UNITED STATES v. MORRIS (2025)

ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on Taylor Morris’ (Defendant) Motion to Suppress. (ECF No. 37). Defendant moves to suppress a firearm seized during a traffic stop as well as statements made to officers. The Government filed a Response, arguing the officers acted with probable cause and reasonable suspicion. (ECF No. 50). This motion has been thoroughly briefed and the court received testimony and oral argument. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review. For the reasons stated below, the motion to suppress is granted.

Also before the court is a motion to quash filed by third-party Lexington County Sheriff's Office (“LCSO”). (ECF No. 35). LCSO seeks to quash Defendant's subpoena requesting policies and procedures related to body-worn camera (“bwc”) use. As explained below, that motion is denied.

II. FACTS 1

Around 1:30 a.m. on January 12, 2024, Corporal David Castro of the Richland County Sheriff's Department stopped a white Lincoln sedan in Columbia, South Carolina. The Lincoln pulled over beside the sidewalk on the 700 block of Wilkes Road. Defendant Morris was a passenger in the backseat of the Lincoln. This stop forms the basis of Defendant's motion.

a. The Initial Stop

Prior to the stop, the Midlands Gang Task Force received information that members of a local bloods gang rented out a business near Fontaine Road in Columbia, S.C. to have a late-night event. Members of the task force and other local law enforcement officers conducted an operation in the area surrounding the event to suppress any violence or criminal activity that may have resulted from the concentration of gang members in the area. Of note, Castro of the Richland County Sheriff's Department was stationed near the area in his vehicle. Tyler Kennedy, an investigator with the Lexington County Sheriff's Department, was also present in his vehicle.

During the operation, Inv. Armando Yturria ² with the Richland County Sheriff's Department was stationed in an unmarked vehicle conducting surveillance at the location. Throughout the night, Yturria communicated information to other members of the task force related to suspicious individuals and vehicles entering and leaving the location.

In one instance, Yturria communicated that a suspicious individual exited the back of the venue, entered a vehicle, and left the location. Castro testified that he heard Yturria relay a description of the vehicle, a white Lincoln sedan, while sitting in his unmarked patrol vehicle near the location. Castro further testified that Yturria reported that the white Lincoln had run a red light exiting the parking lot. Castro did not witness this alleged traffic violation but saw the white Lincoln moments after Yturria's report. Although unmarked, Castro's vehicle was equipped with blue lights, and he initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle. Castro reiterated numerous times that the sole basis for initiating the stop was Yturria's report that the vehicle ran a red light. This is echoed in his written report. Additionally, bwc footage shows Castro discussing red and yellow lights with the driver shortly after pulling her over.³

Herein lies the problem: these is no red light at this location. Although the subject intersection has three red lights, there is no traffic signal or device for those exiting this private parking lot and entering the roadway. All parties admit this to be true. Therefore, it is impossible that the subject driver ran a red light. The photo below shows this intersection from the viewpoint of a driver exiting the private drive.

Contrary to Castro's testimony, Yturria testified at the hearing that he never reported any vehicle running a red light because he could not see any traffic signals from his location. Instead, Yturria testified that he reported vehicles that failed to clear the intersection. Stated differently, Yturria reported vehicles that left the private drive and entered the public roadway without stopping at all. Yturria did not instruct any other officer to conduct a traffic stop. Instead, he merely relayed information and allowed other nearby officers to make an independent determination as to whether a stop was warranted. Yturria took no notes and did not recall any specific vehicle or individual he reported that night. Accordingly, he had no recollection as to any specific report made regarding Morris or the white Lincoln.

b. Morris’ Removal from the Vehicle

The white Lincoln stopped for Castro's blue lights, and Corporal Rebekah Smith with the Richland County Sheriff's Department provided backup in a marked patrol vehicle. When Castro arrived at the driver's window, he informed her that he stopped her because she ran a red light. Castro also asked the driver where she was coming from, and the driver confirmed that she was coming from Fontaine Road and that she was an Uber driver. The driver insisted the light was yellow and Castro told her that she cannot speed through a yellow light and that she should slow down and wait for the red light.⁴ Although there was no red light at the intersection leaving the subject location, the Uber driver drove through several other intersections with traffic signals prior to Castro's stop. She testified that she believed she had been pulled over relating to one of these later intersections.

Smith approached the passenger's side of the vehicle and shined her flashlight into the vehicle while Castro spoke to the driver. Castro looked into the back passenger's seat of the vehicle and spoke to Defendant. Once he saw Defendant's face, he recognized her because she is well-known as a gang member by members of the gang task force and other law enforcement officers operating in Richland County.⁵ Castro winked at Smith to let her know that she should engage with Defendant, However, Smith testified that she did not see the nonverbal communication and instead decided to engage with Defendant because of Castro's overall interaction with her. Smith knocked on the rear passenger's side window, and Defendant rolled the window down and stated she was catching an Uber home.

The Government alleges that Smith then asked for Defendant's identification, and when Defendant went to reach for her license, Smith noticed what appeared to be a bulge from a firearm in the front pocket of Defendant's hoodie. Specifically, Smith testified that she could see a magazine sticking out of Morris’ hoodie pocket. It was later revealed that Morris indeed possessed a gun with an extended magazine. Defendant contests that Smith saw any such bulge as her bwc does not show a bulge in Defendant's front pocket. However, the bwc, which was positioned on Smith's vest, did not have the same view as Smith herself. After Defendant handed Smith her license, she called her mother. While Defendant was on the phone with her mother, she began reaching around near her waist area and Smith instructed her to stop.

Based on these circumstances, Smith then decided to detain Defendant. Smith instructed the driver to unlock the door and instructed Defendant to keep her hands on the seat in front of her. Smith opened the door and took control of one of Defendant's hands. She instructed Castro to grab the other, which he did by going through the rear driver's side door. During this time, Smith was instructing Defendant to step out of the vehicle.

Kennedy, Castro, and Smith pulled Defendant out of the vehicle and Castro grabbed the firearm from Defendant's pocket after Smith alerted him to the presence of the firearm. The officers then engaged in a brief struggle with Defendant which resulted in them wrestling her to the ground and putting handcuffs on her. Just before Defendant is wrestled to the ground, she bumped into Smith's body worn camera, causing it to shut off. However, the remainder of events are captured on Smith's dashboard camera. The officers were able to secure Defendant and the firearm after approximately one minute and fifteen seconds.

Once the scene was secure, Smith observed that her body-worn camera was off and turned it on. Smith mirandized Defendant who then stated that she did not have a concealed weapons permit and that she could not have any guns.

Defendant now moves to suppress the gun and statements made during the stop by arguing that the initial stop was unreasonable because Castro lacked probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred and that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Defendant was armed and dangerous.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[S]earches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The government bears the burden to justify a warrantless search or seizure. United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc). “When police violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, the government may be forbidden from using the improperly obtained evidence at trial.” United States v. Villa, 70 F.4th 704, 716 (4th Cir. 2023).

“A traffic stop is a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and must be reasonable under the circumstances.” United States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 648 (4th Cir. 2016). “[A] passenger is considered ‘seized’ for Fourth Amendment purposes when a police officer makes a traffic stop.” United States v. Soriano-Jarquin, 492 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007)). “If a passenger is considered ‘seized’ for Fourth Amendment purposes when a police officer makes a traffic stop, that passenger may then challenge the constitutionality of the actions taken during that stop.” Id.

The standard governing traffic stops under the Fourth Amendment is well-established in this Circuit. Traffic stops are subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The standard the Supreme Court articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889] (1968), applies to traffic stops because they are investigatory stops rather than custodial arrests. Accordingly, [a court must] ask (1) if the stop was legitimate at its inception, and (2) if the officer's actions during the seizure were reasonably related in scope to the basis for the traffic stop. For the initial stop to be reasonable, the officer must have probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred.

United States v. Miller, 54 F.4th 219, 228 (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).

The government bears the burden to justify a warrantless search or seizure. United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc).

IV. ANALYSIS

a. The Initial Stop

Defendant argues that Castro (1) lacked probable cause to initiate the traffic stop and (2) the search and seizure of Defendant after the stop was initiated was unreasonable.

Defendant first argues that Castro lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop.⁶ The presence or absence of reasonable suspicion must be determined in light of the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer, including all information available to the officer and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn at the time of the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1989)). In making a reasonable-suspicion determination, the reviewing court “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). “For the initial stop to be reasonable, the officer must have probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred.” Miller, 54 F.4th at 228. “Probable cause exists if, given the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that [a person] had committed or was committing an offense.” United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). Accordingly, the “inquiry here is whether, given the totality of the circumstances,” Corporal Castro “had reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to support a prudent person's belief that” a traffic offense occurred. Id. at 588

Defendant initially argued that that Castro lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion because it is not illegal to drive through a yellow light.⁷ To support this argument, Defendant refers to Castro's report in which he indicates that the reason for the traffic stop was the Lincoln “disregarding a red light.” However, he further wrote “the light turns yellow before red and that means that you need to start slowing down to prepare for the light to go red instead of trying to beat the red light.” He likewise said during the stop, “When that light is yellow, that means you gotta slow down and wait for the red light.” Defendant avers that driving through a yellow light is not a traffic offense and therefore, the Government had no probable cause to initiate this stop.

However, at the hearing, Defendant introduced evidence showing the lack of a traffic signal altogether. Accordingly, Defendant's theory evolved into the argument that without a red light, there could be no traffic violation. Moreover, Castro testified that he was familiar with the area. Although Castro testified that Yturria relayed that a white Lincoln had run a red light exiting the parking lot, this contention is belied by Yturria's testimony. Yturria unequivocally testified that he never reported any car running a red light and instead reported cars that failed to stop at the intersection before turning onto the public road. The Government thus avers that Castro misheard or misunderstood the specific traffic violation and erroneously believed Yturria's report was for running a red light. As the Government would have it, Castro's belief that the Lincoln disregarded a red light was a reasonable mistake of fact made in good faith. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 135 S.Ct. 530, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014)(“[A] search or seizure may be permissible even though the justification for the action includes a reasonable factual mistake”).

Castro avers that he pulled the Lincoln over based on Yturria's observations of a white Lincoln running a red light which Yturria then communicated to Castro over the radio. This argument, viewed in isolation, makes sense. It can hardly be disputed that Castro could reasonably rely on real-time information relayed to him by a fellow officer that Castro knew was in position to view such movements and traffic offenses. Probable cause exists if, given the totality of the circumstances, the officer “had reasonably trustworthy information ․ sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.” United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jenkins v. Keating, 147 F.3d 577, 585 (7th Cir. 1998) (“So long as a reasonably credible witness or victim informs the police that someone has committed, or is committing, a crime, the officers have probable cause to place the alleged culprit under arrest”). Accordingly, if Castro's version of events is credited, Yturria's report of a white Lincoln running a red light provided Castro with the probable cause necessary to initiate a stop.

However, Castro's version of events is contradicted by Yturria's testimony that he never reported a car running a red light. Moreover, it was physically impossible for the white Lincoln to run a red light that did not exist. Although the Government argues that Castro's belief is merely the by-product of a mistaken or misunderstood report from Yturria, there is no evidence in the record to justify such an error. The record before the court presents a close call on whether Castro's mistaken belief can truly be seen as reasonable.

Ultimately, the court finds that the Government has failed to meet its burden in showing that this warrantless stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Put simply, Castro, who alleges he is readily familiar with this geographical area, was not reasonable in believing the driver ran a red light when no such red light existed, and no such report was ever made. “The Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes—whether of fact or of law—must be objectively reasonable. We do not examine the subjective understanding of the particular officer involved.” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 66, 135 S.Ct. 530, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014). Although officers are entitled to make reasonable mistakes of fact or law, the Government has failed to show how any such mistake here could be seen as reasonable.

The court would note that it asked for supplemental briefing on whether any traffic violation could have occurred despite the absence of a red light. The Government indeed indicated that it may be illegal to proceed onto a public road without first stopping at an intersection. S.C. Code Ann.§ 56-5-2745.⁸ However, as Defendant's supplement points out, the court is not permitted to engage in such post hoc reasoning. See United States v. Peters, 60 F.4th 855, 864 (4th Cir. 2023)(“While seemingly innocent factors may demonstrate reasonable suspicion when viewed together, the Government cannot rely upon post hoc rationalizations to validate those seizures that happen to turn up contraband.”)(cleaned up); See also Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 381, 140 S.Ct. 1183, 206 L.Ed.2d 412 (2020) (Noting that a court considers “the facts known to [the officer] at the time of the stop.”).

Instead, the court is left to analyze the reason originally presented for the stop. Here, Castro unequivocally reported that he initiated the stop for running a red light. Thus, any later justification cannot be used to support a stop. Because no red light existed and Yturria never reported the driver running a red light, Castro's reason for the stop is basically nonexistent. Moreover, Castro should have been aware of this non-existence given his experience and knowledge of the area. Accordingly, the Government has failed to show this stop was reasonable. Because the initial stop violates the Fourth Amendment, Defendant's motion to suppress must be granted.

b. Morris’ Removal from the Vehicle

Although the above analysis is dispositive of the motion, the court will nonetheless address Defendant's claim that the Officer's actions following the initial stop were unreasonable. Specifically, Defendant avers that even if the officers had probable cause to initiate the stop, they improperly removed Defendant from the vehicle and searched her for a weapon in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Defendant acknowledges that Police may order a passenger to exit a vehicle pending completion of a traffic stop, Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997), but they cannot frisk her without reasonable suspicion that she “may be armed and presently dangerous.” United States v. Buster, 26 F.4th 627, 634 (4th Cir. 2022) (emphasis in original) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868); see Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) (extending Terry to frisks of passengers).

Defendant attempts to minimize her actions during the traffic stop. Specifically, Defendant called her mother after Smith began speaking with her. Additionally, Smith notes in her report that Defendant was “reaching around her waistline/pockets.” Defendant avers that the Fourth Circuit has recognized that even “frenzied arm movements” are not alone sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246–48 (4th Cir. 2011). Instead, “some more concrete factors” are necessary “to demonstrate that there was a reasonable suspicion of current criminal activity.” Id. at 247 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant then seeks to cast Smith's observation of a bulge in Defendant's front pocket as a standalone issue. However, this approach is incompatible with the search for probable cause. Law enforcement interactions such as these are to be evaluated based on “the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).

Here, Smith's observations of a bulge and an extended magazine alone presented enough reasonable suspicion to believe Defendant was armed. Furthermore, the fact that Defendant decided to ignore commands to keep her hands still and instead call her mother during a traffic stop and continue to reach around her waistband, when combined with a visible bulge in her jacket, could lead a reasonable officer to suspect she was armed and presently dangerous. Moreover, after Defendant failed to comply with the instructions of law enforcement officers to get out of the vehicle, Castro was justified in believing Defendant was armed and dangerous when he received information from Smith that Defendant was in possession of a firearm. Thus, Smith had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry search which revealed a gun in Defendant's possession.

Additionally, Defendant presented for the first time at oral argument the theory that the traffic stop had been unreasonably extended. However, the bwc footage shows Castro informing the driver he would write her a warning for the violation. However, the struggle with Morris began before Castro could write the warning. Accordingly, the traffic stop was not unreasonably extended. Consequently, Defendant's arguments on these grounds are unavailing.

Although the officers were reasonable in their actions after the initial stop occurred, the court finds that the original stop was unjustified. Therefore, the entirety of the evidence flowing from that stop must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

c. Motion to Quash

Also pending before the court is a motion to quash filed by the Lexington County Sheriff's Office. Defendant in this case is attempting to subpoena any bwc footage related to this incident ⁹ as well as any polices or procedures LCSO may have regarding the use of bwc. LCSO avers that it has no bwc footage and is refusing to produce any written policies regarding bwc footage. They have thus moved to quash the subpoena. LCSO essentially argues that Defendant cannot show how this evidence would be admissible or relevant in the instant action.

Rule 17(c) permits a defendant to issue a subpoena duces tecum to compel the production at trial of “books, papers, documents, data, or other objects.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(1). “On motion made promptly, the court may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(2). “A subpoena should be quashed as unreasonable or oppressive if it is irrelevant; abusive or harassing; overly vague; or excessively broad.” United States v. Rand, 835 F.3d 451, 463 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Rule 17(c) is not intended to provide a means of pretrial discovery; rather, its primary purpose is simply ‘to expedite the trial by providing a time and place before trial for the inspection of subpoenaed materials.” United States v. Rand, 835 F.3d 451, 462 (4th Cir. 2016)(cleaned up). Accordingly, the requesting party must establish (1) relevancy, (2) admissibility, and (3) specificity of the item sought. Id.

Defendant argues that the policy is relevant as Kennedy did not utilize a bwc which may be in contravention of the applicable LCSO policy. Defendant reasons that whether Kennedy complied with the LCSO's policy bears directly on his credibility should he testify at trial. See United States v. Hammond, 821 F. App'x 203, 208–09 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Evidence concerning a witness's credibility is relevant ․ because it might affect the finder of fact's determination of the weight to attach to the witness's testimony regarding matters of significance to the determination of the action.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Garcia, 554 F. Supp. 3d 421, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (explaining multiple courts “have held that the failure to activate the body camera is an adverse credibility factor”).

Accordingly, Defendant avers that the policy is relevant. Defendant also argues that the policy is admissible as a matter affecting the credibility of a witness. Lastly, Defendant avers this request is sufficiently specific because it requests a single particular written policy.

The court agrees. Defendant's request is relevant and sufficiently tailored as it requests a single document. Accordingly, the motion to quash is denied and LCSO is ordered to produce the bwc policy.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion to suppress (ECF No. 37) is granted and LCSO's motion to quash (ECF No. 35) is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Yturria was not presented by either party to produce testimony related to this stop. However, this court found his testimony necessary in analyzing the legality of this search. Accordingly, the court ordered the government to produce Yturria pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 614 so he could testify as to his actions on the night in question.

3.   The white Lincoln was driven by an Uber driver who had picked Morris up at the subject location.

4.   In his incident report, Castro claimed the reason for the traffic stop was the Lincoln “disregarding a red light.” However, he also wrote “the light turns yellow before red and that means that you need to start slowing down to prepare for the light to go red instead of trying to beat the red light.”

5.   The Government alleges that one of the incidents that contributed to this knowledge is count one of the indictment in this case. That count alleges Defendant was in possession of ammunition in connection with a shooting incident on June 11, 2023, and is not the subject of a suppression motion.

6.   The parties disagree as to whether the applicable standard is probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Ultimately, the answer is irrelevant because the outcome will remain the same under either standard. Either the government's version of events—that Castro reasonably believed the Lincoln ran a red light—is credible and both probable cause and reasonable suspicion exist, or it is not, in which case neither exists. However, it appears the greater weight of Fourth Circuit precedent stands for the proposition that reasonable suspicion is sufficient to conduct a traffic stop. See United States v. Johnson, 734 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir. 2013) (“A traffic stop is reasonable, and therefore not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, if it is justified by probable cause or reasonable suspicion.”); United States v. White, 836 F.3d 437, 441 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[R]easonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred provides law enforcement officers with a constitutionally adequate basis to initiate a traffic stop.”); United States v. Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[A] police officer's inability to identify the correct code section at the time of a stop does not undermine valid probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a driver violated a traffic law.”).

7.   The relevant statute concerning traffic signals states “Steady yellow indication: Vehicular traffic facing a steady circular yellow or yellow arrow signal is thereby warned that the related green movement is being terminated or that a red indication will be exhibited immediately thereafter.” S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-970(B)(1). Thus, under the plain language of the statute, there is no requirement to stop or slow down for a yellow light.

8.   S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2745 provides:The driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, building, private road or driveway within a business or residential district shall stop the vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across the alley, building entrance, road or driveway or, in the event there is no sidewalk area, shall stop at the point nearest the street to be entered where the driver has a view of approaching traffic.

9.   Officer Tyler Kennedy mentioned above is employed by the LCSO.

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., United States District Judge