ERICK IVÁN MORALES LVAREZ v. INTELVOX LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is plaintiff Erick Iván Morales-Álvarez (“Morales”)’s motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 35.) For the following reasons, Morales’ motion is GRANTED.

I. Background

Morales served as the Chief Financial Officer of Intelvox LLC (“Intelvox”) from March 1, 2019 until his termination on February 2, 2026. (Docket No. 1-1 at pp. 2-4.) After he was terminated, he sued Intelvox in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, alleging unjust dismissal under P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 185a-185n (“Law 80”), age discrimination under P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 146-151 (“Law 100”), failure to compensate for accrued vacation pay and unpaid wages under P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 250b-250j (“Law 180”), and failure to authorize release of his 401(k) benefits protected under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (“ERISA”). See id. at pp. 5-7. Intelvox removed the case to federal court, citing federal jurisdiction over Morales’ ERISA claims and supplemental jurisdiction over his Puerto Rico law claims. See Docket No. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 28 U.S.C. § 1367; 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

Morales requested leave to amend his complaint to add ERISA claims against two new defendants, Erick Juan Morales-Díaz and Sila Margarita Otero-Tavárez. (Docket No. 21.) The Court granted this request, noting that his proposed first amended complaint stated claims pursuant to Section 502 of ERISA that would avoid dismissal and that any prejudice to the defendants was minimal because of the early stage of litigation. See Docket No. 32, Álvarez v. Intelvox LLC, Civil No. 26-1256 (FAB), 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153193, at *4-9 (D.P.R. Jul. 1, 2026) (Besosa, J.) In his request for leave to file his first amended complaint, Morales also informed the Court that he would seek leave to amend again to add a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. See Docket No. 21-1 at p. 1. He told the Court that he could not include his ADEA claim in the first amended complaint because he needed to wait sixty days after initiating administrative proceedings with the EEOC before being statutorily authorized to sue under the ADEA. Id.

Morales now requests leave to amend the complaint for a second time, seeking to add an ADEA claim now that the sixty-day waiting period has passed. (Docket No. 35.) Intelvox opposes Morales’ request, arguing that adding an ADEA claim “would add no substantive benefit to the case” because Morales’ existing claim under Law 100 “prohibits the identical conduct, arising from the identical facts, against the identical employer, and [ ] affords [Morales] greater relief than the ADEA[.]” (Docket No. 41 at p. 2.) Morales disagrees, arguing that the ADEA offers complementary remedies to Law 100 and provides an additional basis for federal jurisdiction. (Docket No. 45.)

II. Legal Standard

If a party seeks to amend a pleading after having already amended it once, the party must receive either the opposing party's written consent or leave of the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “The court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Id. “[T]his, [however,] ‘does not mean that a trial court must mindlessly grant every request for leave to amend.’ ” Mulder v. Kohl's Dept. Stores, Inc., 865 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2006)) (internal alterations omitted). “[A] request to amend requires the district court to ‘examine the totality of the circumstances and to exercise its informed discretion in constructing a balance of pertinent considerations.’ ” Id. at 21-22 (quoting Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2006)). “[A] district court may deny leave to amend when the request is characterized by undue delay, bad faith, futility, or the absence of due diligence on the movant's part.” Id. at 20 (quoting Nikitine v. Wilmington Tr. Co., 715 F.3d 388, 390 (1st Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

Intelvox's argument against granting Morales leave to file a second amended complaint is that his ADEA claim would be pointlessly duplicative of his Law 100 claim. As an initial matter, there is no bar against an aggrieved employee in Puerto Rico from bringing concurrent ADEA and Law 100 claims. Courts routinely entertain cases of such a nature. See, e.g., Zampierollo-Rheinfeldt v. Ingersoll-Rand De P.R., Inc., 999 F.3d 37, 58-59 (1st Cir. 2021); Strazarra v. Audio Visual Concepts, Civil No. 08-2069 (ADC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143972, at *21 (D.P.R. Sept. 10, 2009) (Delgado-Colón, J.); Sánchez v. P.R. Oil. Co., 37 F.3d 712 (1st Cir. 1994). Additionally, although Law 100 and the ADEA's protections against age discrimination are “coterminous” (though plaintiff's burden is lighter under Law 100), the inclusion of an additional basis for federal jurisdiction could be useful to Morales in the event his ERISA claims are dismissed and he wishes to continue litigating in federal court. There being some practical utility to Morales adding an ADEA claim, and no rule against bringing concurrent ADEA and Law 100 claims, the Court disagrees with Intelvox's argument that leave to amend would serve no purpose.

Nor does the Court see Morales’ request as being prejudicial to Intelvox, made in bad faith, or reflective of an absence of due diligence. Morales could not bring his ADEA claim before the Court until sixty days after filing a charge of unlawful discrimination with the EEOC. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1). He originally filed his claim before the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance without including an ADEA claim, and it was Intelvox who brought the case to federal court. The Court has limited patience for Intelvox's resistance to adding another federal cause of action when it was Intelvox itself who wanted to make a federal case out of this in the first place. And because Morales’ ADEA claim is substantively coterminous with his Law 100 claim, Intelvox will suffer little if any prejudice from its delayed addition. Accordingly, the Court finds no good reason to deny Morales leave to amend his complaint to include an ADEA claim.

IV. Conclusion

For the above reasons, Morales’ motion for leave to file the Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED. (Docket No. 35.) Morales shall file his Second Amended Complaint no later than August 5, 2026.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

San Juan, Puerto Rico, July 31, 2026.

FRANCISCO A. BESOSA SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE