CYNTHIA WARMBIER v. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2026)

FILED UNDER SEAL UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT

EXHIBIT 6

ECF No. 65: Memorandum Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Cynthia and Frederick Warmbier, the parents of Otto Warmbier, obtained a $501,134,683.80 judgment, in their personal capacities and as representatives of Otto's estate, against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (“North Korea” or “DPRK”) for the hostage taking, torture, and extrajudicial killing of Otto, pursuant to the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the private cause of action available to victims of terrorism under the FSIA, Warmbier v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 356 F. Supp. 3d 30, 60 (D.D.C. 2018). North Korea has never appeared in this action nor has paid the judgment owed to the Warmbiers, who now seek to attach assets that they allege are the property of the A.Q. Khan Network, which they Further allege is an agency or instrumentality of North Korea. Pls.’ Mot. for Issuance of Writ of Attachment (“Pls.’ Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 60; Pls.’ Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. for Issuance of Writ of Attachment (“Pls.’ Mem.”) ¶¶ 1 -4, 21, 26, ECF No. 60-2. Specifically, the Warmbiers request that a writ of attachment be issued to JPMorgan Chase, Bank N.A. (“JPMorgan”) to attach approximately $16,571,347.66 (the “Blocked Assets”) being held by a branch of JPMorgan located in New York State in an account that has been “blocked” at the direction of the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) since [Redacted]. Pls.’ Mem. ¶ 6, 17.

The Warmbiers contend that the blocked assets in the JP Morgan account may be attached to satisfy, in part, the Warmbiers’ judgment against North Korea, pursuant to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), and move for a writ of attachment to initiate that process. Pls.’ Mot; Pls.’ Mem ¶ 7. For the reasons explained below, (he Warmbiers’ motion is granted, and a writ of attachment will issue.

I. BACKGROUND

In December and January of 2016, Otto Warmbier, a healthy, promising college student, participated in a tour group to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (“North Korea”), where he was arrested, forced to “recit[e] a prepared ‘confession’ to ‘severe crimes against’ the [country], that amounted to Otto allegedly taking down a poster with a political slogan supporting North Korea's dictator, Kim Jong-Il, from a hotel's staff-only area,” subjected to a “trial,” and detained for nearly 18 months in North Korea. Warmbier, 356 F. Supp 3d at 37-39, When North Korea finally released him, Otto “wore a diaper and had a feeding lube and a shaved head, his arms [were] curled and mangled, his eyes bulging out. and it almost appeared that he had chewed a hole through his bottom lip, His once perfectly straight teeth were misaligned, and Otto was blind and deaf, with severe brain damage, unable to perceive anything around him.” Id. at 40 (cleaned up). In sum, Otto was in an “unrecoverable state of non-responsiveness.” Id. at 41. Otto's doctors eventually ceased his feeding and breathing assistance, and Otto passed away on June 19, 2017. Id.

In April 2018, the Warmbiers “initiated this action individually and as personal representatives of [their son] Otto's estate, seeking damages under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602, et seq., against North Korea for its torture, hostage taking, and extrajudicial killing of Otto.” Warmbier, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 36. North Korea did not appear to defend the action, and still has not appeared. Id.; Clerk's Entry of Default, ECF No, 14. Upon plaintiffs’ default judgment motion and after finding that North Korea “tortured” and “took Otto hostage,” and that “North Korea's treatment of Otto amounted to an extrajudicial killing,” id at 46-53, this Court found North Korea liable to the Warmbiers individually and to Otto's estate under § 1605A(c) of the FSIA, id. at 55, and awarded to Otto's estate $171,134,684.80 in economic losses, medical expenses, pain and suffering, and punitive damages, and to Frederick and Cynthia Warmbier $ 15,000,000 each in solatium damages and $300,000,000 total in punitive damages. Id. at 60. The total damage award was $501,134,683.80. Id. Three and a half months later, upon determining that a reasonable amount of time had elapsed since judgment and North Korea had not paid, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c), the Warmbiers’ were granted authority to execute the judgment. Order Granting Pls.’ Mot. for Order Under 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c), ECF No. 32; Pls.’ Mot. to Enforce Judgment, ECF No. 31.

Several years later, North Korea has yet to pay the judgment owed in this case, necessitating that the Warmbiers locate and attach North Korean assets in execution of judgment. To this end, the Warmbiers moved for issuance of a writ of attachment, seeking to attach the Blocked Assets, which are electronic funds held by JPMorgan in an account located in New York state. See Pls.’ Mem. ¶ 19. These assets allegedly belong to the A.Q. Khan Network, an “agency or instrumentality” of North Korea, and therefore are arguably subject, under the TRIA, to attachment and eventual execution in order to fulfill plaintiffs’ judgment against North Korea. Pls.’ Mem. ¶ 26.¹ According to the Warmbiers, JPMorgan lakes no position on the issuance of the attachment. Pls.’ Supp. Mem. in Support of Mot. for Issuance of Writ of Attachment (“Pls.’ Supp. Mem.”) at 3 n.2, ECF No. 62.

Following the Warmbiers’ supplementation of the record in response to the Court's jurisdictional queries, see Minute Order (Sept. 19, 2025); Pls.’ Supp. Mem., the pending motion for issuance of a writ of attachment is now ripe. At this stage, the proceedings have been conducted ex parte, meaning that neither North Korea, the A.Q. Khan Network, nor the purported originators or intended recipients of the Blocked Assets have received notice of the Warmbiers’ motion, which was filed under seal. See Pls.’ Mot.² Although JPMorgan has received actual notice of the Warmbiers’ intent to file the motion, JPMorgan is not a party to the action and has not been formally served with a writ or otherwise heard as a party to the action. Pls.’ Mem. ¶ 36; Pls.’ Supp. Mem. at 3.

II. APPLICABLE D.C. LAW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69, once a money judgment is rendered, “[t]he procedure on execution—and in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution—must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1); see also United States v. Fifty-Three Virtual Currency Accts., No. 20-cv-2227 (RC), 2024 WL 4827321, *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-5280, 2025 WL 796120 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 12, 2025) (“D.C. law controls regarding the process to create a judgment lien.”).

Under D.C. law, two steps are required to satisfy a judgment by seizing assets of the judgment debtor. First, in the “writ of attachment” step, “[a]n attachment shall be levied upon credits of the defendant, in the hands of a garnishee, by serving the garnishee with a copy of the writ of attachment ․ and a notice that property or credits of the defendant in his hands are seized by virtue of the attachment.” D.C. Code § 16-546; see id. § 16-544. The person seeking satisfaction of the judgment (i.e., the judgment-creditor), when attaching the property belonging to the defendant (i.e., the judgment debtor), may “submit interrogatories in writing” with the writ of attachment “to be served upon any garnishee, asking about any property of the defendant in his in his possession or charge, or indebtedness of his to the defendant at the time of the service of the attachment.” Id. § 16-552(a). The D.C. Superior Court provides form interrogatories that inquire what property of the judgment debtor is in the possession of the garnishee. See Writ of Attachment, D.C. Super. Ct., available at https://wwv.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/2022-09/Writ-of-Attachment-Non-Wages-Fillable.pdf [https://perma.cc/M66L-3GT6] (last visited Nov. 24, 2025). “Service of the writ on the garnishee creates a valid lien in favor of the judgment creditor on the debtor's property held by the garnishee.” Consumers United Ins. Co. v. Smith, 644 A.2d 1328, 1352 (D.C. 1994); see Mercado v. Carmel Partners Constr., No. 22-cv-3083 (TSC), 2025 WL 1654514, *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2025) (describing this process).

Second, at the “turnover” step, “within ten days after service” of the writ of attachment upon the garnishee, the “garnishee or [a] stranger to the action who may make claim to the property attached may file an answer defending against the attachment.” D.C. Code §§ 16-551, 16-552(a).³ The garnishee may defend against the action, for example, by challenging the jurisdiction of the court over the garnishee or denying the garnishee is in possession of the judgment debtor's property. See, e.g., Metro. Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Franklin Inv. Co., 256 A.2d 913, 914-15 (D.C. 1969). Absent meritorious defenses, within four weeks of the due date for the interrogatories, the judgment-creditor may file an application for judgment before the court issuing the writ of attachment. D.C. Super. Ct. R. 69-1(e)(2). That court must then determine whether “the credits have been found” “in [the garnishee's] hands” and, if so, “judgment shall be entered against [the garnishee] for the amounts of the credits admitted or found, not exceeding the amount of the plaintiff's judgment.” D.C. Code § 16-556.⁴

In sum, at the request of a judgment-creditor, a court may issue a writ of attachment ex parte to be served on a garnishee holding assets of the judgment debtor. Upon service of the writ, a lien is created in favor of the judgment creditor, Then, the garnishee and any other interested parties may contest the propriety of the writ or of any eventual application for judgment against the garnishee requiring the garnishee to turn over the assets to the judgment-creditor.

D.C. statutory law is silent regarding the standard of proof necessary for issuance of a writ of attachment against a garnishee for assets believed to belong to a judgment-debtor. See D.C. Code § 16-546. The D.C. Court of Appeals has emphasized, however, that a “judgment creditor must be allowed to attach the assets of a non-party when [the judgment-creditor] has reason to believe” that property held by the prospective garnishee is owned by the judgment debtor. John C. Flood of MD, Inc. v. Brighthaupt, 122 A.3d 937, 942 (D.C. 2015) (emphasis supplied). This minimal standard of proof is appropriate because “[t]he execution of the writ of attachment would set in motion proceedings that would allow the third-party to contest the ownership of the property and allege that the writ of attachment was unlawfully issued.” Id.; see also Asal v. Mina, 247 A.3d 260, 279 (D.C. 2021) (“A post-judgment writ of attachment will issue even though a trial Court ‘has not previously decided the ownership of the asset in question, given that ownership of the property could promptly be questioned in any case involving a third party.’ ” (quoting Brighthaupt, 122 A.3d at 942)).

In addition to consideration of the process requirements set out in local law, Rule 69 also requires consideration of any applicable federal statute “to the extent it applies.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). Here, the Warmbiers invoke the TRIA's Section 201(a), which specifies several factual prerequisites for the turnover of funds owned by a terrorist party or its agency or instrumentality. Pls.’ Mot. at 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 1610 Note(a). At the writ of attachment step, the low standard outlined by the D.C. Court of Appeals applies: the judgment-creditors must follow the appropriate procedures for filing a writ of attachment and show “reason to believe” that the property sought to be attached will eventually be subject to turnover under the TRIA. Brighthaupt, 122 A.3d at 942; see also Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, No. 10-me-471 (TJK), 2019 WL 4040680, *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2019) (considering evidence submitted by the judgment creditors to determine whether “evidence [was] sufficient to establish” the factual requirements of the TRIA).

III. DISCUSSION

Satisfaction of the requirements under D.C. law and under the TRIA's § 201(a) to issue a writ of attachment against the Blocked Assets are considered, following confirmation that, at this preliminary stage, subject-matter jurisdiction may be exercised to issue the Warmbiers’ requested writ.⁵

A. Jurisdiction to Issue the Writ

Federal courts have an “affirmative obligation” to determine whether they have subject-matter jurisdiction to decide any matter. James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996). This Court exercised subject-matter jurisdiction over the original action against North Korea by the Warmbiers, pursuant to the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the FSIA. See Warmbier, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 44.

Jurisdiction to issue the requested writ of attachment must also be established. Traditionally, “an attachment is a proceeding in rem,” Mitchell v. St. Maxent's Lessee, 71 U.S. 237, 240 (1866); and “[t]he essential function of an action in rem is the determination of title to or the status of property located—physically or legally—within the court's jurisdiction.” 4A G. Wright, A. Miller & A. N. Steinman, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1070, p. 448 (3d ed. 2014). In other words, a court could issue writs of attachment only as to property “located” within its territorial jurisdiction. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958) (“The basis of the jurisdiction is the presence of the subject property within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum State.”).

As more assets became intangible—bank accounts, stocks, intellectual property, etc.—“conflicting rules proliferated” among the states as to when attachment jurisdiction could be conferred over such assets, Aaron D. Simowitz, Siting Intangibles, 48 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 259, 261 (2015); see Robert Laurence, Out-of-State Garnishments: Work-in-Progress, 50 Ark. L. Rev. 415, 417-418 (1997). The Supreme Court eventually held that “[i]f there be a law of the State providing for the attachment of the debt, then, if the garnishee be found in that State, and process be personally served upon him therein, we think the court acquires jurisdiction over him, and can garnish the debt due from him to the debtor of the plaintiff, and condemn it.” Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905). Consistent with this instruction from the Supreme Court, federal procedural rules require application of state procedures in execution of judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a). D.C. law therefore governs whether the blocked assets, wherever held or located, may be attached.

Under D.C. law, “when the garnishment is served on [the garnishee] the suit becomes a suit in personam against the garnishee and the judgment which follows becomes a personal judgment against him.” United States ex rel. Ordmann v. Cummings, 66 App. D.C. 107, 109 (1936) (analyzing D.C. Code § 24-132 (1929), containing identical language to the current D.C. Code § 16-546, to attach cash held by a garnishee). Although more recent D.C. case law deals primarily with garnishment of wages to be paid to judgment-debtors outside of the District, rather than attachment of specific property, the D.C. Court of Appeals has repeatedly affirmed the principle from Ordmann. See Marvins Credit, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 119 A.2d 447, 448 (D.C. 1956) (allowing garnishment of wages to be paid by an employer, as garnishee, with an office in the District of Columbia to an employee, the judgment-debtor, who lived, worked, and was paid in Maryland); Goldschmidt v. Paley Rothman Goldstein Rosenberg & Cooper, Chartered, 935 A.2d 362, 374 n.6 (D.C. 2007) (citing Marvins Credit approvingly for the proposition that “[p]ower over the person of the garnishee confers jurisdiction to enforce a writ of attachment,” as a possible reason that the garnishee-employer with an office in the District had not challenged the D.C. court's jurisdiction to garnish the wages of the judgment-debtor employee living, working, and being paid outside the District). Further, neither the D.C. Code nor case law appears to make any distinction between the reach of garnishment actions and that of writs of attachment, and the D.C. Code uses the terms “attach” and “garnish” interchangeably. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 16-546.

Since D.C. law focuses on the location of the garnishee, rather than the situs of the property targeted for attachment, this Court's jurisdiction to issue the Writ sought by the Warmbiers hinges on whether personal jurisdiction may properly be exercised over JPMorgan, as garnishee. See Ordmann, 66 App. D.C. at 109. The Warmbiers contend that JPMorgan's regional headquarters located in the District of Columbia serves as a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over JPMorgan, under provisions of the District's long-arm statute, See Pls.’ Supp, Mem. at’ 6 (citing D.C. Code § 13-423(a)); Pls.’ Mem. ¶ 6. Specifically, the District's long-arm statute provides that a “court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's ․ transacting any business in the District of Columbia” or “having an interest in, using, or possess real property in the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 13-423 (a)(1), (5), JPMorgan's operation of a regional headquarters in the District certainly appears to fall within those enumerated activities, though whether a garnishment action for the Blocked Assets “aris[es] from” those activities, as required by the long-arm statute for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, is less clear, See id. § 13-423(a); id. § 13-423(b) (“When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him.”), Personal jurisdiction is waivable, however, see Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 705 (1982) (“[T]he failure to enter a timely objection to personal jurisdiction constitutes, under Rule 12(h)(1), a waiver of the objection,” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1))), and JPMorgan has not yet had an opportunity either to consent to or contest the exercise of jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction over JPMorgan is plainly plausible, given that the bank's regional headquarters is physically located here, and sufficiently established by the Warmbiers for (he purposes of this motion. Under D.C. attachment law, this Court thus has subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the writ sought by the Warmbiers.

B. Attachment of Assets under the TRIA

Section 201 of the TRIA, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610 Note, allows plaintiffs who have obtained a judgment against a terrorist party to execute that judgment against assets of the terrorist party even when the assets are otherwise blocked by the federal government from being transferred. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 Note(a). To execute a judgment under § 201 plaintiffs must show (1) that they “obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of terrorism.” 28 U.S.C. § 1610 Note(a); (2) that the assets targeted for attachment are “blocked”—that is, that they are “seized or frozen by the United States under section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S. App. 5(b))” or certain other statutes, id. § 1610 Note(a), (d)(2); and (3) that the targeted assets are owned by either the terrorist party against which judgment was obtained or by “any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party,” id. § 1610 Note(a).

Here, the first two requirements are clearly met. First, the Warmbiers obtained a judgment against North Korea in December 2018, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), which provides a private right of action for victims of terrorism against designated state sponsors of terrorism, See Warmbier, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 54-55. The TRIA defines “terrorist party” to include “a foreign state designated as a state sponsor of terrorism,” which North Korea has been since 2017. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 Note(d)(4); Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST), 82 Fed. Reg. 56,100 (Nov. 17, 2017); Warmbier, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 44-45 (holding that “the State Department's designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism was, at least in part, a result of North Korea's detention and mistreatment of Otto, which is sufficient to meet the state-sponsor-of-terrorism requirement” under the FSIA). Thus; the Warmbiers undoubtedly have a qualifying judgment.

Second, the Warmbiers also submitted evidence showing the assets possessed by JPMorgan are blocked under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) and OFAC's regulations implementing the TWEA as to North Korea. See Pls.’ Mem. ¶ 17 (citing 31 C.F.R. pt. 510, which implements, inter alia, TWEA); Pls.’ Mot, Annex A, Decl. of Justin M. Sher, Pls.’ Counsel (“Sher Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-3, ECF No. 60-3 at 2 (same); Sher Decl., Ex. A, [Redacted] ([Redacted]), [Redacted]; Sher Decl., Ex. C, Expert Decl. of Prof. Sharon Squassoni (“Squassoni Decl.”) ¶ 4(A), ECF No. 60-3 at 19.

The third TRIA requirement draws the bulk of the Warmbiers’ evidence in their efforts to show that (1) the Blocked Assets are the property of the A.Q. Khan Network and (2) the A.Q. Khan Network is an agency or instrumentality of North Korea. As discussed next, the Warmbiers have cleared the low hurdle of showing there is “reason to believe” the assets are owned by the A.Q. Khan Network and that the A.Q. Khan network is an agency or instrumentality of North Korea, the terrorist party against which the Warmbiers hold a judgment. See Brighthaupt, 122 A.3d at 942.

1. Blocked Assets Are Owned by A.Q. Khan Network

The Warmbiers present the reports of two experts, Sharon Squassoni and David Albright. each of whom concludes that the Blocked Assets likely originated from the A.Q. Khan Network, Squassoni Decl. ¶¶ 13-15; Sher Decl., Ex. D, Expert Decl. of David Albright (“Albright Decl.”) ¶ 28-33, ECF No. 60-3 at 50. Each of these experts is well qualified to provide evidence as to the source of Blocked Assets and the role of and agency relationship of the A.Q. Khan Network to North Korea.

Sharon A. Squassoni is a former nuclear nonproliferation policy official with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the U.S. State Department, a former senior specialist in weapons of mass destruction at the Congressional Research Service, a professor of international affairs at George Washington University, and a U.N. expert consultant on North Korean nuclear proliferation. Squassoni Decl. ¶¶ 1-2. David Albright is a physicist, an expert on a U.N. Security Council-mandated team at the International Atomic Energy Agency tasked with inspections in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, and a former advisor to Swiss and German federal authorities prosecuting AQK leaders, Albright Decl. ¶ 1, 6-7. Both Professor Squassoni and Mr. Albright have extensive experience in the subject-matter areas in which they seek to offer their expertise, including decades of experience and familiarity with the A.Q. Khan Network and nuclear proliferation more generally. See Squassoni Decl. ¶¶ 1-2 (describing Squassoni's qualifications); Albright Decl. ¶¶ 1-7 (describing Albright's qualifications). At this stage, no challenge to the qualifications’ or opinions of either Squassoni or Albright has been raised, and after review of both their reports and qualifications, this Court finds, for the purposes of this motion, that each is qualified as an expert to offer the opinions they provide, see Fed. R. Evid. 702, and that both reports comply with all relevant requirements, see id.; Fed. R. Evid. 703. Accordingly, Professor Squassoni is qualified to offer her opinions as an expert on proliferation and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the A.Q. Khan Network and proliferation between Pakistan and North Korea, and Mr. Albright is qualified to offer his opinions as an expert on nuclear and other weapons proliferation, including by the A.Q. Khan Network, Pakistan, and North Korea, and their reports may be relied upon in assessing plaintiffs’ pending motion for issuance of a writ of attachment.

The A.Q. Khan Network is a “highly successful, secret procurement network” that “engaged in the sale of centrifuge and nuclear weapon supplies and the proliferation of centrifuge and nuclear weapons designs, as well as trade in conventional arms, with various countries, including North Korea.” Albright Decl. ¶ 15. The A.Q. Khan Network was founded around 1979 by British-Pakistani metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan (“Khan”), who “acquir[ed] and st[ole] centrifuge intelligence and technology” to support Pakistan's nuclear weapons program while working at a Dutch technological consulting firm in the mid-1970s. Id. ¶¶ 13-14; Squassoni Decl. ¶ 5. Throughout the development of the A.Q. Khan Network, “[t]o evade Western surveillance, Khan implemented increasingly deceptive procurement methods, including transshipment routes (hat frequently passed through Dubai, UAE, and employed complex payment schemes involving intermediaries to conceal transactions.” Albright Decl. ¶ 16.

Turning to the Blocked Assets targeted for attachment in this ease, on [Redacted], [Redacted] approximately $10,000,000 transfer [Redacted] OFAC indicated the funds would he sent from the Rawalpindi Cantt Branch of the National Bank of Pakistan, routed through Chase in New York, and destined for the Commercial Bank of Dubai. OFAC Compliance Letter. Chase blocked the funds on [Redacted], and informed the National Bank of Pakistan of [Redacted]. Pl.’s Mem. ¶ 19. The National Bank of Pakistan [Redacted]. Pls.’ Mem. ¶ 20; Sher Decl., Ex. B, Letter from Fred B. Lee, Vice President, Nat'l Bank of Pakistan-N.Y. Branch, to Newcomb [sic] [Redacted]), ECF No. 60-3 at 10; [Redacted]. ([Redacted]), ECF No. 60-3 at 11. [Redacted] Squassoni Decl. ¶ 4(D).

6 Although the initial amount of funds was $10,000,000, interest has increased the balance of the Blocked Assets to $16,571,346.66. See Sher Decl., Ex. B, Transfer Record, ECF No. 60-3 at 9; OFAC Compliance Letter (indicating the funds must be held in an interest-beating account).

The two experts identify several features of this fund transfer that are markers of A.Q. Khan activity. First, “[a]t that time, both Pakistan and North Korea were suffering cash-flow problems,” meaning that “[i]t is highly unlikely that the Blocked Funds would have originated from any other entity in Pakistan but the A.Q. Khan Network at the time.” Squassoni Decl. ¶ 14(A). Second, the funds originated at the Rawalpindi Cantt Branch of the National Bank of Pakistan, and “both Khan and his lab ․ were based in Rawalpindi.” Id. ¶ 14(B). Third. Dubai, where the funds were to be transferred from Chase, was a “critical node for the flow of goods and payments between the A.Q. Khan Network and its suppliers.” Albright Decl. ¶ 30; see Squassoni Decl. ¶ 14(B). Finally, the transferee named by the National Bank of Pakistan, [Redacted], “is publicly known to have served as [a] conduit for weapons transfers involving North Korea” including those involving the A.Q. Khan Network. Squassoni Decl. ¶ 14(C).

This evidence provides reason to believe that the A.Q. Khan Network was the originator of (he blocked assets.⁷

2. A.Q. Khan Network an Agency or Instrumentality of North Korea

Having shown reason to believe the blocked assets originated from the A.Q. Khan Network, the Warmbiers next offer evidence that the A.Q. Khan Network is an “agency or instrumentality” of North Korea, the last step in allowing attachment of the blocked assets in satisfaction of the Warmbiers’ judgment against North Korea. Pls.’ Mem. ¶¶ 26-28.

The TRIA does not provide a definition of “agency or instrumentality,” but the FSIA does. Specifically, the FSIA's § 1603(b) defines “an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” as “any entity (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is art organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States ․, nor created under the laws of any third country.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b). This FSIA definition applies to the entire chapter, including § 1610, to which the TRIA's § 201 is codified as a note. Id. §§ 1603, 1610 Note. This raises the issue of whether the FSIA's § 1603(b) definition applies to the TRIA's § 201. The D.C. Circuit has not opined on this issue, but two other circuit courts of appeals have done so, and both concluded that the FSIA's definition of “agency or instrumentality” does not apply when attachment is sought under the TRIA. See Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Avenue & Related Props., 830 F.3d 107, 133-34 (2d Cir. 2016); Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 771 F.3d 713, 730-32 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Siman v. Stansell, 577 U.S. 815 (2015). The Second and Eleventh Circuits derived definitions from the ordinary meanings of “agency” and “instrumentality,” both arriving at substantially similar definitions to each other, Although these out-of-circuit decisions are not binding, their reasoning is persuasive as to why a plain meaning definition, rather than the FSIA's statutory definition, should be applied to “agency or instrumentality” in the TRIA.

Most obviously, the TRIA does not actually use the phrase “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” as defined in the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b), but instead refers to the assets of a “terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party),” id. § 1610 Note(a). The difference in phrasing is necessary because the TRIA unambiguously contemplates that non-state terrorist parties, such as organizations or natural persons, might be subject to judgments against them for their terrorist activities and have their assets seized to satisfy those judgments. See Kirschenbaum, 830 F.3d at 133; 28 U.S.C. § 1610 Note(d)(4). The FSIA definition requires that an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” must be an “organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof” or to have a “majority of [its] shares ․ owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof” and therefore cannot apply if the terrorist judgment debtor is not a foreign state. Id. § 1603(b)(2). At the very least, then, “agency or instrumentality of [a] terrorist party” in the TRIA as applied to a non-state terrorist party judgment debtor cannot mean the same thing as “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” as defined in the FSIA § 1603(b), See Kirschenbaum, 830 F.3d at 133-34; Stansell, 771 F.3d at 731 (noting that application of the FSIA's “agency or instrumentality” definition “cannot stand, as TRIA[ ] ․ clearly contemplates nonstate judgment debtors being subjected to TRIA execution”).

In Kirschenbaum the Second Circuit considered whether, when the terrorist judgment debtor is a foreign state, the FSIA definition of “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” should be applied to the phrase “agency or instrumentality of [the] terrorist party” in the TRIA, and concluded that the FSIA's definition “does not apply selectively to foreign states designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under the TRIA.” 830 F.3d at 134. After concluding that the FSIA does not define “agency or instrumentality” for the purposes of the TRIA, the Second Circuit turned to the “ordinary meanings” of “agency” and “instrumentality” Id. at 135. An “agency” is a “person or organization acting on behalf of another, or providing a particular service” or “a person or thing through which power is exerted or an end is achieved.” Id. at 135 (quoting OED Online, Oxford Univ. Press (last visited June 2016), then Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993)). An “instrumentality” is “a means or [a]gency through which a function of another entity is accomplished, such a branch of a governing body” or “something that serves as an intermediary or agent through which one or more functions of a controlling force are carried out; a part, organ, or subsidiary branch esp[ecially] of a governing body,” Id, (first alteration in original) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), then Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993)). From these definitions, the Second Circuit concluded that plaintiffs seeking to attach the assets of an alleged “agency or instrumentality of [a] terrorist party” under the TRIA must show that the owner of the asset sought to be attached “(1) was a means through which a material function of the terrorist party is accomplished, (2) provided material services to, on behalf of, or in support of the terrorist party, or (3) was owned, controlled, or directed by the terrorist party.” Id. (emphasis in original).

The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue in a different context, where the judgment debtor was a non-state narcotics trafficker held liable for acts of terrorism, so did not consider the TRIA's application to state sponsors of terrorism and their agencies or instrumentalities. Stansell, 771 F.3d at 722. Notably, that court adopted a similar definition of “agency or instrumentality,” devised by the district court based on the “ordinary and plain meaning” of the terms “agency” and “instrumentality,” defining an “agency or instrumentality of [a] terrorist party” as an entity that “(1) materially assist[ed] in, or provid[ed] financial or technological support for or to, or provid[ed] goods or services in support of, the international narcotics trafficking activities of a specially designated narcotics trafficker”; (2) was “owned, controlled, or directed by, or acting for or on behalf of, a specially designated narcotics trafficker”; or (3) “play[ed] a significant role in international narcotics trafficking” related to the judgment debtor's trafficking activities. Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, No. 8:09-cv-2308-T-26 (MAP), 2013 WL 12133661, *2 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2013), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, dismissed in part, 771 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 2014); Stansell, 71 F.3d at 732 (“[T]he district court developed a proper standard” for identifying agencies and instrumentalities of terrorist parties.).

These decisions from two circuits, which arrived at substantially the same definition of “agency or instrumentality,” are persuasive, and that definition, as explained in Kirschenbaum, is adopted for the purposes of this motion. See Weinstock v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No; 23-ev-2824, 2025 WL 2257076, *18 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2025) (noting that the two circuits to consider this issue arrived at substantially similar definitions and adopting the Second Circuit's definition); Stansell, 2019 WL 4040680, *4 (Kelly, J.) (adopting the Eleventh Circuit's test); Caballero v. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, 562 F. Supp. 3d 867, 889 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (adopting the Second Circuit's definition). Thus, to obtain a writ of attachment, the Warmbiers must provide “sufficient evidence” to show that the A.Q. Khan Network “(1) was a means through which a material function of the terrorist party is accomplished, (2) provided material services to, on behalf of, or in support of the terrorist party, or (3) was owned, controlled, or directed by the terrorist party.” Kirschenbaum, 830 F.3d at 135 (emphasis in original).

The Warmbiers have shown reason to believe that, at the very least, the A.Q. Khan Network “provided material services to, on behalf of, or in support of the terrorist party.” Kirschenbaum, 830 F.3d at 135. Professor Squassoni explained that the former President of Pakistan, who had previously pardoned Khan for his “illicit proliferation activities.” Squassoni Decl. ¶ 7, “admitted that North Korea was a customer of the A.Q. Khan Network,” and that the A.Q. Khan Network had transferred multiple nuclear centrifuges and information on nuclear technology to North Korea, id. ¶ 8.⁸ According to Mr. Albright, “[w]ithout the A.Q. Khan Network's funds, goods, technology and training,’ North Korea would not have been able to build a gas centrifuge program, a program critical to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.” Albright Decl. ¶ 35. In 2009, when the United States first imposed sanctions directly against the A.Q. Khan Network, the State Department listed as one justification that “Khan and his associates provided centrifuge designs, equipment, and technology to North Korea.” Squassoni Decl. ¶ 9 (quoting U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Int'l Security and Nonproliferation, Designation of A.Q. Khan and Associates for Nuclear Proliferation Activities (Jan. 12, 2009), https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/115913.htm) [https://perma.cc/9MYA-6QY3].

The trade went both ways, and at times, North Korea provided the A.Q. Khan Network with technologies or materials in exchange for cash. See id. ¶ 10; Albright Decl. ¶ 35 (“[T]he A.Q. Khan Network fulfilled ․ [a] material need[ ] of North Korea by [ ] providing hard cash to North Korea, which North Korea lacked because of the extensive sanctions placed upon it ․”). In 998, [Redacted], the A.Q. Khan Network “successfully test-fired a Ghauri missile, essentially a copy of a North Korean No-Dong missile [the Network] had acquired in 1997.” Squassoni Decl. ¶ 11. For the set of missiles including the technology to develop this No-Dong copycat missile, “North Korea was paid around $210 million.” Id. ¶ 12. In sum, throughout at least the period of 1993 to 1999, [Redacted], “North Korea engaged in missile cooperation with Pakistan to (i) gain access to hard cash, which North Korea lacked because of the extensive sanctions placed upon it, and (ii) develop its uranium enrichment program by obtaining assistance, information, equipment and materials,” and “Khan and the A.Q. Khan Network were the key Pakistani conduits for North Korea to achieve both aims.” Id.; see Havlish v. Taliban, 152 F.4th 339, 364 (2d Cir. 2025) (“When we determine whether an entity is an agency or instrumentality of a terrorist party under the TRIA, we assess that entity's status as of the date that the assets at issue were blocked.”); see also Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, 45 F.4th 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2022) (considering any entity “that is or was ever” an agency or instrumentality to be an agency or instrumentality for TRIA purposes (emphasis in original)).

At this stage, these expert reports and the sources cited therein establish reason to believe that the A.Q. Khan Network was an agency or instrumentality of North Korea under the ordinary meaning of those terms as used in § 201(a) of the TRIA. The Warmbiers have shown reason to believe that JPMorgan holds blocked assets eligible to satisfy the Warmbiers’ judgment against North Korea because those assets belong to an agency or instrumentality of North Korea, They are therefore entitled to a writ of attachment to be issued to JPMorgan.

C. Additional Procedural Requests

Finally, the Warmbiers make several procedural requests: (1) that the interrogatories normally enclosed with a writ of attachment be waived and JPMorgan be exempted from responding to such interrogatories, Pls.’ Mem. ¶ 36; (2) that the Court approve the Warmbiers’ plan to serve North Korea by certified mail to the Permanent Mission of North Korea to the United Nations (“North Korean Mission”), id. ¶ 39: (3) that (he Court approve the use of the “Notice to Debtor of Non-Wage Garnishment and Exemptions” prepared by the Warmbiers to be mailed to North Korea, which reflects that the writ of attachment was issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in lieu of the D.C. Superior Court's standard “Notice to Debtor of Non-Wage Garnishment and Exemptions,” which is specifically required by D.C. Super. Ct. R. 69-1(h), Pls.’ Mem. ¶ 38; and (4) that the Court set a 21-day deadline for North Korea to contest the writ after being served with notice of the writ, since both the D.C. Code and D.C. Super. Ct. R. 69-1 are silent on such a deadline, id. ¶ 41. These matters are addressed briefly, seriatim.

First, the interrogatories normally sent to garnishees will not be waived. The Warmbiers initially reported that JPMorgan “does not oppose” the requested writ, id. ¶ 36, but later clarified that JPMorgan in fact “takes no position” on the requested writ, Pls.’ Supp. Mem. at 3 n.2, Given that JPMorgan has already responded to subpoenas regarding the Blocked Assets, Pls.’ Mem. ¶ 4, the bank seems well prepared to respond to the simple interrogatories recommended under local rules. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. A, Writ of Attachment Forms, ECF No. 60-1 (“Had you at the time of the service of the writ of attachment, or have you had between the time of such service and the filing of your answer to this interrogatory, any goods, chattels, or credits of the defendant(s) in you possession or charge, and, if so, what?”). Indeed, the Blocked Assets sit in an interest-bearing account, see OFAC Compliance Letter, so JPMorgan's interrogatory answers may provide an updated accounting of the value of these funds.⁹

As to the second and third requests—where to serve and the specific form used to serve North Korea, as the judgment debtor—is governed by D.C. Super. Ct. R. 69-1(h), which provides that “[t]he judgment creditor must mail to the judgment debtor at his or her last known address, by certified and first-class mail, a copy of the writ and the Notice to Debtor of Non-Wage Garnishment and Exemptions on the form available in the clerk's office, no more than 3 days after service of the writ on the garnishee.” The Warmbiers’ proposed plan of where to serve North Korea accords with this rule and therefore is approved. The alternative “Notice to Debtor of Non-Wage Garnishment and Exemptions” that the Warmbiers propose to use appears to omit some of the information included in the D.C. Superior Court's standard form, compare Pls.’ Mot., Annex II, Alternative Notice Document, with Notice to Debtor of Non-Wage Garnishment and Exemptions, Form CV-3120, D.C. Super. Ct., and, given the express requirement in D.C. Super. Ct. R. 69-1(h) regarding the form of Notice to be used, no alteration to this form is approved.

Finally, the 21-day deadline suggested by the Warmbiers for North Korea to contest the writ before they may apply for judgment against JPMorgan is reasonable and will be adopted.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Warmbiers’ Motion for Issuance of Writ of Attachment, ECF No. 60, is GRANTED. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be filed contemporaneously.

Date: November 26, 2025

FOOTNOTES

1.   This is the second motion for writ of attachment filed by the Warmbiers in this case. See Pls.’ Mot. for Issuance of Writ of Attachment, ECF Nos. 57 (sealed), 63-1 (redacted). Their first motion, which targeted different assets, was denied because the Warmbiers sought to attach assets held outside the District by a garnishee with no presence in the District, and the jurisdiction to issue the writ was thus lacking. See Minute Order (Oct. 24, 2024), ECF No. 63-4 (redacted).

2.   This motion and related filings have been submitted under seal to “prevent the frustration of [p]laintiffs’ efforts to enforce the[ir judgment] against the Blocked Assets held by the Garnishee” and to allow the Warmbiers to establish a priority interest in the assets they have painstakingly identified as potentially eligible to satisfy their judgment. Sealed Mot. for Leave to File Under Seal (“Sealing Mot.”) at 2, ECF No. 59. This Court determined that the Warmbiers met the requirements Tor sealing. See Sealed Minute Order (May 9, 2025); Sealing Mot. at 2-3 (citing EEOC v. Nat'l Children's Ctr., Inc., 98 F.3d 1406, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (when considering sealing motions, courts should consider “(1) the need for public access to the documents at issue; (2) the extent of previous public access to the documents; (3) the fact that someone has objected to disclosure, and (he identity of that person; (4) the strength of any property and privacy interests asserted; (5) the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure; and (6) the purposes for which the documents were introduced during the judicial proceedings”).

3.   If the judgment-creditor does not “contest the answer So the interrogatories” within 14 days of the answers being served, the creditor will be “limited by [the garnishee's] answer” as to the garnishee's obligations. D.C. Super. Ct. R. 69-1(d); see D.C. Code § 16-552(a).

4.   “[A]ny issue of fact ․ may be tried with a jury if any party so desires.” D.C. Code §§ 16-551, 16-553.

5.   Any factual or legal issue determined herein may be reconsidered de novo, with the benefit of adverse briefing, in the context of any motion to quash the writ of attachment or oppose turnover of the funds. See Levin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 523 F. Supp. 3d 14, 19-20 (D.D.C. 2021); Brighthaupt, 122 A.3d at 942.

7.   The D.C. Circuit has held that when funds are blocked while traveling through a U.S. intermediary bank during a wire transfer, as occulted here, “terrorist victims may attach OFAC blocked electronic funds transfers if those funds can be traced to a terrorist owner” at their point of origination, as long as “no intermediary or upstream bank asserts an interest as an innocent third party.” Est. of Levin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 45 F.4th 416, 423 (D.C. Cir, 2022). Whether other parties have valid interests in the property is determined, under D.C. law, after service of the writ of attachment. D.C. Code § 16-551.

8.   Khan not only helped North Korea with its nuclear weapons program, but other countries as well, calling himself “the ‘father’ of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.” Squassoni Decl. ¶ 6. At some point Khan “took measures to ․ decentralize and privatize the A.Q. Khan Network,” such that, by the early 2000s, the relationship between Khan and the Pakistani government had soured, and in 2001, “General Pervez Musharraf (who became President of Pakistan later that year) removed Khan as the head” of the A.Q. Khan Network's research lab. Id.

9.   While the Warmbiers suggest service on JPMorgan at an address in Louisiana, Pls.’ Mot., Ex, 5, Proposed Order ¶ 4, ECF No. 60-5, Federal rules only allow service “within the territorial limits of the state where the district court is located,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.1(a). Thus, service must be effected at JPMorgan's regional headquarters in the District of Columbia.

BERYL A. HOWELL United State District Judge