JANE DOE v. ESA PORTFOLIO LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ (collectively, “ESA”) Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 18. Because Plaintiff Jane Doe's (“K.R.M.”) claims are time-barred on the face of the Complaint and she has not established any basis for tolling, the Court grants dismissal but with leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background 1

K.R.M. was the victim of sex trafficking for roughly two months—from May to June 28, 2013. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 25. Her perpetrator used violence, threats, and drugs to coerce her to engage in commercial sex activity for his financial benefit. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27. This trafficking occurred at an Extended Stay America hotel owned and operated by ESA. Id. ¶¶ 25–30. Hotel staff were able to observe K.R.M.’s demeanor, appearance, promiscuous clothing, movements throughout the hotel, and interactions with her trafficker and others. Id. ¶¶ 31–32, 64. As a result, hotel employees were aware of various “red flags” of trafficking, including “constant and heavy foot traffic in and out of [her] room” at unusual times by men who were not hotel guests, an altercation between K.R.M. and her trafficker, “evidence of excessive sex paraphernalia” in the trash, and requests for extra towels while not allowing housekeeping to clean the room. Id. ¶¶ 32, 58, 64–67.

Sex trafficking has been a long-term issue at ESA-branded hotels. Indeed, K.R.M.’s trafficker chose Extended Stay America because “hotel staff turned a blind eye to signs of trafficking.” Id. ¶¶ 55–56. Online reviews indicate that prostitution and drug activity occurred regularly at the hotel, and ESA allowed traffickers to “secure rooms without providing their own identifying information” and “pay for rooms using non-traceable methods.” Id. ¶¶ 57, 71. Traffickers also used the hotel Wi-Fi network to advertise sex-trafficking services. Id. ¶ 71.

II. Procedural Background

K.R.M. brought this action in April 2024. Doc. 1. Her Complaint seeks perpetrator and beneficiary liability against ESA under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 and 1595.² Id. ¶¶ 4, 75–79. ESA timely moved to dismiss, arguing that these claims are time-barred and that the Complaint “fails to allege how [ESA] participated in [K.R.M.’s] alleged trafficking or how ESA was on notice that [she] was trafficked.” Doc. 18 at 2. K.R.M. opposed dismissal, Doc. 32, and ESA filed a reply in support, Doc. 45. After the motion was fully briefed, K.R.M. filed two notices of supplemental authority. Docs. 57, 64.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The purpose of such motions “is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” Ford v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 553 F. Supp. 3d 693, 697 (E.D. Mo. 2021). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief” and providing notice of the grounds on which the claim rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Additionally, the complaint must include sufficient detail to make a claim “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). Although “[s]pecific facts are not necessary,” the plaintiff must include “either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Delker v. MasterCard Int'l, 21 F.4th 1019, 1024 (8th Cir. 2022) (quotations omitted). The question is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to present evidence in support of the claim. Id.

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Brokken v. Hennepin Cnty., 140 F.4th 445, 450 (8th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). However, the Court does not “presume the truth of legal conclusions.” Jones v. City of St. Louis, 104 F.4th 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted); see also Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 641 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he court is free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.”). Ultimately, this analysis is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009).

DISCUSSION

ESA moved to dismiss K.R.M.’s substantive counts for failure to state a claim. But the Court must first grapple with its threshold argument that the Complaint is barred by the TVPRA's 10-year statute of limitations. The Court agrees dismissal is warranted because the face of the Complaint confirms that K.R.M.’s claims accrued no later than the date she escaped her trafficker, which was more than 10 years before she brought this action, and she has failed to establish a plausible basis for equitable tolling or another exception to the statute of limitations.

“The purpose of a statute of limitations is speedy and fair adjudication of the respective rights of the parties.” Pecoraro v. Diocese of Rapid City, 435 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). As such, “[c]ourts generally require strict compliance with a statute of limitations and rarely invoke doctrines such as equitable tolling to alleviate a plaintiff from a loss of his right to assert a claim.” Id. “The party who is claiming the benefit of an exception to the operation of a statute of limitations bears the burden of showing that he is entitled to it.” Motley v. United States, 295 F.3d 820, 824 (8th Cir. 2002). “Because tolling is a ‘fact-intensive test,’ it is usually not appropriate for consideration in a motion to dismiss ․”. Stewart v. Rock Tenn CP, 2015 WL 1883910, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 24, 2015) (citation omitted). But particularly where the “complaint is self-defeating (in that it shows the action is time-barred),” dismissal may be warranted absent “factual allegations to support the plaintiff's [tolling] arguments.” Joseph v. Wal-Mart Corp., 2020 WL 5995261, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2020) (collecting cases); see also LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 507, 509–10 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting equitable estoppel where plaintiff “failed to sketch a factual predicate” warranting this exception; McMillian v. Miss. Lime Co., 311 F. App'x 942, 943 (8th Cir. 2009) (same for equitable tolling); In re Deepwater Horizon, 2021 WL 4888395, at *4 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021) (“[T]o invoke equitable tolling and survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a party must make some minimal effort to apprise the District Court of facts which would justify such an exceptional step.” (quotation and alterations omitted)); Wasco Prods. v. Southwall Techs., 435 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[F]ederal courts have repeatedly held that plaintiffs seeking to toll the statute of limitations on various grounds must have included the allegation in their pleadings.”) (collecting cases).

The parties agree that, generally, “no [TVPRA] action may be maintained ․ unless it is commenced not later than ․ 10 years after the cause of action arose.” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c)(1); see Doc. 18 at 5; Doc. 32 at 12. It is also undisputed that K.R.M.’s trafficking ended on June 28, 2013—nearly 11 years before the filing of this action on April 1, 2024. Doc. 1 ¶ 25; Doc. 18 at 11; Doc. 32 at 12. Thus, the Complaint is facially time barred and must be dismissed on that basis absent tolling or some other extension of the statute of limitations. While K.R.M. affirmatively pled the application of the discovery rule, continuing-tort doctrine, and equitable tolling, none of these theories hold water, even after viewing the facts in the light most favorable to her. Thus, the Court must dismiss these claims but will grant K.R.M. one opportunity to amend.

I. Discovery Rule

K.R.M. contends that “federal statutes are subject to the discovery rule absent a contrary directive from Congress” and that her “allegations about the persistent effects of trafficking on her mental capacity allege that she discovered her injuries and their legal cause less than 10 years before she filed this lawsuit.” Doc. 32 at 17. ESA counters that “[K.R.M.’s] claim is not the type of narrow circumstance where the discovery rule applies” and that “the court should decline to apply the discovery rule because the statute itself speaks to the statute of limitations, leaving no textual, historical, or equitable reason to apply the rule.” Doc. 18 at 7.

“[E]quity tolls the statute of limitations in cases of fraud or concealment; it does not establish a general presumption applicable across all contexts.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 27 (2001). The discovery rule also applies in context of “latent disease and medical malpractice, ‘where a cry for such a rule is loudest.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). “Under the discovery rule, accrual of a claim is delayed until the plaintiff discovers his or her cause of action.” Kest v. Hunt, 983 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1126 (D. Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). The Eighth Circuit has recognized that, at least under Missouri law, “notice of sufficient information to alert plaintiff of the need to make inquiry was the trigger for the running of the statute of limitations.” Mahanna v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, 747 F.3d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2014).

Here, K.R.M. does not allege fraud or concealment by ESA, and her claims do not relate to medical malpractice or latent disease, so the traditional grounds for the discovery rule do not apply. Nor has K.R.M. cited even a single instance of a court applying this doctrine for a TVPRA claim. In fact, the only relevant precedent cited by either party declined to toll the statute of limitations due to a plaintiff's late discovery of the “long-term effects of trafficking.” H.G. v. Inter-Cont'l Hotels Corp., 489 F. Supp. 3d 697, 711 (E.D. Mich. 2020). K.R.M.’s limited argument in her response falls far short of the weighty analysis that would be required to extend this doctrine to a new context, Doc. 32 at 17–18, and it “is not the Court's job to discover the authority supporting such a rule and to develop a discovery-rule theory for [her].” Id. at 711 n.9.

However, even assuming the discovery rule applies to TVPRA claims, K.R.M.’s specific arguments miss the mark. She alleges her injuries “prevented her from discovering and pursuing her legal rights” and “discover[ing] the legal cause of her injury.” Doc. 1 ¶ 82. (emphasis added). But as ESA points out, the Complaint indicates she was aware of both her injuries and “how her trafficker caused that injury (through acts of physical violence ․),” Doc. 45 at 6–7, and she fails to cite any authority for the proposition that failing to appreciate the contours of a legal claim are relevant to this inquiry, see Varner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1017–18 (8th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing that “ignorance of [a party's] rights does not prevent the operation of the statute of limitations”). Finally, even if Court were to consider the “legal cause of [an] injury,” K.R.M. “must at the very least show that the information could not have been found by a timely diligent inquiry,” which she has not done here (as discussed below). See Motley, 295 F.3d at 824.

II. Continuing Torts

Invoking the continuing-tort doctrine, the Complaint states that “K.R.M.’s addiction to drugs, only brought about by the venture in which [ESA] participated ․ lasted until ․ 2023, which is not more than 10 years before [she] filed this lawsuit.” Doc. 1 ¶ 88. ESA argues that the continuing-tort doctrine ended on June 28, 2013, when K.R.M. escaped her trafficker's control, more than 10 years before K.R.M. filed her lawsuit. Doc. 18 at 10–11. Apparently in agreement, K.R.M. does not address the continuing-tort doctrine in her response. Doc. 45 at 2.

“Under the continuing tort doctrine, the final act is used to determine when the statute of limitations period begins for the entire course of conduct.” Hope v. Klabal, 457 F.3d 784, 793 (8th Cir. 2006). “Damages resulting from [a] completed, wrongful act, although they may continue to develop, are not adequate.” Wilson Rd. Dev. Corp. v. Fronabarger Concreters, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 896, 915 (E.D. Mo. 2013) (citation omitted).

Here, K.R.M. appears to have abandoned her reliance on the continuing-tort doctrine by ignoring it in her response. In any event, her original position had no merit because the Complaint does not allege that ESA contributed to her drug addiction after she escaped her trafficker's control. Thus, the harms she experienced from drug addiction were, at best, a present effect of a past wrongful act by ESA, so the continuing tort doctrine cannot rescue her time-barred claims. See Phillips v. Univ. of Missouri, 2023 WL 8037921, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 20, 2023) (“[I]f a defendant has not engaged in ongoing affirmative acts, a plaintiff has not suffered a ‘fresh injury’ and the [continuing tort] doctrine will not apply.”) (citation omitted).

III. Equitable Tolling

K.R.M. also alleges that “[i]t was not until October 2023 that [she] completed a rehabilitation program to overcome the longstanding effects of her trafficking on her ability to function” and, as a result, that “equitable tolling ․ is not something that can be decided on the face of the pleadings.” Doc. 32 at 13, 15. ESA contends that K.R.M. was able to “discover her injury and pursue her legal claims [but instead] sat on her rights from June 2013 until April 2024, and cannot demonstrate due diligence, which precludes equitable tolling.” Doc. 18 at 10.

Equitable tolling is a “limited and infrequent form of relief” that “requires a [plaintiff] to establish (1) that [she] has been pursuing [her] rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in [her] way.” Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 396 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Both elements must be independently satisfied to equitably toll the statute of limitations.” Harris v. Korneman, 2018 WL 11474907, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 4, 2018) (citing Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 256 (2016)). For a litigant to demonstrate diligence, “[s]he must show that [s]he has been reasonably diligent in pursuing [her] rights not only while an impediment to filing caused by an extraordinary circumstance existed, but before and after as well, up to the time of filing [her] claim in [ ] court.” Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 598–99 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).

Here, K.R.M. alleges several circumstances that “prevented her from discovering and pursuing her legal rights and remedies.” Id. ¶ 82. She claims that she experienced “fear of retaliation from her trafficker and [his] associates” and sustained injuries, including “addiction to drugs” and diminished mental capacity, as a result of being trafficked. Id. ¶¶ 82–85. K.R.M. also notes that “[she] struggled to get the help she needed to combat the lasting effects of her trafficking” until she participated in a rehabilitation program that concluded in October 2023.³ Id. ¶ 88. However, the weight of authority has rejected her stop-clock theory of equitable tolling, and she has not alleged any facts—either in her Complaint or response—that could establish reasonable diligence after her rehabilitation, which is fatal to her claim.

a. “Stop-Clock” Approach Versus “Grace Period”

As an initial matter, K.R.M. misapprehends the way equitable tolling should be applied. She argues in favor of a “stop clock” approach, claiming that the “limitations period pauses during the extraordinary circumstances, leaving a plaintiff with the full benefit of the limitations period while not impaired by a disability.” Doc. 32 at 15. But Judge Posner long ago explained that such arguments stem from confusion between tolling doctrines: “Equitable tolling is frequently confused both with fraudulent concealment on the one hand and with the discovery rule ․ It differs from the latter in that the plaintiff is assumed to know that he has been injured, so that the statute of limitations has begun to run.” Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450–51 (7th Cir. 1990). And with the nuances of this particular doctrine in mind, the Court agrees there is no reason why “equitable tolling should bring about an automatic extension of the statute of limitations by the length of the tolling period or any other definite term,” Id. at 452; accord Gordon v. Arkansas, 823 F.3d 1188, 1195–96 (8th Cir. 2016) (implicitly rejecting a stop-clock approach by declining to apply equitable tolling where plaintiff was subject to an extraordinary condition for 3 months of a 12-month limitations period but failed to show diligence for the remaining 9 months). Moreover, equitable tolling cannot “pause[ ] or suspend[ ] a statute of limitations ․ where a litigant has not diligently pursued his rights before, during, and after the existence of an extraordinary circumstance.” Smith, 953 F.3d at 598.⁴ Because K.R.M. has failed to show requisite diligence in pursuing her legal rights (as discussed below), stop clock would not apply in this case in any event, at least as it is currently pled.

b. Reasonable Diligence

Given that the Complaint is untimely on its face, there is good reason to consider K.R.M's assertion of equitable tolling at this early stage. See, e.g., Joseph, 2020 WL 5995261, at 3; Stewart, 2015 WL 1883910, at *3. Even after construing the Complaint and response in the light most favorable to K.R.M., she has failed to show diligence and thus is not entitled to equitable tolling.

Critically, while the Complaint invokes equitable tolling, it does not contain any facts about K.R.M's post-treatment, pre-filing efforts to pursue her legal remedies. She does not, for example, state that she took prompt action to retain counsel or independently investigate her claims. The closest she comes is an argument in her response that, “[f]rom October 2023 to when she filed this lawsuit on April 1, 2024 is not a facially unreasonable period” to file a lawsuit. Doc. 32 at 16. The Court can imagine situations where that may be true, but K.R.M. asks the Court to make more than a reasonable inference in her favor based on facts to which she has exclusive access but failed to allege. See Rice v. Jennings, No. 4:19-CV-445-SNLJ, 2019 WL 6251235, at *4–5 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 22, 2019) (finding that petitioner did not pursue his rights diligently when he did not file his petition “three to four months” after the extraordinary circumstance abated).

Nor does K.R.M. allege any facts that demonstrate that she diligently pursued her rights before she completed rehabilitation. While her allegations do establish a diminished capacity during the pre-treatment period, she still must show some progress in pursuing her claims during any periods of lucidity, or at a minimum, she must add non-conclusory allegations to show that she was truly incapacitated for the entirety of the 9-year period that preceded her rehabilitation. See Smith, 953 F.3d at 598 (finding that a plaintiff must diligently pursue her rights “before, during, and after the existence of an extraordinary circumstance” to be entitled to equitable tolling) (emphasis added). Because K.R.M. has not advanced any facts that suggest she diligently pursued her rights, particularly after completing treatment, she has failed to meet her burden. Accordingly, she is not entitled to equitable tolling,⁵ and the Complaint must be dismissed as time barred.

IV. Dismissal with Leave to Amend

In her response, K.R.M. requests “leave to amend her Complaint” in the contingency that “the Court [has] any concern about any of her allegations.”⁶ Doc. 32 at 19. ESA did not address this request in its reply but reaffirmed that it seeks dismissal with prejudice. Doc. 45 at 11. While K.R.M. has not yet established any basis to toll the statute of limitations, the arguments advanced by ESA in favor of dismissal do not demonstrate that amendment of the Complaint would necessarily be futile. Thus, the Court will give K.R.M. two weeks to file an amended complaint consistent with this order. See Stewart, 2015 WL 1883910, at *6, 12 (granting leave to amend the complaint when defendant failed to demonstrate that “application of the doctrine of equitable tolling is foreclosed as a matter of law”). Should she fail to do so, however, this Court's dismissal will be with prejudice. See Germany v. DAS Acquisition Co., LLC, No. 4:25-CV-748-ZMB, 2026 WL 160869, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 21, 2026) (“[W]hen a claim is clearly time barred, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.”) (citing Varner, 371 F.3d at 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 2004)).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ [18] Motion to Dismiss. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff Jane Doe's [1] Complaint as time barred but gives her leave to file an amended complaint, provided that she does so no later than March 25, 2026. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case if Doe does not file an amended complaint by that date.

So ordered this 11th day of March 2026.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The Complaint also lists “Liability under § 516.170 of the Missouri Revised Statutes” as a third count. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 80–81. However, that statute is a tolling provision, not a separate cause of action. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.170.

3.   K.R.M. also indicates she completed the rehabilitation program “only last month,” suggesting that the program ended in March 2024. Doc. 1 ¶ 86. Because K.R.M.’s subsequent response commits to the October 2023 date that she also pled in the Complaint, see Doc. 32 at 13, 16, the Court will assume that “only last month” was a mistake and use the earlier date, see Williams v. First Nat. Bank, No. 4:14-CV-1458-ERW, 2014 WL 5800199, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2014) (“Courts need not accept as true ‘factual assertions that are contradicted by the complaint itself ․,’ ”).

4.   The Ninth Circuit's decision in Smith also provides a compelling analysis as to why K.R.M.’s reliance on two Supreme Court decisions—Ibarra and Artis—is misplaced. 953 F.3d at 598 & n.7.

5.   The Court need not reach the “extraordinary circumstance” prong in light of its finding as to diligence. See Harris, 2018 WL 11474907, at *3 (collecting cases). That said, and while it is sympathetic to the hardships K.R.M. has faced, the Court notes that the circumstances she describes are ordinarily insufficient to warrant equitable tolling. In particular, courts have found that most mental illnesses and drug activity are not extraordinary circumstances. See Lyons v. Potter, 521 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Courts that have allowed equitable tolling based on mental illness have done so only in exceptional circumstances, such as where the complainant is institutionalized or adjudged mentally incompetent.”); Bennett v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 2d 877, 889 (D. Neb. 2005) (“[D]rug activity ․ is not the kind of rare and exceptional circumstance warranting the intervention of equity to suspend a statute of limitations.”). Further, another court in this circuit has found that fear of retaliation in the TVPRA context is not “extraordinary” if the victim “had the physical freedom to seek legal advice and assistance.” See Abarca v. Little, 54 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1070 (D. Minn. 2014). Thus, any amended complaint should include allegations as to why K.R.M.’s circumstances were truly unique, even among trafficking victims. Otherwise, finding these circumstances extraordinary would render meaningless the TVPRA's statute of limitations given that trafficking victims often face similar challenges.

6.   K.R.M. also requests oral argument “to fully present her position” because “[t]his motion raises questions about application of 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) that neither this Court nor the Eighth Circuit has addressed.” Doc. 32 at 1. In light of this order, that request is denied as moot, but to be clear, she would not have been entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to the statute of limitations because she had an opportunity to present evidence and failed to do so. See Lyons, 521 F.3d at 983 (“[W]here a plaintiff has an opportunity to present evidence and fails to do so, conclusory and vague claims do not mandate an evidentiary hearing.”); McMillian, 311 F. App'x at 943 (affirming dismissal without an evidentiary hearing where the plaintiff failed to plead the necessary facts to establish equitable tolling).

ZACHARY M. BLUESTONE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE