UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. HARKAMAL SINGH (2026)

ORDER

A Superseding Indictment charged Defendant Harkamal Singh with two offenses arising out of statements made in connection with an attempted firearm purchase and the subsequent investigation into the attempted purchase occurring nearly two years later. Count One alleged that, on or about October 12, 2023, Mr. Singh knowingly made false statements to a federally licensed firearms dealer while attempting to acquire a Ruger, model P95, 9mm pistol by falsely stating that he was not an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States and that he had not been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). (Doc. 25 at 1.) Count Two alleged that, on September 18, 2025, Mr. Singh made a materially false statement within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) by representing he possessed a valid work permit when he attempted to purchase the firearm even though his work authorization had previously been revoked, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). Id.

At trial, Mr. Singh moved for judgment of acquittal on both counts under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The motion raised two principal issues: 1) whether the Government introduced sufficient evidence that Mr. Singh knew he had been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa; and 2) whether the language “illegally or unlawfully in the United States” as used on ATF Form 4473 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Singh under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). The court denied Mr. Singh's Motion with respect to Count Two, and the jury voted to acquit Mr. Singh on that count. The court granted Mr. Singh's Rule 29 motion as to Count One. This Order elaborates on the court's reasoning.

Standard

A court may grant a defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 “only if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Jabar, 19 F.4th 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation modified). The court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the government's favor, and deferring to the jury's assessment of witness credibility and its assessment of the weight of the evidence.” Id. (citation modified). “As long as the evidence would suffice to convince any rational trier of fact that the crime charged has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then the conviction must stand.” Id. (citation modified).

Analysis

I. The Government provided insufficient evidence that Mr. Singh knew he had been admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant visa.

After the close of the Government's case, Mr. Singh argued the Government failed to present evidence that he knew he had been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa. The defense emphasized that, while the evidence showed Mr. Singh entered on a K-2 visa as a child, there was no evidence he ever heard, understood, or used the term “nonimmigrant visa,” and no witness testified that anyone had explained to him that a K-2 visa falls within that category. The Government responded that the jury could infer knowledge from the surrounding circumstances, including his long immigration history, his receipt of notices from the federal government, his participation in removal proceedings, his DACA applications, and the fact that a K-2 visa is temporary.

The court dismissed this portion of Count One for insufficient evidence because, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the Government had not introduced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that Mr. Singh knew he had been admitted under a nonimmigrant visa. The evidence showed Mr. Singh entered on a K-2 visa and may have understood the K-2 visa was temporary, but the court found no evidence that the phrase “nonimmigrant visa” had ever been used with him or explained to him. The court further concluded the record did not support a conscious-avoidance theory because there was no evidentiary basis to infer that Mr. Singh had deliberately avoided learning that a K-2 visa was a nonimmigrant visa.

II. ATF Form 4473 is void for vagueness as applied to Mr. Singh under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a).

A. Legal Background

The second portion of Count Two as charged in Mr. Singh's case brings up several intertwined concepts: ambiguity, the rule of lenity, and the vagueness doctrine. The Supreme Court has explained these concepts fall under the general umbrella of the “fair warning requirement:”

There are three related manifestations of the fair warning requirement. First, the vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Second, as a sort of junior version of the vagueness doctrine, the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered. Third, although clarity at the requisite level may be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute, due process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope.

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (citation modified).

A defendant may bring a motion for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 on the grounds that a statute is ambiguous or unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015) (determining, in the context of review of a district court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, whether the phrase “tangible object” under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is ambiguous and applying the rule of lenity); United States v. Allen, 127 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Combs, No. 24-CR-542 (AS), 2025 WL 2778966, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2025) (citing United States v. Soler, 759 F.3d 226, 228–29 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. Dennis, 132 F.4th 214, 227–29 (2d Cir. 2025); and United States v. Lopez, 143 F.4th 99, 105–06 (2d Cir. 2025)) (“[A defendant] can bring his legal challenges [to his conviction] under Rule 29 despite not raising them earlier. These challenges are routinely made and decided by courts in this circuit, including the Second Circuit itself”).

Ambiguity and vagueness are closely related but distinct legal concepts. “A word or phrase is ambiguous when the question is which of two or more meanings applies; it is vague when its unquestionable meaning has uncertain application to various factual situations.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 32 (2012); see also 2A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45:2 (7th ed.) (“Modern courts typically frame the issue by stating that ambiguity exists when a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.”); Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 196 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation modified) (“A statute is ambiguous if its terms are susceptible to two or more reasonable meanings.”). Vague statutes violate due process because they (1) fail “to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited,” or (2) are “so standardless that [they] authoriz[e] or encourag[e] seriously discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)); see also Shilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)) (“[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine addresses concerns about (1) fair notice and (2) arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions.”). “The ‘touchstone’ of the notice prong ‘is whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant's conduct was criminal.’ ” Mannix v. Phillips, 619 F.3d 187, 197 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S. at 267). “The degree of vagueness tolerated in a statute varies with its type: economic regulations are subject to a relaxed vagueness test, laws with criminal penalties to a stricter one, and laws that might infringe constitutional rights to the strictest of all.” VIP of Berlin, LLC. v. Town of Berlin, 593 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Rubin v. Garvin, 544 F.3d 461, 467 (2d Cir. 2008)).

“It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.” United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975) (citing United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963)). In other words, a challenge based on vagueness that is not premised on the First Amendment is evaluated as-applied rather than facially. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991).

B. Application to Mr. Singh

In relevant part, Count One of the Superseding Indictment charges Mr. Singh with “knowingly ma[king] a false and fictitious written statement to the licensed dealer [of firearms], ․ to the effect that he was not an alien illegally and unlawfully in the United States, whereas in truth and in fact, he was an alien illegally and unlawfully in the United States.” (Doc. 25 at 1.) The statement at issue occurred when Mr. Singh checked the box reading “No” in response to the question on ATF Form 4473, “Are you an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States?”

Mr. Singh moved for the court to dismiss this portion of Count One because Mr. Singh could have reasonably understood that his pending asylum case, his wife's submission of Form I-130 to USCIS (the first step to help a relative—in this case, Mr. Singh—apply for lawful permanent residence), and the lack of a deportation order meant that he was not in the United States “illegally and unlawfully” in the context of ATF Form 4473. The Government contends a reasonable person in removal proceedings and in the process of applying for legal status should have understood that they were in the United States “illegally or unlawfully.”

Several courts have considered “void for vagueness” challenges to ATF Form 4473. See United States v. Ledvina, 166 F.4th 716, 720–21 (8th Cir. 2026) (addressing an “as-applied” vagueness challenge to a question on Form 4473 asking whether defendant was “an unlawful user of, or addicted to, marijuana or any depressant, stimulant, narcotic drug, or any other controlled substance”); United States v. Berry, 60 F.3d 288, 292 (7th Cir. 1995) (“This court will here assume without deciding that the same due process void for vagueness standards apply to the ATF Form 4473 as would generally apply to a federal criminal statute.”); United States v. Wilson, 175 F. App'x 294, 297 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying void for vagueness standard, i.e., whether a term is so confusing that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning, to ATF Form 4473); cf. Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 188 n.10 (2014) (determining whether the phrase “actual buyer” on ATF Form 4473 is ambiguous and thus whether the rule of lenity should apply).

The court concludes 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), as applied to Mr. Singh's response to Question 21m on ATF Form 4473, is void for vagueness. “In reviewing the ordinance's language for vagueness, we are relegated to the words of the ordinance itself, to the interpretations the court below has given to analogous statutes, and, perhaps to some degree, to the interpretation of the statute given by those charged with enforcing it.”^* Cunney v. Bd. of Trs. of Vill. of Grand View, N.Y., 660 F.3d 612, 621 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation modified). The plain text of the phrase “illegally or unlawfully in the United States” itself, its immediate context, and the context of the overall form do not clarify how the phrase should apply to Mr. Singh's case. The question itself does not provide definitions for the terms “unlawfully” or “illegally.” The remainder of the form provides no guidance as to their meaning. Other questions on Form 4473 include detailed information and warnings. Question 21, which contains fifteen separate questions, has lengthy instructions to assist in answering some of the questions, but has no specific instructions for the relevant question (Question 21m), “Are you an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States?” Cf. Ledvina, 166 F.4th at 721 (citation modified) (“Immediately below the question [about unlawful use of controlled substances] was an explicit warning notifying Ledvina that ‘the use or possession of marijuana remains unlawful under Federal law regardless of whether it has been legalized or decriminalized for medicinal or recreational purposes in the state where you reside.’ ”). Neither the question itself nor the accompanying instructions provided any explanation for Mr. Singh of how to determine whether he fell within this category.

While many, if not most, questions would not require further explanation to avoid a finding of vagueness, the wording of this question is particularly problematic given that the language “illegally or unlawfully in the United States” does not clearly correspond to familiar terms in immigration law. The form does not ask Mr. Singh whether he has lawful status, lawful presence, a period of authorized stay, or even on what grounds he could lawfully be in the country. See, e.g., United States v. Horma, Criminal No. 3:18crl8, 2018 WL 4214136, at *5–7 (E.D. Va. Sept. 4, 2018) (explaining difference between lawful status and lawful presence as used in the Immigration and Nationality Act). The failure to clarify what is being asked renders the language particularly vague with respect to Mr. Singh, who had a pending asylum application when he attempted to purchase the firearm. See, e.g., Fangfang Xu v. Cissna, 434 F. Supp. 3d 43, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Plaintiff is permitted to live in the United States without fear of being removed to her home country while her application [for asylum] is pending ․”); Cheng v. Garland, Case No. 1:24-cv-03465 (JLR), 2024 WL 5009146, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2024) (“Plaintiff is deemed lawfully present in the United States and has employment authorization, which she will be able to renew during the pendency of her asylum application.”).

Vague laws violate due process when a person of ordinary intelligence lacks fair notice of what is prohibited. Williams, 553 U.S. at 304 (2008). Mr. Singh has a complicated immigration history—he entered the United States as a child on a K-2 visa, lived here for several years before removal proceedings were initiated against him, received repeated deferrals of removal under DACA, and attempted to gain several different forms of immigration relief, including by applying to receive DACA again, applying for asylum, and beginning the process of gaining lawful permanent residency through his wife. Under these circumstances, the court cannot find the phrase “illegally or unlawfully in the United States” made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that Mr. Singh answered the question falsely for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). See Mannix, 619 F.3d at 197 (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S. at 267).

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, Mr. Singh's motion for a judgment of acquittal on Count One is GRANTED.

DATED at Rutland, in the District of Vermont, this 11th day of March 2026.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.   After the Second Circuit's decision in Cunney, the Supreme Court “has clarified that law enforcement agency interpretations of criminal statutes are not entitled to deference: Whether the Government interprets a criminal statute too broadly (as it sometimes does) or too narrowly, a court has an obligation to correct its error.” United States v. Balde, 943 F.3d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 2019) (citation modified).

Mary Kay Lanthier United States District Judge