GORSKI v. ASCENSION ST JOHN HOSPITAL (2024)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 16)

On December 9, 2022, plaintiff Theresa Gorski filed a complaint alleging three violations of her civil rights under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and one violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”), Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2101 et seq. In sum, she says, Ascension unlawfully discriminated against her religion, first by refusing to grant her a religious exemption from a Covid-19 vaccine mandate and then by terminating her employment for not getting a vaccine.

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 16), which has been fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 21, 24.) The Court finds that a hearing is not necessary. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Gorski began working at Ascension St. John as a nurse tech in May 2019; after she graduated from nursing school, she was promoted to registered nurse in August 2020. (ECF No. 9, PageID.77.)

In July 2021, Ascension Health, which operates a network of facilities across the country, announced a COVID-19 vaccine mandate for all employees, regardless of “whether or not they provide direct patient care, and whether they work in our sites of care or remotely.” (Id. at PageID.88 (emphasis omitted).) Ascension employees had “until October 1, 2021, to submit their religious and/or medical exemption requests.” (Id. at PageID.89.) Noncompliant employees would “be suspended pending further investigation” and would then “be deemed [to have submitted a] voluntary resignation.” (Id. (emphases omitted).)

Gorski, adhering to her “sincerely held religious beliefs,” requested a religious exemption from Ascension's vaccine mandate in late September 2021. (Id. at PageID.89–90.) Her conscience, she said, underpins her Catholic belief that getting the COVID-19 vaccine would be a sin against God. (Id. at PageID.87.) She allegedly explained this belief to Ascension “in depth.” (Id. at PageID.88.)

Ascension denied Gorski's request (id.), and she had to choose between her faith and livelihood. (Id. at PageID.86.) When Gorski did not get the vaccine, Ascension suspended her without pay on November 12, 2021, and her employment later terminated upon a “voluntary resignation.” (Id. at PageID.91–92.) This adverse action, she alleges, violated her civil rights by discriminating against her religious beliefs, harming her emotionally and financially. (Id. at PageID.92.)

On September 7, 2022, Gorski filed a discrimination charge against Ascension with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). (Id. at PageID.84–85.) Six days later, the EEOC gave Gorski a Notice of Right to Sue.¹ (Id. at PageID.85.)

On December 9, 2022, Gorski brought this lawsuit. The defendants are all entities within Ascension's national network: Ascension St. John Hospital, Ascension Michigan, Ascension Health, and Ascension Health Alliance, along with unidentified John and Jane Does, ABC Corporations, and XYZ Partnerships. (Id. at PageID.77–83.) Gorski accuses this conglomerate of establishing a vaccine mandate without proper exemption procedures and enforcing the policy in a coercive and discriminatory way. (Id. at PageID.85.)

The crux of Gorski's complaint is that Ascension's exemption process effectively forced employees to compromise their religious beliefs under the threat of employment termination, in violation of Title VII and ELCRA. (Id. at PageID.92–117.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Civil Rule 12(b)(6), a pleading fails to state a claim if its allegations do not support recovery under any recognizable legal theory. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts the complaint's factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff need not provide “detailed factual allegations” but must provide “more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”).

Although the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” the court need not accept legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (quotations and citation omitted). The complaint is facially plausible if it “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678; see also 16630 Southfield Ltd. v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant's conduct.”). If not, then the court must grant the motion to dismiss. Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc., 553 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009).

Courts usually consider only the allegations in the complaint. Rondigo, LLC v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 680 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). But courts may also rely on “exhibits attached to the complaint, public records, items appearing in the record of the case[,] and exhibits attached to defendant's motion to dismiss”—but only if the complaint relies on them—without having to convert to motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 680–81 (citing Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008)).

III. ANALYSIS OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Ascension argues that Gorski's complaint should be dismissed because she has not sufficiently alleged (1) religious discrimination, (2) a failure to accommodate her beliefs, or (3) retaliation. (ECF No. 16.)

Although each argument will be addressed in turn, Ascension does not contest every element of Gorski's claims, so only its specific arguments will be addressed. Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the “movant” of a motion to dismiss has the “burden” of demonstrating the plaintiff's “failure to state a claim” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6))); see United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) (“In our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party presentation.”); cf. Thomas v. Lambert, 600 F. Supp. 3d 793, 803 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (addressing “Plaintiffs’ claims only to the extent that Defendant ․ contested them”); Martin v. Saginaw Cnty. Rd. Comm'n, 606 F. Supp. 3d 639, 650 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (same).

A. Religious Discrimination (Direct and/or Indirect)

Title VII stands as a bulwark against pernicious twins of discrimination: disparate treatment, where adverse employment actions are taken based in whole or in part on religion, and disparate impact, where seemingly neutral employment practices disproportionately affect members of a certain religion.² Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (m). This statutory framework commands that no one shall suffer adverse consequences based on their religion, thus guarding against obvious prejudice and policies that, though seemingly neutral, perpetuate inequality covertly.

Ascension categorizes Gorski's discrimination claims as disparate-treatment claims rooted in circumstantial evidence. Disparate-treatment claims require plaintiffs to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, intentional discrimination based on their religion. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009). They may satisfy this burden with direct evidence, White v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 429 F.3d 232, 238 (6th Cir. 2005), or circumstantial evidence. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 391 n.5 (6th Cir. 2008). Circumstantial evidence is reviewed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, Columbus Metro., 429 F.3d at 238 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)), requiring Gorski to establish the prima facie case that she:

(1) was a member of a protected class;

(2) experienced an adverse employment action;

(3) was qualified for the position; and

(4) was treated differently than similarly situated employees outside her protected class.

Tepper v. Potter, 505 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 572 (6th Cir. 2000)); see also Mitchell v. Vanderbilt Univ., 389 F.3d 177, 181 (6th Cir. 2004). This same legal standard applies to Gorski's ELCRA claim. Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, 689 F.3d 642, 653 (6th Cir. 2012).

Ascension believes that Gorski's disparate-treatment claims should be dismissed because she “does not claim that she was treated differently than [similarly situated] non-Catholics who did not receive the vaccine.” (ECF No. 16, PageID.167–168.) In this way, as Gorski notes, Ascension is “focus[ing] on the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.” (ECF No. 21, PageID.362 (citing ECF No. 16, PageID.167).)

The Court finds that Ascension's argument lacks merit. Gorski has pleaded two prima facie cases of disparate treatment: that Ascension handled religious-exemption requests differently than “secular” ones, (ECF No. 9, PageID.93), and Ascension treated exemptions of Catholics and non-Catholics differently. (See id. at PageID.94.) Gorski's allegations that she was treated differently than “similarly situated employees outside [her] protected class” satisfy the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F.3d 806, 8113 (6th Cir. 2011); accord Tepper, 505 F.3d at 517. Accordingly, Gorski has sufficiently alleged disparate treatment based on her religion, implicating both an unfavorable treatment compared to those seeking exemptions for secular reasons and a nuanced argument suggesting differential treatment among various religious beliefs.

Even so, as the Sixth Circuit clarified days ago, plaintiffs “do[ ] not have to allege specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in their complaint.” Savel v. MetroHealth Sys., No. 23-3672, 2024 WL 1190973, at *7 (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2024). Since Gorski “alleged that [Ascension] categorically denied all religious exemption requests while granting some nonreligious exemption requests—that is, that [Ascension] treated [her] differently with respect to a condition of employment because of [her] religion,” her disparate-treatment claims will proceed. Id. at *8. Accordingly, Counts I (Title VII) and IV (ELCRA) survive dismissal.

B. Religious Discrimination (Failure to Accommodate)

Ascension sets forth two arguments against Gorski's failure-to-accommodate claim. This type of claim “is straightforward: An employer may not make an applicant's religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions.” EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 773 (2015). To prove it, Gorski must demonstrate that she:

(1) holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement,

(2) informed Ascension about the conflict, and

(3) was discharged or disciplined for failing to comply with the requirement.

Stanley v. ExpressJet Airlines, Inc., 808 F. App'x 351, 355–56 (6th Cir. 2020). If she does so, then the burden shifts to Ascension “to show that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship.” Tepper, 505 F.3d at 514 (quoting Virts v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 285 F.3d 508, 516 (6th Cir. 2002)).

1. Sincerely Held Religious Belief

Ascension asserts that Gorski has not alleged a religious belief. (ECF No. 16, PageID.168–170.) The Court finds that this argument lacks merit.

At this stage, Gorski only needs to allege a sincerely held religious belief; she needs neither to identify nor to explain it. See e.g., Savel v. MetroHealth Sys., No. 23-3672, 2024 WL 1190973, at *7 (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2024). Indeed, “once plaintiffs allege that certain conduct violates their sincerely held religious beliefs as they understand them, it is not within the court's purview to question the reasonableness of those allegations” or “to say that plaintiffs’ religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.” Fox v. Washington, 949 F.3d 270, 277 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up) (citations omitted).

Gorski not only alleged a “sincerely held religious belief that is contrary to receiving the Covid-19 vaccine,” she also explained that it is a “Catholic Church teaching that a person must obey the judgment of his or her own informed and certain conscience when it comes to all life decisions, including medical interventions.” (ECF No. 9, PageID.87.)

2. Undue Hardship

Ascension argues that granting her request would have resulted in an undue hardship(ECF No. 16, PageID.170–176), but that “fact-specific inquiry” is a legal “defense.” Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 468 (2023) (per curiam); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(b), (c)(1). Therefore, it is an improper basis for dismissal at the pleading stage—but proper for summary judgment or trial. See id. at 456.

Moreover, this is not a case in which “the undisputed facts conclusively establish an affirmative defense as a matter of law.” Est. of Barney v. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 714 F.3d 920, 926 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 613 (6th Cir. 2009)). On the contrary, Gorski alleges that Ascension granted some exemption requests for similarly situated coworkers, including some religious exemptions, supporting the reasonable inference that Ascension did not need to deny her request at all. (See ECF No. 9, PageID.94.) For these reasons, Count II survives dismissal.

C. Religious Discrimination (Retaliation)

Finally, Ascension seeks dismissal of Gorski's retaliation claim, explaining that Gorski's employment was suspended and then terminated because she did not comply with Ascension's vaccination policies—not because of her protected activity of seeking a religious accommodation. (ECF No. 16, PageID.178–179.)

To plead a prima facie case of retaliation, Gorski must plausibly allege that:

(1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII,

(2) the exercise of her civil rights was known to defendant,

(3) Ascension took an employment action adverse to her, and

(4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000).

The Court declines to dismiss Gorski's retaliation claim. Just as “[t]here is no way for an applicant to decide whether to check the homosexual or transgender box without considering sex,” Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 668 (2020), “there is no way an employer can discriminate against those who check the homosexual or transgender box without discriminating in part because of an applicant's sex.” Id. at 669.

The same reasoning applies here: Gorski could not decide to request a religious exemption without considering her religious beliefs, and Ascension could not evaluate Gorski's refusal to comply with its vaccination policy without accounting for the religious beliefs that prompted her refusal to do so. Gorski's refusal is inextricably intertwined with her religious belief, thus Ascension's attempt to segregate Gorski's accommodation request from the decision to terminate her employment fails. Gorski's retaliation claim must be viewed through the lens that her request for a religious accommodation and Ascension's later employment actions are connected, such that Gorski's retaliation claim, Count III, survives dismissal.

Having found that none of Gorski's claims should be dismissed, the Court DENIES Ascension's motion to dismiss.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “If an investigator finds no violation of law, a Notice of Right to Sue is issued to the employee who then may bring a lawsuit in federal court.” Margaret B. Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, 127 Yale L.J. 2204, 2238 (2018) (citing Filing a Charge of Discrimination, Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, http://perma.cc/W2US-PP8M)

2.   Alternatively, plaintiffs may allege a mixed motive theory by demonstrating that their religion “was a motivating factor for the defendant's adverse employment action.” Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 595 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original); see also Baxter Healthcare, 533 F.3d at 400 (“[T]he McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework does not apply to our summary judgment analysis of Title VII mixed-motive claims.”). Evidence establishing a mixed motive may be circumstantial. See Griffin, 689 F.3d at 595.

JONATHAN J.C. GREY, United States District Judge