UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SHAWN QUINN (2024)

ORDER

On April 17, 2024, a grand jury indicted Shawn Quinn (“Quinn” or “defendant”) and charged him with possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) [D.E. 1]. On September 6, 2024, Quinn filed a motion to suppress evidence collected from him during his arrest [D.E. 24]. That same day, Quinn filed a motion to dismiss the indictment [D.E. 26], a memorandum in support [D.E. 26-1], and requested leave to file excess pages [D.E. 27]. On September 20, 2024, the United States responded in opposition to Quinn's motion to suppress [D.E. 28] and to Quinn's motion to dismiss the indictment [D.E. 29]. As explained below, the court grants Quinn's motion to file excess pages and denies Quinn's motions to dismiss and suppress.

I.

Quinn is a felon with convictions for felony possession of a stolen motor vehicle and possession of a firearm by a felon. See [D.E. 14] 6. On September 27, 2023, Raleigh police officers stopped a gold sedan with an expired registration. See [D.E. 24-1] 2; [D.E. 28] 3; [D.E. 29] 4. Quinn did not own the sedan but was in the backseat of the car. See [D.E. 24-1] 2; [D.E. 24-2] 3. Upon approaching the car, officers observed Quinn “moving his hands and arms as if attempting to conceal something” and ordered him to show his hands. [D.E. 24-2] 3. Quinn failed to comply. See id. An officer removed Quinn from the car and noticed two knives on the seat next to Quinn. [D.E. 28] 8. Quinn resisted the officer's attempts to place him in handcuffs, and the officer arrested Quinn. [D.E. 24-3] 0:58-1:20; [D.E. 24-4] 0:57-1:31.

After arresting Quinn, the officers discovered a dosage unit of crack cocaine, a glass pipe, and a stolen 9mm pistol on Quinn. See [D.E. 24-2] 3. When arrested, Quinn was on federal supervised release. See id. at 3–4. On April 17, 2024, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of North Carolina charged Quinn with possession of a firearm by a felon. See [D.E. 1].

In his motion to dismiss, Quinn argues that section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. See [D.E. 26]. In his motion to suppress, Quinn argues the officers lacked probable cause to believe Quinn had committed a crime when the officer arrested and searched Quinn. See [D.E. 24-1] 7.

II.

It is unlawful for “any person who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess any firearm or ammunition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Quinn argues that section 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional. See [D.E. 26-1] 11–28. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagrees. United States v. Canada, 103 F.4th 257, 258 (4th Cir. 2024), vacated and remanded, No. 24-5391, 2024 WL 4654952, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 4, 2024) (Mem.), readopted and reissued as modified, ___ F.4th ___, ___, 2024 WL 5002188, at *2 (4th Cir. Dec. 6, 2024). Thus, the court rejects Quinn's facial challenge.

Next, Quinn argues that section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him because he is among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment and because section 922(g)(1) does not comport with the “Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.” [D.E. 26-1] 11–27. Specifically, Quinn argues “even if [s]ection 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face, it is unconstitutional as applied to non-violent felons like Mr. Quinn.” Id. at 21. In support, Quinn argues New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n. Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), abrogated existing Fourth Circuit precedent, including United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2012), United States v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2012), and Hamilton v. Pallozi, 848 F.3d 614, 626–29 (4th Cir. 2017). [D.E. 26-1] 33–35. Once again, the Fourth Circuit disagrees. See United States v. Hunt,___ F.4th ___, 2024 WL 5149611, at *1–4 (4th Cir. Dec. 18, 2024). Thus, the court rejects Quinn's as-applied challenge and denies Quinn's motion to dismiss the indictment.

III

Quinn moves to suppress all evidence seized from him during his arrest. [D.E. 24-1] 8. ‘Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose,” constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996); Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254–56 (2007). Because a traffic stop is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest, the court evaluates Quinn's detention and arrest under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1968). See United States v. Ashe, 521 F. App'x 97, 98 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quotation omitted); see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407–09 (2005). Under Terry, the police officer's actions must be “justified at [the] inception,” and the subsequent questioning and search “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20; United States v. Green, 740 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 2014).

An automobile stop is a reasonable seizure if “the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. Probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred “exists if, given the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the [seized person] had committed or was committing an offense.” United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up); United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008).

“Observing a traffic violation provides sufficient justification for a police officer to detain the offending vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop.” Branch, 537 F.3d at 335. During a traffic stop, an officer may order the occupants out of the car. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–11 (1977) (per curiam); United States v. Williams, No. 20-4344, 2022 WL 134846, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2875 (2022); United States v. Hampton, 628 F.3d 654, 658 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. George, No. 7:12-CR-35, 2012 WL 3523594, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 15, 2012), aff'd, 732 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Wright 856 F. Supp. 2d 736, 748 (E.D.N.C. 2012). An officer may extend a traffic stop if the officer has “reasonable suspicion of a serious crime.” United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 358 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted). An officer has reasonable suspicion of a crime if the officer can point to specific articulable facts that suggest criminal activity. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–24 (2000). The officer need not have probable cause. See id. Before frisking a detained passenger, an officer must have a “reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 482 (4th Cir. 2011).

Here, officers initiated a traffic stop after observing a gold sedan driving with an expired registration. [D.E. 24-2] 3. North Carolina law prohibits the display of an expired registration. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-111(2). Thus, the officers were “justified at [the] inception” of the stop. Ashe. 521 F. App'x at 98. Quinn was in the backseat of the car. See [D.E. 24-2] 3. Upon approaching the car, officers observed Quinn “moving his hands and arms as if attempting to conceal something.” [D.E. 24-2] 3. Bodycam footage confirms that officers repeatedly ordered Quinn to show his hands. [D.E. 24-3] 0:44–0:59; [D.E. 24-4] 0:41-0:53. Quinn failed to comply. [D.E. 24–3] 0:44–0:59; [D.E. 24-4] 0:41-0:53. North Carolina makes it unlawful to “willfully and unlawfully resist, delay, or obstruct a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge an official duty.” N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-223(a).

The officers removed Quinn from the car and noticed two knives on the seat next to him. [D.E. 28] 8. Quinn resisted an officer's attempts to place him in handcuffs. [D.E. 24-3] 0:581:20; [D.E. 24-4] 0:57-1:31. After arresting Quinn and placing him in handcuffs, the officers searched Quinn and the car. [D.E. 24-2] 3. While searching Quinn, officers located a dosage unit of crack cocaine, a glass pipe, and a stolen 9mm pistol. [D.E. 24-2] 3. Because probable cause supported Quinn's arrest, the officers required no additional justification to search Quinn. Michigan v. DeFillinno, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979); United States v Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973); United States v. Ruffin, 814 F. App'x 741, 750 (4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (unpublished). Accordingly, the court denies Quinn's motion to suppress the evidence collected from him during his arrest.

IV.

In sum, the court GRANTS Quinn's motion to exceed the page limit [D.E. 27], DENIES Quinn's motion to dismiss the indictment [D.E. 26], and DENIES Quinn's motion to suppress [D.E. 24].

SO ORDERED. This 19 day of December, 2024.

JAMES C. DEVER III United States District Judge