PHILIP TAYLOR v. SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORP (2025)

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL

Before the Court is Plaintiff Philip Taylor and Defendant The Peelle Company's Stipulation of Dismissal. Doc. 110. For the following reasons, the Court construes the Stipulation as a request for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) and dismisses Peelle with prejudice.

A plaintiff may voluntarily “dismiss an action without a court order by filing ․ a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A). A valid stipulation of dismissal “is effective automatically and does not require judicial approval.” See Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). For the stipulation to be effective, however, it must be “signed by all parties who have appeared.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Courts generally have held that “all means all,” even requiring “the signature of a party that appeared but has already been removed from an action.” City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Hospitality Holdings, 82 F.4th 1031, 1038 (11th Cir. 2023); see also, e.g., Anderson-Tully Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 347 F. App'x 171, 176 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding “the plain meaning of ‘all parties who have appeared’ to include all entities who have appeared in the action as parties”); ITV Direct, Inc. v. Healthy Sols., LLC, 445 F.3d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining practical reasons for this requirement).

When compliance with Rule 41(a)(1) is not feasible, “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request ․ by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Significantly, an otherwise defective stipulation may be construed as a request for court-ordered dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2). See Sanchez v. Disc. Rock & Sand, Inc., 84 F.4th 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2023) (collecting cases); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Peitz, No. 4:17-CV-2927 NAB, 2018 WL 2934013, at *3 (E.D. Mo. June 12, 2018) (taking this approach). In considering a motion for voluntary dismissal, courts consider three factors: (1) “whether the party has presented a proper explanation for its desire to dismiss”; (2) “whether a dismissal would result in a waste of judicial time and effort”; and (3) “whether a dismissal will prejudice the defendants.” Blaes v. Johnson & Johnson, 858 F.3d 508, 512 (8th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted).

Here, the Stipulation is deficient under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) because it lacks “the signatures of all parties who have appeared.” See Peitz, 2018 WL 2934013, at *3. Specifically, Defendants Schindler Elevator Corporation and Otis Elevator Company have not signed the stipulation as required. Nevertheless, the Court construes the Stipulation as a request for dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) and finds that the terms of dismissal are appropriate. First, settlement is more than a sufficient basis to dismiss Peelle from the case. Second, the request for a dismissal with prejudice minimizes any potential waste of judicial time and effort. And third, the Court finds no reason to believe that Peelle's dismissal will prejudice any other party.¹ As such, dismissal is appropriate in this case.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Taylor and Peelle's [110] Stipulation of Dismissal as construed as a request for dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2), orders Peelle dismissed with prejudice, and directs the Clerk of Court to terminate Peelle as a party in this case.

So ordered this 22nd day of October 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While unlikely in light of their own resolution of the case, see Doc. 113, the remaining parties have 14 days from the entry of this order to object to Peelle's dismissal and request reconsideration if the Court is incorrect.

ZACHARY M. BLUESTONE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE