MORALES v. INTELVOX LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is plaintiff Erick Iván Morales-Álvarez (“Morales”)’s motion for leave to file a First Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 21.) For the following reasons, Morales's motion is GRANTED.

I. Background

Morales served as the Chief Financial Officer of Intelvox LLC (“Intelvox”) from March 1, 2019 until his termination on February 2, 2026. (Docket No. 1-1 at pp. 2-4.) After he was terminated, he sued Intelvox in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, alleging unjust dismissal under P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 185a-185n (“Law 80”), age discrimination under P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 146-151 (“Law 100”), failure to compensate for accrued vacation pay and unpaid wages under P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 250b-250j (“Law 180”), and failure to authorize release of his 401(k) benefits protected under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (“ERISA”). See id. at pp. 5-7. Intelvox removed the case to federal court. See Docket No. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 28 U.S.C. § 1367; 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

Morales seeks to amend his original complaint to add claims against two new defendants, Erick Juan Morales-Díaz (“Morales-Díaz”)¹ and Sila Margarita Otero-Tavarez (“Otero”). (Docket No. 21-1 at pp. 7-8.) The proposed First Amended Complaint alleges that Morales-Díaz and Otero obstructed Morales's access to his 401(k) retirement savings account by refusing to sign an authorization releasing funds after Morales was fired. Id. Morales claims that this interference entitles him to relief under Sections 502 ² and 510 ³ of ERISA. Id. The proposed First Amended Complaint also raises Morales's alleged mental pain and suffering damages from $50,000 to $1,000,000. Id. at p. 8.

Intelvox opposes Morales's request to amend the complaint. (Docket No. 25.) First, Intelvox argues that Morales fails to show that amendment is necessary to conform with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at p. 3. Second, Intelvox argues that leave to amend would be futile because the new claims against Morales-Díaz and Otero would not survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at pp. 3-8. Third, Intelvox argues that Morales's escalation of mental pain and suffering damages from $50,000 to $1,000,000 is baseless, prejudicial, and evidences bad faith, justifying denial of leave to amend. Id. at pp. 8-10. Morales replied (Docket No. 28) and Intelvox sur-replied (Docket No. 31).

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides two avenues for a party seeking to amend a pleading. First, the party “may amend its pleading once as a matter of course no later than (a) 21 days after serving it, or (b) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Otherwise, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

“The court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Id. “[T]his, [however,] ‘does not mean that a trial court must mindlessly grant every request for leave to amend.’ ” Mulder v. Kohl's Dept. Stores, Inc., 865 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2006)) (internal alterations omitted). “[A] request to amend requires the district court to ‘examine the totality of the circumstances and to exercise its informed discretion in constructing a balance of pertinent considerations.’ ” Id. at 21-22 (quoting Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2006)). “[A] district court may deny leave to amend when the request is characterized by undue delay, bad faith, futility, or the absence of due diligence on the movant's part.” Id. at 20 (quoting Nikitine v. Wilmington Trust Co., 715 F.3d 388, 390 (1st Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “In reviewing for futility, the district court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Id. Consequently, a proposed amended complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court is “obligated to view the facts of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[ ], and to resolve any ambiguities in [his] favor.” Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2011).

III. Discussion

As stated above, leave to amend should be freely given as justice requires. Morales's request for leave to amend was filed 25 days after Intelvox's answer - just outside the 21-day window for amending as a matter of course pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). See Docket Nos. 5; 21; cf. Steir v. Girl Scouts of the USA, 383 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2004) (“As a case progresses, and the issues are joined, the burden on a plaintiff seeking to amend a complaint becomes more exacting.”). Additionally, this is Morales's first request to amend, and courts generally view a first request more favorably than if a party repeatedly requests to amend the same pleading. See generally Arex Indus., Inc. v. Diode Dynamics, LLC, No. 4:25-cv-00541-CMS, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39711, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 26, 2026) (granting leave to amend a complaint after noting that it was plaintiff's first such request and defendant failed to demonstrate futility). Accordingly, the Court is predisposed toward granting Morales's request, and will deny leave to amend only if it would be futile or would inflict substantial prejudice on the defendants.

Intelvox argues that leave to amend would be futile because the proposed First Amended Complaint contains insufficient allegations that Morales-Díaz and Otero control or administer Intelvox's retirement plan to render them proper defendants to his ERISA claims. See Docket No. 25 at pp. 3-8. Morales disagrees, arguing that his proposed First Amended Complaint adequately states a claim under ERISA section 510, which broadly applies to “any person” who “discharge[s], fine[s], suspend[s], expel[s], discipline[s], or discriminate[s] against a participant or beneficiary ․ for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan.” See Docket No. 28; 29 U.S.C. § 1140.

Although Morales insists that his complaint states a claim under section 510, the Court reads his allegations as fitting better under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), which allows a participant or beneficiary of an eligible plan to bring a civil action “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The proposed First Amended Complaint alleges that Morales is a participant in the plan and is being wrongly denied his benefits. See Docket No. 21-1 at p. 7 (“The defendants ․ engaged in obstructive conduct by refusing to process and authorize the plaintiff's access to his 401(k) retirement plan, which constitutes a vested right of the plaintiff as a plan participant[.]”) Section 502(a)(1)(B) provides the exclusive cause of action for a plan participant who seeks benefits due to him under the plan. See LaRocca v. Borden, Inc., 276 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that a plaintiff could not pursue equitable relief under other sections of the ERISA statute because “if a plaintiff can pursue benefits under the plan pursuant to [ERISA] [s]ection [502(a)(1)], there is an adequate remedy under the plan which bars a further remedy[.]”) The Court does not read Morales's proposed First Amended Complaint as claiming that he was fired for the purpose of denying his retirement benefits, which would fall under section 510. See Barbour v. Dynamics Rsch. Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1995) (“The ultimate inquiry in a section 510 case is whether the employment action was taken with the specific intent of interfering with the employee's ERISA benefits.”) Instead, the narrative in the proposed First Amended Complaint better fits the cause of action provided by section 502(a)(1)(B) – a relatively straightforward denial of benefits to a plan participant.

The Court finds that the proposed First Amended Complaint states a plausible claim for relief under section 502(a)(1)(B). Morales alleges that he is owed benefits protected by ERISA and that Morales-Díaz's and Otero's refusal to sign an authorization is denying him access to these benefits. Intelvox's only argument against this claim is that Morales-Díaz and Otero were not properly alleged to be plan administrators. “The proper party defendant in an action concerning ERISA benefits is the party that controls administration of the plan.” Gómez-González v. Rural Opportunities, Inc., 626 F.3d 654, 665 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1998)). This may include individual officers who exercise discretionary authority over plan decisions. See Brown v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Civil No. 15-1435 (JAG), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107260, at *11-12 (D.P.R. Aug. 11, 2016) (García-Gregory, J.) (finding an in-house medical doctor to be a proper defendant to a claim under section 502); Rooney v. Leerink Partners, LLC, Civil Action No. 1:24-CV-11165-AK, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21501, at *24-25 (D. Mass. Feb. 6, 2025) (finding individuals with discretionary authority over plan administration to be proper defendants to a section 502 claim). The allegations in the proposed First Amended Complaint state that Morales-Díaz and Otero needed to sign an authorization form in order to release Morales's 401(k) retirement funds. Interpreted in the light most favorable to Morales, this allegation shows that Morales-Díaz and Otero “exercis[ed] control over the administration of the benefits[.]” Torres v. Home Depot P.R., Inc., No. 24-01058 (MAJ), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188131, at *6 (D.P.R. Sept. 23, 2025) (Antongiorgi-Jordán, J.). Accordingly, the Court finds that Morales's proposed First Amended Complaint states a plausible claim for relief against Morales-Díaz and Otero under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), and that leave to amend would not be futile.

In addition to futility, Intelvox argues that Morales's request to “fine-tune” his allegations by registering a twenty-fold increase in the amount of claimed emotional damages constitutes bad faith, and that amending the alleged damages would accordingly prejudice their defense. The Court disagrees. At this early stage of litigation, the number that Morales asserts for emotional damages does not alter Intelvox's defenses or litigation strategy enough to create substantial prejudice. Intelvox's gripe about a larger alleged damages number causing “tactical prejudice” is unsupported by either developed argumentation or citation to legal authority. Nor is the Court convinced by Intelvox's argument that Morales needs to provide some “supporting factual development” to justify increasing his damages allegation. Federal notice pleading standards do not require a complaint to plead evidence. See Penalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2011) (“The plaintiff's factual allegations are ordinarily assumed to be true in passing on the adequacy of the complaint, which need not plead evidence.”). Noting again the early stage of litigation, the Court finds that leave to amend the damages claim would not unfairly prejudice the defendants.

IV. Conclusion

For the above reasons, Morales's motion for leave to file the First Amended Complaint is GRANTED. (Docket No. 21.) Morales shall file his First Amended Complaint by July 7, 2026.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Morales-Díaz is Morales's son. See Docket No. 25 at p. 3.

2.   29 U.S.C. § 1132.

3.   29 U.S.C. § 1140.

FRANCISCO A. BESOSA, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE