CHARRON v. MATUSZCZAK (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

The plaintiff, Mark Charron, alleges in his amended complaint, a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, regarding violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Filing 42. The defendants are City of North Platte, Nebraska police officers, sued in their individual capacity. The plaintiff alleges that in responding to a call from a motel desk clerk about possible marijuana use, the defendants subjected him to an unlawful seizure and search of his motel room. Filing 42. The defendants moved for summary judgment and dismissal of the amended complaint based on the defense of qualified immunity. Filing 50. The Court will grant the defendants’ motion and dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint with prejudice.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the evidence are jury functions, not those of a judge. Id.

Qualified immunity protects a law enforcement officer from § 1983 liability if the conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Kelsay v. Ernst, 933 F.3d 975, 979 (8th Cir. 2019) (en banc). A clearly established right is one where the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The law at the time of the events in question must give the officers fair warning that their conduct is unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002).

Qualified immunity does not require a case directly on point, but for a right to be clearly established the existing precedent must have placed the constitutional issue beyond question. White v. Pauly, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017). Clearly established law must not be defined at a high level of generality. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). Qualified immunity gives law enforcement officers breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Id. at 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074.

II. BACKGROUND 1

The plaintiff is a self-employed power systems compliance engineer and travels regularly as a part of his business. Filing 57-1 at 1. On March 12, 2017, the plaintiff was on his way home from a conference in California, when before nightfall he checked into room #105 at the Super 8 Motel in North Platte, Nebraska. That evening, at around 9:42 p.m., the North Platte police received a call from the motel's desk clerk, Jonathan Berryman. Berryman reported that someone was smoking marijuana in one of the rooms, possibly room #105. Filing 52-2 at 2. Defendant McColley was dispatched to the motel to investigate. Filing 52-2 at 4. Defendants Matuszczak and Charter heard the dispatch and responded to assist McColley. Filing 52-2 at 2-3. All three officers reported that they smelled burnt marijuana in the motel lobby, and believed that the odor was emanating from, or was strongest in front of room #105. Filing 52-2 at 1-3.

McColley was the first to confront the plaintiff in his room. He observed a “do not disturb” sign on the door, but knocked anyway. The plaintiff described the knock as a loud pounding that startled him as he was watching television. Filing 57-2 at 3. As the pounding continued, the plaintiff said he heard someone yell, “Open the f**king door!” The plaintiff went to the door and looked through the door's peephole. He saw what “appeared to be a police officer.” Filing 57-2 at 3. The plaintiff said he did not open the door, but stood there as the pounding continued. He heard someone, who he would later learn was McColley, shout, “If you don't open the f**king door we're going to break the son of a bitch down.” Id. Without opening the door, the plaintiff shouted, “Who are you looking for?” McColley responded, “You.” The plaintiff asked, “What's this about?” McColley replied, “There's drugs in the room and we're coming in. Open the f**king door or we're going to break the son of a bitch down.” Id. The plaintiff continued asking McColley questions through the closed door such as who McColley thought the plaintiff was, and why McColley thought drugs would be inside. McColley gave a similar response each time, “Open the ********* door.” The blank, according to the plaintiff, was filled-in with various profanities. Filing 57-2 at 3.

The plaintiff decided to open the door a crack, “to try to defuse the situation.” Filing 57-2 at 4. McColley was the only officer the plaintiff saw. The plaintiff told McColley that he didn't have any drugs, didn't know why McColley was claiming he did, and wanted to know where McColley got his information. McColley said his information came from the front desk. The plaintiff continued questioning McColley about where he got his information and why he suspected the plaintiff, until after a while, the plaintiff told McColley that he didn't have any drugs and couldn't help him. Id.

The plaintiff attempted to shut his door, but McColley put his foot in the threshold and his forearm on the door, opening the door further. Filing 57-2 at 4. The plaintiff told McColley that he would not allow him to enter his room.² When McColley asked why, the plaintiff said, “Because you don't have a search warrant.” McColley replied, “We don't need a search warrant.” In response, the plaintiff started telling McColley about the protections afforded by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, that McColley was already in violation of the plaintiff's rights, and that McColley did not have any right to enter the plaintiff's motel room. Defendant Matuszczak showed up around this time and took over from McColley. Matuszczak questioned the plaintiff about where he had been and asked about the plaintiff's “personal information” such as his last name and phone number. The plaintiff refused to give Matuszczak any information other than his first name. Filing 57-2 at 4-5; filing 52-2 at 3.

Matuszczak asked the plaintiff why he had a “do not disturb” sign on his door. When the plaintiff replied, because he did not want to be disturbed, Matuszczak said, “Well, we're going to come in and search the room because we've been told that you have drugs in the room.” Filing 57-2 at 5. The plaintiff asked to see a warrant, but Matuszczak said he didn't need a warrant. Id. When the plaintiff continued refusing to allow Matuszczak and McColley into his room, Matuszczak said he could go get a warrant and be back in ten minutes. The plaintiff responded, “Go get it, I'll still be here.” Id. The plaintiff tried to push the door closed again, but Matuszczak stopped him by putting his foot and leg completely in the room. The plaintiff repeatedly asked Matuszczak to leave and told Matuszczak that he was violating his constitutional rights, but Matuszczak just laughed. Id.

According to the plaintiff, Matuszczak turned to defendant Charter, who now had joined the confrontation outside room #105, and said: “Listen to this son of a bitch, he thinks he's got some kind of civil rights, isn't that funny.” Id. The plaintiff continued to assert his rights and ask the officers to leave. After the plaintiff again refused to submit to Matuszczak's demand to allow his room to be searched, Matuszczak repeated that he was going to get a search warrant and would be back in ten minutes. The plaintiff said that would be fine, and he would be in his room watching Jimmy Fallon. Filing 57-2 at 5. But instead of leaving, Matuszczak said he had to stay and watch the plaintiff to make sure he didn't destroy evidence. Filing 57-2 at 6. The plaintiff then told the officers that he was going to resolve this, and moved slightly away from the door toward a desk where the motel's phone was located. He said he was going to call the front desk to sort this out—and he made the call. Id.

At some point after the plaintiff had moved toward the phone, Matuszczak shined his flashlight toward the plaintiff, which the plaintiff believes was purposely directed at his face and eyes. Filing 57-2 at 7. Also, because the motel room lights were on, it was unnecessary, according to the plaintiff, for Matuszczak to even use his flashlight to see what the plaintiff was doing. The plaintiff reported that the officers knocked on the doors of nearby rooms, and in at least one instance the officers were allowed to enter and search the guest's room. Filing 57-2 at 8. The plaintiff never stopped asserting his rights under the Fourth Amendment, and he never consented to a search of his room.

The confrontation with the officers ended, according to the plaintiff, with Matuszczak telling him that if he heard “one peep” out of him that night he would come back, “haul [his] sorry ass” out of his room, and throw him in jail. As the officers were leaving, the plaintiff claimed to overhear Matuszczak ask the desk clerk if he wanted them to evict the plaintiff, and the clerk said no. The plaintiff said the entire incident with the defendants lasted between thirty to forty minutes. Filing 57-2 at 7. According to the police dispatch log, the officers arrived on the scene around 9:50 p.m. and left around 10:10 p.m. Filing 52-2 at 2.

III. DISCUSSION

Whether a governmental official is entitled to qualified immunity presents purely a legal question that this Court determines as a matter of law. Kelsay, 933 F.3d at 979. To overcome the defendants’ qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must show (1) that the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to him, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation. Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 474 (8th Cir. 2010).

A court may exercise its sound discretion in deciding which qualified immunity prong to address first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). However, the Supreme Court has urged lower courts to “think hard” before deciding the constitutional issue when the matter could be resolved by examining whether the constitutional interest at issue was clearly established at the time of the deprivation. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 707, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011); accord Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 n.7, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018). A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988).

Here, the Court does not need to decide, and does not decide, whether the defendant officers violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights on the night in question. Even assuming that a Fourth Amendment violation could have occurred—something that is an open question on these facts—the officers were at least entitled to qualified immunity, even when the disputed evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. The Court finds that the plaintiff has not shown that the officers violated his clearly established rights under the Fourth Amendment.

Qualified immunity shields a governmental official from suit under § 1983 if the official's conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727. To be clearly established, a legal principle must be such, so as to clearly prohibit an officer's conduct in the particular situation that is before him. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590. The parameters of the rule must be so well defined that it is “clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).

This standard is demanding, and with respect to law enforcement officers, protects from liability “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). A clearly established legal principle must have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent—it must be settled law, dictated by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589-90. It must be such, that at the time of the officer's conduct, the law was so clear that every reasonable officer would know and understand that his conduct was unlawful. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074. The existing law must have placed the constitutionality of the officer's conduct beyond debate. Id. It is not enough that the rule is merely suggested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable officer would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590.

It is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context—where an officer will often find it difficult to know how a general rule may apply to the precise circumstance he or she is presently encountering—that the rules proscribing an officer's reactions to exigent conditions are defined with a high degree of specificity. See Kisela v. Hughes, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152-52, 200 L.Ed.2d 449 (2018); Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590; see also City of Escondido, Cal. v. Emmons, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503, 202 L.Ed.2d 455 (2019); Kelsay, 933 F.3d at 979-80. Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent squarely governs the specific facts at issue. Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153. “An officer cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official would have understood that he was violating it.” Id.

Generally, the Fourth Amendment provides that individuals are guaranteed the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV; Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011); Azam v. City of Columbia Heights, 865 F.3d 980, 988 (8th Cir. 2017). An unreasonable search threatens the right of an individual in maintaining personal privacy. See U.S. v. Clutter, 674 F.3d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 2012). An unreasonable seizure of a person—as opposed to the seizure of property—threatens an individual's freedom of movement. See Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201, 1208 (8th Cir. 2013).

Here, the plaintiff argues that he “was both searched and seized without a warrant, probable cause, or applicable exception to the warrant requirement.” Filing 56 at 13. The plaintiff argues that he had a “clearly established right to privacy” in his motel room, and was subjected to an unreasonable search when he was compelled to open his motel room door, which allowed the defendants visual access to his room. Id. Further the plaintiff argues that the defendants subjected him to an unreasonable seizure when his freedom of movement was restricted within the private space of his motel room. Filing 56 at 15.

The text of the Fourth Amendment speaks to two conditions. First, all searches and seizures must be reasonable, and second, a warrant may issue if supported by probable cause properly establishing the scope of the search with particularity. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Absent from the text of the Fourth Amendment, however, is direction regarding when a warrant must be obtained. The Supreme Court filled that void by holding that it is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law “that searches and seizures within a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004). A motel room can be the object of Fourth Amendment protections in much the same way as a home. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966).

However, the presumption that the warrantless search of a home is unreasonable may be overcome. Because the ultimate Fourth Amendment question concerns the reasonableness of the action taken, the warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). One such exception is when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable. King, 563 U.S. at 460, 131 S.Ct. 1849. An exigency “long recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search” is the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, but only where the exigency was not created or manufactured by law enforcement conduct. Id.

In Kentucky v. King, under somewhat analogous circumstances, the Supreme Court considered whether the exigent circumstances rule applied when the police, by knocking on the door of a residence and announcing their presence, created the exigency by causing the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence. Id. at 455, 131 S.Ct. 1849. The police had followed a person suspected of buying crack cocaine into an apartment building's breezeway. Id. at 456, 131 S.Ct. 1849. Just as the officers entered the breezeway, they heard, but did not see, a door shut. The officers also detected the odor of burnt marijuana. At the end of the breezeway were two doors, one on the left and one on the right. Id.

The officers did not know which door the suspect went into, but believed the marijuana odor emanated from the apartment on the left. Id. The officers banged on the door of the apartment on the left and shouted as loud as they could, “This is the police” or “Police, police, police.” No one answered the door, but the officers believed they heard people moving around inside and believed that drug-related evidence was about to be destroyed. Id. The officers then “announced that they were going to make entry” into the apartment, and proceeded to kick the door in. Id.

In considering King's motion to suppress the drugs found in his apartment, the Court focused its attention on the exception to the exigent circumstances doctrine—that police may not rely on the need to prevent the destruction of evidence when an exigency was created or manufactured by the police. Id. at 461, 131 S.Ct. 1849. The Court noted that the creation or manufacturing of an exigency needed to be something more than mere proof that the fear of detection by the police may cause evidence to be destroyed. “[A] rule that precludes the police from making a warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence whenever their conduct causes the exigency would unreasonably shrink the reach of this well-established exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 461-62, 131 S.Ct. 1849. The Court held that the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 462, 131 S.Ct. 1849. The Court concluded that here, “the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

Certain aspects of the decision in King are important for this Court in assessing the defendants’ claims of qualified immunity. First, it was conceded that the odor of burnt marijuana outside the apartment gave the officers probable cause to investigate. Id. at 457, 131 S.Ct. 1849. Second, regarding the issue of police-created exigencies, the Court observed that police officers may have a very good reason to announce their presence loudly and to knock on the door with some force. Id. at 468, 131 S.Ct. 1849. Finally, the Court rejected the argument the officers created an exigency by announcing they would break down the door, noting that the announcement that the apartment would be entered came after the exigency arose. Id. In other words, once the police knocked on the door and announced their presence, the threat that drug evidence may be destroyed came into existence. The occupants were now aware of the police presence and may be motivated to destroy evidence. Any additional “demands” to allow the police access to the apartment could not be the cause an exigency, because the exigency already existed.

The facts and circumstances in King and the Supreme Court's analysis and holding, control this Court's consideration of the instant matter. Here, the defendants were dispatched to investigate the complaint of an odor of burnt marijuana in the hallway of the Super 8 Motel. Upon arrival, the defendants also detected the odor of burnt marijuana and determined that the odor either emanated from room #105, or was strongest outside room #105. An officer has probable cause to conduct a search when the available facts would allow a reasonable person to believe that evidence of a crime is present. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013). Having determined that the odor of burnt marijuana emanated from room #105, the defendants now could reasonably believe that probable cause of criminal conduct could be found inside room #105.

Next, according to the plaintiff, defendant McColley pounded on the door to room #105 and yelled “Open the f**king door!” Filing 57-2 at 3. The plaintiff looked through the door peephole and saw a police officer. The plaintiff testified that he did not respond to McColley for a while, and when he did respond he asked McColley, with the door to his room still closed, who he was looking for and what this was about. Id. When the plaintiff did not promptly answer the door, but delayed, and then later started asking questions from the other side of a closed door, a reasonable officer in McColley's situation may conclude that the person on the other side of the door was stalling to give himself time to destroy drug evidence. Similar to the facts in King, McColley's continuing demands for the plaintiff to open the door were subsequent to the exigency, and as such, McColley's continuing demands, no matter how profane, cannot constitute a police-created exigency. King, 563 U.S. at 462, 131 S.Ct. 1849.

With arguable exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search, compelling the plaintiff to open his door was not unreasonable. Recalling in King, exigent circumstances would have justified the officers kicking the door in. Id. at 456, 131 S.Ct. 1849. Further, the defendants’ conduct after the plaintiff opened the door was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Although the officers continued to press the plaintiff for consent to search his motel room, when consent was denied, the defendants did not enter the plaintiff's private space except to secure brief visual access to the room, which assured the defendants that drug evidence was not being destroyed.

The relevant question under the circumstances of this case is not whether the search and seizure violated, in any way, the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. The question for this Court is whether the defendant officers violated a rule that was so clear, every reasonable law enforcement officer would know and understand that his or her conduct was unlawful. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074. Here, the Court concludes that the defendant officers could reasonably believe they had probable cause that evidence of a crime could be found inside room #105, and, under King, that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence.

The plaintiff relies extensively on United States v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 1997), in support of his claims that his motel room was unlawfully searched when the defendants gained visual access, and that there was an absence of evidence showing exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search and seizure. Filing 56 at 15, 18-19. The Court finds that Conner is distinguishable from the plaintiff's matter, both legally and factually.

There, officers had received an anonymous tip that the burglars they were looking for were in a room at an unnamed motel. Id. at 665. The officers believed that they located the motel room, but never developed probable cause to believe that the burglars or items taken in the burglary would be found in the room. Id. Conner is inapposite to the matter before this Court for the obvious reason that here, the defendants could reasonably believe there was probable cause to search room #105. Also, unlike here, in Conner, without probable cause for an arrest or search, the issue whether there were exigent circumstances for a warrantless entry into the room was a nullity.

Similar to the officers in King, the defendants here detected the odor of burnt marijuana, and determined that the probable source of the odor was room #105. Evidence of drug use inside room #105 and the plaintiff's failure to allow the defendants timely access to the room, would allow the defendants to reasonably conclude, under King, that they could secure the room to prevent the destruction of evidence, and compel the plaintiff to at least open his door wide enough to allow a cursory view of his room. See United States v. Jansen, 470 F.3d 762, 765 (8th Cir. 2006); Kleinholz v. United States, 339 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Pierson, 219 F.3d 803, 805-06 (8th Cir. 2000).

The Court finds that there is an absence of clearly established legal principles dictated by controlling authority or a robust consensus of persuasive authority informing the defendants that their conduct was unlawful. Specifically, clearly established law does not inform the officers that the odor of marijuana emanating from behind a closed door is insufficient to conclude that there is probable cause to believe that on the other side of the door evidence of a crime may be found. Neither does controlling authority, or a robust consensus of persuasive authority, inform the officers that exigent circumstances were absent for a limited warrantless search and seizure under these circumstances. The Court finds that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

As a final observation, for the purposes of the defendants’ motion, the Court is required to accept as true the plaintiff's representations regarding the defendant officers’ conduct. The Court's conclusion that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity should not be viewed as an endorsement of the conduct that is alleged to have occurred here. The plaintiff's description of the defendants’ conduct painted them as verbally abusive and unprofessional. The North Platte Police Department would do well to determine whether the plaintiff's description of the officers’ conduct is accurate, in part or in whole; and, if it is, to take measures to assure that such conduct is curtailed in the future.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the constitutional right allegedly violated by the defendants was not clearly established at the time of the violation. The defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

2. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

3. A separate judgment will be entered.

FOOTNOTES

2.   There is no indication in the plaintiff's evidence that McColley made an attempt to actually enter the plaintiff's room.

John M. Gerrard, Chief United States District Judge