ARMSTRONG v. UNKNOWN (2024)

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION AND FAILURE TO CORRECT FILING DEFICIENCIES

Carl J. Armstrong, representing himself from his cell in Wayne County Jail, brings numerous claims related to his ongoing criminal proceedings. Initially, this case was filed in the Western District of Michigan but found its way here on June 13, 2024. Nonetheless, Armstrong's claims lack jurisdiction. Plus, he hasn't paid the filing fee or properly asked for an exemption. These failures warrant dismissal.

I. BACKGROUND

According to Armstrong's complaint, he was arrested on October 27, 2023, in Detroit, without a warrant or probable cause. ECF No. 1 at PageID.1. He is confined at the Wayne County Jail awaiting trial. Id. He accuses Presiding Judge Wanda A. Evans of judicial misconduct, including issuing a warrant prematurely, revoking his bond, and setting an excessive bond amount. Id. at PageID.2–3. He wants his bond reinstated and an investigation into Judge Evans's actions. Id. at PageID.3–4.

On June 14, 2024, this Court ordered Armstrong to fix several issues in his complaint: (1) identify specific legal violations, (2) name the defendants he is suing, and (3) address the lack of payment of the filing fee. ECF No. 5. Armstrong responded on July 8, 2024, with an unsworn affidavit that falls short. ECF No. 6. A few days later he filed another response explaining that he is pursuing numerous federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Michigan law, raising numerous grievances relating to his pretrial detention and court proceedings. ECF No. 7.

II. JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and may only hear cases authorized by the Constitution and federal statutes. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Armstrong's potential avenues for jurisdiction here are federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

A. Federal-Question Jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331)

Federal-question jurisdiction requires a violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Armstrong's federal claims proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

However, all of Armstrong's federal claims are barred by Younger abstention. Federal courts must abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal claims that involve or question ongoing state criminal proceedings. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Armstrong's § 1983 claims challenge official conduct taken in or relating to his pending state criminal proceedings, including his arrest, bond revocation, bench warrant, underlying gun charge, and judicial proceedings. These issues are squarely within the scope of ongoing state criminal proceedings, implicating Younger.

In addition, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), extends Younger to requests for declaratory relief. Armstrong seeks relief that would effectively interfere with state-court processes by challenging the legality of his detention and the judicial conduct of Judge Evans. Under Samuels, this Court must abstain from granting such relief because it would disrupt ongoing state criminal proceedings.

That leaves Armstrong's state-law claims, which must satisfy the requirements for diversity jurisdiction.

B. Diversity Jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332)

Diversity jurisdiction requires “that no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant” and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. V & M Star, LP v. Centimark Corp., 596 F.3d 354, 355 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005)); Castanon v. UPS, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 3d 846, 855 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). Armstrong fails both requirements.

Armstrong and the identified defendants all seem to hail from Michigan, flunking the diversity test. See generally ECF No. 7. Plus, Armstrong hasn't pled an amount in controversy that meets the threshold. Id.

Accordingly, the complaint will be dismissed as frivolous for lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 1915A(b)(1); Clark v. United States, 74 F. App'x 561, 562 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999)); Groulx v. Zawadski, 635 F. Supp. 3d 574, 576 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (“Frivolity includes lack of jurisdiction, and [thus] lack of standing.”).

III. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE

Even if this Court had jurisdiction, Armstrong's complaint would be dismissed “sua sponte for failure to prosecute” under Civil Rule 41(b). United States v. Wallace, 592 F. Supp. 3d 612, 614 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–32 (1962)).

Despite being directed to do so, Armstrong has not prepaid the $402 filing fee or provided the documents needed to waive it. See Boussum v. Washington, 649 F. Supp. 3d 525, 528–29 (E.D. Mich.), recons. denied, 655 F. Supp. 3d 636 (E.D. Mich. 2023). Although he states that “he cannot pay the fees and costs of filling (sic),” Armstrong failed to complete the requisite Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, nor did he provide the information required in that form through any other means. See generally ECF Nos. 6–7. He also failed to request more time to do so.

This Court warned Armstrong that failure to respond adequately would result in dismissal. He failed to provide a satisfactory response, and further delays will likely to be futile. Thus, his complaint also gets dismissed for failure to prepay or to request an exemption from prepaying. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1).

IV. POSTDISMISSAL IMPLICATIONS

This case “is not to be reinstated to the district court's active docket”—even if Armstrong pays the filing fees. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1997) (applying to cases dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007); Boussum v. Washington, 655 F. Supp. 3d 636, 642 (E.D. Mich. 2023) (applying McGore to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)); Redd v. Redmon, 215 F.3d 1327 (6th Cir. 2000) (same to § 1915(e)(2)(A)); Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486, 489 (6th Cir. 2002) (same to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A), abrogated on other grounds by Jones, 549 U.S. 199. Finally, Armstrong may not appeal in forma pauperis, because an appeal from the dismissal order would be frivolous and not taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Carl Armstrong's Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction, failure to prepay, and failure to file the documents necessary to request leave to proceed without prepaying. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1), (e)(2)(B)(i), (e)(2)(B)(ii); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Further, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Carl Armstrong's Complaint, ECF No. 1, is PROHIBITED from being reinstated to the district court's active docket—even if he pays the filing fees.

Further, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Carl Armstrong is DENIED leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

SUSAN K. DeCLERCQ, United States District Judge