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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff, v. DONISHA BUTLER, Defendant.
ORDER
Donisha Butler seeks the expungement of her arrest record in this case. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS Ms. Butler's motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 19, 2025, at around 8:20 p.m., Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officers and federal agents were patrolling the 3400 block of Stanton Road, S.E., Washington, D.C. See Complaint 2, ECF No. 1. During the patrol, law enforcement encountered a crowd. See id. Officers ultimately stopped one individual. See id. Officers gave several verbal commands to the crowd to back up while officers conducted this stop. See id. The government proffers co-defendant Terrance Wilson intentionally struck an officer with his elbow during this process. See id. After a short pursuit, law enforcement arrested Mr. Wilson. See id.
Approximately six minutes later, while Mr. Wilson was in custody in a marked MPD cruiser, Donisha Butler moved toward the cruiser “in order to retrieve [Mr. Wilson's] sweatshirt.” Id. The government alleged that an officer “was physically moving [Ms. Butler] back when she struck [him] in the face with her hand, making physical contact with [the] Officer.” Id. Law enforcement then arrested and detained Ms. Butler. See id.
The government's recitation of the facts is not corroborated by the body worn camera footage. From the Court's review of this footage, the officer appears to be the aggressor.
On August 21, 2025, the government filed a complaint charging both Mr. Wilson and Ms. Butler with violating 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain Officers or Employees. See id. at 1. Mr. Wilson and Ms. Butler did not have their initial appearance until the afternoon of the fourth day after their arrest. See Docket, Min. Entries (Aug. 22, 2025). After detaining the Defendants for those four days without any oversight from this court, the government agreed to their release. See id.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 22, 2025, Mr. Wilson and Ms. Butler orally moved to dismiss the charges in this case. See id. On August 29, 2025, the parties appeared before the Court for a status hearing. See Docket, Min. Entries (Aug. 29, 2025). At that time, the Court set a briefing schedule for Defendants’ motions to dismiss. See id. That same day, the government dismissed the felony charges—only a week after bringing them—and then recharged Mr. Wilson and Ms. Butler with misdemeanor violations of the same statute. See Information, ECF No. 11. The parties subsequently consented to proceed before the undersigned for all purposes. See ECF Nos. 13 and 14. Mr. Wilson and Ms. Butler requested a speedy trial and moved again to dismiss the new charges in the case. See ECF Nos. 16 and 17; Min. Entries (Aug. 29, 2025). The Court set a trial date and briefing schedule on the motions to dismiss. See Order, ECF No. 21; Min. Entries (Aug. 29, 2025).
On September 18, 2025, the government moved to dismiss the case a second time. This time, the government recharged “Defendant Wilson in Superior Court” and “decided not to proceed with any prosecution of [Ms.] Butler.” Gov't Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 22. The government moved to dismiss without prejudice. See id.
On September 22, 2025, the Court dismissed Defendants’ cases without prejudice and set a briefing schedule for any motions to expunge and dismiss with prejudice. See Min. Order (Sep. 22, 2025). On September 30, 2025, Mr. Wilson moved to expunge his arrest related to this case. See Def. Wilson's Mot. to Expunge Fed. Arrest Warrant and Compl., ECF No. 24. Ms. Butler joined in that request. See Notice of Joinder of Co-defendant's Mot. to Expunge, ECF No. 25. On October 2, 2025, the government moved to dismiss the case a third time—this time with prejudice. See Gov't Mot. to Dismiss with Prejudice, ECF No. 26. The Court granted this motion. See Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 27.
On October 17, 2025, the government filed its Response to the Defendants’ Motions for Expungement. See Gov't Resp., ECF No. 28. The government opposed Mr. Wilson's Motion for Expungement, see id. at 1, but did not oppose Ms. Butler's Motion for Expungement, see id. at 1 n.1.1
III. LEGAL STANDARD
“It is well established ․ that courts have the inherent, equitable power to expunge arrest records ․ ‘when that remedy is necessary and appropriate in order to preserve basic legal rights.’ ”2 Livingston v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 759 F.2d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1985). “[T]he decision to expunge an arrest record depends on the facts and circumstances of the case,” and “there must be a logical relationship between the injury and the requested remedy.”3 Doe v. Webster (Webster), 606 F.2d 1226, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Courts have granted expungement motions in cases involving “a lack of probabl[e] cause coupled with special circumstances, flagrant violations of the Constitution, or other unusual and extraordinary circumstances.” United States v. Evans, 78 F. Supp. 3d 351, 352 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
Undoubtedly, the government has a legitimate need to maintain records of arrests. See Webster, 606 F.2d at 1243. That said, records of arrests are less meaningful than records of a conviction.4 See United States v. Pinto, 1 F.3d 1069, 1070 (10th Cir. 1993). The government's interest in maintaining arrest records is twofold: “(1) the need to preserve an accurate record of that which has in fact occurred, I.e., [sic] not to ‘rewrite history;’ and (2) the need to retain such a record for investigative and other law enforcement purposes.” Webster, 606 F.2d at 1241. This interest is not unlimited. It “requires a balancing of the equities between the right of privacy of the individual and the right of law enforcement officers to perform their necessary duties.” In re Reid, 569 F. Supp. 2d 220, 222 (D.D.C. 2008).
Courts must apply the balancing test when considering expungement based on “unusual and extraordinary circumstances.” However, the balancing test is inapplicable to the other two categories. This is because arrests lacking probable cause with a special circumstance or ones based on a flagrant violation of the Constitution are unlawful. And there is no value in retaining unlawful arrest records. See United States v. Benlizar, 459 F. Supp. 614, 624–25 (D.D.C. 1978). “[I]llegal government behavior taints the validity of the arrest.” Id. Moreover, the “unlawful maintenance of records of arrest results in ‘injuries and dangers’ that are ‘plain enough,’ ․ and [ ] ‘this threat is not dissipated, or rendered insubstantial or illusory, by the fact that the arrest was not followed by a prosecution.’ ” Menard v. Saxbe (Saxbe), 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citing Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
Precedent regarding the categories courts have employed for expungement is not “consistent, nor does each [decision] provide a fully-articulated rationale.” Webster, 606 F.2d at 1231 n.14. This has led to conflation between the three categories. See, e.g., Saxbe, 498 F.2d at 1023 (stating that courts “have ordered the expungement of records of police action taken in flagrant violation of the Fourth Amendment” and then describing Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and Gomez v. Wilson, 323 F. Supp. 87 (D.D.C. 1971) both of which analyze arrests made without probable cause). To reiterate, the three categories are an arrest where there is: (1) a lack of probable cause coupled with special circumstances; (2) a flagrant violation of the Constitution; or (3) other unusual and extraordinary circumstances. See Evans, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 352.
The first category is an arrest involving a lack of probable cause coupled with special circumstances. See Webster, 606 F.2d at 1230. Probable cause means a “fair probability” and requires that a “practical, commonsense decision” be made. In re Search of One Device & Two Individuals Under Rule 41, 783 F. Supp. 3d 183, 186 (D.D.C. 2025) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). “The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt” where the belief is “particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (internal citation omitted). To determine whether an officer had probable cause to make an arrest, “a court must examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide ‘whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to’ probable cause.” Id. (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)).
No judge has defined “special circumstances.” In fact, some judges have completely ignored it. See Humbles v. District of Columbia, No. 97-cv-1924, 2000 WL 246578, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 18, 2000). In Humbles, Judge Flannery highlighted how the phrase “coupled with special circumstances” “could be read as requiring more than a finding that an arrest is illegal to justify expungement. However, it does not appear that any court [in the D.C. circuit] has ever actually denied expungement in a case involving an illegal arrest.” Id. Courts in other circuits appear to only ask for a lack of probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Lau, No. 94-mj-1681, 2003 WL 22698810, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2003) (discussing a series of cases supporting the proposition that “[e]xpunction is proper when an arrest was conducted without probable cause.”). Regardless, judges in this circuit cannot ignore the “special circumstances” requirement. See United States v. Talley, No. 03-cr-511, 2026 WL 2185157, at *2 (D.D.C. July 29, 2026) (recognizing that the current law in the D.C. Circuit requires, among other factors, “a lack of probable cause coupled with special circumstances.”). The D.C. Circuit mandates it. See Evans, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 352. Instead of ignoring it, the logical conclusion is that this requirement sets a very low bar.
The second category is an arrest involving a flagrant violation of the Constitution. See Evans, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 352. Courts have not defined “flagrant” in this context. However, there is an abundance of case law on violations of the Constitution. And in Webster, the court catalogued past violations that were sufficiently “flagrant” to warrant expungement: “Tatum v. Morton, [562 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1977)] (arrest of attendants at peaceful Quaker prayer vigil outside White House in violation of First Amendment); Sullivan v. Murphy, [478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973)] (mass arrest of ‘May Day’ protesters of U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia in violation of Fourth Amendment); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967) (arrests in violation of Fifteenth Amendment to intimidate black citizens in their attempts to encourage others to vote); Bilick v. Dudley, 356 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (arrest made to harass group because of political beliefs); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (arrests made for purposes of ‘harassing hippies’).” 606 F.2d at 1230 n.10. This catalogue gives a baseline from which courts can jump off.
The third category is an arrest involving unusual and extraordinary circumstances. See Evans, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 352. “The concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ is a ‘nebulous’ one.” United States v. Carias Torres, No. 25-mj-146, 2026 WL 1469447, at *3 (D.D.C. May 22, 2026). Courts have found extraordinary circumstances where “government misconduct is alleged, [ ] the statute on which the arrest was based is subsequently found unconstitutional,” id., or a “[d]efendant has, for example, been denied [ ] security clearance, specific job opportunities, or has otherwise been materially harmed by the presence of criminal records.” United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 584 (D. Md. 2014).5 “Extraordinary circumstances may [also] include politically or racially motivated arrests, misleading law enforcement testimony, [or] incorrect legal advice.” United States v. Woods, 313 F. Supp. 3d 197, 199 (D.D.C. 2018). One thing is certain: “unusual and extraordinary circumstances” does not require a finding that the arrest lacked probable cause. See, e.g., Benlizar, 459 F. Supp. at 624 (“There are many cases illustrating this principle in which arrest records have been expunged notwithstanding a probable cause basis for the arrest when the arrest is for some other reason defective.”).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Lack of Probable Cause Coupled with Special Circumstances
i. Lack of Probable Cause
A person who “forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties” violates this statute. 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). The government arrested and charged Ms. Butler for violating 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). See Complaint at 1.
The circumstances surrounding Ms. Butler's arrest reveal a lack of probable cause. According to body worn camera footage, Ms. Butler was attempting to retrieve a sweater from Mr. Wilson and was engaged in a conversation with officers. Another officer who was not involved in that exchange then appeared to push Ms. Butler, causing her to fall against the sidewalk. Ms. Butler appears to be the victim, not the aggressor. Thus, Ms. Butler did not assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with any officers. See United States v. Duran, No. 94-cr-447, 2025 WL 1094221, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2025) (noting that “[Section 111] first asks whether the defendant committed one of the listed acts.’ ”). As such, from the standpoint of an “objectively reasonable police officer,” there was not probable cause to arrest Ms. Butler because her actions do not constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1). Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371; see Complaint at 2.
“The government's dismissal request is the clearest evidence that the government [has] recognized that [an arrest] was [ ] illegal.” United States v. Riley, 806 F. Supp. 3d 38, 44 (D.D.C. 2025). Here, the government thrice sought to dismiss the charges in federal court, did not charge Ms. Butler in D.C. Superior Court, and consented to expungement. These actions—which are tantamount to admissions—corroborate the Court's finding of no probable cause.
ii. Special Circumstances
Not every arrest warrant will result in an arrest. And not every arrest will result in incarceration. See, e.g., Liam Bowman and Jasmine Golden, Arrested at Reflecting Pool, woman details ‘heartbreaking’ toll case has taken, Wash. Post (Aug. 5, 2026), https://perma.cc/6MQ2-NXCF. But undoubtedly, an arrest with incarceration counts as special circumstances.6 See Urban v. Breier, 401 F. Supp. 706, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1975). This is because even momentary incarceration is traumatic. See Bryan v. Jones, 519 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1975), on reh'g, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1976). It typically involves at least one strip search. See Reese v. Skinner, No. 05-cv-68, 2008 WL 11448027, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2008), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 322 F. App'x 381 (5th Cir. 2009). And “a strip-search, by its very nature, constitutes an extreme intrusion upon personal privacy, as well as an offense to the dignity of the individual.” Johnson v. District of Columbia, 248 F.R.D. 46, 53 (D.D.C. 2008) (internal citation omitted). Moreover, pre-trial detention is particularly harmful. See United States v. Abass, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2025).
Ms. Butler was wrongfully arrested. Worse yet, the government then wrongfully incarcerated her for four days. Those four days at the D.C. Jail caused Ms. Butler significant trauma. While at the D.C. Jail, she was subject to dangerous conditions. See United States v. Akers, No. 11-cr-313, 2025 WL 2611703, at *3 (D.D.C. Sep. 10, 2025) (citing reports on dangerous conditions at the D.C. Jail); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Justice Department Notifies the District of Columbia of Investigation into Whether Conditions in the D.C. Department of Corrections Correctional Facilities Violate the Constitution (October 19, 2026), https://perma.cc/239M-VJ98. Beyond this, Ms. Butler's intake at the jail and transportation to-and-from the jail involved multiple strip searches. Alone, any of these transgressions equal special circumstances. Taken together, they reflect tragic circumstances.
The lack of probable cause for Ms. Butler's arrest coupled with the existence of special circumstances warrants expungement. There is no reason to retain her arrest record. See Urban v. Breier, 401 F. Supp. at 713; see also McKnight, 33 F. Supp 3d at 586–87.
B. Unusual and Extraordinary Circumstances
Separately, this Court also finds that the circumstances surrounding Ms. Butler's arrest are “unusual and extraordinary.” There are three independent bases for so finding.
First, the government consents to expungement here. See Gov't Resp. at 1 n.1. Government consent to expungement is the quintessential extraordinary circumstance. See McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 584–85, 588 (“[T]he Government did not oppose expungement on any grounds.”); United States v. Bohr, 406 F. Supp. 1218, 1219 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (same). The government's consent underscores that there is no need for a record of arrest. See McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 587 (“the prosecutor represents the most knowledgeable source as to the State's interests [in maintaining arrest record]”); c.f. Riley, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 44 (considering government's concessions when deciding expungement). Indeed, “[t]he Court could not find any case where expungement was denied where the state acquiesced in the request.” McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 587. The prosecutor's concession “should be given considerable weight as the prosecutor represents the most knowledgeable source as to the State's interests in any case.” Id. Based on this alone, Ms. Butler has established extraordinary circumstances.
Second, Ms. Butler will undoubtedly be haunted by innumerable collateral consequences of the unlawful arrest for the rest of her life. An arrest causes harmful legal impacts, social stigma, and economic hardship. As to legal impacts, “ ‘[i]t is common knowledge that a [person] with an arrest record is much more apt to be subject to police scrutiny—the first to be questioned and the last eliminated as a suspect to an investigation.’ Existence of a record may burden a decision whether to testify at trial. And records of arrest are used by judges in making decisions as to sentencing, whether to grant bail, or whether to release pending appeal.” Saxbe, 498 F.2d at 1024 (quoting Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157, 159 (Colo. 1972)). As to social stigma, “[e]ven if no direct economic loss is involved, the injury to an individual's reputation may be substantial.” Natwig v. Webster, 562 F. Supp. 225, 229 (D.R.I. 1983) (quoting Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490–91 (D.C. Cir. 1970)) (plaintiff seeking injunction requiring Director of FBI to expunge records relating to his prior arrests). And “[e]conomic losses themselves may be both direct and serious. Opportunities for schooling, employment or professional licenses may be restricted or nonexistent as a consequence of the mere fact of an arrest.” Id. “Employment rejections due to a criminal record not only have detrimental effects on the individuals involved, but have detrimental effects on society. Lack of employment has been correlated to increased recidivism.” McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 586. “It is sufficient to say here that an arrest record alone can create serious adverse consequences for those who have been arrested in the past, notwithstanding the ultimate disposition of the case.” United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977) (Appellant seeking expungement of record after dismissal of indictment). Based on this alone, Ms. Butler has established extraordinary circumstances.
Third, the government arrested Ms. Butler during the federal law enforcement surge in Washington, D.C. It was unusual how problematic this time period was. See United States v. Beidleman, 806 F. Supp. 3d 11, 12 (D.D.C. 2025). In Beidleman, Judge Sooknanan detailed the government's unprecedented abuses seen throughout this court during that time. See id. These abuses led to the government's rampant dismissal of cases. See id. Indeed, during that eight-week period, the government moved to dismiss 21% of all cases that had been charged by criminal complaint. See Riley, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 48. In contrast, the government had dismissed approximately 0.5% of cases charged by criminal complaint over the prior ten years. See id. That is unusual. Those dismissed cases—which includes Ms. Butler's case—typify the concern that the government was “rush[ing] to charge cases before properly investigating them, resulting in individuals being detained for days only to have the Government voluntarily dismiss the charges against them at early hearings.” Id. Arresting and jailing someone requires careful forethought, not belated afterthought with an offer to expunge to paper over the government's mistake. Based on this alone, Ms. Butler has established unusual circumstances.
Having established unusual and/or extraordinary circumstances, the Court next applies the balancing test. See supra Part III. Specifically, the Court examines the harm to Ms. Butler from the existence of her arrest record against the government's need for retaining it. See Benlizar, 459 F. Supp. at 625. Each of the three unusual and extraordinary circumstances surrounding Ms. Butler's arrest individually outweigh any need for law enforcement to retain her arrest record.
First, where the government has agreed to expungement, there is no doubt that the government's interest is subordinate. But the government's agreement is not required for a defendant's interest to prevail in the balancing test. The second and third circumstances here outweigh any “need to preserve an accurate record of that which has in fact occurred” because of how problematic the arrest of Ms. Butler was. Webster, 606 F.2d at 1241; see supra Part III. Indeed, the government should wish “to ‘rewrite history.’ ” Id. Additionally, the “need to retain such a record for investigative and other law enforcement purposes” appears minimal. Id. As to investigative purposes, this was a single one-off incident. The government appears to have covered all aspects of the incident. Any future investigation of the parties involved in this case would have little to do with this incident. As to other law enforcement purposes, the government dismissed its case and then chose not to pursue it again in another venue. That demonstrates how little the value of the prosecution was to law enforcement and how unlikely future prosecution is.
V. CONCLUSION
Expungement is too little, too late to undo the profound harm that the government inflicted on Ms. Butler. What is worse, there is now a playbook for the government to use against those it detests, be they political enemies or ordinary people: arrest, detain, delay presentment for an initial appearance, dismiss the case, and then consent to expunge. There is little the courts can do to stop this. Indeed, the only thing stopping this tragedy from cascading is dedicated line prosecutors who continue to refuse to arrest and charge specious cases and who uphold the values of the Department of Justice even when its leadership does not. The saxophones are getting louder.
FOOTNOTES
1. The Court still cannot decide Mr. Wilson's request for expungement. In 2025, the government recharged Mr. Wilson in D.C. Superior Court with the D.C. code analogue to the federal charge here. See United States v. Wilson, 2025 CMD 12307 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 2025). That case was set for trial on October 28, 2026. See id. However, the court dismissed the charge against Mr. Wilson for Want of Prosecution. See id. This new dismissal adds yet another twist to the tortured history of his federal case. These new facts require supplemental briefing. Accordingly, the Court bifurcates the co-defendants’ expungement requests. Mr. Wilson shall file a new renewed motion within 30 days that addresses these new facts and the expungement framework set out in this Order.
2. It is also well established that a magistrate judge has jurisdiction to grant motions for expungement. This is true when the magistrate judge is presiding over a case pre-indictment. See United States v. Riley, 806 F. Supp. 3d 38, 43–44 (D.D.C. 2025) (explaining that expungement of arrest records fell within “additional duties” of magistrate judges pursuant to the Federal Magistrates Act, thus conferring jurisdiction over arrestee's motion). And even more so true when the parties have consented to proceed before a magistrate judge for all purposes, including “trial, judgment, and sentencing” pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P 58(g)(2)(B).
3. “When sitting in equity, [ ] the court must ‘mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case,’ emphasize ‘[f]lexibility rather than rigidity,’ and retain ‘[t]he qualities of mercy and practicality [that] have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation.’ ” Livingston, 759 F.2d at 78 (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)).
4. “The mere fact that a [woman] has been arrested has very little, if any, probative value in showing that [she] has engaged in any misconduct. An arrest shows nothing more than that someone probably suspected the person apprehended of an offense.” Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam. of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957).
5. The courts in Carias Torres and McKnight also considered “unlawful and/or unconstitutional [arrests]” as examples of “extraordinary circumstances.” 2026 WL 1469447, at *3 and 33 F. Supp. 3d at 584. This highlights the confusion in the caselaw. Unlawful and unconstitutional arrests fit neatly with the first and second categories, not the third.
6. A wrongful arrest is also sufficient to trigger special circumstances. A wrongful arrest is no trivial matter. It involves seizure of the arrestee, often causing a frightening scene. See, e.g., United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1455 (10th Cir. 1989). The damage does not end there. Wrongful arrests contribute to a fear of law enforcement by—at a minimum—the arrestee and their community. As the Department of Justice has noted, this is a harm to public safety. See U.S. Dep't of Just., Importance of Police-Community Relationships and Resources for Further Reading 1 (2015), https://perma.cc/YWV8-68SC (“Strong relationships of mutual trust between police agencies and the communities they serve are critical to maintaining public safety and effective policing.”).
HON. ZIA M. FARUQUI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Docket No: No. 25-cr-00256-1-TSC-ZMF
Decided: November 12, 2026
Court: United States District Court, District of Columbia.
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