UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. HAITHAM YOUSEF ALHINDI (2025)

ORDER

On May 10, 2024, the United States filed a certificate of mental disease or defect and dangerousness under 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) against Haitham Yousef Alhindi (“Alhindi” or “respondent”) [D.E. 1] and moved to stay proceedings pending the resolution of Alhindi's competency and restorability in his criminal case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida [D.E. 5]. On May 14, 2024, the court granted the United States' motion to stay [D.E. 8]. On May 21, 2024, the United States moved to lift the stay [D.E. 10] and for Federal Medical Center Butner, North Carolina (“FMC Butner”) to evaluate Alhindi under 18 U.S.C. § 4246(b) [D.E. 11]. On May 23, 2024, the court lifted the stay [D.E. 12] and ordered FMC Butner to evaluate Alhindi under 18 U.S.C. § 4246(b) [D.E. 13].

On November 15, 2024, Alhindi moved to dismiss the United States' section 4246 certificate and to hold the commitment hearing in abeyance pending disposition of the motion [D.E. 20]. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On February 18, 2025, the United States responded in opposition [D.E. 32]. As explained below, the court denies Alhindi's motion to dismiss the United States' section 4246 certificate. The commitment hearing will occur, as scheduled, on May 9, 2025.

I.

On June 7, 2022, a grand jury in the United States District Court for Southern District of Florida indicted Alhindi for cyber stalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A). See United States v. Alhindi, No. 9:22-CR-80085 [ECF 15].¹ On July 18, 2022, the Southern District of Florida granted Alhindi's unopposed motion for a competency evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b) and ordered one. See [ECF 19, 20]. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) transferred Alhindi to the Metropolitan Detention Center, Los Angeles (“MDC Los Angeles”), to conduct the competency evaluation, and Alhindi arrived at MDC Los Angeles on August 18, 2022. See [D.E. 20] 2; [D.E. 32] 2. On October 6, 2022, the Southern District of Florida ordered the BOP to complete an expedited psychological evaluation by October 14, 2022. See [ECF 25]. On October 14, 2022, doctors at MDC Los Angeles noted that Alhindi had refused to cooperate with the evaluation and that his actions “suggest[ ] an awareness of the seriousness of the charges, and a deliberate attempt to alter the outcome.” [D.E. 20] 2. The doctors recommended commitment for competency restoration because they could not rule out “an underlying thought disorder or delusional belief system.” Id. The BOP returned Alhindi to the Southern District of Florida. See Id.

On November 28, 2022, the Southern District of Florida held a hearing concerning Alhindi's competence, found Alhindi incompetent to proceed, and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States “to be hospitalized for treatment in a suitable facility for such a reasonable time, not to exceed four months ․, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that, in the foreseeable future, [Alhindi] w[ould] attain the capacity to permit․ proceedings to go forward.” [ECF 34] 2; 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). Alhindi remained at the St Lucie County Jail until late December 2022. On December 13, 2022, a grand jury in the Southern District of Florida returned a superseding indictment and charged Alhindi with five counts of cyberstalking. See [ECF 35]. On December 27, 2022, Alhindi arrived at Federal Detention Center, Miami (“FDC Miami”) to await transport to a suitable facility for treatment. See [D.E. 20] 3.

On February 27, 2023, in light of the BOP's apparent failure to comply with the court's order of November 28, 2022, the Southern District of Florida sua sponte ordered the BOP to hospitalize Alhindi “forthwith.” [ECF 36]. On March 2, 2023, after BOP staff had observed Alhindi's behavior at FDC Miami, the BOP notified the Southern District of Florida that it believed Alhindi required a second competency evaluation. See [ECF 40]; [D.E. 20] 3; [D.E. 32] 3. At a hearing that same day, over Alhindi's objection, the Southern District of Florida ordered a second competency evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b). See [ECF 39, 40]. On March 29, 2023, after evaluating Alhindi, a BOP psychologist diagnosed Alhindi with “Delusional Personality Disorder, Persecutory Type” and opined that Alhindi was not competent to proceed. See [D.E. 20] 4; [D.E. 32] 3.

On April 10, 2023, the Southern District of Florida held a hearing concerning the BOP's second competency evaluation, found Alhindi incompetent to proceed, and committed Alhindi to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). See [ECF 46]; [D.E. 20] 4; [D.E. 32] 3. On April 13, 2023, Alhindi moved to dismiss his superseding criminal indictment. See [ECF 47]. On April 14, 2023, the United States responded in opposition. See [ECF 48]. On April 21, 2023, the Southern District of Florida denied Alhindi's motion to dismiss the superseding indictment and ordered the BOP to transport Alhindi to a suitable facility for treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). See [ECF 49]. On April 25, 2023, Alhindi filed a notice of interlocutory appeal concerning the Southern District of Florida's order of April 21, 2023, denying Alhindi's motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. See [ECF 50].

On June 21, 2023, Alhindi arrived at FMC Butner for treatment. See [D.E. 32] 4. On June 26, 2023, FMC Butner Acting Warden J. Elmore (“Warden Elmore”) sent a letter to the Southern District of Florida confirming Alhindi's arrival. See [D.E. 32-2]. In that letter, Warden Elmore stated that the BOP anticipated Alhindi's evaluation period would expire on October 18, 2023. See id.

On October 3, 2023, Dr. Brianna Grover (“Dr. Grover”), a BOP psychologist, sent a forensic evaluation to the Southern District of Florida which stated that Alhindi was not competent to stand trial, but “that there [was] a substantial probability that [Alhindi's] competency [could] be restored with appropriate treatment.” [ECF 89] 1 (quoting sealed document [ECF 80]); see 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2). That same day, the Southern District of Florida set a status conference for October 13, 2023, to discuss Dr. Grover's forensic evaluation. See [ECF 79].

On October 12, 2023, the Southern District of Florida “converted” the status conference “to a substantive hearing,” and told the United States to be prepared to present evidence on: “(1) whether it intends to seek a Court order authorizing [Alhindi] to be involuntarily medicated by the medical staff at FMC Butner in an effort to restore him to competency, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241 and Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003); (2) whether, alternatively, the Government plans to pursue the possibility of civil commitment; or (3) whether the Government proposes any other steps/considerations.” [ECF 81]. The Southern District of Florida also told Alhindi to “be prepared to respond.” Id. Furthermore, the Southern District of Florida advised that if the United States intended to seek an order of involuntary medication, the United States should “be prepared to explain how the Sell factors are met in this case.” Id.

On October 13, 2023, the Southern District of Florida held a hearing. See [ECF 82]. At the hearing, the United States made arguments on prong one under Sell (i.e., whether important governmental interests were at stake) and asked for time to provide briefing to the court on the remaining Sell factors. See [ECF 83] 3–4. The United States also said that it expected Alhindi would need time to respond to the United States' Sell brief and that Alhindi might desire to hire experts, which would “require a hearing of some kind down the road.” Id. at 4.

Alhindi's counsel, Scott G. Berry (“Berry”), responded and asked the Southern District of Florida to postpone the entire hearing and argued that Alhindi needed to be present, despite the hearing only considering the first prong under Sell. See id. at 6–7. In response to Berry's objection, the Southern District of Florida stated:

Even at a prong [one] hearing? I mean, just determining whether there are important governmental interests at stake? At this point․ we have a finding from a — from a physician that [Alhindi] can't even help you in his defense or truly interact in a way that's non-delusional. So, I appreciate what you're saying, but I also don't want to extend and kick the can down the road unreasonably so this process gets even more prolonged. And it seems to me like this first prong about important governmental interest is something that is a legal question; I think the case law indicates as much. So․ my concern․ is more delay. Why not at least determine whether there are important governmental interests at stake?

Id. at 7. Alhindi (through Berry), however, persisted in his objection and stated: “Well, Your Honor, I think that — my position is that each of the four prongs is important. It's a significant stage in this proceeding, and my client has a right to be present.” Id.

The Southern District of Florida then informed Berry that it would take “in excess of a month, and that's conservative, if we're lucky, to transport [Alhindi]” from FMC Butner to the Southern District of Florida for a “prong [one] Sell hearing, to then be transported back, presumably, to Butner, and all the while retain the bed space at Butner, which you know is at a premium and which we had a hard time getting initially.” Id. at 7–8. Again, Berry responded, “my position is that my client has a right to be present for the hearing.” Id. at 8. Berry also stated: “I happen to agree with the government that briefing might be appropriate here ․ [M]y recommendation about how we should proceed is that we should have one hearing on all — on all prongs, if it becomes necessary to go through all four prongs. We should do it after briefing.” Id. at 9. The Southern District of Florida again expressed concern over delay and asked Berry what he intended to include in his brief. See id. Berry demurred and stated: “Well, Judge, I think it would be fair for me to be able to actually hear, read, process whatever — whatever the argument is that the government is going to make as to prong one ․ I can certainly make arguments on the fly, but this is a fairly important process.” Id. at 9–10.

The Southern District of Florida responded: “Which is why I told the parties to be ready to argue, substantively, the factors.” Id. at 10. The Southern District of Florida continued, “[a]nd each time we meet in this case, it's ‘let's postpone one additional time.’ And I don't think it's warranted to keep [Alhindi] indefinitely in limbo at Butner without more clarity about what we're doing.” Id. Nonetheless, the Southern District of Florida assented to Berry's request for Alhindi to respond in writing to the United States' prong one argument and set a filing deadline for Friday, October 20, 2023. See id. at 21. Berry asked the court to “give [him] the extra weekend” until October 23, 2023. See id. at 21–22. The Southern District of Florida granted Berry's request for an extension and set October 23, 2023, as the deadline for Berry's response brief and October 27, 2023, as the deadline for the United States' reply. See id. at 22–23

On October 23, 2023, Berry responded in writing to the United States' arguments on prong one under Sell. See [ECF 84]. On October 25, 2023, the United States replied. See [ECF 85].

On January 31, 2024, the Southern District of Florida found that the United States had satisfied prong one under Sell, found that important governmental interests were at stake in the case, and ordered that “[o]n or before February 19, 2024, the Director of the FCI-Butner․ shall submit an Addendum to the Forensic Evaluation outlining the proposed treatment regimen and recommended medication in [Alhindi]'s best medical interest for purposes of competency restoration.” [ECF 89] 3.

On February 2, 2024, after receiving the BOP's medical addendum, the Southern District of Florida ordered the parties to brief the remaining Sell factors. See [ECF 90]. On February 15, 2024, Alhindi objected to his continued confinement at FMC Butner and moved for transfer to the Southern District of Florida. See [ECF 93]. In his motion, Alhindi did not dispute that the BOP conducted its forensic evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d)(1) in accordance with the Southern District of Florida's order. Alhindi, however, argued that the four-month evaluation period under section 4246 expired on October 21, 2023, and that the court needed to make a separate finding under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(A) to keep Alhindi confined after October 21, 2023. See id. at 1–6.

On February 19, 2024, the United States responded in opposition to Alhindi's motion and argued that the court should deny Alhindi's request to transfer because the plain meaning of section 4241 required only that the forensic evaluation occur within four months of Alhindi's arrival at FMC Butner and “does not limit the total amount of time that a defendant can be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for the entire competency restoration process or any pre-hospitalization delay.” [ECF 95]6. Moreover, the United States argued that Alhindi's reading of section 4241 would lead to the impractical result of bouncing Alhindi between FMC Butner and the Southern District of Florida while the Southern District of Florida considered the BOP's recommendation that the court order the BOP to medicate Alhindi to restore his competency for trial. See id. at 9–10.

On February 21, 2024, the Southern District of Florida entered an order finding “pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(A), that there is a substantial probability that [Alhindi] will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward, ․ and order[ed] the Attorney General to hospitalize Defendant for treatment in a suitable facility for an additional reasonable period of time, as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(A).” [ECF 98]. The Southern District of Florida also overruled Alhindi's objections and denied Alhindi's request for an immediate transfer from FMC Butner to the Southern District of Florida for the reasons stated in the government's response. See id. The Southern District of Florida also set an evidentiary hearing on the remaining Sell factors for March 6, 2024. See [ECF 97].

On February 23, 2024, Alhindi filed a notice of interlocutory appeal concerning the Southern District of Florida's order of February 21, 2024, denying Alhindi's motion to dismiss the superseding indictment, for release from FMC Butner, and transfer to the Southern District of Florida. See [ECF 99]. That same day, the parties submitted a joint status report to the Southern District of Florida in which they agreed upon the “need for an evidentiary hearing and receipt of additional testimony/evidence” to determine whether the Southern District of Florida decided whether to “grant the government's request to forcibly medicate Mr. Alhindi.” [ECF 100] ¶ 1. On February 28, 2024, Alhindi moved to continue the Sell hearing scheduled for March 3, 2024. See [ECF 101]. On March 5, 2024, the Southern District of Florida granted Alhindi's motion to continue and reset the Sell hearing for March 21, 2024. See [ECF 104].

On March 21, 2024, the Southern District of Florida conducted the Sell hearing. See [ECF 107]. After the hearing, the Southern District of Florida ordered the United States to file a memorandum of law by March 29, 2024. See id. The court ordered Alhindi to respond by April 8, 2024. See id. On March 28, 2024, the United States filed a memorandum of law in support of its motion to involuntarily medicate Alhindi. See [ECF 118].

On April 1, 2024, the Eleventh Circuit resolved Alhindi's first interlocutory appeal concerning the Southern District of Florida's order of April 21, 2023. See United States v. Alhindi (Alhindi I), 97 F.4th 814 (11th Cir. 2024) (per curiam), cert. denied, No. 24-6031, 2025 WL 76654 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2025) (unpublished). In affirming, the Eleventh Circuit approved the Southern District of Florida's commitment order of April 21, 2023, recognized that section 4241 “empowers district courts to order multiple competency evaluations and commitments for hospitalization,” and held that the four-month period in section 4241(d) applies to the period of evaluative hospitalization, not the total time of commitment. See id. at 824–26.

On April 8, 2024, Alhindi responded in opposition to the United States' motion to involuntarily medicate Alhindi. See [ECF 120]. On April 11, 2024, the Southern District of Florida ordered supplemental briefing on the relevance “of the fact that Defendant Alhindi has not agreed to submit to basic labs and other preliminary medical testing/procedures as a precursor to administration of the indicated psychotropic drugs.” [ECF 121]. On April 15, 2024, the parties submitted their supplemental briefs. See [ECF 124, 125].

On May 9, 2024, the Southern District of Florida denied the United States' motion to involuntarily medicate Alhindi and found that the evidence did not support the United States' opinion that “the proposed drug protocol ․ [was] substantially likely to restore Alhindi to competency.” [ECF 126] 7. On May 10, 2024, the United States filed its section 4246 certificate in this court, see [D.E. 1], and moved to stay proceedings in this court pending further developments in the criminal case in the Southern District of Florida. See [D.E. 5]. On May 14, 2024, this court granted the motion to stay and appointed counsel for Alhindi in this case. See [D.E. 6, 8].

On May 16, 2024, the United States filed a status report in the Southern District of Florida and informed that court of its section 4246 certificate in this court and asked the Southern District of Florida to declare Alhindi incompetent and not restorable. See [ECF 127]. On May 20, 2024, the Southern District of Florida declared Alhindi incompetent and, for the first time, unrestorable. See [ECF 128].

On May 22, 2024, this court lifted the stay in this case and, at the request of the Warden of FMC Butner and United States, ordered the BOP to conduct a forensic evaluation of Alhindi under 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246(b) and 4247(b) to determine Alhindi's mental condition. See [D.E. 13]. On June 28, 2024, the United States filed a status report in the Southern District of Florida and updated that court on the proceedings in this court and how the United States intended to proceed. See [ECF 131]. In its status report, the United States informed the Southern District of Florida that this court ordered a forensic evaluation by July 6, 2024, and that this court set the deadline for that report of July 13, 2024. See id. at ¶¶ 4–5. The United States also told the Southern District of Florida that if the BOP examiner opined that Alhindi met the standards for civil commitment under section 4246, then the United States would seek civil commitment in this court. See id. at 6. If, however, the BOP examiner opined that Alhindi did not meet the requisite qualifications for civil commitment under section 4246, then Alhindi would return to the Southern District of Florida for “final disposition” of his criminal case. Id. at ¶ 7. When the United States filed its status report on June 28, 2024, the superseding indictment against Alhindi was still pending in the Southern District of Florida.

On July 12, 2024, the BOP submitted its forensic evaluation to this court. See [D.E. 16]. The psychologist diagnosed Alhindi with “[d]elusional disorder, persecutory type, continuous” and opined that Alhindi's “unconditional release to the community would pose a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or the serious damage to the property of another.” Id. at 11, 19. On July 18, 2024, the United States filed a status report in the Southern District of Florida and informed that court of its intent to proceed on the superseding indictment because this court “had not yet set this matter for the statutorily required hearing to make a final determination as to whether [Alhindi] poses a danger and should be civilly committed.” [ECF 134]. The parties did not propose hearing dates in this court until July 23, 2024. See [D.E. 17, 18].

On July 22, 2024, Alhindi moved in the Southern District of Florida for immediate release from FMC Butner and dismissal of the superseding indictment. See [ECF 136]. On July 30, 2024, the United States responded in opposition. See [ECF 139]. That same day, the Southern District of Florida requested clarification from the United States concerning what effect dismissing the superseding indictment in the Southern District of Florida would have on civil commitment proceedings in this court. See [ECF 140]. On August 6, 2024, the United States responded to the Southern District of Florida's request for clarification. See [ECF 141]. On August 14, 2024, Alhindi replied. See [ECF 142]. On August 23, 2024, the Southern District of Florida dismissed without prejudice the superseding indictment. See [ECF 143].

On November 15, 2024, Alhindi moved in this court to dismiss the United States' certificate of mental disease or defect and dangerousness against Alhindi and to hold the commitment hearing in abeyance pending disposition of the motion to dismiss. See [D.E. 20]; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On December 23, 2024, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed as moot Alhindi's second interlocutory appeal concerning the Southern District of Florida's order of February 21, 2024, because the Southern District of Florida had dismissed Alhindi's superseding indictment and ended Alhindi's period of confinement under section 4241(d). See United States v. Alhindi (Alhindi II). 124 F.4th 869, 873–875 (11th Cir. 2024), petition for cert. filed, Alhindi v. United States, 24-6861 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2025). On February 18, 2025, the United States responded in opposition in this court to Alhindi's motion to dismiss the United States' certificate of mental disease or defect and dangerousness against Alhindi. See [D.E. 32].

II.

Alhindi moves to dismiss the certificate of mental disease or defect and dangerousness that the United States filed under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. See [D.E. 20]; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint's legal and factual sufficiency. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–63 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566 U.S. 30 (2012); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation omitted); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302. In considering the motion, the court must construe the facts and reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving party].” Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted); see Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015). A court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions, “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302 (quotation omitted); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. Rather, a plaintiff's factual allegations must “nudge[ ] [its] claims,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, beyond the realm of “mere possibility” into “plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief․ [is] a context specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint does not suffice. Id.

When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court considers the pleadings and any materials “attached or incorporated into the complaint” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165–66 (4th Cir. 2016); Thompson v. Greene, 427 F.3d 263, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). A court also may consider a document submitted by a moving party if it is “integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the document's authenticity” without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Goines, 822 F.3d at 166. “[I]n the event of conflict between the bare allegations of the complaint and any exhibit attached․ the exhibit prevails.” Id. (quotation omitted); see Fayetteville Invs. v. Com. Builders. Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991). Additionally, a court may take judicial notice of public records. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 201; Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).

A.

Section 4241 provides that, at any point before sentencing, either party in a criminal case may request a hearing to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant is incompetent to proceed. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). The court in the criminal case may order a psychological evaluation before the hearing. See id. at § 4241(b). At the hearing, the defendant receives procedural protections, including representation by counsel, the right to subpoena witnesses and present evidence, and the right to confront any adverse witnesses. See id. at § 4241(c); 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d). If, after the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is incompetent to proceed, the court “shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). After the court commits a defendant under section 4241(d),

The Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable facility—

(1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; and

(2) for an additional reasonable period of time until—

(A) his mental condition is so improved that trial may proceed, if the court finds that there is a substantial probability that within such additional period of time he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; or

(B) the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law;

whichever is earlier.

Id.

Congress included no provision to extend the four-month section 4241(d)(1) hospitalization period, but section 4241(d)(2) allows for an additional reasonable period of hospitalization if the court finds a substantial probability of competency restoration or until the pending charges are disposed of according to law. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2); United States v. Magassouba, 544 F.3d 387, 405–06 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Rendon-Romero, 743 F. Supp. 3d 715, 721 (E.D.N.C. 2024). Subsections 4241(d)(1) and (d)(2), however, “simply establish the maximum periods of hospitalized evaluation and treatment authorized for determining a defendant's competence to stand trial, not the maximum period that the defendant may be held in the custody of the Attorney General.” United States v. Curbow, 16 F.4th 92, 122 (4th Cir. 2021) (Traxler, J., concurring) (emphasis in original); Magassouba, 544 F.3d at 408; Rendon-Romero, 743 F. Supp. 3d at 721. Moreover, section 4241(d) “implicitly recognizes that hospitalization cannot occur instantaneously” and the statute includes a pre-hospitalization period before the four-month clock begins to run. Alhindi I, 97 F.4th at 826; see Magassouba, 544 F.3d at 408; Rendon-Romero, 743 F. Supp. 3d at 721. Furthermore, “[i]f, at the end of the time period specified, it is determined that the defendant's mental condition has not so improved as to permit the proceedings to go forward, the defendant is subject to the provisions of sections 4246 and 4248.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d); Rendon-Romero, 743 F. Supp. 3d at 721.

Section 4246 permits the civil commitment of “certain mentally ill persons who are a danger to the community.” United States v. Carrington, 91 F.4th 252, 258 (4th Cir. 2024). The United States may seek civil commitment if the “director of a facility in which a person is hospitalized certifies” that the person is “presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, and that suitable arrangements for State custody and care of the person are not available.” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). Filing the certificate “immediately stays the person's release until § 4246 proceedings are completed.” Id.; Carrington, 91 F.4th at 258. The court then must hold a hearing to determine whether the respondent suffers from a mental illness and is dangerous to others or their property. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). At the hearing, the United States must prove both prongs by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at § 4246(d).

“Not every hospitalized person may face civil-commitment proceedings.” Carrington, 91 F.4th at 258. Section 4246 applies only to a person: (1) who is “in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons whose sentence is about to expire”; (2) who “has been committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to [18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)]”; or (3) “against whom all criminal charges have been dismissed solely for reasons related to the mental condition of the person.” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). A person subject to section 4246 certification “may challenge the certificate in the civil commitment court on the grounds that he didn't fit within one of these categories at the time the certificate is filed.” Carrington, 91 F.4th at 258. And “if he's right, then the certificate must be dismissed” for failing to satisfy the necessary elements of a section 4246 civil-commitment claim. Id.

B.

The parties focus on whether Alhindi is a person under 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) who has been committed to the custody of the Attorney General under section 4241(d). See [D.E. 20] 7; [D.E. 32] 12. When a person challenges a section 4246 certificate's timeliness on this basis, “the only question before th[e] court is whether he is presently committed to the Attorney General's custody under § 4241(d).” Carrington, 91 F.4th at 259 (emphasis in original); see United States v. Wayda, 966 F.3d 294, 304 (4th Cir. 2020). If a court has ordered commitment under section 4241(d), “and that order is still in effect, then present custody is conclusively established. Any challenges to delays in prior periods of custody, or to the criminal court's authority to issue the operative custody order, must be raised in the criminal court itself.” Carrington, 91 F.4th at 259; see Curbow, 16 F.4th at 115, 116 n.11. The civil-commitment court “may only hear challenges to the period of custody that immediately precedes the civil-commitment proceeding.” Carrington, 91 F.4th at 259: see Curbow, 16 F.4th at 115, 116 n.11: United States v. Ryan, 52 F.4th 719, 722–23 (8th Cir. 2022); Rendon-Romero, 743 F. Supp. 3d at 720–25.

Alhindi argues that the period of custody that immediately preceded when the United States filed its section 4246 certificate began on April 21, 2023, and expired on August 21, 2023. See [D.E. 20] 5–15. According to Alhindi, because the Southern District of Florida did not make a finding under section 4241(d)(2)(A) before August 21, 2023, the Southern District of Florida lacked the authority to enter its order of February 21, 2024, committing Alhindi to the custody of the Attorney General under section 4241(d)(2)(A). See id. Consequently, Alhindi argues that he was no longer under the lawful authority of the Attorney General on May 10, 2024, when the United States filed its section 4246 certificate. See id. Alhindi cites Carrington, Curbow, and Wayda to bolster his argument that he was no longer in the lawful custody of the Attorney General after August 21, 2023. See id. at 11–13.² In opposition, the United States defends both restoration periods that the Southern District of Florida ordered under section 4241(d), argues that section 4241 does not require a court to make a finding under 4241(d)(2)(A) within the four-month period described in section 4241(d)(1), and cites Carrington, Curbow, and Wayda in support of its arguments. See [D.E. 22] 12–24.

Alhindi's memorandum is not a model of clarity. Alhindi appears to challenge the Southern District of Florida's authority to issue its order of February 21, 2024, committing Alhindi to the custody of the Attorney General under section 4241(d)(2)(A). The court, however, may not entertain such a challenge. See Carrington, 91 F.4th at 259; Ryan, 52 F.4th at 722–23; Curbow, 16 F.4th at 115, 116 n.11; Rendon-Romero, 743 F. Supp. 3d at 720–25. Instead, Alhindi had to raise this argument in the Southern District of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit. Moreover, Alhindi did appeal the Southern District of Florida's order of February 21, 2024. Furthermore, on December 23, 2024, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. See [ECF 99]; Alhindi II, 124 F.4th at 873–75. Thus, this court accepts the Southern District of Florida's order of February 21, 2024, as the operative custody order. See Carrington, 91 F.4th at 259; Ryan, 52 F.4th at 722–23; Curbow, 16 F.4th at 115, 116 n.11; Rendon-Romero, 743 F. Supp. 3d at 720–25.

Under Carrington, the immediately preceding period of custody began when the Southern District of Florida entered its order of February 21, 2024, under section 4241(d)(2)(A). See Carrington, 91 F.4th at 259; [ECF 98]. In that order of February 21, 2024, the Southern District of Florida found “that there is a substantial probability that [Alhindi] will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward ․ and order[ed] the Attorney General to hospitalize Defendant for treatment in a suitable facility for an additional reasonable period of time, as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(A).” [ECF 98]; see 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(A). On May 10, 2024, the United States filed its section 4246 certificate in this court. See [D.E. 1]; 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). On May 20, 2024, the Southern District of Florida declared Alhindi incompetent and unrestorable. See [ECF 128]. Thus, when the United States filed its section 4246 certificate on May 10, 2024, the Southern District of Florida's order of February 21, 2024, committing Alhindi to the custody of the Attorney General under section 4241(d)(2)(A) was still in effect. In the words of the Fourth Circuit, Alhindi's “present custody is conclusively established.” Carrington, 91 F.4th at 259; see Curbow, 16 F.4th at 115, 116 n.11. Accordingly, the court denies Alhindi's motion to dismiss.

Alhindi also suggests that the immediately preceding period of custody began on November 28, 2022. See [D.E. 20] 13. Alhindi, however, fails to explain why he chose that date. Regardless, the court rejects this argument because the correct immediately preceding period of custody began on February 21, 2024, when the Southern District of Florida entered its order under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(A). See Carrington, 91 F.4th at 259; Ryan, 52 F.4th at 722–23; Curbow, 16 F.4th at 115, 116 n.11; Rendon-Romero, 743 F. Supp. 3d at 720–25.

To the extent Alhindi relies on Wayda, Curbow, and Carrington to argue that an unreasonable period passed between when the Southern District of Florida entered its order of February 21, 2024, and when the United States filed its section 4246 certificate on May 10, 2024, the court rejects Alhindi's argument. In fact, Wayda, Curbow, and Carrington support the United States' position.

Wayda was a criminal defendant in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland where a federal grand jury charged him with several federal sex offenses. See Wayda, 966 F.3d at 298–99. On the United States' motion, the District of Maryland ordered an evaluation of Wayda under section 4241(b) and a subsequent hearing under section 4241(a) to assess Wayda's competency. See id. at 298. After the hearing, the District of Maryland found Wayda incompetent and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General under section 4241(d)(1). See id. at 299. After six months, the BOP had failed to offer the District of Maryland its forensic analysis, and the District of Maryland ordered a second competency hearing. See id. Following the second hearing, the District of Maryland again declared Wayda incompetent but found a substantial likelihood that he could be restored to competency in the foreseeable future. See id. Thus, the District of Maryland ordered Wayda's continued hospitalization for another “reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months.” Id. The District of Maryland “presumably intended this additional period of hospitalization to be in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2).” Id.; see also Carrington, 16 F.4th at 97.

After five months passed, the District of Maryland found Wayda incompetent and unrestorable and entered a third order committing Wayda to the Attorney General's custody to determine whether Wayda qualified for commitment under section 4246 or section 4248. See Wayda, 966 F.3d at 299–300. Six months after the District of Maryland found Wayda incompetent and unrestorable, the United States filed a section 4248 certificate concerning Wayda's alleged sexual dangerousness. Wayda then moved in the Eastern District of North Carolina to dismiss the section 4248 certificate in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina and argued that he was no longer legally in the custody of the Attorney General under section 4241(d) when the United States filed its section 4248 certificate. See id. at 300.

The Eastern District of North Carolina agreed with Wayda and dismissed the section 4248 certificate. The United States appealed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Eastern District of North Carolina's order and held that “for a person to be eligible for civil commitment under § 4248(a), the government must file a certificate during its time-limited § 4241(d) custody; otherwise, the certificate is untimely.” Carrington, 91 F.4th at 259: see Wayda, 966 F.3d at 304–05. Crucially, in Wayda, “rather than focusing on the delays following the first or second commitment orders, [the Fourth Circuit] examined whether the certificate was filed within a reasonable time after the third and final commitment order.” Carrington. 91 F.4th at 259; see Wayda, 966 F.3d at 303. In Wayda, the Fourth Circuit held that the six-month delay between the final commitment order in the District of Maryland and the section 4248 certificate in the Eastern District of North Carolina was unreasonably long and affirmed the Eastern District of North Carolina's order dismissing the section 4248 certificate as untimely. See Carrington, 91 F.4th at 260; Wayda, 966 F.3d at 309.

In Curbow, Curbow was charged with a federal criminal offense in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi after shooting at military helicopters flying over his farm. See Curbow, 16 F.4th at 94. Upon a joint motion, the Northern District of Mississippi ordered a competency evaluation under section 4241(b), held a hearing under 4241(a), declared Curbow incompetent to proceed, and committed Curbow to the custody of the Attorney General under section 4241(d)(1). See id. at 100–01. After about six months, the United States filed another report concerning Curbow, and the Northern District of Mississippi found that Curbow remained incompetent but that there was a substantial probability of restoration in the near future. See id. at 101. Thus, the Northern District of Mississippi committed Curbow to the custody of the Attorney General for a second reasonable period under section 4241(d)(2)(A). See id.

On June 6, 2019, the FMC Butner evaluators reported to the Northern District of Mississippi that Curbow was mentally incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to be restored in the near future. See id. The evaluators asked the court for 30 more days to evaluate Curbow. See id. On June 6, 2019, the Northern District of Mississippi granted the BOP's request for a 30-day evaluation period. See id. The BOP submitted a report from a psychologist dated July 5, 2019, and signed July 12, 2019, opining that Curbow was mentally incompetent to stand trial, not restorable in the near future, and dangerous under 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). See id. at 101–02. On July 17, 2019, the FMC Butner warden adopted the psychologist's opinion and executed a section 4246(a) certificate concerning Curbow. See id. at 102. On July 25, 2019, the United States filed the section 4246(a) certificate in the Eastern District of North Carolina. See id.

After the United States filed its section 4246(a) certificate in the Eastern District of North Carolina, Curbow moved to dismiss the United States' section 4246 certificate and argued that he was no longer in the custody of the Attorney General when the United States filed its section 4246 certificate because the Northern District of Mississippi's three commitment orders resulted in impermissible delay. See id. The Eastern District of North Carolina denied Curbow's motion to dismiss, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. See id. at 108–18. In affirming, the Fourth Circuit held that “the period of custody immediately preceding the filing of the civil-commitment certificate—i.e., the period between the third and final commitment order [of June 6, 2019,] and the filing of the certificate [on July 25, 2019]—was reasonable.” Carrington, 91 F.4th at 260–61; see Curbow, 16 F.4th at 109–10. The Fourth Circuit also held that the Northern District of Mississippi's most-recent commitment order of June 6, 2019, was still operative when the United States filed its section 4246(a) certificate; therefore, Curbow was still “committed to the custody of the Attorney General” for purposes of section 4246(a). See Curbow, 16 F.4th at 109–10. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held that Curbow could not challenge in the Eastern District of North Carolina any period of delay that might have occurred during any of the Northern District of Mississippi's earlier commitment orders. See id. at 114–17. Curbow could only challenge in the Eastern District of North Carolina the most-recent commitment order preceding when the United States filed its section 4246 certificate on July 25, 2019. See id. The Fourth Circuit also observed that Curbow could have challenged alleged earlier delays in the Northern District of Mississippi, but Curbow failed to do so. See id. at 115–16. Thus, Curbow forfeited such challenges in the Northern District of Mississippi or the Fifth Circuit. See id.; Carrington, 91 F.4th at 261 & n.5.

In Carrington, a federal grand jury in the Middle District of North Carolina indicted Carrington after he sent a threatening email to a United States Senator's whistleblower email address. See Carrington, 91 F.4th at 262. Shortly after Carrington's detention and arraignment hearing, the Middle District of North Carolina ordered a competency evaluation under sections 4241(a) and (b). See id. The United States completed its competency evaluation in June 2021, submitted a psychologist's report opining that Carrington was incompetent to proceed, and requested a hearing on whether the Middle District of North Carolina should commit Carrington under section 4241(d)(1). See id. On August 20, 2021, the Middle District of North Carolina held the requested hearing. See id. At the hearing, the Middle District of North Carolina found Carrington incompetent, committed him to the care of the Attorney General under 4241(d)(1), and told the United States that if it could not meet the four-month deadline, “it could contact the court and provide more information.” Id. On August 23, 2021, the Middle District of North Carolina formalized its findings in a written order. See id.

Although the Middle District of North Carolina issued its written order on August 23, 2021, Carrington did not arrive to FMC Butner until January 18, 2022. See id. at 262. On May 20, 2022, the United States completed and filed its forensic evaluation which opined that Carrington was still incompetent and not likely restorable. See id. On May 26, 2022, the United States filed a certificate under section 4246(a) in the Eastern District of North Carolina concerning Carrington. See id. The Eastern District of North Carolina stayed the section 4246 proceeding pending completion of the Middle District of North Carolina's competency proceeding. See id.

On August 26, 2022, the Middle District of North Carolina held a competency and restorability hearing. See id. At the hearing, Carrington's counsel objected to “the period between August 23, 2021,․ and the end period of the report of May 15, 2022.” Id. The Middle District of North Carolina asked Carrington's attorney to file a motion explaining her argument more fully and deferred ruling on Carrington's competency and restorability. See id. On September 15, 2022, after receiving Carrington's submission, the Middle District of North Carolina found Carrington incompetent to proceed and not likely restorable. See id. at 264. On September 16, 2022, the Middle District of North Carolina dismissed without prejudice the indictment against Carrington, and Carrington appealed. See id. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Carrington's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See id. at 264–70.

Here, as discussed, the United States filed its section 4246 certificate on May 10, 2024, which is before the Southern District of Florida declared Alhindi incompetent and unrestorable on May 20, 2024. Compare [D.E. 1], with [ECF 128]. Thus, no time (much less an unreasonable period of time) elapsed between when the Southern District of Florida found Alhindi incompetent and unrestorable on May 20, 2024, and when the United States filed its section 4246(a) certificate on May 10, 2024. Moreover, the Southern District of Florida's commitment order of February 21, 2024, was operative on May 10, 2024, and Alhindi was “committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to section 4241(d)” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) on May 10, 2024. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). Furthermore, Curbow and Carrington forbid this court from considering Alhindi's collateral challenge to the Southern District of Florida's authority to issue its order of February 21, 2024, or to consider Alhindi's collateral challenges to earlier orders in the Southern District of Florida. See, e.g., Carrington, 91 F.4th at 259; Curbow, 16 F.4th at 115, 116 n.11. Alhindi was in the lawful custody of the Attorney General when the United States filed its section 4246 certificate on May 10, 2024. Accordingly, the court denies Alhindi's motion to dismiss.

III.

In sum, the court DENIES respondent's motion to dismiss petitioner's section 4246 certificate [D.E. 20]. Alhindi's competency hearing will occur, as scheduled, on Friday, May 9, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. in courtroom one of the Terry Sanford Federal Building and United States Courthouse, 310 New Bern Avenue, Raleigh, North Carolina.

SO ORDERED. This 17 day of April, 2025

FOOTNOTES

1.   For clarity, this order uses “[ECF]” to refer to documents filed in the Southern District of Florida and “[D.E.]” to refer to documents filed in this court.

2.   Alhindi also suggests in passing that the Southern District of Florida lacked the authority to issue its order of April 21, 2023, committing Alhindi to a second period under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). See [D.E. 20] 4 (“On October 21, 2023, assuming this second restoration period was justified at all, the four-month period allowed under § 4241(d)(1) expired.”). This court rejects this passing argument. The Eleventh Circuit already held that the Southern District of Florida had the authority to order a second competency evaluation and issue the second commitment order. See Alhindi I, 97 F.4th at 821–24. This court cannot review the Eleventh Circuit's holding. See Carrington, 91 F.4th at 259; Ryan, 52 F.4th at 722–23; Curbow, 16 F.4th at 115, 116 n.l:Rendon-Romero, 743 F. Supp. 3d at 720–25.

JAMES C. DEVER III United States District Judge