KAO SAECHAO v. BRIDGETOWN NATURAL FOODS LLC GRACO INC (2025)

ORDER

After being injured in a workplace accident, Kao Saechao sued Bridgetown Natural Foods, LLC (“Bridgetown”) and Graco, Inc. (“Graco”) in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Multnomah. Against his employer, Bridgetown, Mr. Saechao asserts a single claim under Oregon tort law, alleging “intentional misconduct.” ECF 1-1 at 21. Mr. Saechao contends that Bridgetown violated certain Oregon and federal regulations, specifically, Oregon Administrative Rule (“OAR”) 437-001-0760(1)(a)-(b) and 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.212(a)(1), 1910.147(c)(4), 1910.147(c)(7), and 1910.147(f)(1). Against Graco, an equipment manufacturer, Mr. Saechao asserts what he labels a single claim under Oregon tort law, alleging one count of strict products liability and one count of negligence. ECF 1-1 at 14-16. Graco timely removed the case to federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). ECF 1. Graco contends that Plaintiff's claims against Bridgetown are barred under Oregon law and that Graco is the only properly joined defendant. Graco explains that because it is a citizen of a different state than Plaintiff and the amount in controversy satisfies the jurisdictional threshold, diversity jurisdiction is present. Now before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to remand. ECF 9. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion.

STANDARDS

A motion to remand is the proper procedure for a plaintiff to use when challenging removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447; see also Moore-Thomas v. Ala. Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that removal is proper. Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244. “This burden is particularly stringent for removing defendants because ‘[t]he removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.’ ” Corral v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 878 F.3d 770, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244); see also Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting the “strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction).

A civil action generally may be removed from state court to federal court if the federal district court would have had original, subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Subject matter jurisdiction may be based on either diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Diversity jurisdiction exists over civil actions when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is complete diversity among all plaintiffs and defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). “[D]iversity jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different State from each plaintiff.” Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (emphasis in original).

Removal is barred if any properly joined defendant is a citizen of the State in which the case is brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A defendant may still remove a case, however, if that defendant can prove by clear and convincing evidence that a non-diverse defendant was fraudulently, or improperly, joined. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914); Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007). “[T]here are ‘two ways to establish improper joinder: (1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court.’ ” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)); see also GranCare, LLC v. Thrower, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018); Olsen v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 2023 WL 1795226, at *2 (D. Or., Feb. 6, 2023). The first prong is not at issue in the pending motion. The second prong will be satisfied if the defendant can show that the “individuals joined in the action cannot be liable on any theory.” Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).

BACKGROUND

Mr. Saechao is a resident of Portland, Oregon and a longtime employee at Bridgetown. Compl. (ECF 1-1) ¶ 1(j),(k). Bridgetown is a Delaware LLC with its principal place of business in Oregon; its only member is a citizen of Oregon. Id. ¶ 1(a)-(c). At its Portland manufacturing facility, Bridgetown uses the Saniforce Drum Unloader (also known as the “Jelly Pump”), which is produced by Graco, a Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business in Minnesota. Id. ¶ 1(d),(e),(g).

On June 25, 2023, Bridgetown employees disassembled the Jelly Pump to clean it. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Upon reassembling the machine, the employees misaligned certain components of the Jelly Pump, rendering it useless. Id. ¶ 5. The assigned operator of the Jelly Pump was new to the role and requested Mr. Saechao's help to fix it. Id. ¶ 2. Mr. Saechao and two less experienced employees attempted to fix the Jelly Pump. Id. Bridgetown, however, had not provided any of these three workers with training on the safe and proper assembly of the Jelly Pump and did not provide an instruction manual for the machine. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 6. As Mr. Saechao and his co-workers attempted to troubleshoot the Jelly Pump, Mr. Saechao directed one of his colleagues to find either a supervisor or an instruction manual; they were unable to do so, in part because the assigned shift supervisor died earlier that day and Bridgetown had not yet assigned another supervisor to cover the shift. Id. ¶ 4. While attempting to realign the Jelly Pump's components, Mr. Saechao instructed his colleague to “energize the machine and ‘release the air’—a standard assembly step that should have caused the shaft to lift.” Id. ¶ 5. But the shaft unexpectedly drove downward into Mr. Saechao's hand, amputating his thumb. Id.

During Mr. Saechao's employment with Bridgetown, the Oregon Occupational Safety and Health Division (“Oregon OSHA”) repeatedly cited Bridgetown for failing to establish workplace safety procedures and failing to provide required safety-related trainings. Id. ¶ 11. Mr. Saechao's injury resulted in another Oregon OSHA investigation, after which that agency directed Bridgetown to take corrective action; only then did Bridgetown circulate written instructions on how safely to assemble and disassemble the Jelly Pump. Id. ¶ 12.

On June 24, 2025, Mr. Saechao filed his complaint against Bridgetown and Graco in state court, seeking $15,780,703.57 in damages, ECF 1 ¶ 1; ECF 1-1 ¶ 37. Mr. Saechao served Bridgetown on June 30, 2025, and served Graco on July 3, 2025. ECF 1-1 ay 19. On July 30, Graco removed the case to federal court. ECF 1. On August 18, Mr. Saechao filed the pending motion to remand. ECF 9.

DISCUSSION

No party asserts federal question jurisdiction in this case. Thus, to establish subject matter jurisdiction, Graco must show that diversity jurisdiction is appropriate. The amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 threshold. But on the face of the Complaint, the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction because there is not complete diversity of the parties. The Complaint alleges that Mr. Saechao “was a resident” of Oregon, which does not clearly show his domicile (and thus citizenship) at the time of filing his Complaint. No facts, however, are alleged to indicate that he is not a citizen of Oregon, and no party contends that Mr. Saechao is not a citizen of Oregon. Further, the facts alleged show that Bridgetown is a citizen of the state of Oregon. Nonetheless, Graco argues that the Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because Mr. Saechao fraudulently, or improperly, joined Bridgetown to the suit. Because Graco does not allege that Mr. Saechao fraudulently alleged any jurisdictional facts, such as the parties’ domiciles or the amount in controversy, Graco must prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is no theory under which an Oregon state court might find Bridgetown liable to Mr. Saechao. See Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1044, 1046; Ritchey, 138 F.3d at 1318; GranCare, 889 F.3d at 548-49. “To determine if [Graco] has carried its heavy burden,” the Court “must examine [Oregon] state law.” Weeping Hollow Ave. Tr. v. Spencer, 831 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2016).

Under Oregon's Workers’ Compensation Law, Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.018, an employer is shielded from civil liability for injuries on the job unless the circumstances of that injury fall into one of a handful of exceptions. See Panpat v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 334 Or. 342, 348 (2002) (“When the Workers’ Compensation Law provides the basis for a compensable injury claim, then that remedy is exclusive and the worker cannot seek a tort remedy instead.”). Because this is a workplace injury, Mr. Saechao's suit against Bridgetown is barred unless it falls into one of the statutory exceptions. Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.018(3)(a) provides an exemption from exclusivity “[i]f the willful and unprovoked aggression by a person under this subsection is a substantial factor in causing the injury.” Defendant contemplates (and rejects) the applicability of this exemption to the case. Because Plaintiff does not claim this exemption, the Court need not consider it.

Mr. Saechao argues that a separate, narrow exception applies. Under that exception, “[i]f injury or death results to a worker from the deliberate intention of the employer of the worker to produce such injury or death, the worker ․ may take under this chapter, and also have a cause for action against the employer.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.156(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the dispositive question is whether Bridgetown's conduct can reasonably to viewed as constituting “deliberate intention.”

The Oregon Supreme Court has held that for the deliberate intention exception to apply, “the worker must show that the employer determined to injure an employee, that is, had a specific intent to injure an employee; that the employer acted on that intent; and that the worker was, in fact, injured as a result of the employer's actions.” Kilminster v. Day Mgmt. Corp., 323 Or. 618, 630 (1996); see also Davis v. U.S. Emps. Council, Inc., 147 Or. App. 164, 168-69 (1997); McLean v. Pine Eagle Sch. Dist., No. 61, 194 F. Supp. 3d 1102, 1126 (D. Or. 2016). “[T]he employer must have determined to injure an [employee] and used some means appropriate to that end; there must be a specific intent, and not merely carelessness or negligence, however gross.” Jenkins v. Carman Mfg. Co., 79 Or. 448, 453-54 (1916) (emphasis added); see also Heikkila v. Ewen Transfer Co., 135 Or. 631, 634 (1931).

Accordingly, courts applying Oregon law have found that the following employers did not act with deliberate intent:

• A sawmill that refused to repair or replace a lumber roller that it knew to be broken, requiring its workers to continue laboring near the roller, resulting in injury to an employee. Jenkins, 79 Or. at 449-51, 453-54.

• An employer who failed to “rectify conditions which twice previously injured plaintiff,” its employee. Caline v. Meade, 239 Or. 239, 240 (1964).

• A grocer that, in response to feedback from employees, replaced a dead man's switch with a regular “on/off” switch on a pie-cutting machine, contributing to an employee's inadvertent activation of the machine's blade and subsequent injury. Duk Hwan Chung v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 276 Or. 809, 811-14 (1976).

• A body shop that, in order to save money, refused to take remedial steps (including some required by regulation) to protect employees from the known harms of excessive exposure to paint fumes. Davis, 147 Or. App. 166-70.

• An employer that required an already-injured employee to continue work that required heavy manual labor and lifting and was certain to result inflammation of the pre-existing injury, causing severe and lasting harm. Goings v. Calportland Co., 280 Or. App. 395, 397-403 (2016).

• A company that failed to post specific warnings or instructions, require the use of important safety equipment, adequately train employees, or correct unsafe employee conduct, contributing to an employee's physical injury due to an exploding tire, where the plaintiff could not attribute conduct of his supervisors to the corporation. Miller v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 434 F. Supp. 3d 869, 872-76 (D. Or. 2020).

These examples teach that the “deliberate intent” exception is reserved for the most egregious conduct by an employer, not conduct that is merely negligent (even grossly) or reckless.

Mr. Saechao relies on Kilminster, however, to argue that Bridgetown acted with deliberate intent to harm him when it failed to train or supervise him on how to assemble safely the Jelly Pump or provide written warnings and instructions. In Kilminster, as part of his work for the defendant employer, the decedent routinely climbed extremely tall radio towers. Kilminster, 323 Or. at 621. Consistently and over an extended period, the employer in Kilminster failed to provide its workers with legally required safety equipment and deliberately did not instruct its workers on how to use that equipment safely or how to engage in safe work practices, including how to follow state fall-protection regulations. Id. The employer went so far as to encourage its workers to forego the use of certain safety equipment and legally mandated safety precautions. Id. As a result, the decedent frequently complained to his employer, expressing apprehension about continuing to climb towers and asking that he not be required to do so. Id. The plaintiffs in Kilminster case, who were the decedent's parents, alleged that “serious injury to or death of a worker was certain to occur” under those conditions, and that the employer knew it. Id. at 633 (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the employer ordered the decedent either to “climb or leave his employment.” Id. at 621. He climbed and subsequently fell 400 feet to his death. Id. at 621-22. These facts were so severe that the Oregon Supreme Court held that a jury reasonably could infer that the employer “determined to injure an employee.” Id. at 631-33. In the case now before this Court, Mr. Saechao argues that the facts here are analogous to those in Kilminster, asserting that Bridgetown also failed to implement needed safety measures and training.

But “the Kilminster Court first looked at the certainty of injury and then concluded a reasonable jury could infer from those allegations that the employer wished to injure or kill decedent.” Eriksen v. Saelm-Keizer Sch. Dist., 2025 WL 1019757, at *8 (D. Or. Apr. 4, 2025). The threshold for such an inference is high. Indeed, in the last century, it appears that Oregon appellate courts have only three times held that a jury might reasonably infer from an employer's conduct that it specifically wished or intended to injure an employee. See Kilminster, 323 Or. at 631-33; Weis v. Allen, 147 Or. 670, 682-86 (1934) (holding that a jury could infer that an employer deliberately intended to injure his employee by setting spring guns and pointing them at the entrance to a yard the employee was tasked to open); Lusk v. Monaco Motor Homes, Inc., 97 Or. App. 182, 188-89 (1989) (holding that a reasonable jury could infer that an employer wished to injure an employee when it failed to provide a respirator for use during work with paint that it knew to be highly toxic, despite warnings from its workers, its insurer, and the paint manufacturer).

For two reasons, no such inference is reasonably possible here. First, injury in this case was not certain. Although a lack of training, supervision, and written instruction in the proper use of heavy machinery would likely elevate the risk of injury, Mr. Saechao had worked in the same role for Bridgetown for a decade without incident. Additionally, he alleges no previous accident with the Jelly Pump involving any other worker. This extended period of safe operation of generally functional equipment is a far cry from the perilous facts of Kilminster.

Second, Bridgetown exhibited no specific intent to harm Mr. Saechao. Both Jenkins and Kilminster stand for the proposition that an employer's intent to harm must be specific to be deliberate. Jenkins rejected the idea that mere knowledge of the risk inherent in defective or dangerous systems, by itself, rises to the level of deliberate intent. 79 Or. at 452-54. In that case, the employer admitted to shirking its responsibility for worker safety to save cost, not to harm any worker. Id. In Kilminster, by contrast, the plaintiff alleged specific facts that made it clear that the employer was aware of the danger to the decedent specifically, particularly because of the decedent's direct warning to the employer. 323 Or. at 621-22. No such allegations exist here. Mr. Saechao does not allege any facts that would have given Bridgetown the same degree of certainty that Mr. Saechao would be harmed as were alleged in Kilminster. Mr. Saechao does not allege that he ever discussed any enduring safety issues with his employer. To the extent that he alleges that Bridgetown had such knowledge, most of those allegations are merely conclusory assertions, which the Court need not accept as true. See ECF 1-1 at ¶¶ 4, 7, 8, 10, 13. “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up). Although Mr. Saechao alleges that Oregon OSHA issued three citations against Bridgetown before his injury for various safety violations, none of those citations directly or specifically concerned the operation of the Jelly Pump. ECF 1-1 at ¶ 11. Accordingly, that allegation does not establish that Bridgetown had actual knowledge of the specific danger that Mr. Saechao faced.

Mr. Saechao also alleges a fourth Oregon OSHA investigation and citation pertaining to the Jelly Pump, as well as Bridgetown's subsequent efforts to draft instructions for assembly of the machine. Id. at ¶ 12. But these events took place after and in response to Mr. Saechao's injury. Thus, Mr. Saechao does not allege any facts that show that Bridgetown had a specific, and therefore deliberate, determination—or specific intent—to injure him.

Bridgetown's conduct likely constitutes negligence. It perhaps even constitutes gross negligence or recklessness. But that is not enough. Taken together, the facts as alleged do not show a certainty of injury that would support an inference that Bridgetown specifically wished or intended to harm Mr. Saechao.

Absent that inference, Oregon Revised Statutes § 656.156(2)’s exception to the Workers’ Compensation Law does not apply. Because the exception does not apply, there is no legal theory under which Bridgetown could be liable to Mr. Saechao. As a result, the Court concludes that Bridgetown was fraudulently, or improperly, joined in this lawsuit. That leaves a case between Mr. Saechao, a citizen and resident of Oregon, and Graco, a Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business in Minnesota. With complete diversity of these two parties and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000, the jurisdictional requirements for the Court are met.

CONCLUSION

The Court does not believe that oral argument will assist in the sound resolution of the pending motion to remand. See LR 7-1(d)(1). Accordingly, the Court STRIKES the hearing scheduled for October 29, 2025 (ECF 18) and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF 9).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 6th day of October, 2025.

Michael H. Simon United States District Judge