UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. WILHELM LÓPEZ AFANADOR 14 (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is defendant Wilhelm López-Afanador (“López”)’s amended motion to travel. (Docket No. 250.) For the reasons set forth below, López's motion is DENIED.

I. Background

On September 25, 2025, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging López with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), 841(b)(1)(D), and 846 (Count Three), conspiracy to possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (Count Twelve), and possession of a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) (Count Fifteen). (Docket No. 54) Magistrate Judge Héctor L. Ramos-Vega granted pre-trial release, setting an unsecured bond at $10,000. (Docket No. 128.) The order setting conditions of release requires López to remain in his residence at all times except for employment, education, religious services, attorney visits, court appearances, and activities approved by the court. (Docket No. 130.) López would also submit to location monitoring technology. Id.

López subsequently moved to modify his conditions of release, requesting permission to attend his goddaughter's first birthday. (Docket No. 142.) The Court denied his request. (Docket No. 150.) On March 9, 2026, López moved to amend his conditions of release, requesting the removal of his home detention and location monitoring. (Docket No. 250.) López argues that these conditions should be removed because he has fully complied with all the conditions imposed on him. Id. The Court ordered the government and pretrial services to respond. (Docket No. 251.) The Pretrial Services Officer stated she did not oppose the removal of these conditions. (Docket No. 252.) The government opposed. (Docket No. 262.)

II. The Bail Reform Act

Congress enacted the Bail Reform Act in 1984, 18 U.S.C. sections 3141, et seq., in response to “the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on release.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987) (citation omitted). Pursuant to this statute, the judicial officer “before whom an arrested person is brought shall order that such person be released or detained, pending judicial proceedings.” 18 U.S.C. § 3141(a). Section 3142 enumerates permissible conditions of release, including “specified restrictions on personal associates, place of abode, or travel.” Id. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(iv). Conditions of release serve to “assure the appearance of the person” in Court and to protect “the safety of any other person and the community.” Id. § 3142(c). Courts consider the following factors to determine the appropriate conditions of release:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence [․] or involves a minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive or other destructive device;

(2) the weight of the evidence against the person;

(3) the history and characteristics of the person; [and]

(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release.

Id. § 3142(g) (emphasis supplied). Moreover, the “Court may consider uncharged conduct in assessing the degree of danger posed by the defendant.” United States v. Rivera-Sepúlveda, Criminal No. 19-695, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14692 *5 (D.P.R. 2020) (Arias, J.) (citing United States v. Rodríguez, 950 F.2d 85, 88-89 (2d. Cir. 1991)). “A judicial officer may at any time amend the [release] order to impose additional or different conditions of release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(3). “The legislative history reports that ‘this authorization is based on the possibility that a changed situation or new information may warrant altered release conditions.’ ” United States v. Lafrance, No. 16-10090-IT, 2016 WL 3882845, at *1 (D. Mass. July 13, 2016) (citing S. Rep. No. 98-226 at p. 16 (1983)).

III. Removal of Location Monitoring and Home Detention

López seeks to modify the conditions of release by removing his location monitoring and home detention. (Docket No. 250.) He states that he has fully complied with his conditions of release. Id. The Pretrial Services Officer does not oppose the request. (Docket No. 252.) She states that López has a low probability of non-compliance with the conditions of release. Id. The government opposes the request because compliance with conditions of release is a baseline expectation and not a reason to modify the conditions. (Docket No. 262.)

The Court has already determined that pretrial detention is not necessary. (Docket No. 130.) Pretrial Services supports conditions of release and does not oppose the removal of López's current request to remove location monitoring and home detention. The question before the Court is, therefore, whether location monitoring and home detention continue to be the least restrictive conditions to ensure public safety and López's return to court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142. They are.

A consideration of the section 3142(g) factors compels the Court to deny López's motion. First, “[i]t is presumed that the defendant will abide by the conditions imposed ․ The fact that defendant has complied with his conditions of release is what allows him to remain out of custody and is not new information that has a material bearing on his conditions to reopen the detention hearing.” United States v. Ebonka, 733 F. Supp. 3d 967, 970 (D. Nev. 2024) (collecting cases). While “[c]ompliance with conditions of release ‘might’ suffice for later modification when the Government and/or Pretrial Services supports the request ․ it is ultimately the ‘judicial officer’ who must decide whether to modify conditions, and the Court is not obligated to adopt the positions taken by the parties or by Pretrial Services.” Id. at 970 n. 4 (internal citations omitted).

Second, the nature of the offenses charged in the superseding indictment are serious. López allegedly conspired to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, 40 grams or more of fentanyl, and a detectable amount of marihuana, allegedly possessed one or more firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and allegedly possessed a machine gun. (Docket No. 54.)

Third, the weight of the evidence is ostensibly strong. Federal law enforcement agents gathered a plethora of evidence against López during a long-term investigation conducted by the Department of Homeland Security, including court authorized searches of electronic devices revealing photo and written messages between López and other members of the conspiracy. (Docket No. 262 at p. 3.) The government proffers various communications between López and a codefendant, by which López sent three images of firearms: (1) a Glock pistol, model 42, 380 caliber, which was reported stolen in Florida; (2) a machinegun, and (3) another Glock pistol modified to be a machinegun, which López stated belonged to him. Id. at pp. 4-6. Proffered evidence also indicates that the organization, “La V,” shipped packages containing cocaine through the United States Postal Service or FedEx to members located in continental United States. (Docket No. 262 at p. 3.) The pictures López sent to another member of the La V organization support that López conspired to possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Inculpatory evidence increases the likelihood of conviction, which in turn presents an incentive to flee. See United States v. Palmer-Contreras, 835 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that where “the evidence against defendant[ ] is strong, the incentive for relocation is increased.”).

Finally, the Court is concerned about the danger to the community posed by López's release. The government proffers that La V planned out the murder of two individuals with the use of firearms. Id. at p. 7. This proffer reflects the dangerousness of the organization. López, as an individual with prior access to firearms, could present a danger to the community because he may supply firearms to other members of the organization.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES López's motion to modify his bail conditions. He shall remain under the same conditions of release imposed by the magistrate judge. See Docket No. 130.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, López's motion to modify bail conditions is DENIED. (Docket No. 250)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

San Juan, Puerto Rico, April 10, 2026.

FRANCISCO A. BESOSA UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE