Stephen Baske, Plaintiff, v. Jasper County, a political subdivision of., the State of South Carolina, et al., Defendants. (2025)

AMENDED ORDER

The Plaintiff brings this matter before the Court with their motion for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiff claims the Jasper County Fire Department discharged him for exercising his First Amendment rights. (Dkt. No. 5). Plaintiff seeks his reinstatement to his former position during the pendency of this litigation. Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that they had a legitimate interest in terminating Plaintiff's employment with the County based upon statements he made online while off duty. (Dkt. No. 15). The Court conducted oral argument on the motion on April 24, 2025. The motion is now ripe for disposition.

Factual Background

Plaintiff, a United States Navy veteran with long experience as a firefighter and EMT, began employment with the Jasper County Fire Department on May 22, 2023. Prior to the present controversy over his online communication, Plaintiff had an unblemished disciplinary record. On February 2, 2025, while off duty and at home on his personal device, Plaintiff engaged in a discussion on Reddit, a social media platform, with various persons online. (Dkt. No. 5 at 4). One participant in the discussion sought the advice of others regarding difficulties she was experiencing with her boyfriend over a streaming service she operated, in which she reportedly made $14,000 a month. She feared the breakup of her relationship with the boyfriend might terminate her access to her streaming service and her income. (Dkt. No. 15-2 at 1-2).

Plaintiff commented on the post and assumed that any woman making $14,000 a month on a streaming program must be involved with an adult web site. Plaintiff stated that engaging in such alleged activity involves “selling your body” and further stated that “you seem to be lacking brains.” (Id. at 2). Several others chimed in and those taking part in the online discussion exchanged vituperative comments. One commenter, Tania Dubodiel, commented to Plaintiff “are you dumb?” because there were streaming services other than adult sites. Plaintiff responded, referring to Ms. Dubodiel as “an imbecile.” (Id. at 3). Plaintiff noticed that Ms. Dubodiel picture showed her wearing a mask and in front of a Ukrainian flag. He commented, “OK Asshat your mask explains EVERYTHING․and the Ukrainazi flag.” (Id. at 4). Ms. Dubodiel responded she wears a mask because she is a medical student and healthcare worker and has the Ukrainian flag because she is Ukrainian. She then stated that the “only Nazi․here is you.” (Id. at 4). Plaintiff responded that Ms. Dubodiel was a “healthcare whore” and that Ukraine was a “well known established Nazi nation presently and historically.” Ms. Dubodiel responded in kind, telling Plaintiff, “you're a fucking idiot” and “you're the one with the Nazi president.” (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff responded Ukraine had an “unelected dictator gay actor” as its president and he could not wait until the Russians arrested him. (Id. at 5).

One day after this less than civil exchange on Reddit, Ms. Dubodiel determined where Plaintiff was employed and emailed his superior, Fire Chief Russell Wells, the following: “Your senior firefighter Stephen Baske is a xenophobe and a racist, and frankly, it's concerning the shit he is spewing.” Ms. Dubodiel provided a copy of the online exchange. Mr. Wells responded: “I will look into this immediately.” (Dkt. No. 15-3 at 1). Three days later, Chief Wells recommended Plaintiff's termination, explaining that “it is essential that your actions be beyond reproach and in the best interest of the County you serve.” Mr. Wells went on to state that although the interaction was with a “civilian” and on his personal time, “the complaint has now arrived at the employer.” Mr. Wells concluded: “Given the egregious conduct and the complaint filed with Jasper County Emergency Services, it is recommended that FF/AEMT Stephen Baske be discharged.” (Dkt. No. 15-4). The following day, the County's Human Resources Director terminated Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 15-5).

Legal Standard

A. Preliminary Injunction

“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must make a “clear showing” that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 21 (2008). Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that each factor supports his request for preliminary injunction. Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir. 1991). Irreparable injury must be both imminent and likely; speculation about potential future injuries is insufficient. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Direx Israel, 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir. 1991) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Discharge Of Public Employee For Speech Related Activity

It is well settled that “a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech” and a public employee has the First Amendment right to speak out on a matter of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). A public employee's speech is a matter of public concern where it “involves an issue of social, political, or other interest to the community.” Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 776 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 406–7 (4th Cir.2000)). “The inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question of whether it deals with a matter of public concern.” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987). A “bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment․ is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).

Where a public employee has spoken out on a matter of public concern, it is necessary to seek a “balance between the interests of the [employee] as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Factors to consider when weighing the interest of the government as employer in an employee free speech case include whether the speech: “(1) impairs the ability of supervisors to mete out discipline; (2) impairs harmony among co-workers; (3) damages close working relationships; (4) impedes the performance of the public employee's duties; (5) interferes with the operations of the agency; and (6) is communicated to the public or to co-workers in private.” Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d at 778.

In addressing a public employee's free speech claim, a district court must consider three questions. First, does the speech relate to a matter of public concern? If the speech at issue does not involve a matter of public concern, no further First Amendment inquiry is necessary. Second, does the employee's interest in free expression outweigh the employer's interest in the efficient operation of the workplace? If the employer's interest in an efficient and orderly workplace prevails in the balancing of the employee and employer's interests, no further First Amendment inquiry is necessary. Third, is there a causal relationship between the protected speech and the retaliatory employment action? If the employee has an affirmative response to all three questions, the First Amendment entitles the employee to relief. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d at 776.

Discussion

A. Can Plaintiff Make a Clear Showing That He Is Likely To Succeed On The Merits In His First Amendment Claim?

Following the Love-Lane analysis, the Court first addresses whether the speech at issue relates to a matter of public concern. This is determined by the “content, form, and context of a given statement.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. at 147 (1983).

While the form of Plaintiff's online statements can fairly be described as provocative, intemperate, and at times uncivil, the content addressed several highly contested public issues, including the Russian-Ukraine War, Ukrainian President Zelensky, President Donald Trump, and the use of masks to prevent the spread of contagious diseases. Ms. Dubodiel, a patriotic Ukrainian, was understandably offended by Plaintiff's attacks on her country, her president, and the pejorative way Plaintiff addressed her. But she gave as good as she got. She referred to the American President and Plaintiff as Nazis and called Plaintiff a “fucking idiot.” (Dkt. No. 1-8 at 6)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's speech is best be described as “name calling” and a matter of personal interest. (Dkt. No. 15 at 7-8). Many who do not spend hours on social media throwing insults may find Plaintiff and Ms. Dubodiel's statements offensive and uncivil. But it is undeniable that their disagreements, however expressed, relate to matters of great public debate. The Court finds that Plaintiff's online statements relate to matters of public concern.

Second, after deciding the Plaintiff's speech involved matters of public concern, the Court must address whether the employer's interest in the efficient operation of its workplace outweighs the employee's interest to speak out on matters of public concern, which is a core First Amendment issue. Pickering v. Board of Education, at 568. It is important to note that Plaintiff's speech involved posting on social media sites on his personal devices while off duty. Defendants assert that certain unnamed fellow employees are apprehensive about working with Plaintiff in light of his online comments. Defendants also speculate that some of Plaintiff's comments may cause disharmony among coworkers and offend coworkers who may be Ukrainian, gay, or female. (Dkt. No. 15 at 11-12). However, Defendants have offered no specific evidence to support evidence to support these claims.

In recognition that there is little to no evidence of actual disruption caused by Plaintiff's comments, only that Plaintiff's comments “could reasonably cause apprehension,” Defendants argue they are not required to “await actual disruption before acting.” (Dkt. No. 15 at 11-2). Defendants cite Jackson v. Bair to support their claim that a public employer need not “await actual disruption before acting.” 851 F.2d 714, 722 (4th Cir.) In Jackson, a correctional officer who voiced concerns regarding the operation of the prison was terminated. There was no record of evidence indicating that the officer's speech caused actual disruption. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant and the Fourth Circuit reversed, saying when an employer acts in response to a “mere potential for disruption,” the action must “objectively justifiable under the circumstances ․ Otherwise, the right would be no stronger than the timidity or nervousness or impatience of the particular employer, in which case it would be effectively no right.” Id. at 718. On this record, the Court finds no evidence to support actual disruption and no objectively reasonable basis to conclude that Plaintiff's online comments to Ms. Dubodiel made while off duty would likely disrupt the orderly conducting of the Jasper County Fire Department's operations.

Defendants further speculate that perhaps others may have seen Plaintiff's online comments, and this would affect the ability of the Fire Department to perform its duties. Again, Defendants have offered no evidence that anyone residing in Jasper County saw Plaintiff's communication on Reddit or have any engagement with this online platform. Further, since Ms. Dubodiel appears to reside outside Jasper County—and indeed outside the United States—it seems unlikely that Plaintiff would encounter her while performing his public duties as a fireman and EMT. In sum, after carefully balancing the interests of the employer and employee in this matter, Defendants have failed to show that any alleged inefficiency in the operations of the Jasper County Fire Department caused by Plaintiff's online comments outweigh Plaintiff's right as a private citizen to speak out on matters of public concern in online discussions while off duty.

Third, the Court considers whether Defendants terminated Plaintiff's employment due to his protected speech. There is no dispute on the matter. Defendants readily admit they fired Plaintiff because of his online statements to Ms. Dubediel, asserting in their memorandum in opposition to the motion for a preliminary injunction that “Jasper County had a legitimate interest in terminating the Plaintiff based on his speech.” (Dkt. No. 15 at 10).

In sum, at this stage of the litigation, Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing that he will likely succeed on the merits of his First Amendment claim.¹

B. Can Plaintiff Make a Clear Showing That He Will Suffer Irreparable Injury In The Absence Of Preliminary Relief?

A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate the presence of irreparable injury. “A showing of irreparable harm is the sine qua non of injunctive relief.” Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir.1990) (citing Frejlach v. Butler, 573 F.2d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir.1978)).

It is established that the “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). Defendants, seeking to distinguish Elrod, argue that since Plaintiff is already fired, he can now speak all he wishes and has no irreparable injury, whereas in Elrod the Plaintiffs were threatened with dismissal. (Dkt. No. 15 at 17) (emphasis added). This distinction is not sufficient to overcome the well-established doctrine that when constitutional freedoms are abrogated, even for a minimal period, it constitutes an irreparable injury for purposes of injunctive relief. See Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338 (4th Cir. 2022), Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Dep't, 2 F.4th 330 (4th Cir. 2021), In re Murphy-Brown, LLC, 907 F.3d 788 (4th Cir. 2018). Therefore, Plaintiff has made a clear showing that their termination resulted in an irreparable injury absent injunctive relief.

C. Can Plaintiff Show That The Balance Of Equities Tips In His Favor And An Injunction Is In The Public Interest?

Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his First Amendment claim and a clear showing of irreparable harm absent preliminary relief. The Court now addresses the final considerations required for granting a preliminary injunction: whether the balance of equities favors the Plaintiff and if an injunction serves the public interest. These two factors merge when the opposing party is a government entity. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)

In balancing the equities, the Court considers the respective harms to Plaintiff and Defendants. Plaintiff has suffered the loss of employment and infringement upon constitutionally protected speech. Defendants argue that reinstatement may cause workplace disruption or affect department efficiency. However, Defendants’ claims of potential disruption remain speculative and lack specific evidentiary support. Given that Plaintiff engaged in speech off duty, on a personal device, and without evidence of any actual or potential disruption to department operations, the balance of equities strongly favors Plaintiff.

Regarding the public interest, protecting constitutional rights—particularly a core First Amendment right like freedom of speech—inherently serves the public good. Conversely, Defendants have articulated no significant public interest in preventing Plaintiff's reinstatement pending further litigation. Therefore, Plaintiff has made a clear showing that both the balance of equities and the public interest are in his favor, warranting the relief of a preliminary injunction.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 5) and directs that Plaintiff be promptly reinstated to his former position pending the disposition of this case on the merits.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendants offered for the first time at oral argument on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction a copy of Jasper County's social media policy. (Court Exhibit No. 1). The policy expressly provides that “[e]mployees are free to engage in personal use of social and electronic media on personal devices during non-work time and express themselves as private citizens through these media outlets to the degree that the speech does not impair or impede the performance of duties, impair discipline and harmony among coworkers or negatively affect the public perception of the department and/or the county and its officials.” Id. at § 4.02. On the record before the Court, Defendants have failed to provide any evidence of actual adverse impact Plaintiff's exchange with Dubodiel had on Jasper County's operations.

Richard Mark Gergel United States District Judge