UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LUIS MELÉNDEZ RAMOS (2026)

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is defendant Luis Meléndez-Ramos’ motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). (Docket No. 225.) For the following reasons, his motion is DENIED.

I. Background

Mr. Meléndez and his co-defendant, Byron Montijo-Maysonet, were indicted in 2016 with multiple counts of transporting minors with intent to commit criminal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). The indictment alleged that, on two occasions in November 2015, Mr. Meléndez and Mr. Montijo transported two minor females, ages 13 and 14, from their school to a motel in Arecibo, Puerto Rico and engaged in sexual activity with them. (Docket No. 28 at pp. 1-5.) At the time of the offense, Mr. Meléndez was 21 years old. (Docket No. 73 at p. 11.) A forensic examination of Mr. Meléndez's phone after his arrest also revealed dozens of videos depicting him engaging in sexual activity with another minor female who was 16 years old at the time the videos were created. Id. at 14. Mr. Meléndez was also charged with production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2251(e).

Mr. Meléndez entered into a plea agreement with the government in which he agreed to plea guilty to the single count of production of child pornography in exchange for the dismissal of the multiple counts of transportation of a minor with intent to commit unlawful sexual activity. (Docket No. 73.) By contrast, Mr. Montijo was found guilty at trial of one count of coercion and enticement of a minor and four counts of transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. (Docket No. 196.) The plea agreement entered into between Mr. Meléndez and the government stipulated that his total adjusted offense level was 38, after taking into account a three-point reduction for his acceptance of responsibility. (Docket No. 73 at pp. 4-5.) The Court found that Mr. Meléndez had a criminal history category of II. (Docket No. 94.) Accordingly, his guidelines sentence range was between 262 and 327 months. Id. At sentencing, the Court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), considered Mr. Meléndez's age, his troubled childhood and family environment, his prior criminal history, and the seriousness of the offense, and sentenced him below the guideline range, to 192 months imprisonment, followed by ten years of supervised release. (Docket No. 93.) His co-defendant, Mr. Montijo, was sentenced to 198 months of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. (Docket No. 196.)

After serving ten years in prison, Mr. Meléndez now brings this motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). (Docket No. 225.) He raises five arguments as to why his sentence should be reduced: (1) his sentence of 192 months constitutes an “unusually long sentence” within the meaning of United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”) § 1B1.13(b)(6); (2) the disparity in sentence between himself and his co-defendant constitutes an “extreme and compelling” circumstance; (3) the COVID-19 pandemic-era restrictions made his sentence more punitive than what was contemplated at the time of sentencing; (4) his rehabilitation while in prison weighs in favor of a sentence reduction; and (5) that all of the aforementioned circumstances bear on the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and counsel a reduced sentence. As discussed below, none of the circumstances Mr. Meléndez identifies is sufficient to meet the high bar imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) and USSG § 1B1.13 for a sentence reduction.

II. Legal Standard

The compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1), “carve[s] out a narrow exception to the general rule that the court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” United States v. Saccoccia, 10 F.4th 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2021). A sentence may only be reduced pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) if a court finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and that “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). In its policy statement on sentence reductions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), the United States Sentencing Commission has outlined what circumstances constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” These include (1) the medical condition of the defendant; (2) the old age of the defendant combined with deteriorating health; (3) circumstances in which a close family member of the defendant is left without a caretaker, leaving the defendant as the person's only available caretaker; (4) sexual or physical abuse by a prison employee; and (5) “other reasons” similar in gravity to those described in (1) through (4). See USSG 1B1.13(b)(1)-(5). Pursuant to USSG 1B1.13(b)(5), “district courts [may] consider almost any complex of circumstances that a defendant alleges as a potential extraordinary and compelling reason for early release.” United States v. Vázquez, 793 F. Supp. 3d 423, 429 (D.P.R. 2025) (Besosa, J.) (quoting United States v. Sepúlveda, 762 F. Supp. 3d 153, 157 (D.R.I. 2025)). Nonetheless, “[a] reason is ‘extraordinary’ and ‘compelling’ only if it is sufficiently unusual and convincing to ‘warrant’ compassionate release.” Rutherford v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1320, 1332 (2026). The Sentencing Commission's policy statement also indicates that the rehabilitation of the defendant by itself does not constitute an extraordinary and compelling circumstance, but it may be considered alongside other factors to determine whether a sentence reduction is warranted. USSG 1B1.13(d).

In 2023, the Sentencing Commission amended its policy statement to include a sixth type of “extraordinary and compelling” reason. See Rutherford, 146 S. Ct. at 1328. That amendment states that if the defendant received an “unusually long sentence” and has served at least ten years of imprisonment, a “change in the law” may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, “but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed ․” USSG 1B1.13(b)(6).

A defendant bears the burden of proving that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist. United States v. Rodríguez-Soler, No. 10-164-4 (MAJ/BJM), 2024 WL 1596853 at *3 (D.P.R. Apr. 12, 2024) (McGivern, M.J.) (citing United States v. Figueroa-Gibson, 2024 WL 376432, at *2 (D.P.R. Jan. 31, 2024) (Arias-Marxuach, C.J.)). Only once a defendant has proven that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist, does a court determine whether an amount of sentence reduction is warranted by considering the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Rutherford, 146 S. Ct. at 1333 (“Before determining the extent of a reduction based on the [section] 3553(a) factors, a court must first ensure that a movant is part of the ‘limited class of prisoners’ who are ‘eligibl[e]’ for such a reduction.”) (alteration in original).

Finally, before filing a motion pursuant to section 3582(c), a defendant must first exhaust his or her administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). To exhaust administrative remedies, a defendant must first request from his or her warden that the BOP file a motion for compassionate release on his or her behalf. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(a). If the warden refuses, “the defendant may only file a motion in federal court if he has either (1) fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal the BOP's failure to bring a motion on his behalf; or (2) waited thirty days from the receipt of his request by the warden of his facility, whichever is earlier.” Vázquez, 793 F. Supp. 3d at 428 (alterations omitted). While administrative exhaustion is a mandatory requirement, it serves only as a “claims processing rule” and therefore the government can waive the requirement “either expressly or by failing to raise it as a defense.”¹ Id.

III. Discussion

A. “Unusually long sentence”

Defendant's first argument in support of his motion is that his 192-month sentence constitutes an “unusually long sentence” pursuant to USSG 1B1.13(b)(6), and also independently constitutes an “other” extraordinary and compelling reason pursuant to USSG 1B1.13(b)(5). See Docket No. 225 at pp. 7-10. Defendant argues that his 192-month sentence is significantly higher than the average sentence of 116 months and the median sentence of 97 months for child pornography offenses as reported in the Sentencing Commission's Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics for 2024. United States Sentencing Commission, 2024 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics 38 tbl. 15 (2024) (“Sentences By Type of Crime”) (hereafter “2024 Sourcebook”). Defendant indicates that child pornography offenses represent “some of the harshest punishment structures in the federal criminal system” and that “when evaluated against contemporary federal sentencing data reflected in the Sentencing Commission's Sourcebook, represent[ ] a measurable and significant disparity that falls outside modern federal sentencing norms.” (Docket No. 225 at pp. 8, 10.)

There are several problems with defendant's argument. First, he cites the wrong data. The Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics defines its “Child Pornography” category, which defendant relies upon, as including offenders sentenced pursuant to USSG §§ 2G2.2 and 2G2.4, involving the trafficking in or possession of materials involving the sexual exploitation of minors. See 2024 Sourcebook at p. 187 (“Appendix A: Description of Datafiles and Variables”). Defendant, however, was sentenced pursuant to USSG 2G2.1, production of child pornography, which the Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics includes in its “Sexual Abuse” category, which also includes other sexual abuse and sex trafficking crimes. Id. at 189-90. Referencing the most recent edition of the Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, the 2025 edition, the average sentence for “Sexual Abuse” crimes was 230 months and the median sentence was 210 months. United States Sentencing Commission, 2025 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics 38 tbl. 15 (2025) (hereinafter the “2025 Sourcebook”). Indeed, the Sentencing Commission's 2021 report titled “Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography: Production Offenses” found that “[c]hild pornography production offenders generally received lengthy sentences,” and that in 2019, “production offenders received an average sentence of 23 years (275 months) ․” United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography: Production Offenses 3 (2021) (hereinafter the “2021 Child Pornography Production Report”). The 2021 Child Pornography Production Report also demonstrates that from 2005 to 2019 the average sentence imposed for child pornography production offenses has remained “relatively stable” even while the average guideline minimum has increased. Id. at p. 21. It also notes that in 2019 the majority (57.2%) received a downward variance below the guidelines range, as Meléndez did in this case. Id. at p. 22. Similarly, the 2025 Sourcebook indicates that the majority of offenders in its “Sexual Abuse” category of offenses (55.8%) received downward departures or variances. 2025 Sourcebook at p. 66, tbl. 31. The average downward variance for sexual abuse offenders was 71 months. Id. at p. 77, tbl. 40.

Contrary to defendant's argument then, his 192-months sentence can hardly be considered “unusually long” in comparison to the most up to date data on sentences for child pornography production and similar offenses. Rather, his sentence is both below the current applicable guidelines range, 262 to 327 months, and is below the 2025 average sentence length for child pornography production and similar offenses, 230 months. While the downward variance of defendant's sentence was 66 months, slightly lower than the 2025 average downward variance for similar offenses, his sentence is still well within the range of reasonable sentences permitted by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Even if defendant's sentence was considered “unusually long,” it is unclear whether a change in the trend of sentence lengths, over which courts are granted considerable discretion, would constitute the requisite “change in law” required by USSG 1B1.13(b)(6), absent a textual amendment to a statute or the Sentencing Guidelines. And even if such a change in average sentence lengths did constitute a “change in law,” USSG 1B1.13(b)(6) indicates that to be considered an “extraordinary and compelling reason” it must be a change that “would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed.” As the above data show, that is not the case here. Thus, defendant's 192 months sentence does not constitute an “extraordinary and compelling reason” that warrants a reduction in his sentence.

B. Sentencing disparity between co-defendants

Defendant next argues that the sentencing disparity between himself and his co-defendant constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for reducing his sentence. He argues that while the difference of six months between he and his co-defendant's sentence may, at the time of sentencing, have been a meaningful distinction to reflect the fact that defendant pled guilty while his co-defendant proceeded to trial, after ten years of incarceration this distinction has evaporated and now runs against the principle contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that courts should avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between defendants found guilty of similar conduct. (Docket No. 225 at pp. 10-14.)

Disparities in sentences between co-defendants can be considered when determining whether an extraordinary and compelling reasons exists to reduce a sentence. See United States v. Gómez-Olmeda, No. CR 3-73(RAM), 2023 WL 3641485 at *3 (D.P.R. May 25, 2023) (Arias-Marxuach, C.J.) (citing United States v. Grullón, 996 F.3d 21, 35 (1st Cir. 2021)). For a disparity to be relevant, however, there must be “two identically situated defendants receiving different sentences from the same judge.” Grullón, 996 F.3d at 35 (alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Reyes-Santiago, 804 F.3d 453, 467 (1st Cir. 2015)). In other words, the “defendant must compare apples to apples.” Id. Thus, to establish a sentencing disparity, there must be an “appropriate comparator.” United States v. Locust, 771 F. Supp. 3d 819, 826 (E.D. Va. 2025).

Here, defendant points primarily to the fact that he pled guilty, saving the government the time and expense of trial preparation, while his co-defendant proceeded to trial, and yet he received a sentence only six months shorter than his co-defendant. Defendant's plea, however, is not the only difference between he and his co-defendant. At trial, Mr. Montijo was found guilty of one count of coercion and enticement of a minor and four counts of transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. (Docket No. 196.) Mr. Montijo was found to have a criminal history category of I and his guideline range was 235-293 months. (Docket No. 201 at p. 27.) At sentencing, the Court considered, among other factors, Mr. Montijo's strong family environment, his education, his work history, and his age (Mr. Montijo was 29 at the time of the offense while defendant was 21.) Id. at pp. 11-15. The defendant and his co-defendant were sentenced for different crimes, and their sentences were based on individual circumstances that varied significantly. These differences justify the two defendants’ disparate sentences. Accordingly, the disparity identified by defendant does not rise to the level of an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence.

C. COVID-19 conditions

Next, defendant argues that measures taken at BOP facilities in response to the COVID-19 pandemic “materially increased the punitive character of [his] sentence far beyond what was contemplated at the time of sentencing.” (Docket No. 225 at p. 15.) In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, courts have acknowledged that “[a] day in prison under [COVID-19] conditions is a qualitatively different type of punishment than one day in prison used to be,” and that such conditions “undoubtedly increase a prison sentence's punitive effect.” United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 335 (4th Cir. 2021) (Gregory, J., concurring.) Accordingly, some courts have found extraordinary and compelling reasons present where defendants have detailed particularly harsh conditions at their facility combined with unique health conditions rendering them especially vulnerable to COVID-19. See United States v. Newell, No. 1:13-CR-165-1, 2021 WL 3269650 (M.D.N.C. July 30, 2021) (defendants submitted extensive evidence both of severe conditions at their facility as well as individual health circumstances.) Courts have, however, declined to find extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction where such conditions “do not set [him] apart from the rest of the BOP inmate population.” United States v. Henríquez, No. 04-CR-0939 (JS), 2024 WL 4450851, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2024) (“Standing alone, the harshness of conditions Defendant faced during the Pandemic were the same as those endured by his fellow inmates; in that sense, they were not extraordinary.”).

Here, defendant has made only general statements about precautions imposed by BOP in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. While the Court acknowledges that these precautions have made prison conditions harsher than usual, defendant has failed to specify any condition at his particular facility that were harsher than the conditions endured by all other BOP inmates. Nor has defendant argued that he suffered health conditions which made him particularly vulnerable to the COVID-19 virus. In the absence of evidence of conditions which would differentiate the defendant from the rest of the BOP inmate population, the Court does not find that the existence of COVID-19 precautions, standing alone, rises to level of an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction.

D. Rehabilitation

Defendant also argues that his rehabilitation while in prison, together with the other factors discussed above, constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence. Defendant acknowledges the limitation in USSG 1B1.13(d) that “rehabilitation of the defendant is not, by itself an extraordinary and compelling reason.” Nonetheless, he argues that USSG 1B1.13(d) permits the court to consider evidence of rehabilitation in combination with other circumstances to determine whether and to what extent a reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment is warranted.

As discussed above, however, none of the circumstances defendant has put forth constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons, and so there are no other reasons in combination with which the Court can consider evidence of defendant's rehabilitation. See United States v. Sepúlveda, 34 F.4th 71, 77 (1st Cir. 2022) (“The district court, however, having rejected each of the defendant's other proffered reasons for compassionate release, correctly determined that rehabilitation alone could not be an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release.”). While the Court does not doubt that defendant has made progress towards rehabilitation during his time in incarceration, even if the Court could consider such evidence of rehabilitation, defendant has provided no detail on what specific steps he has taken towards rehabilitation, let alone supplied the Court with any evidence of those steps. See id. (“The district court also noted that [defendant] included as exhibits to his motion a number of certificates for educational, vocational, and self-improvement programs he has completed during his incarceration, as well as letters of support from BOP staff and family members, among others.”). Accordingly, defendant's rehabilitation while incarcerated does not, standing alone, warrant a reduction in his sentence.

E. Section 3353(a) factors

Finally, defendant argues that each of the above circumstances he has put forward also bears on the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a), and that together they counsel a reduction in his sentence. But, “[b]efore determining the extent of a reduction based on the [section] 3553(a) factors, a court must first ensure that a movant is part of the ‘limited class of prisoners’ who are ‘eligible’ for such a reduction.” Rutherford, 146 S. Ct. at 1333 (2026) (alterations omitted). Here, because the Court finds that none of the circumstances identified by defendant constitutes “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction, the Court does not proceed to the consideration of the section 3353(a) factors.

IV. Conclusion

Because Mr. Meléndez has not presented any extraordinary and compelling reason that warrants a reduction in his sentence, his motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

San Juan, Puerto Rico, August 31, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mr. Meléndez has attached to his motion his request to his BOP warden for compassionate release. (Docket No. 225-1.) The government has not contested the sufficiency of this evidence of administrative exhaustion and therefore has waived any objection.

FRANCISCO A. BESOSA SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE