UNITED STATES v. MORALES PÉREZ (2025)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is defendant Fedwín Morales-Pérez (“Morales”)’s notice of his intent to cross-examine Puerto Rico Police Bureau Agent Gabriel Rodríguez-Rodríguez (“Agent Rodríguez”) about an alleged complaint of misconduct pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) (“Rule 608(b)”).¹ (Docket No. 140.) The government opposed. (Docket No. 155.) For the reasons set forth below, Morales’ motion is DENIED.

On October 20, 2025, Morales filed a notice of his intention to cross-examine Agent Rodríguez about an administrative complaint against him alleging that he performed a “warrantless, illegal entry into a home, which was recorded by a security camera.” Id. Morales argues that the administrative complaint is evidence of a specific instance of conduct that bears on Agent Rodriguez's character for untruthfulness pursuant to Rule 608. Id. The government opposes Morales’ proposed questioning because (1) extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to attack a witness's character for truthfulness unless it is a criminal conviction; (2) the evidence is not probative of Agent Rodríguez’ character for untruthfulness; and (3) even if it does have probative value, it does not outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. (Docket No. 155.)

Rule 608(b) provides:

(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness's conduct in order to attack or support the witness's character for truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of:

(1) the witness ․

Fed. R. Evid. 608(b).

To the extent that Morales intends to use the security camera footage during cross-examination, the Court finds that Rule 608(b) prohibits its admission because it is extrinsic evidence.² “Rule 608(b)[, however,] allows a party to ask a witness about a specific instance of past conduct if it is probative of the witness's character for truthfulness, with the understanding that the party is then ‘stuck’ with the witness's answer.” Lech v. von Goeler, 92 F.4th 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2024). And even if the conduct may be initially probative, a court must still weigh if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ․ unfair prejudice” pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

“Generally, complaints against officers are not probative of a law enforcement witness's truthfulness or untruthfulness unless the underlying conduct involves dishonesty.” United States v. Clanton, 769 F. Supp. 3d 147, 153 (E.D.N.Y 2024). Morales cites to United States v. Beltrán-García, 338 F.App'x 765, 771 (10th Cir. 2009) to support his argument that questioning about an illegal search goes to an officer's untruthfulness and is, therefore, admissible under Rule 608. In Beltrán-García, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the “evidence tending to affect the [officer's] character for truthfulness include[d] [the officer's] alleged misrepresentation of the extent of consent given to search a house.” Id. at 771. The Court, however, affirmed the district court's decision to exclude any cross-examination of the officer's conduct because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. The Court indicated that the cross-examination would mislead and confuse the jury because the misconduct was remote in time and did not obviously reflect on the officer's character for truthfulness. Id. at 772.

Unlike the officer in Beltrán-García, who misrepresented defendant's consent to search the house, there is no evidence here that Agent Rodríguez has misrepresented any fact. In Beltrán-García, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not find that the search was probative of the officer's character for truthfulness because the search was illegal, but because of the officer's alleged misrepresentation as to the consent given to search the house. Id. at 771-772. Accordingly, without any fact that shows Agent Rodríguez misled another in performing the alleged illegal search, the search itself is not probative of his character for truthfulness. The alleged illegal entry and search merely shows, without more, poor judgment, not dishonesty.

Even if the alleged misconduct were probative of Agent Rodríguez's character for truthfulness, its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. First, because the administrative complaint is still pending investigation, there has not been an adverse credibility determination against him. See Clanton, 769 F. Supp. 3d at 153 (“Regarding any pending investigations the government has identified, where such allegations are not substantiated, any probative value of the alleged conduct is outweighed by prejudice[.]”). Second, because the misconduct has not been adjudicated, it would likely require additional background information, which could increase the risk of jury confusion. And third, details of the allegation, if admitted, could improperly prejudice the jury against Agent Rodríguez based on an appearance of lack of judgment rather than his character for truthfulness. Accordingly, Morales may not cross-examine Agent Rodríguez about the alleged misconduct.

For the reasons set forth above, Morales’ motion to cross-examine Agent Rodríguez is DENIED. (Docket No. 140.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court construes the notice as a motion in limine to admit Rule 608(b) evidence.

2.   While Rule 608 prohibits extrinsic evidence used to attack a person's character for truthfulness, it does not prohibit a party from using extrinsic evidence for other impeachment purposes, such as to show bias, to contradict a witness’ testimony, or to demonstrate that the witness has made prior inconsistent statements. United States v. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d 167, 179 (1st Cir. 2014).

BESOSA, Senior District Judge.