KOTKE v. AGER (2025)

ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE OPINIONS OF DR. THOMAS A. SHEA III [ECF No. 29] IN ABEYANCE PENDING SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING, AND REQUIRING SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING

On May 30, 2021, Plaintiff Travis Kotke called 911 when he and his wife became involved in a domestic dispute. Defendants Andrew Ager, Tara LaMilza, and Chad Sheldon—Michigan State Police Troopers—responded to the call. Ultimately, Defendants arrested Plaintiff on multiple charges. As a result of these events, Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against Defendants, alleging claims for excessive force, false arrest and imprisonment, failure to intercede and unreasonable search and seizure, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution.

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Thomas A. Shea III. Defendants argue that the opinions of Dr. Shea—who is a purported expert on law enforcement and use of force—are unreliable. Accordingly, Defendants seek to exclude Dr. Shea's opinions. Plaintiff responded in opposition. Upon review of the parties’ arguments, the Court concludes that oral argument will not aid in the disposition of this motion and will determine it on the briefs. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2).

For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Thomas A. Shea III [ECF No. 29] is HELD IN ABEYANCE pending supplemental briefing on the issue of substantial justification or harmlessness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1). The parties are ORDERED to submit this supplemental briefing under the conditions described in the Conclusion of this Order.

I. BACKGROUND

When Plaintiff was arrested by Defendants on May 30, 2021, Defendant Ager conducted an “arm bar” takedown of Plaintiff and placed his knee on Plaintiff's back while handcuffing him on the ground. ECF No. 29-3, PageID.486. As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a torn rotator cuff and broken scapula. Id. Plaintiff hired Dr. Shea to act as an expert witness on Defendants’ use of force under the circumstances of this case.

Defendants do not contest that Dr. Shea is qualified to serve as an expert. ECF No. 32, PageID.545. Dr. Shea states that he is a “nationally recognized Law Enforcement and Security expert in policing best practices, security standards, and emergency preparedness” and that he specializes in police operations and the use of force. ECF No. 29-3, PageID.485. Dr. Shea worked in law enforcement for almost two decades before he retired and transitioned into academia. Id. He has a doctorate in civil security leadership, management, and policy, has teaching experience at several universities, has a variety of peer reviewed and other publications, and has given a variety of presentations. ECF No. 29-2, PageID.477–81.

Rather, Defendants argue that Dr. Shea's opinions are unsupported by logical reasoning, legally conclusory, and outside his area of expertise. Defendants assert that many of Dr. Shea's conclusions lack any reasoning arising from a logical foundation, and that where Dr. Shea does include reasoning, that reasoning “raises more questions than answers.” ECF No. 29, PageID.463. Furthermore, Defendants argue that Dr. Shea's opinion includes legal conclusions—such as that force was excessive or unreasonable—which invade the province of the Court and jury. Id. at PageID.465–66. Defendants also note that Dr. Shea's opinion impermissibly extends into psychology and medicine, areas that are outside his realm of expertise. Id. at PageID.467–68. Defendants base their argument for excluding Dr. Shea's opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, although they also cite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) during their analysis as another rule that Dr. Shea's opinion violates. See id. at PageID.461, 464.

Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ arguments. Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Shea properly identified the governing standards, compared the standards to the facts of the case, and “articulated how Trooper Ager's use of a straight-arm bar takedown and knee-in-back technique was objectively unreasonable, especially considering Plaintiff's non-violent behavior and visible disability.” ECF No. 31, PageID.540. According to Plaintiff, Dr. Shea “identified specific errors, such as the failure to attempt de-escalation, the application of disproportionate force, and the absence of medical aid after injury.” Id. Plaintiff states that Dr. Shea's opinion about the objective reasonableness of the force used is relevant to the main issue in Plaintiff's excessive force claim, and that Dr. Shea's conclusion that force was “excessive” is not a legal conclusion because it is based on Michigan State Police policy. Id. at 541. Ultimately, Plaintiff notes that Dr. Shea was not subject to a deposition and that he has not had a chance to testify about his report; thus, the Court should hold a Daubert hearing.¹ Id. at PageID.541–42. Notably, Plaintiff focuses his rebuttal on Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and does not mention Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.

In reply, Defendants assert that a Daubert hearing is not necessary. Defendants emphasize that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a), Dr. Shea's expert report is deficient, and a Daubert hearing would not change that fact. ECF No. 32, PageID.545–46.

II. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Defendants’ arguments blend the standards from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Nonetheless, these are distinct rules that have distinct consequences. The legal standards for Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a) and 37(c) follow.

a. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a) and 37(c)

Under Rule 26(a), parties are required to make certain disclosures during the course of litigation. This rule “enable[s] [each side of the case] to prepare for trial and to prevent surprise tactics from affecting the case's outcome.” Baker v. Blackhawk Mining, LLC, 141 F.4th 760, 772 (6th Cir. 2025). As for expert witnesses, Rule 26(a)(2) provides that parties must disclose any expert witnesses that they intend to use at trial and that such disclosure must be accompanied by the expert's written report. Id.(a)(2)(A)–(B). The expert's written report must contain:

(i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them;

(ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them;

(iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them;

(iv) the witness's qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years;

(v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and

(vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case.

Id.(a)(2)(B).

The Sixth Circuit has specified that “[u]nder Rule 26(a), a report must be complete such that opposing counsel is not forced to depose an expert in order to avoid an ambush at trial; and moreover the report must be sufficiently complete so as to shorten or decrease the need for expert depositions and thus to conserve resources.” R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. CU Interface, LLC, 606 F.3d 262, 271 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Salgado v. Gen. Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 735, 741 n.6 (7th Cir. 1998)) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, under this rule, expert reports are required not only to provide the expert's opinions, but to “set forth facts, and, in doing so, outline a line of reasoning arising from a logical foundation.” Brainard v. Am. Skandia Life Assurance Corp., 432 F.3d 655, 664 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[B]road and dramatic language without substance or analysis[ ] fails to satisfy the very basic requirements of a Rule 26 expert report.” Hubble v. Cnty. of Macomb, No. 2:16-cv-13504, 2019 WL 1783043, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2019) (quoting Brainard, 432 F.3d at 664) (quotation marks omitted).

When an expert report fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 26(a), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) provides that the party “is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). The Sixth Circuit has interpreted this rule as requiring “automatic and mandatory” exclusion of the evidence unless the party seeking to offer it demonstrates substantial justification or harmlessness. Dickenson v. Cardiac and Thoracic Surgery of E. Tenn., 388 F.3d 976, 983 (6th Cir. 2004); see also R.C. Olmstead, Inc., 606 F.3d at 271.

B. Analysis

a. Dr. Shea's Expert Report Violates Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i)’s Requirement That He Explain the Basis and Reasons for His Opinions

Dr. Shea's analysis and conclusion sections consist of about five paragraphs (out of the entire 11-page report), and state as follows:

There were prominent themes throughout each of [Defendants’] depositions:

• The officers were aware that Kotke was disabled.

• The officers stated that Kotke was not physically violent towards them during the arrest.

• Kotke was only passively resisting arrest.

• Ager was aware and understood the meaning of ‘objective reasonableness,’ and the MSP Use of Force continuum.

The MSP Use of Force policies and orders above continually mention the terms ‘objectively reasonable’ when evaluating how much force is necessary to effect an arrest. There are obviously multiple variables that must be considered during this evaluation; however, it is documented, and the officers were aware that Kotke was a non-violent, disabled man during the arrest. While the officers were justified in using a moderate level of force to put his arms behind his back during the arrest, the forceful takedown and knee in the back were not objectively reasonable to effect an arrest with those variables.

․

The focus of this expert report is not an analysis regarding whether the arrest was valid; instead, the scope was limited to whether the force deployed by Trooper Ager was proportional under the circumstances. The context documented in these reports reveals that all the troopers’ actions initially appeared to be legal and justified. They believed that Kotke committed an act of domestic violence against his wife. Once the decision was made to arrest Kotke, he resisted, justifying a moderate level of force to get him under control and in handcuffs. However, the troopers were aware that Kotke was disabled, yet Ager chose to deploy an arm bar technique with enough force to cause a rotator cuff tear. Additionally, Ager placed a knee in Kotke's back with enough force to fracture his shoulder blade. Kotke was not violently resisting, was disabled, and was quickly brought under control by the troopers. The amount of force used to effect the arrest was excessive, based on the resultant injuries.

․

There are numerous choices that an officer can make to reduce or mitigate the possible injuries to an arrestee. The incident on 5/30/21 does not demonstrate that Trooper Ager made any of those choices. Though he may have been justified in using moderate force to get Kotke under control, the decision to use the chosen, disproportional level of force was not objectively reasonable. It resulted in unnecessary injuries to a disabled man.

No evidence existed in the discovery materials that Kotke was actively resisting arrest. In my opinion, he passively resisted because he felt that he was the victim in this situation and was upset. His frustration was likely justified because all subsequent charges against him were dismissed. Instead of an ultimatum, the troopers could have tried to further de-escalate the situation without force. However, Kotke was being placed under arrest and required to submit to the troopers’ authority. Additionally, the troopers had the right to utilize a moderate level of force to get control of his arms when he passively resisted. However, the decision by Trooper Ager to use an arm bar technique and a knee in the back of a non-violent, non-threatening, disabled man left Kotke with unnecessary physical injuries that could have been avoided with less force.

ECF No. 29-3, PageID.493–95. In separate sections, the remainder of Dr. Shea's report contains Dr. Shea's background, the facts of the incident, the documents that Dr. Shea reviewed and his “methodology,” excerpts from the sources he consulted, and excerpts from Defendants’ depositions. See generally ECF No. 29-3.

Absent from Dr. Shea's analysis and conclusion is any real connection to the sources he consulted in the “methodology” section of his report. See Baker, 141 F.4th at 772 (stating that an expert report violates Rule 26 where it “reache[s] conclusions without identifying their supporting reasoning.”). Dr. Shea repeatedly states that Defendants were entitled to use “moderate” force on Plaintiff, but at no point does he define what moderate force is or why Defendants were entitled to use it under the governing standards he reviewed. See id. at PageID.493–495. Nor does Dr. Shea explain what an arm-bar takedown is, what “level” of force it constitutes on the use-of-force continuum, or why Plaintiff being “nonviolent” and “disabled” means that the arm-bar takedown was inappropriate. See id. Indeed, Dr. Shea does not even explain why he believes Plaintiff was passively, rather than actively, resisting. See id. at PageID.493, 495.

Dr. Shea also stated that there are “multiple variables” to consider when using force, and that there are “numerous choices” an officer can make to reduce the possibility of injuries during arrest, but he does not identify those variables or choices or what those variables and choices are based upon. See id. at PageID.493, 495. Dr. Shea fleetingly mentions that Defendants could have attempted to de-escalate the situation instead of giving Plaintiff “an ultimatum,” but does not explain why the situation called for de-escalation or what exactly he means by an “ultimatum.” See id. at PageID.495.

Dr. Shea's mystifying opinion continues: “In my opinion, [Plaintiff] passively resisted because he felt that he was the victim in this situation and was upset. His frustration was likely justified because all subsequent charges against him were dismissed.” Id. at PageID.495. Dr. Shea does not explain on what basis he can assume Plaintiff's mental state during the arrest or why Plaintiff's subjective beliefs have anything to do about the appropriateness of the use of force. Moreover, Dr. Shea repeatedly claims that Plaintiff's injuries were “unnecessary” but does not indicate why they were unnecessary or on what basis. See id. at PageID.494–95. He also claims that force was “excessive, based on the resultant injuries,” but does not identify why the injuries indicate that the use of force was inappropriate or on what basis. Id. at PageID.494. Indeed, Dr. Shea even states that Defendants’ actions caused Plaintiff's injuries, but there is nothing in his report to explain causation for those injuries. Id. at PageID.494.

In sum, Dr. Shea's report “fails to supply any meaningful analysis or reasoning,” Hubble, 2019 WL 1783043, at *5 (quotation marks omitted), and “contains nothing more than his bald opinions[.]” Henry v. City of Flint, No. 17-cv-11061, 2019 WL 2207669, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 2019). “Expert reports must include ‘how’ and ‘why’ the expert reached a particular result, not merely the expert's conclusory opinions.” R.C. Olmstead, Inc., 606 F.3d at 271 (citation omitted). For the reasons described above, Dr. Shea's report does not describe the “how” or “why”—it only provides his “own say-so.” Henry, 2019 WL 2207669, at *5. As such, Dr. Shea's opinion is “nothing but a bottom line [and] supplies nothing of value to the judicial process.” Brainard, 432 F.3d at 664 (citation omitted).

Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary miss the mark. Plaintiff notes that Dr. Shea reviewed extensive documentation when arriving at his conclusions, as well as the governing use-of-force standards and police procedures. ECF No. 31, PageID.539–40. The Court expresses no opinion about the evidence that Dr. Shea reviewed or the sources with which he consulted. Rather, the Court takes issue with the fact that Dr. Shea did not incorporate these sources into an analysis that is sufficient under Rule 26. “Rule 26 demands more than [a] generalized reference to the materials [the expert] reviewed.” Hubble, 2019 WL 1783043, at *7. Although Dr. Shea “mechanically listed the facts he relied upon to make his conclusions, he did not reveal, even in a most basic sense, the ‘process of reasoning’ or ‘inferential process’ he relied on in making his conclusions.” Eggerson v. Hessler, No. 05-2333, 2007 WL 579545, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2007) (citing Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 187 F.3d 533, 544 (6th Cir. 1999)).

Plaintiff further claims that “Dr. Shea compared the facts to [the governing police practices] standards in a detailed, line-by-line fashion, noting areas of compliance and deviation[.]” ECF No. 31, PageID.540. This assertion is simply untrue. Dr. Shea's report contains abundant copied-and-pasted excerpts from Defendants’ depositions and certain police practices publications. However, merely citing to “some record evidence with no discussion of how that evidence supports the proffered opinion” fails to satisfy Rule 26. Hubble, 2019 WL 1783043, at *6. Dr. Shea's list of excerpts from police practices publications and the facts of the case provide no reasoning that explains which governing police practices standards Defendants allegedly violated, how they were violated, or why they were violated. See Henry, 2019 WL 2207669, at *5 (“[N]owhere in Dr. Westrick's ․ opinions does he mention any particular ‘procedures’ or ‘protocols’ that were violated, or explain how he reached his conclusions.”).

As an example, Dr. Shea asserts (without explanation) that Plaintiff was passively resisting, notes that Plaintiff was non-violent and disabled, and then concludes that Defendants were justified in using “moderate force” and that the arm-bar technique was “objectively unreasonable.” ECF No. 29-3, PageID.493. Dr. Shea vaguely cites to “[Michigan State Police] Use of Force policies and orders” in this section of his analysis,² but aside from this ambiguous citation, Dr. Shea offers no explanation of why the Michigan State Police Use of Force policies and orders support his conclusions, nor does he describe what he means by “moderate force” and “objectively unreasonable.” “Such a veneer explanation will not suffice.” Reynolds v. Freightliner LLC, No. 05-70-GFVT, 2006 WL 5249744, at *6 (E.D. Ky. June 21, 2006). This example is “emblematic of [the] problem which permeates [Dr. Shea's] entire report,” as the Court's analysis thus far has thoroughly elucidated. Henry, 2019 WL 2207669, at *5.

Plaintiff further claims that “Dr. Shea articulated how Trooper Ager's use of a straight-arm bar takedown and knee-in-back technique was objectively unreasonable ․ considering Plaintiff's non-violent behavior and visible disability”; and that he “identified specific errors, such as failure to attempt de-escalation, the application of disproportionate force, and the absence of medical aid after injury.” ECF No. 31, PageID.540. As an initial matter, Dr. Shea did not claim, whatsoever, that Defendants should have rendered medical aid to Plaintiff. Aside from that, Plaintiff's argument fails to recognize that Dr. Shea introduced these concepts in a conclusory fashion, but did not explain why he arrived at those conclusions or connect them to any line of reasoning. See Henry, 2019 WL 2207669, at *5 (“Dr. Westrick includes only a brief paragraph of purported ‘reasoning’ after each of his six opinions, but actually he provides no reasoning whatsoever.”).

For example, why did Plaintiff's “non-violent behavior” and “visible disability” mean that the arm-bar technique and knee in the back was unreasonable under the circumstances of the arrest? Why was de-escalation called for under the circumstances? Why was the use of force “disproportionate”? Dr. Shea does not answer these questions, but rather makes “sweeping generalized pronouncements” that fail the basic requirement under Rule 26 that an expert report explain the basis and reasons for the expert's opinion. Hubble, 2019 WL 1783043, at *5.

In sum, the reader of Dr. Shea's report is left to speculate about the connections Dr. Shea made between the facts of the case and the governing police practices standards and how he arrived at his conclusions. Under Rule 26, this is unacceptable. By requiring disclosure of expert reports, Rule 26 is designed to “avoid an ambush at trial,” “shorten or decrease the need for expert depositions,” and “conserve resources.” R.C. Olmstead, Inc., 606 F.3d at 271. Dr. Shea's bare-bones report provides Defendants with little notice of what to expect from his testimony at trial and, indeed, Defendants would have to depose him—after the close of discovery—to ascertain the reasoning he employed in arriving at his conclusions. Accordingly, Dr. Shea's report violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B).

Under Rule 37(c)(1), the Court is required to exclude Dr. Shea's opinions unless the error was “substantially justified” or “harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Plaintiff did not address substantial justification or harmlessness in his response to Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff is not at fault for this failure, because Defendants blurred the lines between Rule 26 and Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Accordingly, having found that Dr. Shea's report violates Rule 26(a)(2)(B), the Court concludes that supplemental briefing is necessary on the issue of substantial justification or harmlessness under Rule 37(c)(1) and Howe v. City of Akron, 801 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2015).³ The supplemental briefing schedule is provided in the Conclusion of this Order.

Because the Court finds that Dr. Shea's report fails Rule 26(a), it need not address Defendants’ remaining arguments under Rule 702 that (1) many of Dr. Shea's opinions are legal conclusions and (2) some of his opinions exceed his expertise in police practices and use of force.⁴ These issues are subsumed into the overarching defect in Dr. Shea's opinion—namely, that Dr. Shea lacked reasoning for his opinions in his expert report.

b. The Court Declines to Hold a Daubert Hearing

The Court will not hold a Daubert hearing. In his response, Plaintiff contends that the Court should hold a Daubert hearing because Dr. Shea was “not subjected to a deposition in this matter” and that, if the Court desires additional detail on Dr. Shea's methodology, a Daubert hearing would be appropriate. ECF No. 31, PageID.541–42.

A Daubert hearing—which determines an expert's admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 702—would not change the fact that Dr. Shea's expert report is deficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and that the time for supplementation of the expert report has passed. See Hubble, 2019 WL 1783043, at *2 (stating that where there are deadlines for expert disclosures and for motions challenging experts, “Rule 26(e) supplementation must occur prior to th[ose] agreed upon deadline[s].”). Notably, Rule 26 was designed “to obviate the need to depose experts and it is not incumbent on the opposing party to depose an expert to find out the substance of what an expert report lacks.” Id. at *5. The fact that Defendants did not depose Dr. Shea (because they did not receive his expert report until weeks after the close of discovery) is not a sufficient reason to hold a hearing, given that the Court is deciding Defendants’ motion under Rule 26.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Opinions of Thomas A. Shea III [ECF No. 29] is HELD IN ABEYANCE pending supplemental briefing on the issue of substantial justification or harmlessness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1).

1. Plaintiff is ORDERED to file a supplemental brief explaining whether the deficiencies in Dr. Shea's expert report are substantially justified or harmless under Rule 37(c)(1) and the governing standards described in Howe v. City of Akron, 801 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2015). The supplemental brief is due on or before July 28, 2025 and is limited to 7 pages.

2. Defendant shall file a response to Plaintiff's supplemental brief on or before August 5, 2025, which is limited to 7 pages.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Regarding the lack of deposition in this case, Defendants noted that they issued a notice of deposition on February 27, 2025, to depose Dr. Shea on March 4, 2025, which was the last day of discovery. ECF No. 29, PageID.453 n.2. However, Defendants stated that they did not receive Dr. Shea's expert report until March 17, 2025—nearly two weeks after the close of discovery and over three months after the due date for Plaintiff's expert disclosures. Id.; see ECF No. 15, PageID.70. Neither party has given any further explanation for the late expert report. Although the Court entered a joint stipulation of the parties to substitute Plaintiff's first police practices expert (Dr. Dennis M. Savard) with Dr. Shea on February 25, 2025, the parties’ stipulation specified that due dates were not affected. See ECF No. 24.

2.   In fact, this is Dr. Shea's only citation to any publication or literature in his analysis and conclusion sections.

3.   The Court will not entertain argument that Dr. Shea should be permitted to supplement his expert report under Rule 26(e). Aside from the fact that supplementation would be untimely, “[b]y seeking to transform [Dr. Shea's] conclusory report via supplementation, Plaintiff [would be] in effect essentially and impermissibly presenting a new opinion.” Eiben v. Gorilla Ladder Co., No. 11-CV-10298, 2013 WL 1721677, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2013); see also id. at *5 (“[I]t is not mere supplementation when a party submits a manifestly incomplete report lacking analysis or supporting rationale, waits for the summary judgment deadline to pass, and then submits a fuller report that contains actual reasoning ․Rule 26(e) does not give the producing party a license to disregard discovery deadlines and to offer new opinions under the guise of the supplement label.” (quotation marks omitted)). The supplemental briefing in this case should focus solely on substantial justification and harmlessness.

4.   The Court simply notes that Defendants’ arguments have merit. Dr. Shea's report is rife with conclusions that use the exact legal terminology in Fourth Amendment excessive force jurisprudence—such as “objectively reasonable,” “excessive,” and “unreasonable.” However, an “expert's opinion must stop short of embracing the ‘legal terminology’ which frames the ultimate legal conclusion which the jury must reach in the case.” Alvarado v. Oakland Cnty., 809 F. Supp. 2d 680, 688 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (citation omitted). Dr. Shea's opinions also simply tell the jury what result to reach, not only by coming to cursory conclusions using exact legal terminology, but also by asserting that Plaintiff's injuries were “unnecessary” and that Defendants should have used less force. Henry, 2019 WL 2207669, at *8 (“Courts regularly exclude testimony about the necessity of force or harm during an arrest because such testimony improperly expresses legal conclusions.”). Moreover, Dr. Shea speculates that Plaintiff's “passive resistance” during his arrest was due to Plaintiff feeling that “he was the victim,” that Plaintiff suffered “unnecessary physical injuries that could have been avoided with less force,” and that Defendant Ager's actions caused Plaintiff's injuries. ECF No. 29-3, PageID.495. Dr. Shea has no psychological or medical credentials that would qualify him to opine on Plaintiff's state of mind or the injuries Plaintiff suffered.

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN, United States District Judge