JAMES RICKHER v. MEGAN SULLIVAN SCOTT BESSENT (2026)

OPINION & ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff James M. Rickher, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Megan Sullivan, the acting chief for the U.S. Mint's Office of Design Management, and Scott Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury (“Defendants”), to challenge the U.S. Mint's alleged approval and imminent issuance of a 24-karat gold commemorative coin bearing the likeness of President Donald J. Trump. Amended Complaint (“AC”) ¶ 1, ECF 7. Plaintiff, a novice collector of United States numismatic coins, alleges that the challenged coin violates 31 U.S.C. § 5114(b), which prohibits portraits of living individuals on U.S. currency and securities. AC ¶¶ 1–5. Plaintiff claims Defendants’ actions violate the Administrative Procedures Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C), AC ¶¶ 50–54, 59–65, and are ultra vires actions that exceed the scope of the authority granted by Congress, AC ¶¶ 55–58.

Before this Court is Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Motion” or “Mot.”), ECF 6. Plaintiff seeks to bar Defendants from producing, issuing, or distributing any coin bearing the likeness of President Donald J. Trump. Id. at 1. Defendants responded to Plaintiff's Motion, arguing that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Motion, that Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits of his claims, and that Plaintiff cannot show irreparable harm. Defendants’ Response in Opposition (“Resp.”), ECF 25 at 9–10. In particular, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to make a clear showing that he has suffered or imminently will suffer concrete harm from issuance of the challenged coin. Id. at 17–22. Without concrete harm, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate standing, which is required for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Motion. Id. Plaintiff replied, arguing that his concrete harm follows from his role as an active numismatic market participant that evaluates, acquires, and holds coins.¹ Plaintiff's Reply in Support (“Reply”), ECF 27 at 5–8. This Court heard oral argument on Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction on June 3, 2026. Minutes of Proceeding, ECF 32.

Based on the briefing, the evidence provided by the parties, and the oral argument on June 3, 2026, Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. Plaintiff, at this stage, has failed to present evidence that clearly shows he will personally suffer concrete harm from issuance of the challenged coin. Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate standing to support his motion for a preliminary injunction, which is an extraordinary remedy, this Court is unable to reach the merits of Plaintiff's claims at this time.

STANDARDS

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that may be awarded only if the plaintiff clearly shows entitlement to such relief.” Am. Beverage Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 754 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). At the preliminary injunction stage, the plaintiff “must make a ‘clear showing’ that [ ]he is ‘likely’ to establish each element of standing.” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 58 (2024) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 22). Where the plaintiff fails to establish standing to seek a preliminary injunction, the analysis begins and ends there. Id. at 56.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a novel numismatist ² and coin collector. Declaration of James M. Rickher (“Rickher Decl.”), ECF 27-1 ¶ 2. Plaintiff's collection “has been assembled through deliberate, ongoing acquisition and represents a sustained commitment to the numismatic discipline.” Id. Plaintiff's collection features over 100 United States coins and includes coins from 1917 through the early 2000s. Id. ¶ 3.

On March 24, 2026, Plaintiff filed this action after learning that the United States Commission of Fine Arts approved the final design for a 24-karat gold coin bearing President Trump's image. Complaint, ECF ¶ 3; AC ¶ 3. As currently proposed, this coin (the “challenged coin”) would feature an image of President Trump standing at his desk on the front of the coin, and a Bald Eagle atop the Liberty Bell on the back. Declaration in Support of Federal Defendants’ Opposition (“Stafford Decl.”), ECF 25-1 ¶ 29; Ex. 1, ECF 25-2. The challenged coin will be issued alongside other gold coins in 2026 in celebration of the Semiquincentennial of the United States. Stafford Decl., ECF 25-1 ¶ 30. The mint plans to issue 47 of the challenged coin. Id. ¶ 32. Each coin will weigh approximately 19.7 oz., which currently puts the coin's precious metal content at approximately $90,000. Id. The Secretary of the Treasury has not yet approved the final design of the challenged coin, and the Mint has not produced or “struck” the challenged coin. Id. ¶ 33.

Plaintiff asserts that the challenged coin depicting President Trump violates 31 U.S.C. § 5114(b), which prohibits portraits of living individuals on U.S. currency and securities. AC ¶¶ 1–5. In Plaintiff's view, the issuance of the challenged coin will “corrupt[ ] the regulatory and taxonomic framework on which Plaintiff relies in making collecting decisions and that underpins the value of his existing collection.” AC ¶ 33. The issuance of the challenged coin will also compel Plaintiff to decide whether he should acquire, avoid, or affirmatively exclude the coin from his collection. Rickher Decl., ECF 27-1 ¶ 7. Additionally, Plaintiff has refrained from acquiring additional coins since the Mint's announcement because Plaintiff believes that “the regulatory and market integrity of the legal tender coin market” is “uncertain.” Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff has also expressed disagreement with what he views as “the government's use of the sovereign coinage system to perpetuate a violation of a statutory protection enacted to prevent ․ executive self-promotion through the currency.” AC ¶ 33.

Plaintiff alleges that these injuries are imminent because the challenged coin had a target issuance date of July 4, 2026. Id. ¶ 34. However, Defendants have represented to this Court that the challenged coin will not issue on or before July 4, 2026, because the Secretary of the Treasury has not yet approved the challenged coin's final design. Stafford Decl., ECF 25-1 ¶ 34. After the Secretary's approval, the Mint would need six to eight weeks to begin striking the challenged coin, as well as several additional months to produce all 47 coins. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff has not contested Defendants’ asserted timeline for issuing the challenged coin. Therefore, despite Plaintiff's initial view, the evidence shows that the challenged coin will not issue on or before July 4, 2026, but will in fact issue, if at all, several months after that date.

DISCUSSION

“[B]efore a federal court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court must establish the requisite standing to sue.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154 (1990). In other words, “the plaintiff must have a personal stake in the dispute.” FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 379 (2024) (citation modified). This requirement ensures that “the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).

The “ ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ ” of standing requires that the plaintiff has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).

The first element of standing requires that the injury in fact is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). A concrete injury is one that is “real and not abstract.” Id. at 424 (citation modified). In determining whether an injury is concrete, courts should “assess whether the alleged injury to the plaintiff has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm ‘traditionally’ recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.” Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 341). “A ‘particularized’ injury is a harm affecting a plaintiff ‘in a personal and individual way,’ not a ‘generalized grievance’ shared by the public.” Bost v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 607 U.S. 71, 83–84 (2026) (Barrett, J., concurring) (quoting Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 339 & n.7). An actual or imminent injury must be “certainly impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (citation modified). “Allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.” Id. (citation modified).

Plaintiff asserts four harms that he would suffer from the challenged coin's issuance: “market integrity harm,” “forced transactional harm,” “chilling harm,” and “dignitary harm.” AC ¶¶ 32–36.³ This Court finds that, based on the current record, Plaintiff has failed to clearly show that any of these alleged harms amounts to Plaintiff personally experiencing an injury in fact.

Market Integrity Harm. Plaintiff asserts that “the introduction of an unlawfully issued coin into the numismatic market corrupts the regulatory and taxonomic framework on which Plaintiff relies in making collecting decisions and that underpins the value of his existing collection.” AC ¶ 33. Plaintiff makes several assertions broadly stating that the introduction of a “unlawfully issued coin” will harm the numismatic market. See, e.g., Reply, ECF 27 at 6 (“This coin, from the moment it is struck, will upend the legal and taxonomic framework that underpins the numismatic market.”); id. at 7 (“It corrupts the regulatory and taxonomic baseline on which every participant's collecting decisions rest and on which the value of every compliant coin in the market is in part premised.”). Plaintiff asserts that collectors deciding whether to acquire numismatic products are “making market decisions premised on the assumption that the coins in that market were issued in compliance with federal law.” Id. at 7.

Other than Plaintiff's own declaration, Plaintiff has provided no evidence showing that the challenged coin would negatively impact Plaintiff's collection or the numismatic market generally. Plaintiff's bare assertions about the effect this coin will have on the market are insufficient, particularly since Plaintiff is a “novice collector” of numismatic coins, AC ¶ 11, and because Plaintiff does not even claim to be an expert in the numismatic market. Even assuming that the challenged coin is unlawful, the existence of an unlawful coin, without more, is not sufficient to establish standing at this stage. Standing “requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 341.

Forced Transactional Harm. Plaintiff alleges that “as an active market participant[, he] will be compelled to make affirmative decisions regarding the unlawful coin, i.e. whether to acquire, avoid or respond to it, in a market that should not contain it.” AC ¶ 33. In short, Plaintiff alleges that his injury is that he will have to decide how to react to the challenged coin, but Plaintiff has not “identified a close historical or common-law analogue for [his] asserted injury.” TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 424. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how this alleged forced transactional harm resembles “a harm ‘traditionally’ recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.” Id. (quoting Spokeo, inc., 578 U.S. at 341).

Chilling Harm. Plaintiff argues that “the uncertainty created by Defendants’ unlawful conduct has already altered Plaintiff's present collecting activity.” AC ¶ 33. According to Plaintiff, he has “refrained from making acquisitions [he] would otherwise have made.” Declaration of James M. Rickher, ECF 27-1 ¶ 5. For example, he deferred purchasing “additional Kennedy half dollar year-dates and proof set acquisitions pending resolution of this litigation.” Id. This choice was motivated by Plaintiff's belief that “the regulatory and market integrity of the legal tender coin market ․ is currently uncertain due to Defendants’ unlawful conduct.” Id.

Plaintiff however, “cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on [himself] based on [his] fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416. That is true, even if Plaintiff's actions are a “reasonable reaction to a risk of harm.” Id. Finding standing under this asserted chilling harm “would be tantamount to accepting a repackaged version” of Plaintiff's other “failed theor[ies] of standing.” Id. “Allegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.” Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972).

Plaintiff is choosing to cease collecting coins due to his subjective fear that the challenged coin would harm the market integrity of the legal tender coin market. As explained above, Plaintiff has failed to clearly show on the current record that the challenged coin would in fact harm the market integrity of the legal tender coin market or the value of any other coin in his coin collection. Plaintiff cannot circumvent that shortcoming by changing his behavior based on his subjective belief that such harm will occur. Therefore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that any chilling harm he may have suffered was based on a “certainly impending” future injury.

Dignitary Harm. Plaintiff contends that he suffers “dignitary harm, as a numismatic stakeholder, from the government's use of the sovereign coinage system to perpetuate a violation of a statutory protection enacted to prevent ․ executive self-promotion through the currency.” AC ¶ 33. On reply, Plaintiff clarified that he is “asserting a particularized interest in the integrity of the market and legal framework that gives his collection its value and meaning.” Reply, ECF 27 at 8.

“Article III standing screens out plaintiffs who might have only a general legal, moral, ideological, or policy objection to a particular government action.” All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 381. “A citizen may not sue based only on an asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with the law,” even if that complaint is “accompanied by a strong moral, ideological, or policy objection to a government action.” Id. (citation modified). Here, Plaintiff has again restated his market integrity harm that this Court has already rejected on the present record. Any additional “dignitary harm” is based on the challenged coin offending Plaintiff because of his belief that it violates the statute and policy against executive self-promotion through the currency. Plaintiff has failed to develop the record to show that he is more than a “concerned bystander[ ].” Id. at 382 (citation modified). Accordingly, Plaintiff's asserted dignitary harm, at this stage, falls short of any “clear showing” that Plaintiff suffered an injury in fact.

In summary, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden at this stage to clearly show that he is likely to establish that the challenged coin harms the value of Plaintiff's coin collection or otherwise injures Plaintiff in any concrete and particularized manner. At most, Plaintiff has asserted a strong moral, ideological, or policy objection to a potentially illegal action by the Executive. But the Constitution “does not contemplate a system where 330 million citizens can come to federal court whenever they believe that the government is acting contrary to the Constitution or other federal law.” Id. at 382. The Constitution requires the Plaintiff to demonstrate his “personal stake” in the case. Bost, 607 U.S. at 76. Plaintiff has failed to make a clear showing of his personal stake in the Mint issuing the challenged coin, so this Court must deny Plaintiff the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction.

Accordingly, this Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction. To be clear, this Court does not reach the merits of Plaintiff's lawsuit or determine whether the challenged coin is illegal. Nor does this Court express any view on the sufficiency of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. This Court only decides, based on the record presented in support of Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction, that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to clearly show that he has standing to seek a preliminary injunction.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF 6, is DENIED. Defendants’ Response to the Amended Complaint, ECF 7, is due within twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Opinion & Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 18th day of June, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiff filed a declaration with his reply to supply further evidence of the concrete harm he alleged. Reply, ECF 27 at 6; Declaration of James M. Rickher, ECF 27-1. Defendants moved for leave to file a sur-reply to respond to the evidence presented in Plaintiff's reply declaration. Plaintiff did not oppose the motion, and this Court granted it on June 4, 2026. This Court considers both Plaintiff's reply declaration and Defendants’ sur-reply, ECF 29-1, in deciding Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

2.   Numismatics is “the study or collections of coins, tokens, and paper money and sometimes related objects (such as medals).” Numismatics, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/numismatics [https://perma.cc/YSB7-4PE7] (last visited June 17, 2026).

3.   Plaintiff does not address standing in his Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF 6. Accordingly, this Court looks to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint to identify on what grounds he asserts that he has standing.

Karin J. Immergut United States District Judge