BRIAN CARPENTER KRISTINA CARPENTER v. TEXTRON INC SAFEAERO TRELLEBORG DELTA AIRLINES INC DAIFUKU AIRPORT AMERICA CORPORATION WAYNE COUNTY AIRPORT AUTHORITY (2025)

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND AND REMANDING CASE TO WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN CIRCUIT COURT

Plaintiffs Brian and Kristina Carpenter filed this workplace personal injury lawsuit in the Wayne County, Michigan circuit court after Brian was injured while working on a de-icing truck at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport. Defendant Delta Airlines removed the case to this Court alleging diversity jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs have moved to remand it. The plaintiffs' claims are based entirely on state law, and it is clear that there is no complete diversity among the parties. Delta contends, however, that the plaintiffs' claims against the non-diverse defendants are meritless and should be disregarded for jurisdictional purposes under the theory of fraudulent joinder. The Court disagrees. After full briefing and oral argument, it is apparent that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the lawsuit because the plaintiffs have asserted colorable claims against at least one non-diverse defendant. The case will be remanded after the Court entertains the plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees, if such a request is made, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

I.

According to the complaint, Brian Carpenter was employed by defendant Daifuku Airport America Corporation, a Michigan corporation, at the Wayne County Airport, which is owned and operated by defendant Wayne County Airport Authority (WCAA), a municipal entity under the governance of Wayne County, in the State of Michigan. On November 22, 2024, Carpenter's work involved operating a de-icing truck that allegedly “malfunctioned,” throwing him from the cab, causing “severe and permanent injuries to his mouth, face, head, neck, and spine.” The plaintiffs allege that the de-icing truck was designed and manufactured by defendants SafeAero I Trelleborg and Textron Sweden AB (allegedly both Swedish companies). The truck allegedly “was maintained by defendants DELTA, DAIFUKU, and WCAA.” Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.32. In Count II of the complaint, Carpenter further alleged that defendants Delta, Daifuku, and WCAA negligently maintained the de-icing truck, knew about the hazard to Carpenter's person resulting from their deficient maintenance, and willfully failed or refused to disclose the risk to him. Id. ¶¶ 25-28, PageID.34.

The complaint pleads causes of action for negligence and gross negligence separately against all defendants (Count I), and distinctly against defendants Delta, Daifuku, and WCAA (Count II); along with claims of gross negligence, negligent manufacture, failure to warn, and breaches of express and implied warranties against defendants SafeAero and Textron (Counts III-VI); a claim against defendant Daifuku alone styled as “intentional tort” for knowing failure to warn Carpenter of the certainty of injury to his person (Count VIII); and a claim for loss of consortium on behalf of Kristina Carpenter (Count IX).

The plaintiffs filed their complaint in state court on May 22, 2025. On July 30, 2025, defendant Delta Airlines removed the case to this Court, asserting diversity jurisdiction and arguing that the removal was proper despite the admitted absence of complete diversity among the parties, based on its position that defendants Daifuku and WCAA — both Michigan citizens like the Carpenters — were fraudulently joined in the action. The Court initially directed the plaintiffs to respond to the allegation of fraudulent joinder. The plaintiffs did so and subsequently filed their motion to remand the case to state court. Defendants Delta and Daifuku each responded and opposed the motion and reiterated the position that the plaintiffs have no colorable claims against defendants Daifuku or WCAA. Counsel for defendant Delta Airlines, Inc. entered his appearance as counsel of record for defendant WCAA and filed an answer to the complaint over his signature on the County's behalf. However, the opposition to the motion to remand was submitted solely by defendant Delta.

After the removal and the plaintiffs' remand motion was filed, Delta asserted a new position that Brian Carpenter's employer at the time of the incident was not Daifuku Airport America Corporation but rather was Daifuku Services America Corporation, a Florida corporation.

II.

There are some basic points that are beyond dispute. First, federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing jurisdiction rests with defendant Delta, as the party removing the case and asserting federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Second, “ ‘[a]ll doubts as to the propriety of removal are resolved in favor of remand.’ ” Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 1999)), abrogated on other grounds by Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). Third, although 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) permits a defendant in a civil action to remove cases originally filed in state courts to federal district courts where there is diversity of citizenship between the parties, federal diversity jurisdiction “exists only when no plaintiff and no defendant are citizens of the same state.” Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 176 F.3d 904, 907 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 955 F.2d 1085, 1089 (6th Cir. 1992)).

However, relief from the complete diversity rule is available if the “ ‘party who removes a case involving non-diverse parties to federal court on diversity grounds ․ can show that the non-diverse parties were fraudulently joined.’ ” Chambers v. HSBC Bank USA, NA, 796 F.3d 560, 564 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Saginaw Hous. Comm'n v. Bannum, Inc., 576 F.3d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 2009)). Establishing that joinder of a party is “fraudulent” requires no proof of the plaintiffs' actual motive. Jerome-Duncan, 176 F.3d at 907 (quoting Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also 16 Moore's Fed. Prac. § 107.14(2)(c) (observing that “[t]he term ‘fraudulent joinder’ is a bit misleading because it requires neither a showing of fraud nor joinder in one sense”). Rather, the thrust of the inquiry is “whether [the plaintiff] had at least a colorable cause of action against [the non-diverse defendant] in the Michigan state courts.” Jerome-Duncan, 176 F.3d at 907 (citing Alexander v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 949 (6th Cir. 1994)). Federal courts look to state law to determine whether a plaintiff states “a colorable cause of action” against the non-diverse defendant. Ibid.

“To prove fraudulent joinder, the removing party must present sufficient evidence that a plaintiff could not have established a cause of action against non-diverse defendants under state law.” Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 1999). “[I]f there is a colorable basis for predicting that a plaintiff may recover against non-diverse defendants, [the] Court must remand the action to state court.” Ibid. Moreover, “[t]he district court must resolve all disputed questions of fact and ambiguities in the controlling state law in favor of the non-removing party.” Ibid. (cleaned up). “When deciding a motion to remand, including fraudulent joinder allegations, [the Court applies] a test similar to, but more lenient than, the analysis applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 433 (6th Cir. 2012). The Court may, “[a]s appropriate ․ ‘pierce the pleading’ and consider summary judgment evidence, such as affidavits presented by the parties,” and “[t]he court may look to material outside the pleadings for the limited purpose of determining whether there are undisputed facts that negate the claim.” Ibid. (cleaned up).

A.

No one disputes that defendant Daifuku Airport America Corporation (Daifuku Airport) is a citizen of Michigan. Delta argued in its removal notice, however, that because this entity was Brian Carpenter's employer, the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy against this defendant is the Michigan Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA). Later, Delta and Daifuku Airport asserted that Carpenter's actual employer was Daifuku Services America Corporation (Daifuku Services), which is not a citizen of Michigan.

1.

Under Michigan law, worker's compensation benefits “shall be the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer for a personal injury or occupational disease” incurred during or in the course of employment. Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.131(1). However, in 1987, Michigan's legislature amended the WDCA “to provide an intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision.” Bazinau v. Mackinac Island Carriage Tours, 233 Mich. App. 743, 750, 593 N.W.2d 219, 223 (1999). The amended statute creates “an exception” to the exclusive remedy bar “when an employee is injured as a result of a deliberate act of the employer and the employer specifically intended an injury.” Id. at 750-51, 593 N.W.2d at 223 (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.131(1)). Employers are “deemed to have intended to injure if the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge.” Ibid. (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.131(1)).

The Michigan Supreme Court has construed the “actual knowledge” requirement of the statute to permit recovery in tort only “ ‘[w]hen an employer subjects an employee to a continuously operative dangerous condition that it knows will cause an injury, yet refrains from informing the employee about the dangerous condition so that he is unable to take steps to keep from being injured.’ ” Id. at 752, 593 N.W.2d at 223 (quoting Travis v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 453 Mich. 149, 178, 551 N.W.2d 132, 145 (1996)). However, “[m]erely showing a likelihood of an accident is not sufficient,” because such a circumstance does “not present a ‘continuously operative dangerous condition,’ but rather a potential hazard.” Id. at 755, 593 N.W.2d at 225.

The Carpenters' complaint affirmatively pleads that defendant Daifuku Airport was Brian Carpenter's employer and was responsible for maintenance of the de-icing truck that caused the plaintiff's injury. Causes of action for injury to persons resulting from negligent maintenance of an instrumentality have long been recognized as presenting valid premises for negligence claims under Michigan law. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 4 Mich. App. 56, 61, 143 N.W.2d 801, 804 (1966); Hudson v. Grand Trunk W. Ry. Co., 227 Mich. 1, 4, 198 N.W. 339, 339-40 (1924) (“Plaintiff [ ] claims that the defendant company was guilty of negligence in carelessly permitting the crossing bell to be out of order, out of repair․ [H]aving adopted that device, it owes a duty to the public to use reasonable care to keep that device in working order, and, if it neglects or fails to have the device in working order, then it would be guilty of negligence in that respect.”) (quotation marks omitted).

Of course, the claims in this case face the acknowledged obstacle that an employee ordinarily is limited to recovery through the WDCA for injuries suffered in the course of his employment, unless the statutory intentional tort exception applies. Delta argues that the plaintiff alleged nothing more in his complaint than a “potential hazard.” But that argument overlooks the plain allegations of the pleading where the plaintiff positively asserts that (1) the de-icing truck was “maintained” by defendant Daifuku (and other defendants), (2) the defendants' negligent conduct included failing properly to “service” and “maintain” the truck, (3) defendant Daifuku “had actual knowledge of the defects, faults, damage, and/or hazards” of the truck, Compl. ¶ 25, PageID.34, (4) defendant Daifuku “knew that the [ ] de-icing truck ․ was malfunctioning and still required [plaintiff] to use the de-icing truck as part of his employment,” and (5) defendant Daifuku “had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur to [plaintiff], and willfully disregarded that knowledge,” including by “fail[ing] to warn [plaintiff]” about the certainty of harm, id. ¶¶ 58, 60, PageID.40.

Those pleaded facts, which must be accepted as true at this preliminary stage of the case, overlay neatly onto the rubric of the intentional tort exception elucidated by the Michigan Supreme Court in Bazinau. On the basis of the controlling precedent and those pleaded facts, the plaintiff has made out a colorable claim that could allow him to recover against defendant Daifuku as his employer, surmounting the exclusive remedy bar of the WDCA.

2.

Delta's new position is that Daifuku Services, not Daifuku Airport, was Carpenter's actual employer in November 2024. But it has not established that proposition “by competent evidence.” Its fraudulent joinder argument on this basis fails as well.

As a threshold matter, the defendant misapprehends the parties' respective burdens in the present procedural posture. It is the removing defendant's burden in the first instance to justify its invocation of the Court's jurisdiction, because the party “seeking to bring a case into federal court carries the burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction.” Coyne, 183 F.3d at 493. It is the removing party, faced with a motion to remand, that must “show that the non-diverse parties were fraudulently joined.’ ” Chambers, 796 F.3d at 564. But in order “[t]o prove fraudulent joinder, the removing party must present sufficient evidence that a plaintiff could not have established a cause of action against non-diverse defendants under state law.” Coyne, 183 F.3d at 493 (emphasis added).

When facing a fraudulent joinder allegation, the plaintiff enjoys a “more lenient [test] than[ ] the analysis applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Casias, 695 F.3d at 433. Typically, when deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court looks only to the pleadings, Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2008), the documents attached to them, Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c)), documents referenced in the pleadings that are “integral to the claims,” id. at 335-36, documents that are not mentioned specifically but which govern the plaintiff's rights and are necessarily incorporated by reference, Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), and matters of public record, Northville Downs v. Granholm, 622 F.3d 579, 586 (6th Cir. 2010). However, beyond that, assessment of the facial sufficiency of the complaint ordinarily must be undertaken without resort to matters outside the pleadings. Wysocki v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 607 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, on a motion to remand, the Court may “pierce the pleading” and consider other evidence, such as affidavits and declarations. Casias, 695 F.3d at 433.

The defendant argues that the plaintiffs have “failed to refute” evidence that defendant Daifuku Airport was not Brian Carpenter's employer on the date that he was injured. As support for that argument, the defendant points to (1) a services contract executed between Delta Airlines and “Elite Line Services, Inc.,” see Def. Stmt, ECF No. 18, PageID.232; (2) an email from a Daifuku corporate source dated November 1, 2023, indicating that as of January 1, 2024 the Elite Line Services business unit would be renamed to “Daifuku Services America Corporation,” see id. at PageID.260-61 (“After extensive discussion and careful consideration, we have decided to change the names of our companies operating under the ‘Daifuku North America’ group․ The new name for Elite Line Services, Inc. will be Daifuku Services America Corporation.”); (3) corporate filings recorded with Florida state authorities showing that “Daifuku Services America Corporation” is the corporate moniker for a corporation previously named Elite Line Services, Inc., see id. at PageID.263; and (4) defendant Daifuku Airport's answer to the complaint in which it denied the allegation that it was the plaintiff's employer, see Def.'s Answer, ECF No. 13, PageID.193 (“Answering Paragraph 11, Daifuku denies the allegations as untrue. In further answer, Plaintiff Brian Carpenter was not an employee of Defendant Daifuku at the time of his alleged accident, he was an employee of Daifuku Services America Corporation, a separate legal entity.”).

Defendant Daifuku Airport, for its part, presents a declaration by its general counsel asserting that Brian Carpenter was not employed by defendant Daifuku Airport. However, counsel also affirmatively admits that the named defendant entity is a corporate parent of Daifuku Services, which counsel says was the plaintiff's “employer.”

The “evidence” submitted by Delta, so far as it goes, touches only tangentially on facts tending either to establish or to refute the alleged employment relationship between Daifuku Airport and plaintiff Brian Carpenter. So far as they go, the contract documents and public filings presented suggest nothing more than that defendant Delta itself had some contractual relationship with an entity that subsequently changed its corporate moniker to Daifuku Services America Corporation. Those papers may prove something about the existence of a relationship (or lack thereof) between the co-defendants, but they say nothing conclusive about either defendant's legal relationship with the plaintiff.

Carpenter affirmatively alleged in his complaint that he was employed by Daifuku Airport at the time of the accident, and the Court is obligated to accept that factual allegation as true at this stage of the case. Daifuku Airport denied that allegation in its answer, and it has submitted a declaration of counsel that reiterates the same unadorned assertion, sworn under penalty of perjury. However, the record does not disclose any competent evidence presented by any defendant tending to prove those competing assertions one way or the other. As the Michigan Supreme Court has explained, “[a]lthough by its terms the exclusive remedy provision [of the WDCA] limits the liability of the employee's ‘employer,’ the provision does not define the term ‘employer,’ ” and “[t]hat being the case, [Michigan appellate courts] have regularly applied the ‘economic realities test’ to determine whether an employment relationship exists for purposes of the exclusive remedy provision, and thus whether an individual or entity is the ‘employer’ of a given employee.” Clark v. United Techs. Auto., Inc., 459 Mich. 681, 687, 594 N.W.2d 447, 450 (1999). “Although the totality of the circumstances are considered, in applying the economic realities test, the courts generally consider the following four factors (1) [the] control of a worker's duties, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the right to hire and fire and the right to discipline, and (4) the performance of the duties as an integral part of the employer's business towards the accomplishment of a common goal.” Id. at 688, 594 N.W.2d at 451. The “evidence” presented by the defendants does not touch on any of those contextual factors relevant to the fact-intensive analysis of whether a particular corporate entity qualifies as the plaintiff's “employer” for purposes of invoking the exclusive remedy bar in the WDCA.

To the extent that the record suggests anything definitive at all, it is merely that the identity of the plaintiff's putative employer remains in question; the record certainly does not sustain any undisputed conclusion on that point.

Moreover, if the Court were to find as a proposition of fact that Daifuku Airport was not the plaintiff's employer, that conclusion only would undermine further the defendant's opposition to the remand. If Daifuku Airport did not employ the plaintiff, then the WDCA's exclusive remedy provision would pose no bar to recovery, and the remaining allegations in the complaint that it maintained the de-icing truck would be sufficient to sustain a claim of ordinary negligence. If Daifuku Airport was the plaintiff's employer, then the plaintiff has made out a colorable argument that he can surmount the exclusive remedy provision; if it was not, then the exclusive remedy statute is no obstacle to an ordinary negligence claim. Either way, the pleaded facts make out a colorable claim against Daifuku Airport. That is a further basis fortifying the lack of complete diversity.

B.

Delta argued in its removal notice that the plaintiffs did not plead a colorable claim against the Wayne County Airport Authority, the other non-diverse defendant, because the action against it is barred by governmental immunity. Delta is on firmer ground here.

Under Michigan law, “[a]s a general rule, ‘a governmental agency is immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.’ ” Rowland v. City of Detroit, --- N.W.3d ---, No. 372120, 2025 WL 2638938, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2025) (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(1)). “But that immunity applies only ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this act.’ ” Ibid. “One such exception is the ‘motor vehicle exception,’ which provides that ‘[g]overnmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any ․ employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1405). Separately, the statute also immunizes individual governmental officials from suit, where it “provides that ‘each ․ employee of a governmental agency ․ is immune from tort liability for an injury to a person ․ caused by the ․ employee ․ while in the course of employment’ if certain requirements are met.” Ibid. (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(2)(c)). “The key condition is that the ‘employee's ․ conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage,’ which is known as the ‘gross negligence exception.’ ” Ibid. “ ‘Gross negligence’ is defined as ‘conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(8)(a)).

The plaintiffs make no effort to defend their undeveloped argument that the “motor vehicle exception” to governmental immunity could apply. The complaint here does not allege either that a governmental employee was operating the de-icing truck at the time of the accident, or that defendant WCAA was the “owner” of the truck, and the plaintiff has not presented any further information, or any developed argument, tending to support the application of the motor vehicle exception.

Next, as Delta correctly points out, the carve-out for tort claims involving “gross negligence” of an actor covers claims against a governmental employee, and here the plaintiff has not named any municipal employee as a defendant. See ibid. (explaining that the statute immunizes individual governmental officials from suit, where it “provides that ‘each ․ employee of a governmental agency ․ is immune from tort liability for an injury to a person ․ caused by the ․ employee ․ while in the course of employment’ if certain requirements are met.” (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(2)(c)) (emphasis added). The plaintiff has not cited any Michigan case law permitting a free-standing tort claim against a municipal agency alone to proceed under the gross negligence exception, as opposed to tort claims against an individual allegedly engaging in tortious conduct in the course of his official duties.

In the absence of any discernible exception to the general statutory bar on tort suits against municipal entities, the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that any colorable claim against the WCAA is pleaded in their complaint. But because the plaintiffs have made out colorable claims against defendant Daifuku, which also concededly is non-diverse, the viability of claims against the County is immaterial to the resolution of the jurisdictional inquiry. The deficiency of their claim against the WCCA is a matter to be taken up by the state court in the first instance, not to be litigated in this federal forum, since the parties properly joined (including defendant Daifuku) are not completely diverse.

C.

The plaintiffs also seek sanctions for the improper removal by defendant Delta. That defendant conceded outright in its notice of removal that the parties were not completely diverse, in particular as to defendant Daifuku, and, rather than confronting that reality, it interposed an extended argument about the supposed “fraudulent joinder” of that defendant, premised entirely on a strained reading of the complaint, which simply ignored the facts plainly pleaded, as summarized above. The defendant's presentation post-removal does nothing to rehabilitate the false premise for its foray into the federal forum. As the Supreme Court has explained, “ ‘[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney's fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.’ ” Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 507 F.3d 910, 914 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005)). The criteria for an award of costs for the removal is satisfied here. The plaintiffs may apply for attorney's fees with a proper motion.

III.

The plaintiffs have not made a compelling presentation demonstrating that they have any colorable claims against defendant WCAA, but there are colorably pleaded causes of action implicating non-diverse defendant Daifuku Airport America Corporation. The motion for remand will be granted after the Court entertains a timely request for attorney's fees by the plaintiff.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that if the plaintiffs want to seek attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), they must file a properly documented motion on or before November 13, 2025.

DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge