REYNOSO v. DEJOY (2024)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is defendant United States Postmaster General Louis Dejoy (“defendant”)’s objections to Magistrate Judge Marcos E. López (the “magistrate judge”)’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”). (Docket No. 64.) The magistrate judge recommended that the defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 49) be granted in part and denied in part. (Docket No. 64.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court ADOPTS IN PART and REJECTS IN PART the magistrate judge's R&R, (Docket No. 64), and GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 49.)

I. Background

The magistrate judge recommended findings of fact based on the evidence present in the summary judgment record. (Docket No. 64 at p. 3.) After careful review of the record, the Court ADOPTS the magistrate judge's factual findings, and summarizes the pertinent parts as follows.

On January 20, 2021, plaintiff Marcos A. Reynoso (“Reynoso” or “plaintiff”) and Mr. Carlos Ortiz (“Mr. Ortiz”), both United States Postal Service (“USPS”) employees, engaged in a fight while at work. (Docket No. 50 at p. 1.) That same date, both Reynoso and Mr. Ortiz were placed in an off-duty-without-pay status. Id. Both employees started their off-duty status from January 23, 2021, to January 27, 2021; after serving their suspension, they returned to work. Id. at 2. On February 8, 2021, both the plaintiff and Mr. Ortiz each received a notice of removal due to improper conduct. Id. at 3. Subsequently, on March 2, 2021, as a result of a grievance settlement, Reynoso and Mr. Ortiz agreed that the notice of removal be reduced to a suspension of 14 days. Id. Reynoso's 14-day suspension began on March 3, 2021, and ended on March 16, 2021. Id. Ex. 13 at p. 2. While it is disputed when Mr. Ortiz's suspension began, it is undisputed that it ended on March 12, 2021. Id. at p. 4.

Approximately a month after serving his suspension, Reynoso contacted the USPS Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor alleging discrimination and retaliation arising from the altercation in January 2021 and the notice of removal issued in February 2021. (Docket No. 50 at p. 5.) Reynoso signed an “EEO Complaint of Discrimination in the Postal Service,” on August 4, 2021, which alleged discrimination during the following events: (1) On January 20, 2021, [Plaintiff was] involved in a physical altercation and subsequently, placed on Emergency Placement in a non-pay status. (2) On February 8, 2021, [Plaintiff was] issued a Notice of Removal ․ The Notice of Removal dated February 8, 2021, was reduced to a 14[-]Day Suspension via the grievance process. Id. The USPS EEO office dismissed the plaintiff's EEO complaint on August 25, 2021, concluding that Reynoso's “request for pre-complaint counseling was made over 45 days after the issue alleged to be discriminatory.” Id. The EEO advised Reynoso that “[i]n lieu of filing an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, you may file a civil action in an appropriate U.S. District Court within 90 calendar days of your receipt of this decision.” Id. at 6. Reynoso filed his claim before this Court on November 28, 2021, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). (Docket No. 1.)

II. Legal Standard

A district court may refer a pending motion to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Loc. Rule 72(b). Any party adversely affected by the report and recommendation may file written objections within fourteen days of being served with the magistrate judge's report. Loc. Rule 72(d). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party that files a timely objection is entitled to a de novo determination of “those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which specific objection is made.” Ramos-Echevarría v. Pichis, Inc., 698 F.Supp. 2d 262, 264 (D.P.R. 2010); Sylva v. Culebra Dive Shop, 389 F.Supp. 2d 189, 191-92 (D.P.R. 2005) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980)).

Failure to comply with this rule precludes further review. See Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1992); Borden v. Secretary of H.H.S., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1987). In conducting its review, a court is free to “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(b)(1); Templeman v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 247 (1st Cir. 1985); Álamo Rodríguez v. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 286 F.Supp.2d 144, 146 (D.P.R. 2003). Furthermore, the Court may accept those parts of the report and recommendation to which the parties do not object. See Hernández-Mejías v. General Elec., 428 F.Supp.2d 4, 6 (D.P.R. 2005) (citing Lacedra v. Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility, 334 F.Supp. 2d 114, 125-126 (D.R.I. 2004)).

III. Discussion

The magistrate judge recommended that the defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 49) be granted as to all of plaintiff's claims except one: race and/or color discrimination based on disparate treatment arising solely from the USPS's implementation of the 14-day suspension of Mr. Ortiz and the plaintiff. (Docket No. 64 p. 23.) The magistrate judge reasoned that the plaintiff had met his burden in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination pursuant to Title VII and, furthermore, that the claims relating to the implementation of the 14-day suspension were the only claims that had been properly administratively exhausted and were not time-barred. Id. at p. 10.

Reynoso has not objected to the magistrate judge's recommendations within the allowed time and has therefore waived review in this Court. See Davet 973 F.2d at 30-31. In spite of the plaintiff's waiver of review, the Court has nonetheless examined the entire record and agrees with the magistrate judge's reasoning regarding the time-barred claims and those claims that were not administratively exhausted. (Docket No. 64 p. 23.) The Court does not agree, however, with the magistrate's finding that the plaintiff has met his burden to set out a prima facie case of race discrimination. Id. at p. 17.

To succeed on a discrimination claim pursuant to Title VII, “the complainant ․ must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of ․ discrimination.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The plaintiff must set forth a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that he; “(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) is qualified for the job [he] seeks; (3) has suffer[ed] an adverse employment action at the hands of [his] employer; and (4) there is some evidence of a causal connection between [his] membership in a protected class and the adverse employment action.” Luceus v. Rhode Island, 923 F.3d 255, 258 (1st Cir. 2019). (internal quotations omitted) (citing Bhatti v. Trustees of Bos. Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2011)). Furthermore, in cases where the non-movant party bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case, the non-movant must present “competent evidence to rebut a motion for summary judgment.” Moeller Tevez v. Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 534 F. Supp. 2d 253, 255 (D.P.R. 2008) (Acosta, J.) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256–257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, (1986)). It is well established that a party cannot rely on “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation” at the summary judgment stage. López–Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 412 (1st Cir. 2000); Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994); Medina–Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).

As was highlighted in the R&R, plaintiff does not cite to a single fact in support of the finding that he is a member of a protected class. (Docket No 64 at p. 12.) The R&R concluded that because Reynoso alleged in his complaint that he was a member of a protected class, and because, while the defendants denied it in their response, defendants did not challenge it on summary judgment, it would be treated as an uncontested fact. Id. The Court disagrees with this reasoning. While defendants did not directly challenge the plaintiff's race, they did specifically challenge the race discrimination allegation as “baseless,” and further claimed there was no “connection to race or color.” (Docket No. 52 at p. 11, 15.) Reynoso failed to respond and, though he alleged disparate treatment in comparison to “lighter skinned employees,” he did not cite to any evidence of the race or color of the USPS employees. (Docket No. 64 at 12.) Furthermore, nowhere in the record does plaintiff name multiple employees. His only references are to Mr. Ortiz when it comes to the race discrimination claim, and yet, he provides no evidence of Mr. Ortiz's race either. Id.¹

This lack of evidence is fatal to plaintiff's race or color claim. It is insufficient at the summary judgment stage for Reynoso to rely merely on his allegations in the amended complaint as evidence that he is a member of a protected class and that Mr. Ortiz is not. Medina–Muñoz 896 F.2d at 8. The absence of evidence regarding membership in a protected class also frustrates any meaningful analysis of the causation element of plaintiff's prima facie case. Even if the Court accepts Reynoso's contention that he was subjected to a longer suspension period than Mr. Ortiz, Reynoso must still show that “there is some evidence of a causal connection between [his] membership in a protected class and the adverse employment action.” Luceus, 923 F.3d at 258. The R&R correctly notes that causation may be inferred when the individuals subjected to different treatment were similarly situated. (Docket No. 50 at p. 16.) (citing Bhatti v. Trustees of Bos. Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2011)). Given the complete dearth of evidence in the record regarding race or color, however, the Court is unable to conclude that Reynoso and Mr. Ortiz were similarly situated in every aspect except Reynoso's membership in a protected class. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (finding causation element was satisfied because a similarly situated person of a different race was given the same job.)

For the above reasons, the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to set forth a prima facie case of discrimination pursuant to Title VII. See Medina–Muñoz 896 F.2d at 8 (finding that the court should ignore “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation” at the summary judgment stage); see also Smith v. Jenkins, 732 F.3d 51, 76 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Shafmaster v. United States, 707 F.3d 130, 135 (1st Cir. 2013)). At this late stage in the proceedings the Court must look to the evidence in the record. Id. Even a simple sworn statement or deposition discussing membership in a protected class might have sufficed. See Rivera-Rivera v. Medina & Medina, Inc., 898 F.3d 77, 92-93 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding that information provided in plaintiff's sworn statement met the necessary requirements to establish her membership in a protected class). Without more than allegations, however, Reynoso cannot survive summary judgment on his race or color claim and therefore it must be dismissed. Medina–Muñoz 896 F.2d at 8.

While the plaintiff has waived review of his other claims, the Court has nonetheless conducted a complete review of the record and agrees that Reynoso's age discrimination and workplace retaliation claims must also be dismissed for the reasons set forth in the R&R. For the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS the defendant's motion for summary judgment. As such, the case is DISSMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and the Court need not consider the defendants’ objections to the R&R.

IV. Conclusion

For the above reasons, the Court ADOPTS IN PART and REJECTS IN PART the magistrate judge's R&R, (Docket No. 64), and GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 49.) All of plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Reynoso also fails to proffer any evidence to satisfy the second prong of a prima facie case, that he is qualified for his job. (Docket No. 64 at p. 12.)

BESOSA, Senior District Judge.