UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. NGEL AYALA VÁZQUEZ (2025)

OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant Ángel M. Ayala-Vázquez (“Ayala”) moves the Court for a sentence reduction pursuant to the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Docket No. 4740.) For the following reasons, his motion for compassionate release is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Ayala was the kingpin of a massive drug trafficking organization run out of the José Celso Barbosa and Sierra Linda Public Housing Projects in Bayamón, Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 2298 at pp. 13-15.) On April 26, 2011, after an eighteen-day jury trial, Ayala was found guilty of five counts of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute narcotics within a protected location under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and 860, one count of conspiracy to import narcotics into the United States under 21 U.S.C. § 963, and three counts of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). See Docket No. 1606; Docket No. 3024. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. See Docket No. 2318, Docket No. 2788. As the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated when affirming Ayala's life sentence, “[t]he sheer size, scope, sophistication, and profitability of the DTO's Barbosa operations are enough to take one's breath away. The human toll exacted by its illicit activity is unknowable.” United States v. Ayala-Vázquez, 751 F.3d 1, 35 (1st Cir. 2014).

By all accounts, the amount of narcotics involved in the conspiracy was extremely large. The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) states that the drug trafficking organization realized earnings of over $100 million during the 14-year span of the conspiracy. (Docket No. 2298 at p. 16.) In calculating Ayala's offense level, the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) notes that “[t]he total amount of drugs attributed to the defendant after converting all of the controlled substances based on the drug equivalent Table found in USSG § 2D1.1 is more than thirty thousand (30,000) kilograms of marihuana,” in other words, more than the threshold for the highest offense level provided in the table. Id. at p. 34. During the sentencing hearing, the presiding district judge noted that, over a four-and-a-half-year period during the fourteen-year conspiracy, the organization handled shipments of 40 to 60 kilograms of cocaine per week, for an approximate total of over 9,000 kilograms. Docket No. 2788 at 20:5-16. Ayala did not object to any of the amounts specified in the PSR or indicated by the district judge at sentencing.

Ayala's base offense level was 38 under Section 2D1.1(c)(1) of the November 2010 edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual. See Docket No. 2298 at p. 34. He also received a four-level enhancement for his leadership role, a two-level enhancement for use of firearms in furtherance of the conspiracy, and another two-level enhancement for running the conspiracy out of a public housing project, for a total adjusted offense level of 46. Id. at pp. 34-35. This level was treated as an offense level of 43 (the maximum provided in the sentencing guidelines) for which the guideline sentencing range is life imprisonment, regardless of criminal history. Id. at p. 35. Ayala also received six criminal history points due to prior offenses involving unregistered firearms, though this did not increase his guideline sentencing range, which was already at the maximum. See id. at pp. 36-37.

Ayala was originally incarcerated at USP Victorville in California. (Docket No. 4326 at p. 4.) He was subsequently relocated to his current place of incarceration, USP Hazelton in West Virginia. (Docket No. 4757 at p. 1.) USP Hazelton is a high-security prison. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, USP Hazelton, https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/haz/ (last visited May 16, 2025).

On March 17, 2025, Ayala moved to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the compassionate release statute. (Docket No. 4740.) He argues that his sentence was computed using “draconian” laws and guidelines that have since been amended, and that he would receive significantly less time if he were sentenced today. He also argues that his rehabilitation while incarcerated has been exemplary. Acknowledging the severity of the crimes for which he was convicted, Ayala proposes not that he be released immediately, but rather that his sentence be reduced to thirty years. He has been incarcerated since his arrest in 2009, a total of over 15 years. The thirty-year incarceration period he requests would make him eligible to be released in less than ten years.

The government opposed Ayala's motion. (Docket No. 4753.) It argues (1) that Ayala failed to exhaust administrative remedies as is required for defendant-initiated motions for compassionate release, (2) that Ayala's rehabilitation, which he overstates, is insufficient on its own to justify compassionate release, and (3) that Ayala fails to demonstrate that he received an “unusually long sentence” that would provide an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release. Ayala replied to the government's response. (Docket No. 4756.) The U.S. Probation Office also submitted an informative brief (docket No. 4744), to which Ayala responded. (Docket No. 4749.) The probation office opined that Ayala does not qualify for a sentence reduction under Amendment 821 and does not benefit from a change in law providing a shorter sentence under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). The probation office also pushed back on Ayala's claimed rehabilitation, providing a list of disciplinary infractions he has incurred while in prison between 2012 and 2023.

The current motion is Ayala's second petition for compassionate release. He previously requested compassionate release in a July 2021 motion to reduce sentence. (Docket No. 4326.) The Court rejected his compassionate release arguments, see docket no. 4370, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in United States v. Ayala-Vázquez, 96 F.4th 1, 12-14 (1st Cir. 2024). His current motion brings new arguments which the Court will address below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The First Step Act of 2018 amended the compassionate release statute to allow incarcerated individuals to make requests for sentence reductions to the court once they have exhausted administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). To exhaust administrative remedies, a defendant must first request that the BOP file a motion for compassionate release on his behalf. See id. “After filing such a request, the defendant may only file a motion in federal court if he has either (1) fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal the BOP's failure to bring a motion on his behalf; or (2) waited thirty [ ] days from the receipt of his request by the warden of their facility, whichever is earlier.” United States v. Morales, Crim. No. 95-235 (MAJ), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13217, at *5 (D.P.R. Jan. 24, 2025) (Morgan, M.J.) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). The defendant has the burden of showing that he exhausted administrative remedies prior to bringing his claim before the Court. See United States v. Wells, Crim. No. 13-151, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139425, at *10 (E.D. La. Aug. 5, 2020). The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that exhaustion of administrative remedies is merely a “claim-processing rule” rather than a jurisdictional requirement. United States v. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2022). As a result, the government can waive this requirement “either expressly or by failing to raise it as a defense.” United States v. Pabón-Mandrell, Crim. No. 07-121, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229346, at *12 (D.P.R. Dec. 22, 2023) (Ramos-Vega, M.J.).

A court may not reduce a term of imprisonment unless “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). One such extraordinary and compelling reason is if the defendant received an unusually long sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). An unusually long sentence may count as extraordinary and compelling if the defendant has served at least ten years of imprisonment, and if a change in law (other than a non-retroactive amendment to the guidelines manual) would produce a gross disparity between the original sentence the one likely imposed today. Id. When making that determination, a Court must also consider the defendants’ individualized circumstances. Id.

If the Court finds that there are extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, it must still consider the sentencing factors set forth in section 3553(a), including the potential danger a defendant poses to the community, and the reduction must be consistent with “applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). A defendant's potential dangerousness to the community, evaluated based on his or her criminal history and his or her conduct while incarcerated, is an important factor that courts consider when weighing the section 3553(a) factors. See United States v. D'Angelo, 110 F.4th 42, 50-52 (1st Cir. 2024) (district court did not err when it “reasonably concluded that D'Angelo’s potential dangerousness under [section] 3553(a) outweighed all else”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The government contends that Ayala failed to properly exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing his current motion. Ayala disagrees. His first argument is that he exhausted administrative remedies when he brought his initial compassionate release motion (docket no. 4326) and that the law does not require him to do so again. This argument is meritless. Besides the fact that his previous petition was made to his previous warden at USP Victorville rather than to his current warden at USP Hazelton, the law is clear that “[s]uccessive compassionate release motions must independently satisfy the exhaustion requirement.” United States v. Cain, No. 1:16-cr-00103, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20672, at *10-11 (D. Me. Feb. 3, 2021). Ayala's assertion that, in the context of multiple motions for compassionate release, “[c]ourts across the country have held that the exhaustion requirement need only be satisfied once” is simply not true. The cases he cites are inapposite – United States v. Torres ¹ and United States v. Hancock ² both involved only one compassionate release motion rather than multiple successive motions. The other case he cites, United States v. Williams, 2020 WL 5573023, does not seem to exist.

Perhaps anticipating that the Court would reject his first argument, Ayala filed an informative motion stating that he petitioned his warden at USP Hazelton for compassionate release on October 17, 2024, and that his request was declined. See Docket No. 4757 at p. 1. He does not provide the Court with any documentation evidencing his request or the warden's response. Instead, he provides the contact telephone number of the case manager assigned to his request and invites the government and the Court to contact her directly. Id. Because Ayala bears the burden of showing that he exhausted administrative remedies, merely asserting that he made the necessary request to the warden is insufficient without additional proof, such as documentary evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Van Sickle, No. CR18-0250JLR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80854, at *10 (W.D. Wa. May 7, 2020) (“Mr. Van Sickle submits nothing more than his say so to demonstrate his exhaustion of administrative remedies ․ [his] word, without more, is insufficient to meet his burden here.”) Therefore, the Court finds that Ayala has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

In any case, even if Ayala had exhausted his administrative remedies, his motion also fails on the merits as will be discussed below.

B. Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances

Ayala's motion for compassionate release hinges on his argument that he received an “unusually long sentence” under section 1B1.13(b)(6) of the sentencing guidelines. He also points to his rehabilitation while incarcerated as a plus factor in this regard. As noted in the sentencing guidelines, “rehabilitation of the defendant is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason,” but “may be considered in combination with other circumstances in determining whether and to what extent a reduction ․ is warranted.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d). The success of his rehabilitation, however, is called into question by his numerous disciplinary infractions while incarcerated. See Docket No. 4744 at p. 4-5. Additionally, the fact that he claimed to have a clean disciplinary record until called out by the government and probation office is troubling. Compare Docket No. 4740 at p. 9 (“He has maintained a perfect disciplinary record, with zero infractions over 13 years”), with Docket No. 4744 at p. 4-5 (listing disciplinary infractions dating between 2012 and 2023). The Court is not persuaded by, and will not consider, Ayala's argument concerning his rehabilitation because it is simply not true, and will proceed to analyze his Section 1B1.13(b)(6) argument on its own.

In rejecting Ayala's previous compassionate release motion, the First Circuit Court of Appeals already found that the Fair Sentencing Act's changes to his statute of conviction did not provide him with a reduced sentence. 96 F.4th at 6-11. Instead, Ayala now argues that subsequent retroactive amendments to the sentencing guidelines, specifically amendments 814 and 821, create a gross disparity between his life sentence and the sentence he would receive for the same crimes today. Section 1B1.13(b)(6) specifies, however, that only retroactive amendments to the sentencing guidelines qualify for consideration as extraordinary and compelling circumstances. Section 1B1.10(d), in turn, lists which sentencing guideline amendments are retroactive. While Amendment 821 is on the list, Amendment 814 is not on the list. Ayala may, however, have meant to refer to Amendment 782 – he claims that Amendment 814 “revised the Drug Quantity Table and lowered the base offense levels for numerous controlled substances,” which is not what it did, but which is exactly what Amendment 782 did. The Court will give Ayala the benefit of the doubt and analyze whether Amendment 782, as well as Amendment 821, would provide him with a lower sentence.³

Ayala was originally sentenced with a base offense level of 38, the highest level provided in the Section 2D1.1(c) drug quantity table (then as now). As modified by Amendment 782, a defendant triggers the base offense level of 38 when he or she were responsible for 450 kg or more of cocaine or 90,000 kg or more of converted drug weight. The PSR and sentencing transcript indicate that Ayala was responsible for quantities which far exceed these thresholds. The PSR records $51 million of proceeds from the sale of crack cocaine, over $25 million from heroin, $17 million from cocaine, $4 million from marijuana, and around $3 million from Xanax and Percocet. See Docket No. 2298 at p. 16; see also United States v. Jehan, 949 F.3d 1030, 1033 (7th Cir. 2020) (“The high dollar earnings here support finding Jehan responsible for more than 450 kilograms of cocaine and 90 kilograms of heroin, the threshold quantities for the highest base level on the current drug-quantity table”). In one incident, 500 kilograms of cocaine were stolen from a Wellcraft boat in 2007, a quantity which puts Ayala in the highest offense level category all on its own. See Docket No. 2298 at p. 31. During sentencing, the district judge estimated that Ayala imported into the United States over 9,000 kilograms of cocaine over a four-and-a-half-year period during the fourteen-year conspiracy. See Docket No. 2788 at 20:8-16. Ayala did not object to, and does not currently contest, any of these facts.⁴

Finding that Ayala was responsible for a quantity of drugs which places him in the highest offense level category is consistent with the PSR's offense level calculation finding him responsible for “at least” 30,000 kg of marijuana-equivalent drug weight. See United States v. Spears, 824 F.3d 908, 913 (9th Cir. 2016) (sentencing court's statement that defendant was responsible for manufacturing “in excess of one and a half kilograms of crack cocaine” not inconsistent with the district court's later attribution of 11 kilograms for guideline calculations); Jehan, 949 F.3d at 1033 (“A district court may make new findings of fact to determine a defendant's base offense level when a retroactive amendment alters the relevant drug-quantity thresholds - so long as those findings are supported by the record and consistent with the findings made at the original sentencing”). With a base offense level of 38, Ayala's final offense level is no different new than when he was originally sentenced, and his guideline sentencing range, including the level enhancements he received, remains the same (life). Therefore, Amendment 782 does not create a disparity between his life sentence and the sentence he would likely receive today.

Similarly, Amendment 821 does not provide Ayala with an argument for a reduced sentence. Ayala received six criminal history points, none of which were for committing his current offense during a prior criminal justice sentence. (Docket No. 2298 at pp. 36-37.) His criminal history points would be the same today as when he was originally sentenced, and in any case, with his offense level of 43, the guideline sentencing range is life regardless of his criminal history.

In sum, Ayala fails to show that he would receive a lower sentence today due to retroactively applicable sentencing guideline amendments. He thus fails to show that extraordinary and compelling reasons justify his release after 30 years imprisonment.

C. Sentencing Factors Pursuant to Section 3553(a)

While a district court is not required to analyze the section 3553(a) factors if it does not find extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting release, appellate “review is aided ․ when the district court takes the additional step of making a section 3553(a) determination.” Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th at 52. Pursuant to section 3553(a), a court must determine if the sentence imposed reflects the seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the law, provides a just punishment, affords adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, protects the public from additional crimes by the defendant, and provides the defendant with needed correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Ayala's personal characteristics suggest that he would be a danger to the community and at a high risk to reoffend if released. He is a repeat offender with a history of violence and firearm violations. See Docket No. 2298 at pp. 17, 36-37. While incarcerated, he has amassed numerous disciplinary infractions against him. See Docket No. 4744 at pp. 4-5. When he was under supervision for his prior federal conviction, he was rarely at his designated job site and the probation officers often had difficulty contacting him, which casts doubt on whether he would abide by release conditions. (Docket No. 2298 at p. 42.) And the sheer scope of the unlawful conduct leading to his conviction suggests at best an indifferent or even a callous disregard of the law, with implications on his potential danger to the community, recidivism, and monitoring.

Contrary to Ayala's assertion, the fact that some of his co-defendants have served their terms and been released does not weigh in his favor. As the kingpin of the drug trafficking organization, he is arguably the most culpable defendant in the case. Regardless, apart from his own brother (similarly still incarcerated), each of his co-defendants decided to reach plea arguments with the government. See United States v. Ayala-Vázquez, 751 F.3d at 7 (“The other defendants named in the Indictment - with the exception of a few who could not be located - reached individual plea agreements with the government, and in the end Ayala and Cruz were the only two who stood trial”); Docket No. 4740 at pp. 9-10. “There is a material difference between defendants who plead guilty and those who elect to go to trial, and any sentencing disparity that results from that difference is not unreasonable.” United States v. Rivera Calderón, 578 F.3d 78, 107 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Turning to arguments in Ayala's favor, the Court notes that he has completed numerous educational courses while incarcerated, claims to have pursued mentorship roles for younger inmates, claims remorse, and claims to have maintained strong family ties. See Docket No. 4740 at p. 9; Docket No. 4749 at p. 11. On balance, the Court finds that the section 3553(a) factors weigh against Ayala's release after 30 years. This, coupled with his failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, necessitate a denial of his motion.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Ayala's motion for compassionate release is DENIED. (Docket No. 4740.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 21, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   464 F. Supp. 3d 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

2.   No. 1:06-CR-206-2, 2021 WL 848708 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 5, 2021).

3.   Ayala previously petitioned the Court for a sentence reduction under Amendment 782. (Docket No. 3709.) The Court denied his motion. (Docket Nos. 4019, 4021, 4022.)

4.   It is no argument to say that the drug quantities listed in the indictment and jury verdict would put him in a lower offense level, which would have the effect of reducing his guideline range. The drug quantities attributed to a defendant in the PSR or at sentencing are used to calculate the guideline range, not the quantities listed in the indictment. See United States v. Rodríguez-Rodríguez, 686 F. Supp. 3d 58, 63 (D.P.R. 2023) (Besosa, J.). “Such findings may be based on approximations drawn from historical evidence as long as those approximations represent reasoned estimates of drug quantity.” United States v. Ventura, 353 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 2003).

FRANCISCO A. BESOSA SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE