UNITED STATES v. TURK (2024)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 18), DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE (ECF NO. 15), AND GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS (ECF NO. 17)

Detroit Police Officers seized three handguns from Rickey Arnell Turk during a traffic stop. Turk now faces a charge for possessing a firearm as a felon. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Turk moves to dismiss the indictment based on New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). ECF No. 18. He also moves to suppress the evidence seized, as well as the statements he made, during the traffic stop. ECF Nos. 15 & 17.

The Court held a hearing on Turk's motions on June 7, 2024. Having carefully considered the evidence presented at the hearing, and the arguments advanced in the briefs and during oral argument, the Court will DENY Turk's motions to dismiss and to suppress physical evidence. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulations, the motion to suppress statements will be GRANTED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

On the night of February 1, 2024, three Detroit Police Officers—Colegrove, Gonzalez, and Dinnan—were patrolling in the area of Puritan Avenue and Coyle Street in a scout car as part of Detroit Police's Operation “Restore Order.” Colegrove was the driver.

At approximately 11:30 p.m., Colegrove spotted a red Dodge Charger—driven by Rickey Arnell Turk—approaching his vehicle as he drove west on Puritan Avenue towards Coyle Street. At the intersection of Puritan and Coyle, the Charger turned south down Coyle. Colegrove decided to initiate a traffic stop and activated his overhead lights because, he testified, the Charger had failed to signal before turning.

Colegrove's dashcam automatically began recording 15 seconds after he activated his overhead lights. The footage it recorded shows the view through Colegrove's front windshield and begins as the Charger is already mid-way through its turn. Gov't Ex. A. The Charger disappears from the videoframe for some 4 to 5 seconds as Colegrove proceeds to the intersection and turns left to follow it. After Colegrove completes his turn, the Charger reappears in the videoframe and can be seen inching its way up a driveway on the righthand side. Id. at 00:10.

Dashcam footage shows Colegrove pull into the driveway behind the Charger, boxing it into the driveway. Id. at 00:14. Colegrove testified that, before he turned into the driveway (at around the 00:11 mark on the video), he observed that the Charger did not have a rear license plate. Colegrove, Dinnan, and Gonzalez exited the scout car to make contact with the Charger's occupants. Colegrove headed straight to the driver's door, and Dinnan went to the passenger's door; Gonzalez, meanwhile, walked between the two behind the car as the interaction unfolded.

Colegrove testified that, on making contact with Turk, he advised Turk about the reason for the stop and asked about his lack of a license plate. Gonzalez's bodycam captures some of the interaction, including Turk responding, “I just got a ticket for this the other day, bro, sorry ․ I'll try to get it taken care of as soon as possible.” Gov't Ex. B, 00:42-00:46. Colegrove testified that Turk seemed nervous: his hands were shaking, he could not hold eye contact, and he attempted to smoke a marijuana blunt while inside the vehicle.

When Turk was unable to provide his driver's license or registration, Colegrove asked him to step out of the car. Colegrove testified that the lack of plates in a high crime area late at night, plus the fact that he knew from experience that Chargers were frequently stolen in Detroit, caused him to suspect that the Charger was stolen. Gonzalez's bodycam captures Colegrove saying, “You live here? You got any weapons in the car? Nothing like that? OK, well, hop out real quick, bro.” Id. at 01:37-01:41. Turk initially refuses; his responses are inaudible on the bodycam recording, but Colegrove testified that Turk stated he want to go into the house to use the bathroom. Colegrove can be heard saying:

You don't have a plate on the vehicle ․ until I can confirm the vehicle is not stolen ․ No, that's not how this works. You gotta hop out, you don't got a valid license on you ․ that's not how that works, so you don't got it on you, you don't have insurance, you've got no plate on the car, I don't know if the car is stolen, until I can confirm all those things, you gotta hop out of the vehicle. That's how that works ․ I hate to say, it's difficult, but that's what's gotta happen right now ․ Hop out real quick, bro, we'll get you outta here real quick, bro. You're prolonging it right now by not hopping out.

Gov't Ex. B, 01:43-02:24.

After this exchange, Turk complies with the order to step out of the vehicle. Id. at 02:26. Colegrove testified, and Gonzalez's bodycam footage seems to confirm, that Turk dropped both of his arms down as he got out of the car as if to cover his ribcage. Colegrove testified that he found this behavior suspicious because it seemed to him that Turk was trying to conceal something on his body. Bodycam footage captures Colegrove order Turk to put his arms on the roof of the Charger, ask “Anything on you? Any weapons?,” and begin to pat Turk down. Id. at 02:32-02:42.

As the search progresses, Colegrove asks, “What's this?” Id. at 02:39. Colegrove testified during the hearing that he asked the question because he felt something consistent with a firearm on Turk's person. Gonzalez's bodycam footage then shows Turk being placed in handcuffs. As the search progresses, Turk admits he has two holsters, and Colegrove asks, “You got two guns? Why you got two guns for?” Id. at 02:52-02:59. Turk begins muttering that he “got set up right there down the street” and “just got out of the hospital” for “brain surgery.” Colegrove and Gonzalez then discover a third firearm on Turk's person and ask, “Let me guess, you don't have a CPL?” Turk responds “unfortunately no” and mumbles something about “probation” and a “bounty” on his head.

In total, officers seized three handguns from Turk's person: (1) a CZ P-10C loaded with a black magazine containing 14 live 9mm rounds; (2) a Colt Commander loaded with a black magazine containing 10 live .45 caliber rounds and a loose .45 caliber round that was chambered; and (3) a Canik TP9SF loaded with a black magazine containing 18 live 9mm rounds. A federal grand jury later returned an indictment charging Turk with one count of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Turk now seeks dismissal of the charge as a violation of his rights under the Second Amendment. ECF No. 18. He also seeks orders declaring that the government may not use the evidence seized and the statements he made during the stop. ECF Nos. 15 & 17.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 18)

The Court will begin by addressing Turk's challenge under the Second Amendment.

Turk argues that the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), mandates dismissal of the charge against him because the analytical framework it announces renders the felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. He argues that the statute is unconstitutional both facially and as applied to him.

A. Legal Standard

A defendant may seek dismissal of a defective indictment in a pre-trial motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B).

B. Discussion

The Second Amendment provides that, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to bear arms, shall not be infringed.” For the first two centuries following its passage, there was little debate over its interpretation. Broadly, it was understood to concern the maintenance and preservation of a military for the common defense of the people. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178-79 (1939) (concluding that the Second Amendment did not protect the right of an individual to possess a “shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length” because there was no evidence that such a weapon “could contribute to the common defense”).

But in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Supreme Court for the first time interpreted the Amendment to find in it an “inherent” right of every law-abiding American citizen to bear arms in defense of self. Justice Scalia's majority opinion held that a complete prohibition on handguns enacted in the District of Columbia “fail[ed] constitutional muster” because it violated “the inherent right of self-defense [that] has been central to the Second Amendment right”—in particular, because in the home, “the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.” Id. at 628-29.

Of course, Heller had some holes. It did not articulate a framework for courts to apply in considering challenges to the constitutionality of regulations implicating the Second Amendment. In announcing the existence of the previously unknown but apparently “inherent” right of law-abiding citizens to possess firearms in defense of self and property, however, the Court cautioned that, “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Id. at 626. Justice Scalia expressly noted that nothing in the opinion “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons”—which, he explained in a footnote, were “presumptively lawful.” Id. at 626-27 & n.26. In a later decision invalidating a municipal gun ordinance in Chicago, the Court again “repeat[ed] ․ assurances” that laws prohibiting felons from possessing firearms remain presumptively valid. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010).

In the aftermath of Heller, federal Courts of Appeals attempted to fill the analytical holes left by Heller by adopting a “two-step” framework to evaluate challenges to regulations and restrictions on the possession of firearms. At the first step, the government would argue that the challenged regulation applied to activity falling outside the scope of the Second Amendment right as it was originally understood. If the government was successful in this argument, the analysis stopped there. If the challenge proceeded to the second step, courts would consider how close the means adopted by the regulation came to the core of the Second Amendment right and how severely its ends burdened that right. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 18-19 (collecting cases).

In Bruen, the Supreme Court announced that this two-step framework was inconsistent with Heller. Justice Thomas, who wrote the majority opinion, held that the second step was “one step too many.” Id. at 19. According to Justice Thomas, Heller did not support applying the “means-end” security courts were applying at step two. Id. He revised the two-step test to be applied as follows: first, a court must evaluate whether the government can rebut the presumption that the Second Amendment protects the challenged gun-possession conduct; second, the court must evaluate whether the government can justify the challenged regulation by demonstrating that it is “consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 24.

Turk's Bruen challenge is one that has by now become familiar. He argues that felons like himself are part of the “People” protected by the Constitution, so their conduct in possessing firearms falls within the scope of the Second Amendment. From there, he asserts that the government will not be able to meet its burden under Bruen to show that § 922(g)(1) has an adequate historical analog. ECF No. 18, PageID.70-75.

As Turk acknowledged during oral argument, this District has been nearly unanimous in rejecting challenges to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). The one exception is United States v. Williams, No. 23-20201, ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, 2024 WL 731932 (E.D. Feb. 22, 2024), an opinion by the Honorable Judith E. Levy declaring § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to a particular defendant. Apart from this, courts in the District have reasoned that, despite unsettling the analytical framework of several Courts of Appeals, nothing in Bruen purported to overrule Heller or disturbed Justice Scalia's observations in the majority opinion that regulations prohibiting felons from possessing firearms are presumptively lawful. They have further reasoned that courts in this circuit are bound by the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010), which upholds the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) without applying the sort of means-end scrutiny condemned by Justice Thomas in Bruen.

Indeed, this Court itself has thrice rejected Bruen challenges in reasoned opinions. See United States v. Nelson, 680 F. Supp. 3d 827 (E.D. Mich. 2023); United States v. McNeil, No. 23-20229, 2023 WL 6627972 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 11, 2023), United States v. Ellison, ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, 2024 WL 3278937 (E.D. Mich. July 2, 2024). Most recently, in Ellison, this Court concluded that—although Judge Levy reasoned in Williams that Bruen-related challenges could not be resolved under the existing Sixth Circuit guidance in Carey because Carey pre-dated Bruen—it remained bound by Carey. And Carey relied on Justice Scalia's admonition in Heller that “nothing in [the] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” in upholding the constitutionality of the federal felon-in-possession statute. 602 F.3d at 741. The Court recognized that other panels of the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that this admonition in Heller was dicta. But those courts applied that dicta in addressing similar challenges in Heller’s aftermath. See, e.g., United States v. Khami, 362 F. App'x 501, 507-08 (6th Cir. 2010). And especially since the Supreme Court recently repeated this dicta in upholding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(8) in United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 1902 (2024), this Court saw no reason to disregard Heller’s admonition that prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons are presumptively lawful.

Turk offers no persuasive reason for this Court to deviate from its prior reasoning concerning the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). He acknowledges that facial challenges are disfavored. ECF No. 18, PageID.69. See Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1898 (recognizing that facial challenges are “the most difficult challenge to mount successfully” (quotations omitted)). But, he urges, even if § 922(g)(1) is not facially unconstitutional, it is unconstitutional as applied to him. ECF No. 18, PageID.75-76. He argues that the felony that formed the predicate for the § 922(g)(1) charge he now faces, carrying a concealed weapon in violation of MCL § 750.227, did not concern violent conduct like murder, rape, kidnapping, or burglary. Id. According to Turk, his prior conviction simply is not the kind of conviction that would find historical support for the complete and perpetual disarmament provided for in § 922(g)(1). Id.

Until and unless the Sixth Circuit or the Supreme Court should instruct otherwise, this Court declines to undertake a felony-by-felony analysis regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). Turk is correct that the modern understanding of what kind of conduct warrants “felon” status has grown considerably more expansive since the Founding Era. And the Sixth Circuit has previously acknowledged the possibility that a ban on weapons could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 837 F.3d 678, 686 (6th Cir. 2016). But Heller made clear that it was concerned with only the rights of “law-abiding citizens.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. Under current Sixth Circuit precedent, as a felon, Turk is not a part of this group—this is so whether his felony conviction concerns conduct that is violent or not. The Supreme Court has advised that the law is not “trapped in amber,” Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1897, and other courts have recognized that the right to bear arms may be nonexistent not just for violent felons but for any person who has committed a serious offense. See, e.g., United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 979 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he core right of the Second Amendment protects law-abiding members of the political community.”); United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684-85 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[M]ost scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the government could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’ ”)

The Supreme Court has yet to squarely address the question of whether and how § 922(g)(1)’s ban on felons possessing firearms is consistent with the Second Amendment under Bruen’s framework. Until it does so, this Court is bound by existing Sixth Circuit precedent. Accordingly, Turk's motion to dismiss must be DENIED.

III. MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE (ECF No. 15)

Turk next seeks an order suppressing the firearms and ammunition seized from his person as fruits of an illegal stop. ECF No. 15, PageID.43.

A. Legal Standard

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ․ and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Stopping a motorist is considered to be a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, even if “the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Generally, an officer may stop and detain a motorist so long as the officer has probable cause to believe that the motorist has violated a traffic law. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).

A stop that starts out as reasonable may become unreasonable in “its manner of execution.” United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 488 (6th Cir. 2010). To remain reasonable, a traffic stop should last only as long as it takes “to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Id. (quotations omitted). If officers wish to extend a stop, they need “reasonable suspicion that the individual has engaged in more extensive criminal conduct.” United States v. Bell, 555 F.3d 535, 539 (6th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). “Reasonable suspicion requires specific and articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the continued detention of a motorist after a traffic stop.” United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 588 (6th Cir. 2001). It requires “more than an ill-defined hunch” and “must be based upon a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person ․ of criminal activity.” Id. (quotations omitted). The legality of the seizure turns on the officer's objective justifications, not his subjective motivations. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.

B. Discussion

Turk argues that officers lacked probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion, to detain him. ECF No. 15, PageID.46. He challenges the reasonableness of the decision to initiate a traffic stop, urging that Colegrove's account that he failed to signal before turning and lacked a visible license plate is not corroborated by available video evidence. Id. at PageID.46-47. He also attacks the scope and duration of the stop, contending that it was unreasonably prolonged because he did not attempt to resist, flee, or take any other action that would justify Colegrove's decision to ask him to step out of the vehicle, frisk, and handcuff him. Id. at PageID.47-48. In light of the evidence before the Court, neither challenge has merit.

First, officer testimony and available video footage establish that the traffic stop had, not one, but two independent justifications.

Colegrove testified that he personally observed Turk fail to signal before making a righthand turn off Puritan onto Coyle. As the government points out, MCL § 257.648 requires Michigan drivers to give a signal prior to turning; violating it is a civil infraction under Michigan law that provides probable cause for a traffic stop. See generally People v. Hrlic, 744 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (interpreting MCL § 257.648). Of course, Turk is correct that available dashcam footage does not actually show his failure to signal. But according to Colegrove's testimony, the dashcam footage did not begin recording until 15 seconds after he turned on the scout car's overhead lights—an action he took only after he observed Turk commit the infraction of failing to signal. (Indeed, the footage begins with Turk's Charger is already mid-way through its turn, so neither the front of the car nor the back of car is clearly visible.) The available footage does not contradict Colegrove's account, and the Court sees no other reason to discredit his testimony.

And after Colegrove decided to make the stop, but before he pulled into the driveway behind the Charger, he observed a second infraction: a violation of MCL § 257.225, which requires Michigan drivers to have license plates on their vehicles. Colegrove testified that, after he caught up with the Charger on Coyle and before he turned to park behind it, he saw that the car did not have a rear license plate. Available dashcam footage clearly shows that the vehicle lacks a rear license plate after Colegrove parks behind it. Of course, had Colegrove simply seen a parked vehicle that was never in motion in a driveway, the situation would be different. But that was not the case: just seconds before he parked behind it Colegrove had observed the vehicle driving down the road.

Second, available video footage and testimony establish that officers did not unreasonably extend the duration of the stop because they developed reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity during the stop. The sequence of events is critical to this analysis.

Colegrove testified, and Gonzalez's bodycam footage confirms, that when he initially made contact with Turk he simply told Turk of the reason for the stop, asked about the license plate, and requested Turk's driver's license and registration. He asked no extraneous questions. But at this point Turk became nervous, mumbled about being previously stopped for the lack of a license plate, tried to smoke a blunt, and could not provide a satisfactory reason for not being able to provide a driver's license and registration paperwork. The Court concludes that, by the time Colegrove asked Turk to step out of the vehicle, several factors had combined to create reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot:

• It was late at night, and officers were patrolling in what they knew from experience to be a high crime area;

• The vehicle at issue was a Dodge Charger, which officers knew from experience to be a model of vehicle that was frequently stolen;

• The vehicle lacked license plates and Turk was unable to provide insurance paperwork or a valid driver's license, which officers knew from experience often indicated that an individual was driving a stolen vehicle;

• Turk became exceedingly nervous—such that his hands were shaking, he could not maintain eye contact, and he tried to smoke a blunt—on being contacted by officers.

In short, these factors combined to give Colegrove an objectively reasonable basis to suspect that—though he stopped the vehicle for traffic infractions—the vehicle might actually be stolen. This suspicion allowed him to temporarily detain the occupants for the time necessary to investigate Turk's mumbled account that it was not. United States v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 371 (6th Cir. 2008) (concluding that officer was justified in temporarily detaining vehicle and occupants to investigate whether car was stolen when license tags were reportedly “not on file” and driver could not provide identification). In any event, Colegrove was authorized under the Fourth Amendment to ask Turk to step out of the vehicle in the course of an otherwise lawful traffic stop, since the Fourth Amendment permits officers to conduct an otherwise legitimate stop on their own terms. United States v. Street, 614 F.3d 228, 232 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997), and Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)).

Of course, a lawful investigatory stop “does not necessarily carry with it the authority to conduct a pat-down search.” Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 822 (6th Cir. 2005). Officer safety is one of a few justifications for a pat-down search during a temporary investigative detention. Campbell, 549 F.3d at 372. But, here too, Colegrove's actions in deciding to frisk Turk for weapons were justified. Colegrove testified that, when Turk stepped out of the Charger, he dropped his arms in a manner suggestive of concealing something—possibly a weapon—in his chest area. The Court concludes that, when combined with the nature of the crime under investigation (i.e., car theft) and everything else Colegrove had just seen (the lack of plates, the high crime setting, the late hour, Turk's lack of identification or registration paperwork, and Turk's attempt to smoke a blunt), this observation was sufficient to cause a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances to believe his safety or that of others was at risk. Id. at 373.

And as the pat-down search progressed, what began as a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity eventually ripened into probable cause for an arrest. Immediately on commencing the pat-down search, Colegrove detected an object that through its plain feel felt like a firearm. When he asked Turk what that object was, Turk volunteered that he had two guns—and officers found a third as they continued their search. Turk raises no arguments that the pat-down search was executed in an unreasonable manner, and if he did, the record here would not support them. Footage from Gonzalez's bodycam refutes any argument that officers were “rummaging” unacceptably through Turk's pockets. See generally Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (articulating parameters of “plain feel” doctrine).

In Michigan, the law prohibits carrying a concealed pistol on one's person without a license. MCL § 750.227(2). Carrying a concealed pistol is a prima facie violation of the law, subject to a defendant's right to defend by producing evidence of a license. United States v. Williams, 483 F. App'x 21, 27 (6th Cir. 2012); see also MCL § 776.20 (stating that in any prosecution for violating a Michigan law that relates to the possession of firearms, “the burden of establishing any exception” is on the defendant but “this does not shift the [prosecution's] burden of proof for the violation”). Carrying a concealed weapon in Michigan is presumptively illegal and once officers detected the firearms and Turk could not produce a gun license, officers had probable cause to arrest him. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, No. 21-20390, 2022 WL 1194058, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2022) (Lawson, J.) (concluding same).

Accordingly, Turk's motion to suppress physical evidence is DENIED.

IV. MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS (ECF No. 17)

Finally, Turk seeks an order suppressing all the statements and admissions he made after officers made initial contact with him.

In its brief, the government advises that, in communications with Turk's counsel, it has agreed not to use any of the statements Turk made after the 02:45 minute mark on the footage from Gonzalez's bodycam (the point in time when officers find the first handgun and place Turk in handcuffs). ECF No. 21, PageID.109-10. The government further represents that Turk's counsel agreed to this resolution of the motion, and Turk's counsel confirmed as much at the June 7, 2024 hearing.

Pursuant to the parties’ stipulations, Turk's motion to suppress his statements is GRANTED IN PART. The government may not use any of Turk's statements made after the 02:45 mark on Officer Gonzalez's bodycam footage affirmatively in its case-in-chief, though it may use those statements for impeachment purposes.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Turk's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18) is DENIED. His motion to suppress physical evidence (ECF No. 15) is also DENIED. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulations, Turk's motion to suppress statements (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED IN PART. It is ORDERED that the government may not use any statement made by Turk after the 2:45 mark on Officer Gonzalez's bodycam footage affirmatively in its case-in-chief, though it may use those statements for impeachment purposes.

SO ORDERED this 13th day of August, 2024.

TERRENCE G. BERG, United States District Judge