UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ANTIONE ARTSHAWN HAMILTON (2025)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO SUPPRESS [19] AND DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT [20]

Antione Hamilton faces a one-count indictment for possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ECF 1. He first moved to suppress statements that he made to law enforcement officers after he was arrested and before he was given a Miranda warning. ECF 19. He then moved to dismiss the indictment and argued that his prosecution contravenes the Second Amendment. ECF 20. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant the motion to suppress and deny the motion to dismiss the indictment.

BACKGROUND 1

During the Fall of 2023, Hamilton was on supervised release related to his convictions for bank theft and burglary of controlled substances. Law enforcement officers observed social media posts that showed him with illegal drugs and firearms. In December, officers attempted to execute a search warrant at Hamilton's home, Hamilton fled in his car, and officers pursued him. Eventually, Hamilton stopped his car and fled on foot. As he did so, he allegedly tossed a pistol onto the ground.

Officers cornered Hamilton, placed him under arrest, handcuffed him and sat him in the back of a squad car. Officers never read a Miranda warning to Hamilton, even though the officers engaged in conversation with him. The officers asked for Hamilton's name and last known address. ECF 27, PgID 115–17.² Hamilton asked the officers many times why he was arrested. Id. The officers generally answered him, for example, by explaining that he was “in possession of a firearm” and was “a convicted felon.” Id. at 118. Hamilton, however, kept asking questions and the following exchange occurred:

13:42:16 – Hamilton: Alright. I mean, what did I do though?

13:42:22 – Agent 2: What do you mean?

13:42:24 – Hamilton: I'm saying what did I do? Somebody called the police on me?

13:42:28 – Agent 2: Somebody called saying what?

13:42:30 – Hamilton: Somebody called the police on me?

13:42:32 – Agent 2: No, we were watching the apartment.

13:42:35 – Agent 2: Cuz you you you know that you've done like a lot of violations of your probation, right?

13:42:41 – Hamilton: What have I done?

13:42:43 – Agent 2: Well for one, you dropped dirty all of your drug tests. For two, you've been seen with a lot of different guns and drugs in pictures. So we were coming to do a search warrant to look for guns. Then you left. You have got an arrest warrant as well. So they did a traffic stop on you. You ran. You had a gun on you. That's kind of the cliff notes' version. Alright. Alright, good luck.

13:43:14 – Hamilton: I'll tell you. Can I please tell you this though?

13:43:17 – Agent 2: Tell me whatever.

13:43:18 – Hamilton: That's the only firearm I got. I'm being honest with you. I'm giving you my honest, my honest answer. My kids life.

Id. at 119.

A grand jury indicted Hamilton with one count of possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ECF 1. Hamilton moved to suppress his statements including those after Agent 2's question “Cuz you you you know that you've done like a lot of violations of your probation, right?” ECF 19. Hamilton also moved to dismiss the indictment. ECF 20. The Court held oral argument on the motion to suppress, but determined under Local Rule 7.1(f) that oral argument on the motion to dismiss was unnecessary.

DISCUSSION

The Court is presented with two pretrial motions: a motion to suppress evidence and a motion to dismiss the indictment. The Court will address both in turn.

I. Motion to Suppress Statement

Officers must inform individuals of certain rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), before the individuals are subjected to “custodial interrogation.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431–32 (2000). Interrogation is “either express questioning or its functional equivalent ․ [like] words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980). Statements or questions that are “normally attendant to arrest,” and thus not interrogative, include explanation of the charges, the suspect's rights, or the evidence. See United States v. Collins, 683 F.3d 697, 703 (6th Cir. 2012). And officers may ask follow-up questions to clarify the content of a Defendant's statement so long as the officer's question does not seek to expand the interview. Tolliver v. Sheets, 594 F.3d 900, 921 (6th Cir. 2010).

Hamilton moved to suppress statements that he made during his conversation with officers in the squad car. ECF 19. The Government does not contest that the officers had not Mirandized Hamilton at any point during the relevant discussion. See generally ECF 25, PgID 82–87. The parties further appear to agree on what was said. Id. And the Government does not contest that Hamilton was in custody; after all, he was handcuffed and in the back of a squad car. Id. The parties instead contest whether Hamilton's concededly custodial conversation with the officers was “interrogation.”

Hamilton did not specifically identify which of the statements by officers constituted impermissible interrogation in his view. He instead argued broadly that the entire conversation was impermissible. See generally ECF 19. The Court will sort the questions into two categories and conclude that some were permissible questions, and others were impermissible custodial interrogation.

A. Questions Attendant to Arrest

Officers asked Hamilton for his name, his date of birth, his last known address, his phone number, his mom's phone number, and his romantic partner's name. ECF 27, PgID 115–17. Those questions are of the sort that are normally attendant to arrest, were not reasonably calculated to elicit an incriminating response,³ and thus fall within the “booking” exception to Miranda. United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1024–25 (6th Cir. 1983). Hamilton's unwarned answers to questions before 13:41:49 on the transcript of the discussion need not be excluded.

Agent 2 then asked Hamilton: “Can I tell you what you are being arrested for?” before immediately stating “Because you were in possession of a firearm, and you're a convicted felon.” ECF 27, PgID 119. The Agent's question was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, and instead formed part of an explanation of the reason for the arrest. Explaining the reason for the arrest is a classic statement or question normally attendant to arrest. Collins, 683 F.3d at 703. The Court will exclude nothing based on Agent 2's question and explanation at 13:41:54 and 13:41:58 of the interview transcript.

B. Custodial Interrogation

The nature of the officers' conversation with Hamilton changed when Agent 2 asked him “Cuz you you you know that you've done like a lot of violations of your probation, right?” ECF 27, PgID 119. Hamilton's extended response to that question included an admission that the firearm was his. Id. (“That's the only firearm I got.”).

Although officers may ask follow-up questions to volunteered information, the questions may not expand the scope of the interview. See Tolliver, 594 F.3d at 921. For example, if the police have discovered one gun, and a suspect volunteers that he was attempting to get the “other” gun out, officers may follow up to confirm with the suspect that there is a second firearm. Id. at 92. The suspect's implied admission—that he possessed multiple firearms—has been made, so the follow-up does not move the ball. Id.

But “when asking a suspect about volunteered information, police may at times “cross the [fine] line from asking clarifying or follow-up questions into” impermissible questioning that expands the interview in an incriminating way. Id. at 920. For example, if a suspect asks “Can I put my shoes on before I go to jail?” And the officer replies “Why would you be going to jail?” The officer has directly called for an incriminating response. United States v. Sydnor, No. 6:16-cr-21-2, 2016 WL 8672913, at *10 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 9, 2016). (“What sort of non-incriminating response could [Defendant] have possibly given to this question?” ․ [T]he only reasonably likely and responsive answer would be incriminating.”). The answer must be suppressed. Id.

Here, the Government argued that the question—“Cuz you you you know that you've done like a lot of violations of your probation, right?”—was a permissible follow-up to Hamilton's question: “Somebody called the police on me?” ECF 25, PgID 87. The argument fails for two reasons. First, the question is not a follow-up question. Indeed, Hamilton's question conveyed no information and thus did not require a follow-up question. Rather, his question only invited an answer like the ones given previously, see ECF 27, PgID 118 (“Because you were in possession of a firearm, and you're a convicted felon.”), and after the question. See id. at 119 (“Well for one, you dropped dirty all of your drug tests ․”).

Second, and more importantly, even assuming the agent's question was a follow-up, it impermissibly expanded the scope of the interview.⁴ Hamilton had not admitted any violation of supervised release before Agent 2 asked him whether he was aware that he had violated the terms of his release. See ECF 27, PgID 115–119. The question therefore impermissibly expanded the scope of the conversation into one about the violation.⁵ Indeed, like in Sydnor, “the only reasonably likely and responsive answer would be incriminating” because the officer sought an admission of probation violations. Sydnor, 2016 WL 8672913, at *10. Taken together, the officer's question combined with the list of violations was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.

In sum, Agent 2's actions constituted “express questioning” that sought an admission of until-then unadmitted probation violations—one of which was illegal firearm possession. See ECF 27, PgID 119 (“For two, you've been seen with a lot of different guns and drugs in pictures.”). Whether or not it was intended to do so, the question directly called for Hamilton to admit incriminating conduct, and he eventually did. Id. Because the question was neither a permissible explanation of the basis for the arrest nor a permissible follow-up question, Hamilton's incriminating communicative conduct after the question must be suppressed.

II. Motion to Dismiss

Next, the Court will review Hamilton's motion to dismiss the indictment. ECF 20. The Second Amendment instructs that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. But under federal law, certain categories of persons are prohibited from possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Felons—that is, persons who have “been convicted in any court of[ ] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”—are one such category. Id. § 922(g)(1). The Supreme Court, and many of its members, has repeatedly instructed that certain “longstanding prohibitions” on firearm possession, including those targeting felons, are presumptively constitutional. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 & n.26 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (plurality opinion); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 72 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.); United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 1902 (2024); cf. United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 664–65 (6th Cir. 2024) (Davis, J., concurring in judgment). Nonetheless, defendants have challenged § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment and have relied on cases that interpreted the amendment like Bruen and Rahimi. Following that trend, Hamilton challenged the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) both facially and as applied to him. ECF 20. Applying recent Sixth Circuit precedent, the Court will reject both challenges.

A. Facial Challenge

In United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024), the Sixth Circuit determined that § 922(g)(1) is not susceptible to a facial challenge because “most” of its applications are constitutional. Id. at 965. Despite Hamilton's suggestion to the contrary, see ECF 20, PgID 51 (“Defendant contends that Williams' analysis, as to a facial challenge of 922(g), is unsound ․”), the Court has no discretion to reject that holding.⁶ Accordingly, the Court will reject Hamilton's facial challenge to § 922(g)(1)'s constitutionality.

B. As-Applied Challenge

Hamilton's as-applied challenge also fails. Bruen placed the burden on the Government to show a historical tradition that supports disarmament. 597 U.S. at 18. The Government subsequently demonstrated a historical tradition of disarming dangerous individuals and dangerous classes of individuals. United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 1901–02 (2024); Williams, 113 F.4th at 662. The burden in the Sixth Circuit now falls on defendants making as-applied challenges to § 922(g) to show that they are sufficiently nondangerous to be excepted from the statute's “presumptively lawful” scope. Williams, 113 F.4th at 645, 662–63.

With the Williams test in hand, the Court must determine whether Hamilton is sufficiently “dangerous” that he was validly disarmed by § 922(g)(1). In Williams, the Court of Appeals considered the effect of a defendant's criminal history and sorted many criminal acts into three categories. 113 F.4th at 663. First, crimes of violence against another person are “strong evidence that an individual is dangerous, if not totally dispositive on the question.” Id. at 658. Second, other not-technically violent crimes like drug trafficking and burglary that “put someone's safety at risk” also “justify a finding of danger.” Id. at 659. Third, “crimes [that] cause no physical harm to another person or the community” are the most challenging category because they “don't make a person dangerous.” Id. No category is necessarily dispositive. The “dangerousness determination [should] be fact-specific, depending on the unique circumstances of the individual defendant,” and courts should make an informed judgment under all of the circumstances. Id. at 660. In doing so, the district court “may consider a defendant's entire criminal record,” including “evidence of past convictions” and “other judicially noticeable information.” Id. at 659–60.

Here, the Court takes judicial notice of Hamilton's Rule 11 plea agreement from an earlier case in which he was convicted of burglary involving controlled substances in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2118(b) and bank robbery/theft under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). United States v. Hamilton, No. 20-cr-20287 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2021), ECF 19. Hamilton admitted that, to facilitate the charged burglary, he and others crashed a car “at high speed” through a wall to gain access to a pharmacy. Id. at 57. Hamilton also admitted to committing five other burglaries of pharmacies, including once more crashing a vehicle to gain entry. Id. at 58–60. In total, Hamilton committed six burglaries in a less-than-two-month spree, two of which involved vehicle crashes to gain entry.

Hamilton's past crimes are within the second category of crimes discussed in Williams.⁷ See 113 F.4th at 659 (referring to burglary as an example of the second category of offenses). Evidence that a defendant has a past conviction for an offense within Williams's second category of crimes—those that do not necessarily require violence against another, but that nonetheless “pose a significant threat of danger”—will usually justify a judicial determination of dangerousness. Id. Accordingly, any one of Hamilton's burglaries would justify a finding of danger most of the time. See id. at 659, 663.

Because of his convictions for two offenses—both inherently dangerous—and his admission of committing five more inherently dangerous offenses, Hamilton faces the “difficult” task “of showing he is not dangerous.” Id. at 663. Hamilton attempted to do so by arguing that his relevant convictions were committed when he was fewer than twenty-five years old and that he has now been released on bond pending trial. ECF 20, PgID 69–70. The Court will address each argument in turn.

The Sixth Circuit did not directly address how courts should consider the age of an offender at the time of their offense, but it did suggest that courts should apply a holistic approach. Williams, 113 F.4th at 657–58 & n.12. The youth of an offender and his increased maturity in the years that followed the conviction may be relevant to his dangerousness. But here, Hamilton committed the robberies only a few years before the alleged firearm possession in this case. The mere passage of a handful of years is insufficient to take the application of § 922(g)(1) to Hamilton outside the bounds of permissible firearm regulation. Hamilton's youth at the time of his burglary spree is therefore insufficient to rebut his dangerousness.

Hamilton next argued that the Court already determined that he is not dangerous when it did not require his pretrial detention. ECF 20, PgID 70. But the “dangerousness” analysis in the pretrial detention context differs significantly from that in the context of § 922(g). First, for most crimes in the federal system, the presumption runs against pretrial detention. United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 945 (6th Cir. 2010). But in the context of § 922(g)(1), “most” applications of the statute are lawful, so the presumption runs against the defendant—that is, it is the defendant who bears the burden to make a showing of non-dangerousness. Williams, 113 F.4th at 657; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26. Moreover, there is no compelling reason why the Court should link the showing of danger that is statutorily required to detain a presumed-innocent defendant to the showing of danger necessary to constitutionally disarm a previously convicted felon under a different statute.

In sum, Hamilton's past convictions and admitted offenses are serious ones; even one violent or dangerous conviction can defeat an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1); and the Sixth Circuit has instructed that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional in “most” cases. Considering Hamilton's entire criminal history, the Court finds that he qualifies as “dangerous” as the term was historically understood. Accordingly, the prohibition in § 922(g)(1) applies to Hamilton, and the Court must deny his as-applied challenge and his motion to dismiss.

Alternatively, although the Court focuses on Williams, the Sixth Circuit has since held that firearm possession in violation of a condition of probation is sufficient to render § 922(g)(1) valid as applied. See United States v. Goins, 118 F.4th 794, 804– 05 (6th Cir. 2024) (applying Williams). Thus, under Goins, Hamilton was validly disarmed and may be validly prosecuted on the independent basis that his firearm possession violated a condition of his supervised release. See id.; United States v. Hamilton, No. 20-cr-20287 (E.D. Mich. June 60, 2021), ECF 26, PgID 150.

ORDER

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant Hamilton's Motion to Suppress [19] is GRANTED IN PART as described above.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Hamilton's Motion to Dismiss [20] is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The Government provided a transcript of the body worn camera audio. See ECF 27. The Court has reviewed both the footage and the transcript and finds the transcript to be a true and accurate account of the audio.

3.   In theory, admitting one's identity when charged with an offense that requires a prior-felony predicate could be “inculpatory.” The Sixth Circuit has, nevertheless instructed that “at the very least, asking the defendant his name is the type of biographical question permitted under the booking exception.” United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 424 (6th Cir. 2008).

4.   The Government argued that because the answer to Hamilton's question, “Somebody called the police on me?” could involve bringing up his violations and because it “is reasonable to expect that Hamilton knew of his violations and knew that they could result in his arrest,” ECF 25, PgID 87, Agent 2's questions did not expand the scope of the interview. The Court takes a different view. The apparent cognizance of wrongdoing does not open the door for incriminating questions. Presumably most detainees are aware of their inculpatory behavior. If that awareness entitled officers to ask inculpatory questions, requiring Miranda warnings prior to interrogations would be ineffectual.

5.   Had the Government merely explained the basis for the arrest without asking an inculpatory question, Hamilton's response need not be suppressed. See Collins, 683 F.3d at 703; see, e.g., ECF 27, PgID 119 (“Well for one, you dropped dirty all of your drug tests ․”).

6.   For largely the same reasons, the Court will reject Hamilton's overbreadth challenge to § 922(g)(1) and his void-for-vagueness challenge to the Sixth Circuit's holding in Williams. Overbreadth challenges are not available in the Second Amendment context. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (“[W]e have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”) (citation omitted). Further, the void for vagueness doctrine applies to statutes and does not allow a district court to ignore binding precedent because that precedent is “vague.” The applicable statute, § 922(g)(1), is clear on its face.

7.   Although Williams discussed burglary in the context of a home invasion, the same risk—increasing the odds of a violent confrontation with another—applies to businesses, especially because the offense conduct here included using a car as a battering ram to gain entry “at high speed.”

STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III United States District Judge