UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. WILLIE TORRES GERENA (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is the United States of America's motion to clarify order regarding defendant's omnibus motion in limine. (Docket No. 185.) For the reasons set forth below, the United States’ motion is DENIED.

The government has requested that the Court clarify its order precluding any reference to a restraining/protective order A.S.J. sought against Torres after the alleged incident, and any reference to his possession of a firearm. Id. The motion, however, clearly reflects that the government understands the Court's order and there is nothing to clarify. It seems the government instead wants the Court to reconsider its determinations.

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly provide for motions for reconsideration. See United States v. Ortiz, 741 F.3d 288, 292 n.2 (1st Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The First Circuit Court of Appeals applies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) (“Rule 59(e)”), however, to motions for reconsideration arising in the criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying Rule 59(e) to a motion for reconsideration in a criminal case).

Pursuant to Rule 59(e), a district court will alter its original order only if it “evidenced a manifest error of law, if there is newly discovered evidence, or in certain other narrow situations.” Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). A motion for reconsideration does “not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures [or] allow a party [to] advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to judgment.” Iverson v. City of Bos., 452 F.3d 94, 104 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “Rule 59(e) does not exist to allow parties a second chance to prevail on the merits ․ [and] is not an avenue for litigants to reassert arguments and theories that were previously rejected by the Court.” Johnson & Johnson Int'l v. P.R. Hosp. Supply, Inc., 322 F.R.D. 439, 441 (D.P.R. 2017) (Besosa, J.) (citations omitted). “As a general rule, motions for reconsideration should only be exceptionally granted.” Villanueva-Méndez v. Nieves-Vázquez, 360 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323 (D.P.R. 2005) (Domínguez, J.) In deciding a motion for reconsideration, however, the reviewing court has considerable discretion. Venegas-Hernández v. Sonolux Recs., 370 F.3d 183, 190 (1st Cir. 2004).

In its August 6, 2026 Opinion and Order, the Court determined that the protective order against Torres is not relevant to the charged crime because it does not go to any element of the crime, and it was pursued after the alleged incident. (Docket No. 165 at p. 18.) Similarly, the Court determined that Torres’ possession of a firearm was not relevant because the government has never alleged that Torres used the firearm during the alleged incident. Id. at p. 21. The Court issued these dispositions after both parties filed their briefs, affording ample opportunity for the United States and Torres to set forth their respective arguments. In its motion to “clarify,” the government does not evidence a manifest error of law or newly discovered evidence.

The government mostly regurgitates the same arguments as its original motion in the hopes the Court reverses course. The Court will not. A motion for reconsideration is not an insurance policy against an adverse ruling. The government is simply attempting to take the proverbial “second bite at the apple.” United States v. Laboy, 658 F. Supp. 2d 263, 265 (D. Mass. 2009). The Court, however, will address the government's argument that A.S.J.’s testimony about her knowledge about Torres’ previous possession of a firearm would explain any theory by the defense that A.S.J. consented to the alleged sexual act. (Docket No. 185 at pp. 7-8.) Torres responds that he “does not anticipate relying on A.S.J.’s actual consent to defend against the charge of what he intended at the time of transportation.” (Docket No. 187 at p. 5. (emphasis in original)) Even though Torres does not anticipate relying on whether A.S.J. consented as a defense, the Court warns Torres that should he cross-examine A.S.J. in an attempt to show that she consented, the Court will allow limited testimony on rebuttal about her knowledge about Torres’ possession of a firearm. See United States v. DeSimone, 488 F.3d 561, 577-78 (1st Cir. 2007) (trial court properly allowed government to rebut a defense presented by defendant with evidence previously deemed inadmissible because defendant opened the door).

Accordingly, the government's motion to clarify is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

San Juan, Puerto Rico, August 28, 2026.

FRANCISCO A. BESOSA SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE