UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JEREMY HOVEY (2024)

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S OPPOSED MOTION FOR EARLY TERMINATION OF SUPERVISED RELEASE

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's Opposed Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release. Doc. 793. In this motion, Defendant asks for early termination of his supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).¹ Having considered the parties arguments as well as the applicable law, the Court finds that Defendant's motion (Doc. 793) is not well-taken and is therefore DENIED.

BACKGROUND 2

Before Defendant's current offenses, state law enforcement officers arrested Defendant on March 30, 2010. On this date, officers observed Defendant placing a package behind a utility box at an apartment complex. The package contained 454 grams of methamphetamine. Defendant was released and not convicted for this conduct. Despite being released, Defendant continued to traffic controlled substances, eventually leading to his current offense and convictions which occurred between June of 2010 and September of 2011.

On February 8, 2011, a grand jury returned a 35-count indictment against Defendant and his co-conspirators. Doc. 104. On January 29, 2013, Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to Counts 1, 2, 3, 20, and 35:

• Count 1: Conspiracy to distribute 50 grams and more of methamphetamine between June 2010 and September 12, 2011, contrary to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846;

• Count 2: Conspiracy to distribute 5 grams and more of a mixture and substance containing cocaine base between June 2010 and September 12, 2011, contrary to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846;

• Count 3: Conspiracy to distribute cocaine between June 2010 and September 12, 2011, contrary to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846;

• Count 20: Possession with intent to distribute 50 grams and more of methamphetamine on September 12, 2011, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A); and

• Count 35: Use of a telephone to facilitate a drug trafficking offense on April 25, 2011, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).

In his plea agreement, Defendant Hovey admitted to his participation in a large-scale drug conspiracy from June. 2010, to September 12, 2011, during which he sold drugs to a co-conspirator who then redistributed the drugs throughout Albuquerque. Doc. 260 at 6. In one instance, Defendant spoke with his co-conspirator over the phone about a purchase of one-half kilogram of cocaine for $12,500. Id. at 7.

In Defendant's “PSR,” United States Probation assigned Defendant a total offense level 35 and criminal history category III, resulting in a guideline range of 210–262. On August 8, 2013, the Court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of 158 months of imprisonment as to Counts 1, 2, 3, 20, and a concurrent 48-month term of imprisonment as to Count 35. Doc. 312. In arriving at this sentence, the Court varied downward based on Defendant's history and characteristics. Id. at 2. Additionally, the Court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of five years supervised release as to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 20, and a concurrent one-year term of supervised release as to count 35. Id. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) requires courts to impose a term of not less than five years of supervised release for Defendant's convictions under Counts 1 and 20.

On November 24, 2021, the Court reduced Defendant's sentence pursuant to the parties stipulated agreement in petition for reduced sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and ordered Defendant released. Doc. 786. Defendant's supervised release commenced in December 2021.

DISCUSSION

In the instant motion, Defendant Hovey asks for early termination of his supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). Defendant has completed approximately 30 months of his 5-year term of supervision. As grounds for such a request, Defendant cites his compliance with his terms of supervision, lack of positive urinalysis, and his consistent employment at Southwest Patient Transport. United States Probation does not oppose early termination, but the United States does.

A. Law regarding early termination of supervision under § 3583(e)(1):

Under § 3583(e)(1), a district court may grant an early termination of supervised release—after one year has elapsed—so long as the Court considers the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the release is in the interest of justice. § 3583(e)(1); United States v. Warren, 650 F. App'x 614, 615 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished); cf. Rhodes v. Judiscak, 676 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Whether to grant a motion to terminate a term of supervised release․ is a matter of sentencing court discretion.”); United States v. Sheppard, 17 F.4th 449, 455 (3d Cir. 2021) (“cut[ting] short” a term of supervised release rests in the district court's discretion). While this Court considers all the § 3553(a) factors, the most relevant to Defendant Hovey's request for early termination of supervision are:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed --

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.

B. Analysis:

Although § 3583(e)(1) allows district courts to terminate a defendant's term of supervision early, Defendant's five-year term of supervision is mandated by § 841(b)(1)(A). The Tenth Circuit has not yet determined if district courts, under § 3583(e)(1), can reduce a defendant's supervision below this statutory minimum. Thus, the Court first addresses whether § 3583(e)(1) grants district courts the authority to reduce a term of supervision below the minimum term of supervision required under § 841, before considering the § 3553(a) factors.

The Sixth Circuit addressed this very question in United States v. Spinelle, 41 F.3d 1056 (6th Cir. 1994). In Spinelle, the Sixth Circuit held that “a district court has discretionary authority to terminate a term of supervised release after the completion of one year, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), even if the defendant was sentenced to a mandatory term of supervised release under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a).” Id. at 1060. In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished between the sentencing phase and post-sentencing phase. Id. The court stated, “the sentencing phase is different than post-sentence modification” and reasoned that while § 841(b)(1)(C) required district courts to impose a three-year term of supervised release at the sentencing phase, such requirement did not apply to a post-sentence modification. Id. In other words, after imposing the minimum term of supervision mandated by § 841(b)(1)(C) at sentencing, the court still retains subsequent discretionary authority to terminate the term of supervision early and discharge the defendant after he completes one year of supervision. Id. The court also highlighted that interpreting the statutes as applying to two separate chronological phases ensures that the statutes are not in conflict and gives effect to both statutes. Id. at 1059.

Some courts recognize a circuit split on this issue, citing United States v. Lafayette, 585 F.3d 435 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In Lafayette, however, the D.C. circuit addressed whether district courts may reduce terms of supervision below that mandatory minimum under § 3582(c)(2) not § 3583(e)(1). The D.C. Circuit held that even assuming that § 3582(c)(2), which on its face only allows courts to reduce terms of imprisonment, could be stretched to cover other aspects of a sentence, the district court correctly denied any reduction to the defendant's term of supervision because the defendant's five-year term of supervised release was mandated by § 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). In reaching this conclusion the Court relied on United States v. Paulk, 569 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2009). In Paulk, the Ninth Circuit concluded that district courts have no authority to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) when the defendant was sentenced pursuant to a statutory mandatory minimum of imprisonment. Id.

Although Lafayette did not directly address whether a term of supervision based on a mandatory minimum could be reduced under § 3583(e)(1), this Court agrees with the United States and that the reasoning applied by the Ninth Circuit in Paulk and the D.C. Circuit in Lafayette is persuasive and should apply to the case at bar. Relying upon Paulk and Lafayette, this Court is of the view that it is logical to treat mandatory terms of supervision in the same manner as mandatory prison terms, thereby prohibiting reductions in supervision terms based on a mandatory minimum.

Turning to Spinelle, the Court agrees with the Sixth Circuit that statutes should be interpreted to give effect to each statute but fails to see how the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 3583(a)(1) achieves this goal when the Spinelle holding effectively makes § 841(b)(1)(A)’s supervision requirement meaningless. For convictions under § 841(b)(1)(A), Congress requires district courts to impose a term of supervision of at least five years. However, the Sixth Circuit interprets this language to mean that while courts must initially impose a five-year term of supervision, they can later reduce the term to less than five years under § 3583(e)(1). This Court questions why Congress would require district courts to impose a minimum term of supervision of at least five years only to allow it to be subsequently reduced. If Congress intended for defendants convicted under § 841(b)(1)(A) to serve terms of supervision for less than five years, it would not have required district courts to impose a five-year minimum in the first place. Further, this Court does not see how interpreting § 3583(e)(1) to not apply to mandatory terms of supervision fails to give effect to the statute. Indeed, if courts applied § 3583(e)(1) solely to discretionary terms of supervision,” both statutes - § 3583(e)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(A) - would have purpose and serve such purposes without any conflict.

In short, this Court finds the reasoning in Lafayette more persuasive than that in Spinelle. Nonetheless, the Court does not resolve this question at this stage, as doing so is unnecessary. In other words, even if § 3583(e)(1) permits courts to reduce a defendant's term of supervision below the statutory minimum, in the instant case early termination of Defendant Hovey's supervised release is not justified under the § 3553(a) factors.

As an initial matter, the nature and circumstances of Defendant Hovey's offenses weigh in favor of denying his request for early termination of supervised release. Not only did Defendant's offenses of conviction involve significant amounts of drugs, but Defendant also committed those offenses shortly after being arrested and released by state law enforcement for similar drug trafficking activities. Rather than learn from his arrest, Defendant Hovey continued to engage in substantial drug trafficking activities, illustrating a persistent and significant pattern of drug trafficking behavior that is not easily deterred. For these same reasons, this Court finds that early termination of Defendant's term of supervision is not consistent with the statutory goals of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a)(2) in that early termination of supervised release would not reflect the seriousness of the offenses of conviction, would not afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and would not protect the public from further crimes of Defendant.

While the Court commends Defendant's compliance with his terms of supervision, the Court cannot see how such conduct alone justifies early termination of his supervision given the seriousness and circumstances of his offenses of conviction and his history and characteristics to include his pre-sentence conduct. Indeed, “[c]ompliance with the conditions of supervised release is expected, not exceptional.” United States v. Melvin, 978 F.3d 49, 51 (3d Cir. 2020). The Third Circuit's reasoning in Melvin is especially true because the mandatory minimum, at the very least, reflects Congress's judgment on the appropriate term of supervised release for these types of cases, and should not be undercut by courts unless they are firmly convinced that the § 3553(a) factors support early termination. United States v. Hernandez-Flores, No. CR 02-1020 JB, 2012 WL 119609 (D.N.M. 2012). That is not scenario presented by Defendant Hovey's case.

In sum, even assuming § 3583(e)(1) permits courts to reduce a defendant's term of supervision below the statutory minimum, early termination of the Defendant Hovey's supervised release is not justified under the § 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release (Doc. 793) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In his motion, Defendant requests early termination of his supervision under 18 U.S.C. 3564(c). Doc. 793 at 1. However, as pointed out by the United States, § 3564 “pertains to the running of a term of probation, and subsection (c) of that statute provides for early termination of probation.” Doc. 796 at 5. The correct statute for early termination of supervised release is 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). Accordingly, the Court construes Defendant's request for early termination as a request under § 3583(e)(1).

WILLIAM P. JOHNSON CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE