KIRSTIE WADE ABRIANA CHAVEZ JAYDEN CHAVEZ OSCAR CHAVEZ JR v. POTTAWATTAMIE COUNTY STATE OF IOWA (2022)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court following an evidentiary hearing on defendant Pottawattamie County's (“County”) Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 6) plaintiff Kirstie Wade's (“Wade”) Complaint (Filing No. 1) for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and (6); NECivR 7.1(a) and 12.1.

The threshold issue in this case is whether the County is subject to personal jurisdiction in Nebraska. See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007) (explaining “a federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over ․ the parties”). Wade “bears the burden of proof on” that issue “and must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence at trial or when the court holds an evidentiary hearing.” Creative Calling Sols., Inc. v. LF Beauty Ltd., 799 F.3d 975, 979 (8th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added); see also Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Techs. Corp., 760 F.3d 816, 820 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that a court deciding a motion to dismiss for a lack of personal jurisdiction “must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve factual conflicts in [her] favor” only if “no hearing is held on the motion”).

“A federal court may assume jurisdiction over a defendant in a diversity action if the forum State's long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction and that exercise is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Creative Calling, 799 F.3d at 979. Nebraska's long-arm statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-536, permits personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by the United States Constitution, so Wade need only prove that asserting personal jurisdiction over the County here comports with due process. See Stanton v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 340 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 2003).

“Due process requires that a non-resident have minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the lawsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Fastpath, 760 F.3d at 820 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980), and Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The critical question is whether “the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Kaliannan v. Liang, 2 F.4th 727, 733 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (alteration omitted)).

“Personal jurisdiction can be specific or general.” Fastpath, 760 F.3d at 820 (quoting Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., 646 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 2011)). Wade only alleges that specific jurisdiction applies here.

“In analyzing whether specific jurisdiction comports with due process,” the Court “must decide whether the [County] has certain minimum contacts with [Nebraska] and whether [Wade's] claims ‘arise out of or relate to [those] contacts.’ ” Kaliannan, 2 F.4th at 733 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. ___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021)). The County's contacts must “be based on ‘some act by which [it] purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [Nebraska], thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’ ” Morningside Church, Inc. v. Rutledge, 9 F.4th 615, 619 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. FedNat Holding Co., 928 F.3d 718, 720 (8th Cir. 2019)). “The purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Stanton, 340 F.3d at 693-94 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In evaluating the sufficiency of the County's contacts, the Court considers “(1) the nature and quality of contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) convenience of the parties.” Whaley v. Esebag, 946 F.3d 447, 452 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Maples Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1996)). “The first three factors are ‘of primary importance,’ while the fourth and fifth factors ‘carry less weight.’ ” Morningside, 9 F.4th at 620 (quoting Whaley, 946 F.3d at 452).

On December 14, 2022, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the County's motion to dismiss. See Creative Calling, 799 F.3d at 979. Neither party called any witnesses or presented any additional evidence, instead relying on the affidavits and other exhibits submitted before the hearing.¹

Wade contends the County is subject to personal jurisdiction in Nebraska because in her view, its deputies purposefully pursued a fleeing vehicle from Iowa across the state line into Nebraska where it struck her vehicle. Wade acknowledges the deputies turned off their lights and sirens and radioed confirmation that they had terminated their pursuit but notes they did not immediately pull off the road or slow down to the speed of traffic. As Wade sees it, the deputies “continued that pursuit until the dangers that flowed from it were certain to enter The State of Nebraska” where they injured her and her children.

The County maintains its contacts with Nebraska are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction because the deputies ended the pursuit “by word and deed” before crossing into Nebraska and only continued into Nebraska to turn around. According to the County, its deputies’ presence in Nebraska was “merely random, isolated, or fortuitous” and not the result of purposeful availment.

After careful review of the record and the parties’ respective arguments, the Court finds Wade has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that this Court has personal jurisdiction over the County in this matter. In short, the Court concludes—for the reasons stated on the record at the close of the evidentiary hearing—that the County did not purposefully avail “itself of the privilege of conducting activities within” Nebraska. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant Pottawattamie County's Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 6) is granted in part and denied in part.

2. The motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted.

3. The alternative motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is denied.

4. This case is dismissed without prejudice.

5. A separate judgment will issue.

Dated this 15th day of December 2022.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parties also did not specifically request an opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery either before or after the evidentiary hearing on personal jurisdiction, and the Court does not deem such discovery necessary to resolve the County's motion under the circumstances. See Ritchie Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 960 F.3d 1037, 1055 (8th Cir. 2020); cf. Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1074 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004) (“When a plaintiff offers only speculation or conclusory assertions about contacts with a forum state, a court is within its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery.” (quoting Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003))).

Robert F. Rossiter, Jr. Chief United States District Judge