UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOS TORRES DÍAZ (2025)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is defendant José Torres-Díaz (“Torres”)’s motion submitting certified translations of documents related to the suppression motion at docket no. 91. (Docket No. 119.) For the reasons set forth below, and as indicated previously, Torres’ motion submitting certified translations is NOTED (Docket No. 119,) and his suppression motion remains DENIED. (Docket No. 118.)

On June 2, 2025, Torres filed a motion to suppress statements he made during three interrogations, and evidence obtained from a search of his cellphone. (Docket No. 91.) In the motion, Torres submitted the officers’ notes of the interrogations in Spanish, and requested the Court allow him to file certified translations by June 12, 2025. Id. at p. 4 n.3. The Court waited for the translations to rule on the motion. The translations, however, were not filed by the requested date. On June 20, 2025, the Court denied Torres’ motion to suppress the statements. (Docket No. 118.) Three days after the Court denied the motion, Torres submitted the certified translations providing no reason for his delay. (Docket No. 119.)

“All pleadings and proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico shall be conducted in the English language.” Jones Act, 48 U.S.C. § 864. Additionally, Local Rule 5(c) specifically states that “[a]ll documents not in the English language which are presented or filed, whether as evidence or otherwise, must be accompanied by a certified translation.” (emphasis added). Loc.Civ.R. 5(c), made applicable to criminal cases by Local Criminal Rule 112. “This language is mandatory.” United States v. Barros-Villahermosa, 91 F. Supp. 3d 261, 265 (D.P.R. 2015) (Delgado-Colón, J.). Upon reading the motion to suppress at docket no. 91, the Court waited for Torres to file the certified translation past the requested June 12, 2025 date. The Court, however, was left with documents that it could not consider under binding precedent. See United States v. Morales-Madera, 352 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing 48 U.S.C. § 864) (“Providing an English-language transcript of wiretap evidence is more than merely useful when the recorded language is not English; for Jones Act purposes, it is necessary. The language of the federal courts is English. Participants, including judges, jurors, and counsel, are entitled to understand the proceedings in English.”). Even so, the Court did not file its opinion and order until June 20, 2025, in the hopes Torres would file the translations he indicated he would file by June 12, 2025. The Court cannot delay ruling on a motion indefinitely because a party fails to file the required translations on time. Additionally, the Court could not further delay its ruling because trial is scheduled to commence on July 21, 2025. Now, almost two weeks after Torres himself indicated he would submit the translations, Torres files the translations in the hope that the Court changes its opinion on the motion to suppress. That ship has sailed.

Even if the Court were to consider the translations, however, they would not change the Court's opinion denying the motion to suppress. Torres first argues that the officer conducted an unlawful two-step interrogation, where he was first interrogated without receiving Miranda ¹ warnings, and then once the officer got a confession, the officer gave him the warnings for him to confess again. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (plurality opinion) (finding that statements from a two-stage interview can only be admitted if the Miranda warnings and accompanying break between the interviews are sufficient to give the suspect the reasonable belief that he has the right not to speak with the police). Because the officer failed to give him the Miranda warnings before the 2:00 a.m. interrogation, he argues all statements should be suppressed. Miranda warnings, however, are only given when an officer wants to question a defendant that is in custody. The determination involves two distinct inquiries: “first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, [whether] a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). When an individual is unable to “leave” the place of the interrogation solely due to circumstances incident to medical treatment, the question is said to be slightly different: whether he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and “cause the [officers] to leave.” United States v. Infante, 701 F.3d 386, 396 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. New, 491 F.3d 369, 373 (8th Cir. 2007)); see United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 628 (4th Cir. 2007) (whether an individual whose freedom of movement is restricted due to medical treatment is subject to Miranda custody depends on “whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter”). Torres arrived at the hospital around 1:47 a.m. (Docket No. 119-1 at p. 8.) Pursuant to the officer's notes, he spoke with Torres at 2:00 a.m. (Docket NO. 119-2.) The interview could not have taken much time since hospital records reflect Torres was being triaged at 2:10 a.m., had an electrocardiogram done at 2:16 a.m., and placed on an IV bag at 2:19 a.m. If the interrogation occurred while “hospital staff came and went freely ․ [then this] suggest[s] that the officer [was] not in a position to dominate the setting.” Id. Additionally, hospital notes state that Torres was moving freely throughout the emergency room. See Docket No. 119-1 at p. 6. Therefore, Torres was not in custody and the officer was not required to give Miranda warnings. Seibert only applies if the initial unmirandized interview was custodial. See, e.g., United States v. Simmonds, 641 F. App'x 99, 101 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2006); Sturm v. Superintendent of Indian River Juv. Corr. Facility, 514 F. App'x 618, 625 n.2 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Thompson, 496 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 2007); Smith v. Clark, 612 F. App'x 418, 421 (9th Cir. 2015). Therefore, there is no Seibert-type interrogation here. That is, the interviews are not part of the same continuum.

Torres notes in his brief that the Miranda form for the 4:55 a.m. interview was signed five minutes ² after it began, and that the Miranda form for the 6:55 a.m. interview was signed at 7:03 a.m. (Docket No. 119-5; Docket No. 119-6.) Torres, however, does not argue that the waiver was involuntarily given, only that the interviews are part of an unlawful Seibert two step interrogation, which we have decided it is not.

Torres’ other argument is that the statements were given involuntarily because his faculties were impaired. (Docket No. 91 at pp. 12-15.) In its opinion and order, the Court recognized that Torres was in pain but that he was alert and walking around without any issues. See Docket No. 118. Additionally, Torres stated that he was not on any medication, and not under the effects of any substance. (Docket No. 119-3; Docket No. 119-5.) Nor is there any evidence that he was withheld water, food or sleep. The crux to finding involuntariness is whether the police activity was coercive. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). There is no evidence that the officers coerced Torres’ statements. Accordingly, Torres’ statements were voluntary.

For the reasons set forth above, Torres’ motion submitting certified translations is NOTED (Docket No. 119,) and his motion to suppress remains DENIED. (Docket No. 118.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 27, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2.   According to the translated Miranda form provided, Torres waived his rights at 3:00 a.m. See Docket No. 119-4. Upon review of the original form, however, the translation is incorrect. Torres waived his rights at 5:00 a.m. See Docket No. 91-4.

FRANCISCO A. BESOSA SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE