, 2017 WL 2703532, at *2 (M.D.N.C. June 22, 2017) (unpublished); Smith v. Comput. Task Grp., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 603, 611 (M.D.N.C. 2008); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 96-4(x)(8). Furthermore, Wall does not oppose MFI's motion to strike the NCESC decision as evidence. Thus, the court strikes the NCESC decision. The court does not address Wall's damages exhibit because it is not necessary to decide the cross-motions for summary judgment.

II.

MFI (an agricultural food production and processing company) operates the Lumber Bridge complex. See DSMF ¶¶ 1, 3.¹ The Lumber Bridge complex consists of a processing plant in Lumber Bridge, North Carolina (“the plant”), a Fayetteville, North Carolina, recruiting office (“the Fayetteville office”), and feed mills in Candor, North Carolina, and Scotland County, North Carolina. See id. ¶ 3. In May 2022, MFI hired Wall as a Human Resources Representative at the plant. See id. ¶ 2. In her role, Wall recruited hourly employees for the Lumber Bridge complex, conducted employee interviews, and handled new hire reporting. See id. Wall reported to Robert Sawyer (“Sawyer”), and Sawyer reported to Bart Crater (“Crater”). See id. ¶ 4. Wall primarily worked in the Fayetteville office from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. See id. ¶ 5. MFI often relied on Wall to open the Fayetteville office. See id.

In December 2022, Wall often missed work without giving Sawyer two weeks' notice. See id. ¶¶ 6, 9; see also PRSMF ¶ 7.² Sawyer and Crater discussed Wall's absences, and Sawyer issued Wall a written warning. See DSMF ¶ 7. On December 20, 2022, Wall received the written warning. See id. ¶ 8. In the written warning, Sawyer noted the following times Wall failed to provide two weeks' notice for time off:

• December 6, 2022: Wall notified Sawyer that she was not reporting for work that day because she had an “urgent matter” to attend to. Compare id. ¶ 9a, with PRSMF ¶ 7a, and Sanchez Dep. [D.E. 23-5] 17.

• December 7, 2022: Wall told Sawyer she would report late for work the next day—December 8, 2022. See DSMF ¶ 9b; PRSMF ¶ 7b.

• December 9, 2022: Wall told Sawyer she would be late for work that day. See DSMF ¶ 9c; PRSMF ¶ 7c.

• December 15, 2022: Wall forgot the Fayetteville office key, returned home to get it, and reported late for work. See DSMF ¶ 9d; PRSMF ¶ 7d.

• December 19, 2022: Wall told Sawyer she would be late to work that day. See DSMF ¶ 9e; PRSMF ¶ 7e.

• December 20, 2022: Ten minutes before the Fayetteville office opened, Wall told Sawyer she was not reporting for work that day. See DSMF ¶ 9f; PRSMF ¶ 7f.

Sawyer warned Wall that MFI would take further disciplinary action “up to and including; termination of employment” if her behavior was not “corrected immediately.” DSMF ¶ 10; see PRSMF ¶ 8.

On April 24, 2023, Candace Gallagher (“Gallagher”) replaced Sawyer and became Wall's direct supervisor. See DSMF ¶ 11; PRSMF ¶ 9. Wall's absences continued from Gallagher's start date through May 2023, which Gallagher and Crater periodically discussed. See DSMF ¶ 11; PRSMF ¶ 9. Compare DSMF ¶ 12, with PRSMF ¶ 10, and Sanchez Dep. 22.

On June 14, 2023, Wall moved computer equipment from one team member's desk to another without approval. Compare DSMF ¶ 13, with PRSMF ¶ 11, and Sanchez Dep. 25. Gallagher told Wall to return the equipment and prohibited her from moving equipment. Compare DSMF ¶ 13, with PRSMF ¶ 11, and Sanchez Dep. 25. Despite Gallagher's instructions, Wall moved desks, chairs, and employees' personal items—disrupting interviews and causing conflicts with coworkers. Compare DSMF ¶ 14, with PRSMF ¶ 12, and Sanchez Dep. 25. That same day, Gallagher also learned that Wall changed MFI's candidate interview questionnaire without the requisite approval. Compare DSMF ¶ 15, with PRSMF ¶ 13, and [D.E. 23-2] 29. Gallagher consulted with Helen Proctor (Employee Relations Manager) and issued Wall a final written warning. Compare DSMF ¶ 16, with PRSMF ¶ 14, and [D.E. 23-2] 29. Gallagher delivered the final written warning to Wall and explained it was for insubordination, failure to follow the chain of command, and disregard for authority. Compare DSMF ¶ 16, with PRSMF ¶ 14, and [D.E. 23-2] 29. Gallagher warned Wall that future violations could result in termination of Wall's employment. Compare DSMF ¶ 16, with PRSMF ¶ 14, and [D.E. 23-2] 29. Gallagher notified Crater about the final written warning. See [D.E. 34-9] 2.

On July 8, 2023, MFI's recruiting team participated in the Lumbee Homecoming event in Pembroke, North Carolina. See DSMF ¶ 18; PRSMF ¶ 16. MFI told Wall that she had to participate in the event for two hours. See DSMF ¶¶ 18–19. On July 7, 2023, Gallagher's recruiting team (including Wall) met to prepare for the event and review individual schedules. See id. ¶ 19. Gallagher scheduled Wall to participate from 9:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. See id. On July 8, 2023, all team members except Wall arrived at 9:00 a.m. See id. 20. Gallagher texted Wall twice, but Wall did not respond. See DSMF ¶¶ 21, 23–24; PRSMF ¶¶ 19, 21–22. Gallagher also texted Crater, told him Wall missed the mandatory event, and indicated that the two needed to discuss the situation. See DSMF ¶ 22.

On July 10, 2023 (the Monday after the Lumbee Homecoming event), Wall responded to Gallagher, explained that her mother had a “light stroke” on the day of the event, and told Gallagher that she would call her shortly. See DSMF ¶ 25; PRSMF ¶ 23. Wall did not call Gallagher or report for work that day. See DSMF ¶ 27; PRSMF ¶ 25. Gallagher shared Wall's text message with Crater and noted that “the lack of communication on [Wall's] end continues to occur.” DSMF ¶ 26; see PRSMF ¶ 24. Although MFI could have terminated Wall's employment, Gallagher and Crater agreed to give Wall another opportunity and issued Wall a second final written warning. See DSMF ¶ 31.

On July 12, 2023, Chrislein Sanchez (“Sanchez”), the Benefits Supervisor for the Lumber Bridge complex, received Wall's request for intermittent FMLA leave to care for Wall's mother. See DSMF ¶ 34; PRSMF ¶ 32.

On July 19, 2023, Gallagher delivered the second final written warning to Wall. Compare DSMF ¶ 32, with PRSMF ¶ 30, and [D.E. 23-2] 39. In the second final written warning, Gallagher articulated the following expectations and the consequences for failing to meet those expectations:

Timely communication—preferably prior to shift start is required for an absence. As you are aware, the success of our department depends on every associate showing up on time and performing his or her job duties. You have previously been informed of this expectation when we encountered a similar expectation in late April ․ [A]ny type of future violations will lead to further action, up to termination.

DSMF ¶ 33; see PRSMF ¶ 31.

On August 9, 2023, Sanchez approved Wall's request for intermittent FMLA leave and emailed Wall to tell her that she was approved to take leave one to two times per month (pursuant to the doctor's recommendation). See DSMF ¶ 37; PRSMF ¶ 35; see also Pl.'s Stmt. Material Facts (“PSMF”) [D.E. 26] 1; Def.'s Response to Pl.'s Stmt. Material Facts (“DRSMF”) [D.E. 29] 1. In that same email, Sanchez wrote, “Please remember if you have to be out of work to care for your mother get in touch with me and your supervisor.” DSMF ¶ 38; see PRSMF ¶ 36. On August 10, 2023, Wall acknowledged Sanchez's email. See DSMF ¶ 39; PRSMF ¶ 37.

MFI granted all of Wall's FMLA leave requests, which occurred in September, October, November, and December 2023. Compare DSMF ¶ 42, with PRSMF ¶ 40, and [D.E. 23-2] 9–10, But Wall failed to communicate with Gallagher about her FMLA leave per Sanchez's instructions, Wall testified that in October 2023, Gallagher told Wall that in addition to Sanchez, Wall needed to tell Gallagher when she planned to take FMLA leave because Wall was frequently responsible for opening the Fayetteville office. See [D.E. 23-2] 10. Nevertheless, after this conversation, Wall failed to notify Gallagher about her FMLA absences. See DSMF ¶¶ 45, 49a, 49d. Compare DSMF ¶ 49b, with PRSMF ¶ 47b, and Sanchez Dep. 21.

On November 13, 2023, Gallagher started reviewing the Fayetteville office's security cameras and keeping a timeline of Wall's communication and timeliness issues. See DSMF ¶ 48. On November 17, 2023, Gallagher called Wall's office phone at 10:15 a.m., but no one answered. See id. ¶ 49c. Gallagher texted Wall and asked her if she was coming to work but received no response. See id. Upon checking the cameras, Gallagher discovered that Wall arrived late for work, left the Fayetteville office around 10:10 a.m., and arrived at the plant around 12:05 p.m. (despite the drive time between the Fayetteville office and the plant taking only 45 minutes). See id. On November 21, 2023, Wall left work over two hours early without notifying Gallagher. See id. ¶ 49e.

On November 22, 2023, Wall left the Fayetteville office midday for about two hours, and when she returned, Gallagher observed a young child in the office with Wall. Compare DSMF ¶ 49f, with PRSMF ¶ 47f, and [D.E. 23-2] 41. MFI prohibits any individual under age 17 from entering its facilities. See DSMF ¶ 50. Gallagher contacted Wall and told her that the child (Wall's three-year-old grandson) needed to be picked up immediately. Compare DSMF ¶ 49f & n.4, with PRSMF ¶ 47f, and [D.E. 23-2] 41. Crater believed the incident demonstrated Wall's poor judgment. See DSMF ¶ 50.³

Crater decided to terminate Wall's employment. Compare DSMF ¶ 51, with PRSMF ¶ 49, In reaching his decision, Crater considered Wall's failure to communicate absences to Gallagher, Wall's violation of MFI policy by allowing her grandson to be present in the Fayetteville office, and the three warnings (which included two final warnings) that MFI issued Wall in the preceding; 12 months. Compare DSMF ¶ 51, with PRSMF ¶ 49. Crater also consulted with Gallagher, Proctor, and Rodrigo Lozano (Senior Director of Human Resources Operations). See DSMF ¶ 52. On December 1, 2025, MFI planned to terminate Wall's employment, but Wall took FMLA leave that day without informing Gallagher. Compare DSMF ¶ 55, with PRSMF ¶ 53.

On December 4, 2023, Gallagher met with Wall in person to communicate the termination decision. See DSMF ¶ 56. Proctor joined the meeting via phone. See id. During the meeting, Gallagher reviewed the three written warnings issued to Wall and discussed Wall's grandson being present in the Fayetteville office and Wall's continued failure to communicate absences and tardies. See id. Wall and Proctor did not mention Wall's FMLA leave or her mother's health. See PSMF ¶ 58; PRSMF ¶ 56.

On October 3, 2024, Wall signed and filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See DSMF ¶ 59; PRSMF ¶ 57.

III.

Summary judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the record as a whole, the court determines that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 380 (2007); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment initially must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleading, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49, but “must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (cleaned up). A trial court reviewing a motion for summary judgment should determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In making this determination, the court must view the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Harris, 550 U.S. at 378.

A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position [is] insufficient ․” Id. at 252; see Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The nonmoving party, however, cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.”). Only factual disputes that affect the outcome under substantive law properly preclude summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

A.

MFI seeks summary judgment on Wall's ADA claim for associational disability discrimination. MFI argues that Wall did not file her charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment action. See [D.E. 21] 10–11.

The ADA incorporates the administrative enforcement provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including the requirement that a plaintiff exhaust her administrative remedies by timely filing a charge with the EEOC concerning the alleged discrimination before filing suit in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), 12117(a); Hoffman v. Inova Health Care Servs., 169 F.4th 207, 218 (4th Cir. 2026); Sydnor v. Fairfax Cnty., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012); Manning v. N.C. State Univ., 724 F. Supp. 3d 438, 450–51 (E.D.N.C. 2024); Williams v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 364 F. Supp. 3d 596, 601 (E.D.N.C. 2018); Thiessen v. Stewart-Haas Racing, LLC, 311 F. Supp. 3d 739, 743 (M.D.N.C. 2018). Requiring a plaintiff to file an EEOC charge about the alleged discrimination before filing suit is an “integral part of the [ADA] enforcement scheme.” Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 593 (citation omitted); see Hoffman, 169 F.4th at 218; Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2013). The requirement to file an EEOC charge serves “two principal purposes.” Balas, 711 F.3d at 407. “First, it notifies the charged party of the asserted violation.” Id. (citation omitted). Second, “it brings the charged party before the EEOC and permits effectuation of the [ADA]'s primary goal, the securing of voluntary compliance with the law.” Id. (citation omitted).

Wall had to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of each alleged ADA violation. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), 12117(a). When the alleged ADA violation involves employment termination, the 180-day period commences once the plaintiff receives “final and unequivocal” notice of her employment termination. English v. Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957, 962 (4th Cir. 1988); see Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 564 (2016); Del. State. Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980); Hearn v. Town of Oak Island, No. 21-1598, 2022 WL 7935994, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished). The 180-day time requirement is not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982); see also Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 550–52 (2019). Although the timeliness of administrative exhaustion is not jurisdictional, the failure to file an EEOC charge concerning the alleged discrimination can bar an ADA claim. See Davis, 587 U.S. at 550–52.

Such a failure results in loss of an “actionable” claim and “the ability to recover.” Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110, 113 (2002), superseded by statute on other grounds, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5; see Davis, 587 U.S. at 551–52. Moreover, “only incidents that took place within the timely filing period are actionable.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114; see Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 623–24 (2007), superseded by statute on other grounds, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5; Hentosh v. Old Dominion Univ., 767 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by Davis, 587 U.S. 541.

Although Wall disputes which day MFI terminated Wall's employment, the evidence shows that MFI terminated Wall's employment on December 4, 2023. The “Salary Termination of Employment” form listed Wall's “termination date” and last date of pay as December 4, 2023. See [D.E. 27-5] 2. Furthermore, Proctor (who joined Wall's termination meeting via phone) affirmed in an affidavit that the termination meeting occurred on December 4, 2023. See [D.E. 23-4] 4.

In opposition, Wall argues that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wall, MFI terminated Wall's employment on December 8, 2023. See [D.E. 32] 12. The court disagrees. “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380; see Richardson v. Clarke, 52 F.4th 614, 621 (4th Cir. 2022); Oliver v. Bolling, No. 2:17-CV-1294, 2021 WL 11549982, at *9 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 28, 2021) (unpublished) (granting summary judgment when a fact in dispute was clearly contradicted by medical exhibits), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 11549912 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 26, 2021) (unpublished); DeShazor v. Larod, No. CIV 11-3412, 2012 WL 4889542, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 12, 2012) (unpublished) (same). Here, the record evidence shows that MFI terminated Wall's employment on December 4, 2023, which contradicts Wall's unsupported assertion in her brief that MFI terminated her employment on December 8, 2023.⁴ Accordingly, Wall received “final and unequivocal” notice of her termination on December 4, 2023, and had until June 3, 2024, to file her EEOC charge. English, 858 F.2d at 961–62: see Hearn, 2022 WL 7935994. at *1.⁵

On October 3, 2024, Wall filed her untimely charge with the EEOC. See DSMF ¶ 59; PRSMF ¶ 57; [D.E. 34-8] 7–10. Thus, Wall's ADA claim for termination is not actionable. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 623–24; Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110, 113; Hentosh, 767 F.3d at 417. The same conclusion is true even if MFI terminated Wall's employment on December 8 or 10, 2023.

Next, Wall argues that North Carolina is a deferral state with a 300-day filing period and cites Tinsley v. First Union National Bank, 155 F.3d 435 (4th Cir. 1998). See [D.E. 32] 11–12. But Tinsley addresses Virginia's status as a deferral state, not whether North Carolina is a deferral state. See 155 F.3d at 439–40. “North Carolina is a deferral state in two very limited circumstances,” neither of which apply here. Bratcher v. Pharm. Prod. Dev., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 533, 543 (E.D.N.C. 2008). Moreover, even if the 300-day filing period applied (and it does not), Wall submitted her EEOC charge after the 300-day filing period expired on September 30, 2024.

To the extent Wall argues that equitable tolling applies to the 180-day filing period, the court disagrees. Equitable tolling applies only when there are “(1) extraordinary circumstances, (2) beyond [a party's] control or external to [the party's] own conduct, (3) that prevented [the party] from filing on time.” Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004). “Principles of equitable tolling do not extend to garden variety claims of excusable neglect.” Rouse, 339 F.3d at 246; see Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1048–49 (4th Cir. 1987).

The “extraordinary circumstances” standard is “demanding.” Bratcher, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 543. The party seeking the “extraordinary remedy” of equitable tolling bears “a considerable burden to demonstrate that it applies.” CVLR Performance Horses, Inc. v. Wynne, 792 F.3d 469, 476 (4th Cir. 2015). A party seeking such relief must show that she diligently pursued her rights, but that an extraordinary circumstance external to her own conduct prevented her from timely filing an EEOC charge or complaint in federal court. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); CVLR Performance Horses, Inc., 792 F.3d at 476. Wall does not present any extraordinary circumstances beyond her own control that prevented her from timely filing her EEOC charge; therefore, equitable tolling does not apply to Wall's 180-day filing period. Cf. Sosa, 364 F.3d at 512; Rouse, 339 F.3d at 246. Thus, Wall's termination claim under the ADA is not actionable, and the court grants MFI's motion for summary judgment on Wall's ADA termination claim.

B.

Next, Wall and MFI each seek summary judgment on Wall's claim against MFI for interference and retaliation in violation of the FMLA.

1.

The FMLA protects “employees from discrimination or retaliation for exercising their substantive rights under the FMLA.” Vannoy v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 304 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see Fry v. Rand Constr. Corp., 964 F.3d 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2020); Dotson v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 294 (4th Cir. 2009). FMLA retaliation claims are analogous to Title VII retaliation claims, and courts analyze them under the burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973). See Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., LLC, 446 F.3d 541, 550–51 (4th Cir. 2006); Nichols v. Ashland Hosp. Corp., 251 F.3d 496, 502 (4th Cir. 2001). The McDonnell Douglas framework includes three steps. First, Wall must make out a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation. Specifically, Wall must show that (1) “[s]he engaged in protected activity,” (2) MFI “took adverse action against h[er],” and (3) “the adverse action was causally connected to [her] protected activity.” Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 551 (citation omitted); see Shipton v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 109 F.4th 701, 706 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 774 (2024); Fry, 964 F.3d at 244; Hannah P. v. Coats, 916 F.3d 327, 347 (4th Cir. 2019); Waag v. Sotera Def. Sols., Inc., 857 F.3d 179, 191 (4th Cir. 2017); Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 1998).

Second, if Wall establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to MFI “to rebut the presumption of retaliation by articulating a legitimate[,] nonretaliatory reason for its actions.” Beall v. Abbott Lab'ys, 130 F.3d 614, 619 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated in part on other grounds by Gilliam v. S.C. Dep't of Juv. Just., 474 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 2007); see Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981); Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 1994). This burden is one of production, not persuasion. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509–11 (1993).

Third, once MFI offers admissible evidence sufficient to meet its burden of production, “the burden shifts back to [Wall] to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [MFI's] stated reasons were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for” retaliation. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (cleaned up), overruled in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin, Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009); see, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142–43 (2000); King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 150–54 (4th Cir. 2003). Wall can do so by showing that MFI's “explanation is unworthy of credence or by offering other forms of circumstantial evidence sufficiently probative of” retaliation. Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 336 (4th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up), abrogated in part on other grounds by Gross, 557 U.S. at 177–80; see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147. At bottom, Wall “must produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact such that a reasonable factfinder could conclude the adverse employment action was taken for an impermissible reason, i.e., retaliation.” Sharif v. United Airlines, Inc., 841 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2016); see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 148–49.

As for the prima facie case, the court assumes without deciding that Wall has established a prima facie case of retaliation under the FMLA. In turn, MFI offers two legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for terminating Wall's employment. First, MFI alleges that it terminated Wall's employment because she allowed her three-year-old grandson to be present in the Fayetteville office despite clear company policy prohibiting individuals under age 17 from entering MFI's facilities. See [D.E. 21] 6–7. Second, MFI alleges that Wall failed to communicate her expected absences (both FMLA and non-FMLA) to Gallagher despite explicit instructions from both Sanchez and Gallagher to do so. See id. at 6–8; see also DSMF ¶ 38; PRSMF ¶ 36; [D.E. 23-2] 10.

Wall responds that MFI considered her FMLA absences when deciding to terminate her employment, which delegitimizes one of MFI's nonretaliatory reasons for termination. See [D.E. 32] 6–7; [D.E. 36] 4–6. Not so. MFI fired Wall (in part) for failing to notify Gallagher when Wall took FMLA leave, not for the FMLA leave itself. Before Wall requested intermittent FMLA leave, MFI issued Wall an initial written warning and a final written warning for failing to properly communicate about absences and tardies. See DSMF ¶¶ 7–8, 31–32. In those warnings, MFI notified Wall that her communication and compliance with leave requirements needed to improve or MFI would terminate her employment. See DSMF ¶¶ 10, 33; PRSMF ¶¶ 8, 31. Furthermore, after Wall received intermittent FMLA leave, Wall failed to notify her supervisor (Gallagher) about her leave despite clear instructions from Gallagher and Sanchez to do so. See DSMF ¶ 38; PRSMF ¶ 36; [D.E. 23-2] 10. Accordingly, MFI's decision to terminate Wall's employment based on that failure did not violate the FMLA. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(c) (“When the need for leave is not foreseeable, an employee must comply with the employer's usual and customary notice and procedural requirements for requesting leave, absent unusual circumstances,” which may include contacting “a specific individual.”); Soutner v. Penn State Health, 841 F. App'x 409, 416 (3d Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (holding that “regardless of whether [plaintiff's] absences were FMLA-designated, [plaintiff] was required to comply with [defendant's] reporting procedures[;]” therefore, because the plaintiff did not comply, the defendant lawfully fired her); Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 1008–09 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n employer generally does not violate the FMLA if it terminates an employee for failing to comply with a policy requiring notice of absences, even if the absences that the employee failed to report were protected by the FMLA.”); Bacon v. Hennepin Cnty. Med. Ctr., 550 F.3d 711, 715 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Employers who enforce [call-in] policies by firing employees on FMLA leave for noncompliance do not violate the FMLA.”); Lewis v. Holsum of Fort Wayne, Inc., 278 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2002) (same). Wall's continued failure to notify Gallagher about her absences (both FMLA and non-FMLA) and Wall permitting her grandson to be present in the Fayetteville office are both legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for terminating Wall's employment. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; Twigg, 659 F.3d at 1008–09; Bacon, 550 F.3d at 750; Beall, 130 F.3d at 619; Carter, 33 F.3d at 460.

As for pretext, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wall, no rational jury could find that MFI's stated reasons for terminating Wall's employment are pretextual. As for Wall's grandson being present in the Fayetteville office, Wall argues that her termination form does not mention the presence of her grandchild in the Fayetteville office as a reason for termination, which demonstrates pretext. See [D.E. 36] 5. Not so. The termination form asked the “Reason for Termination,” and Gallagher marked the box for “Involuntary Termination.” See [D.E. 27-5] 2. Gallagher also checked “dependability” and “cooperation” as unsatisfactory performance areas for Wall. See id. An employee is not dependable if she violates company policy by allowing an underage individual to be present in the facility. Furthermore, during the termination meeting, Gallagher told Wall that her employment was terminated, in part, because her grandson was present in the Fayetteville office. See DSMF ¶ 56. Thus, MFI's failure to explicitly discuss Wall's grandson on her termination form does not show pretext.

As for Wall's failure to communicate absences to Gallagher, Wall makes five arguments about pretext. First, Wall argues that MFI “described [her] termination as the result of ‘poor communication,’ ‘failure to notify,’ ‘lack of cooperation,’ ‘attendance issues,’ and ‘dependability concems[;]’ ” therefore, Wall argues that “[t]he lack of a consistent explanation, coupled with evolving terminology, undermines the credibility of [MFI's] justification and supports the inference that its stated reasons were manufactured after the fact.” [D.E. 32] 7–8. The court disagrees. A continued failure to notify a supervisor about an upcoming absence suggests multiple shortcomings, including poor communication, a failure to notify, attendance issues, and a lack of dependability.

Second, Wall argues that MFI expressly incorporated FMLA absences into its “dependability” analysis. See id. at 8; see also [D.E. 27-5] 3–4 (Gallagher's timeline of absences). As discussed, MFI lawfully considered Wall's failure to notify Gallagher about her FMLA absences, not the FMLA absences themselves. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(c); Soutner, 841 F. App'x at 416; Twigg, 659 F.3d at 1009–10; Bacon, 550 F.3d at 715; Lewis, 278 F.3d at 710.

Third, Wall argues that she complied with MFI's notice procedures and cites WALL0009, the altered August 9 email. See [D.E. 32] 8–9. As discussed, the authenticated email directed Wall to notify Sanchez and Gallagher about FMLA leave, which Wall did not do.

Fourth, Wall argues that MFI “took no disciplinary action for alleged ‘communication’ failures until after [Wall] began using her approved intermittent FMLA leave.” Id. at 9. Not true. Before Wall requested intermittent FMLA leave, MFI issued Wall an initial written warning and a final written warning for failing to properly communicate about absences. See DSMF ¶¶ 7–8, 31–32. In those warnings, MFI notified Wall that her communication and compliance with leave requirements needed immediate improvement or MFI would terminate her employment See DSMF ¶¶ 10, 33; PRSMF ¶¶ 8, 31. Thus, “MFI's tone” did not “abruptly change[ ] from supportive to punitive” about communication issues after Wall requested intermittent FMLA leave. [D.E. 32] 9.

Lastly, Wall argues that MFI's “reliance on its attendance policy [was] selectively enforced and inconsistently applied.” Id. But Wall cites no evidence to support this argument.

Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wall, no genuine issue of material fact exists about pretext. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142–43; Hill, 354 F.3d at 285; Mereish, 359 F.3d at 336; King, 328 F.3d at 150–54. Thus, the court denies Wall's motion for partial summary judgment and grants MFI's motion for summary judgment on Wall's FMLA retaliation claim.

2.

The FMLA makes it unlawful for any employer to “interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under [the FMLA].” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (emphasis added). “To prove FMLA interference, an employee must demonstrate that (1) [she is] entitled to an FMLA benefit; (2) [her] employer interfered with the provision of that benefit; and (3) that interference caused harm.” Roberts v. Gestamp W. Va., LLC, 45 F.4th 726, 732 (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up); see Adams v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Pub. Schs., 789 F.3d 422, 427 (4th Cir. 2015), abrogated in part on other grounds by Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024). “The FMLA provides no relief unless the employee has been prejudiced by the violation.” Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 302 (cleaned up); see Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002). Thus, “an employer may avoid liability if it shows it would have taken the contested adverse employment action regardless of the employee's FMLA leave.” Roberts, 45 F.4th at 732–33; see Hannah P. v. Haines, 80 F.4th 236, 244 (4th Cir. 2023); Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 547.

Wall alleges that MFI interfered with her FMLA benefits when it considered her FMLA leave as a negative factor in terminating her employment. See [D.E. 32] 10. But, as discussed, MFI considered Wall's failure to abide by MFI's notice requirement, not the FMLA leave itself. Furthermore, MFI approved all of Wall's FMLA requests. Thus, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wall, Wall has failed to prove a prima facie case of FMLA interference.

Alternatively, even if Wall could prove a prima facie claim of FMLA interference, MFI articulated legitimate reasons for terminating Wall's employment and would have terminated Wall's employment regardless of her intermittent FMLA leave. See, e.g., Hannah P., 80 F.4th at 244; Roberts, 45 F.4th at 732–33; Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 547. Thus, the court denies Wall's motion for partial summary judgment and grants MFI's motion for summary judgment on Wall's FMLA interference claim.

IV.

In sum, the court GRANTS IN PART defendant's motion to strike [D.E. 30], GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment [D.E. 20], and DENIES plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment [D.E. 24]. Defendant may file a motion for costs in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this court's local rule. The clerk SHALL close the case.

SO ORDERED. This 11 day of June, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Docket entry 33 consists of Wall's response to MFI's statement of material facts. Wall's numbering does not correspond with MFI's statement of material facts. Wall has 73 paragraphs, while MFI has 75. Based on the subparagraphs, the court assumes Wall's paragraph 7 corresponds with MFI's paragraph 9. Thus, Wall failed to respond to two of MFI's paragraphs numbered 1through 8. The court cannot determine which paragraphs Wall skipped. Accordingly, MFI's paragraphs 1 through 8 are deemed admitted, and the court will compare the paragraphs beginning at MFI's paragraph 9 and Wall's paragraph 7. See Local Civ. R. 56.1(a)(2).

2.   A party's statement of material facts is “deemed admitted for the purposes of the motion [for summary judgment] unless it is specifically controverted by a correspondingly numbered paragraph in the opposing statement” that is “followed by a citation to [admissible] evidence.” Local Civ. R. 56.1(a)(2), (a)(4); see Felton v. Moneysworth Linen Serv., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 595, 597–98 n.1 (E.D.N.C. 2018); Howard v. Coll. of the Albemarle, 262 F. Supp. 3d 322, 329–30 n.1 (E.D.N.C. 2017), aff'd, 697 F. App'x 257 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished). Wall's response provides citations only in some paragraphs. Thus, Wall has admitted the facts contained in the remaining paragraphs of MFI's statement.

3.   Wall testified that her grandson's father was present at the Fayetteville office with her grandson. See [D.E. 23-2] 41. Wall cites this deposition testimony to dispute that she brought her grandson to the Fayetteville office. See PRSMF ¶ 47f. Whoever brought the child to the office is irrelevant. The issue is whether Wall allowed her grandson to be present in the Fayetteville office in violation of MFI policy, and Wall did.

4.   Wall contradicted her proposed December 8 termination date in her deposition. Wall testified that MFI terminated her employment on “December 10.” [D.E. 23-2] 44. When asked why she believed MFI terminated her employment on December 10, Wall responded that December 10 “just kind of rings a bell.” Id.

5.   Wall's original 180-day deadline fell on a weekend; therefore, the period was “extended to include the next business day,” June 3, 2024. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(g).

JAMES C. DEVER III United States District Judge