ESTATE OF GEORGE WATTS JR v. LLOYD AUSTIN III (2025)

ORDER

Plaintiff, the estate of George Watts, Jr., sued the Secretary of the Department of Defense in his official capacity, alleging that Watts died due to myocarditis caused by Covid-19 vaccines. ECF 1. The Court granted the government's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that sovereign immunity shielded the government from Plaintiff's suit. ECF 17. Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Relief from a Judgment under Rule 60(b)(1). ECF 18. In that motion, Plaintiff argues—for the first time—that the Court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the suit because the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to a three-judge panel to decide a motion to dismiss for this kind of willful-misconduct claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(5) (“Any action under subsection (d) shall be assigned initially to a panel of three judges. Such panel shall have jurisdiction over such action for purposes of considering motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and matters related thereto.”). Neither Party had requested a three-judge panel nor argued that one was necessary before the Court granted the government's Motion to Dismiss.¹

Because Plaintiff has a strong argument that it was entitled to a three-judge panel, the Court grants Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) Motion. “Rule 60(b)(1) covers all mistakes of law,” Kemp v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1856, 1862 (2022), so the Court must consider whether Plaintiff's asserted entitlement to a three-judge panel has merit. The PREP Act commands that any action raising a willful-misconduct claim “shall be assigned initially to a panel of three judges.” 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(5) (emphasis added). And it dictates that “[s]uch panel shall have jurisdiction over such action for purposes of considering motions to dismiss.” Id. Given this plain statutory text, Plaintiff has met its “burden of showing that [it] is entitled to the relief.” Jarvis v. Parker, 13 F. Supp. 3d 74, 77 (D.D.C. 2014). The government's response that Plaintiff cannot prevail because it failed to follow Local Civil Rule 9.1, which requires the filing of a formal application for a three-judge panel with a complaint, is unpersuasive because “[a] local rule must be consistent with ․ federal statutes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1).

It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) Motion is GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED that this Court's order dismissing the case is VACATED.

The Court requests that the Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit convene a three-judge panel.

The Clerk is directed to reopen the case.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The government stated in a footnote in its Motion to Dismiss that the PREP Act “requires that willful misconduct claims be brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to a three-judge panel.” ECF 13-1 at 3 n.1. But neither it nor Plaintiff ever argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the Motion to Dismiss on its own.

CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge