UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOSE ANTONIO ALIENDRES GARCIA (2026)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

On August 19, 2025, a grand jury returned a 56-count indictment against 32 Defendants. (Filing No. 5). A superseding indictment was returned on October 21, 2025. (Filing No. 172). As part of the superseding indictment, Defendant Jose Antonio Aliendres Garcia (hereinafter “Defendant”) was indicted on eight counts, including: Count I: Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; Count II: Conspiracy to Commit Bank Burglary and Fraud in connection with Computers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; Counts 16 and 17: Bank Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 & 2; Counts 34 and 35: Bank Burglary in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) & 2; and Counts 52 and 53: Intentional Damage to a Protected Computer in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A), (c)(4)(B) & 2. He now moves to suppress any evidence seized as a result of his April 28, 2025 stop and arrest, arguing that the arrest was unlawful, the subsequent search warrant for his cell phone lacked probable cause, and the good faith exception permitted by United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984), does not apply. (Filing No. 115). For the following reasons, the undersigned magistrate judge recommends the motion be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The motion to suppress came on for evidentiary hearing on December 1, 2025. Defendant was present with counsel Adam Sipple and court interpreter Laura Garcia-Hein. Assistant United States Attorneys Sean Lynch and Dan Packard appeared for the government. Evidence was adduced, including the testimony of Adams County Sheriff's Deputy Christopher Costa and Adams County Sheriff's Patrol Sergeant Mike Poplau. Additional evidence was offered, without objection, including the Application of Search Warrant with Affidavit (Exhibit 1), cruiser camera and body-worn camera recordings (Exhibit 2), Adams County Sheriff's Department Supplemental report by Patrol Sergeant Poplau (Exhibit 3), Report by Deputy Costa (Exhibit 4), and the transcript from Defendant's preliminary hearing held May 14, 2025, in Case No. 8:25-cv-00111-BCB-RCC (Exhibit 101). (Filing No. 268). Arguments were made and prior briefs were submitted and considered. (Filing No. 116, Filing No. 159). After hearing testimony, observing witnesses as they testified, and reviewing the evidence, the court finds the following facts to be credible:

On April 28, 2025, Adams County Sheriff's Deputy Christopher Costa (“Costa”) was on patrol in Juniata, Nebraska. At approximately 11:22 p.m., he observed a silver sedan with a broken taillight traveling eastbound on 14th Street (also referenced as 12th Street locally). Costa noticed that the driver was traveling approximately 15-20 miles per hour although the posted speed limit was 40 miles per hour. Costa pulled behind the silver sedan, but did not activate his emergency lights. He followed the vehicle approximately 600-700 feet and then observed the sedan turn southbound onto Brass Avenue. Costa continued to follow the vehicle, at which time it pulled into a ditch on the west side of the street, near an Adams County Bank and ATM. (Filing No. 311, at p. 20). Costa radioed Sergeant Mike Poplau (“Poplau”) to assist him with a suspicious vehicle parked in the ditch. (Ex. 3). Costa then initiated a traffic stop by activating his emergency lights and noted that the vehicle had a temporary tag out of the state of Illinois. (Filing No. 311, at p. 20).

Costa made contact with the driver Ivan Angulo Flores (“Flores”) and the Defendant, who was riding as a passenger. (Ex. 1). Both men presented Venezuelan identification cards. Flores also had a valid driver's license from New York, but he was unable to provide proof of insurance for the vehicle. (Filing No. 311, at pp. 22-23, 26). Neither individual spoke English, so Costa utilized Google translate on his phone to communicate. Flores stated they were traveling from Chicago to Lincoln, but when Costa inquired as to why the two were in Juniata, Flores responded they were there to see a friend. (Ex. 4; Filing No. 311, at p. 24). These responses struck Costa as odd because Lincoln is about an hour and a half to the east of Juniata, and the vehicle was no longer heading east, but south. (Filing No. 311, at p. 26).

Costa observed in the center console of the vehicle a pair of blue examiner gloves. (Filing No. 311, at p. 26). He also observed two backpacks in the backseat, one black and one green. Upon request, both men gave Costa consent to search the backpacks and the vehicle, and both men were placed in Costa's patrol car during the search. (Filing No. 311, at pp. 28, 32). In the black backpack that Flores identified as his, Costa found a laptop, a wireless keyboard, a wireless hot spot for internet, three (3) SSD hard drives labeled 1, 2, and 3, and other electronic equipment. (Filing No. 311, at p. 33). There were no clothes or toiletries observed in the black backpack. In the green backpack that Defendant claimed as his, Costa located personal clothing items, but no other electronic equipment. (Filing No. 311, at p. 33). Costa testified that although each man claimed ownership of one backpack, he believed they shared the bags because of the way they were organized. (Filing No. 311, at pp. 33-34). In the vehicle, Costa located two flathead screwdrivers, one in the backseat and the other in the cupholder of the front seat center console. (Ex. 3; Filing No. 311, at p. 28). He also located an empty box of blue nitrile exam gloves, with a discarded pair in the cupholder. (Filing No. 311, at pp. 34-35).

Given the discovery of these items, and the close proximity to the Adams County Bank, Costa and Poplau suspected that the individuals might be part of an ATM “jackpotting” scheme. In particular, Costa testified that the ATM at that same bank had been broken into sometime in February 2025, and he had been part of the investigation. He was aware that the individuals involved with that earlier incident utilized a laptop and keyboard to install malware onto the ATM and withdrew over $20,000 in cash without authorization. (Filing No. 311, at p. 63). Given these suspicions, Poplau walked over to the Adams County Bank ATM located at the corner of 14th Street and Brass Avenue and discovered that the bottom access panel and top side panel had both been unlocked. (Filing No. 311, at pp. 79-80, 87-88; Ex. 3). He returned to tell Costa his findings and asked dispatch to contact bank personnel.

Poplau decided to inspect another Adams County Bank ATM located in Kennesaw, Nebraska, approximately ten minutes to the west of Juniata, because that was the direction Costa said the vehicle had been traveling from. Poplau discovered that the Kennesaw ATM was also unlocked. (Filing No. 311, at p. 81). Poplau eventually made contact with the bank president Neel Keiser, who advised that none of the ATMs should be unlocked. Poplau reported this information back to Costa. (Filing No. 311, at pp. 81-82). Mr. Keiser and Poplau reviewed video footage of both ATMs recorded on April 28, 2025, between the hours of 2200-2330, but the subject vehicle was not observed. (Filing No. 311, at p. 83).

Based upon these circumstances, including Costa's knowledge of the February ATM jackpotting investigation, his observations made during the traffic stop, and Poplau's advisement that the two ATMS were unlocked but should not be, Costa placed both Flores and Defendant under arrest at 1:18 a.m. on April 29, 2025. (Filing No. 311, at p. 38). Defendant was initially charged with criminal possession of a forgery device, possession of burglary tools, and conspiracy under Nebraska state statutes. (Filing No. 311, at p. 64). Both backpacks were seized as evidence and the vehicle was towed to an Adams County Sheriff's Department storage lot. (Filing No. 311, at p. 39, 85). Law enforcement also seized Flores’ and Defendant's cell phones.

On May 20, 2025, Magistrate Judge Michael D. Nelson signed a warrant authorizing law enforcement to search the cell phones. (Ex. 1). The application for the search warrant was supported by an affidavit authored by Agent Brandon Stigge (“Stigge”), a Task Force Officer with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). In that affidavit, Stigge reiterated the events from the scene and also testified about other ongoing ATM jackpotting schemes. Specifically, Stigge provided information that the backpack recovered at the scene was identical to one observed in surveillance video dated April 13, 2025, from an ATM in Moravia, Iowa, which was also victimized in an ATM jackpotting theft. (Ex. 1, at pp. 11-12). Both Flores and the Defendant were later interviewed, and Flores made admissions regarding taking photos of the ATMs in Juniata and Kennesaw. (Ex. 1, at pp. 12-13). Defendant claimed he was unaware of the ATM incidents and was only with Flores in Juniata to “pick up some women.” (Ex. 1, at p. 13). Defendant's phone was subsequently searched and the government asserts that incriminating evidence was found. (Filing No. 159, at p. 3). The matter was later set for a preliminary hearing, in which the court found sufficient probable cause for the case to continue. (Ex. 101). The grand jury then returned a criminal indictment against both Flores and the Defendant on August 19, 2025. (Filing No. 5).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant seeks to suppress any evidence obtained from his warrantless arrest and subsequent search of his cell phone. As to the first issue, he argues primarily that his mere presence as a passenger in Flores’ vehicle was insufficient to establish probable cause. For the following reasons, the court disagrees.

A. Defendant's Arrest

As an initial matter, the defendant does not take issue with the stop itself. The parties appear to agree that one of the taillights was broken, which provided the officer sufficient probable cause to stop the vehicle due to the traffic violation. See United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 2005) (“A traffic violation – however minor – creates probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle”). Defendant argues instead that his subsequent arrest lacked probable cause because there was little, if any, evidence tying him to a crime simply by being present in the vehicle.

Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause. Bell v. Neukirch, 979 F.3d 594, 603 (8th Cir. 2020) (“In conformity with the rule at common law, a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.”) (quoting Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004)). Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists when, at the moment of the arrest, law enforcement officers are aware of “facts and circumstances grounded in reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a belief by a prudent person that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” United States v. Hartje, 251 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 2001). “Because ‘[p]robable cause is a practical and common-sensical standard,’ ‘an officer may draw inferences based on his own experience’ to determine whether probable cause exists.” United States v. Soderman, 983 F.3d 369, 375 (8th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d 407, 418 (8th Cir. 2017)). This determination must be based on the totality of the circumstances and a “combination of otherwise innocent factors may create probable cause.” Id.

Defendant argues that probable cause must be “particularized,” and there was no evidence obtained or admissions made sufficient to connect him to any criminal conduct. He relies heavily upon Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) in support of this proposition. In that case, law enforcement obtained a search warrant for a public tavern and one of the bartenders as the result of suspected drug offenses. While executing the search, one of the officers announced to all those present that they were going to conduct a “cursory search for weapons.” Id. at 88. Officers then frisked the patrons and found narcotics on one of them. Id. at 88-89. The Supreme Court concluded that the search of the patron was not constitutionally permissible because it went beyond the scope of the warrant. The Court held a search or seizure of a person must be supported by sufficient probable cause particularized with respect to that person. Id. And while the Court acknowledged that officers may generally conduct a “pat down” search to find weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are in possession of the person, that “reasonable belief or suspicion [must] be directed at the person to be frisked[.]” Id. at 93-94.

The Supreme Court has of course analyzed these issues further since Ybarra, including in the more recent case Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003). In Pringle, three men were riding in a small sedan when it was stopped. Upon searching the vehicle, law enforcement found rolled up cash in the glove compartment and five baggies of cocaine in the back seat armrest. None of the men claimed ownership of the money or the narcotics. Id. at 371-372. The Court explained that probable cause can be found as to each occupant in a motor vehicle, when they each exercise dominion and control over its contents. “We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus, a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe [the defendant] committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly.” Id. at 372. The Court expressly rejected the defendant's reliance on Ybarra and concluded that “[t]his case is quite different from Ybarra. Pringle and his two companions were in a relatively small automobile, not a public tavern.” Id. at 373. “ ‘[A] car passenger- unlike the unwitting tavern patron in Ybarra- will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.’ ” Id. (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)).

The court finds the same to be true here. Similar to Pringle, the Defendant was a passenger in the car with Flores, where he was able to exercise dominion and control over both backpacks, gloves, and screwdrivers. Although Defendant did not claim ownership of the backpack which contained the electronics, Costa reasonably believed that one backpack contained personal items of both Flores and Defendant, and they each also had control over the backpack with the electronics. Costa further testified that he knew of prior ATM jackpotting thefts in the area, including the bank in close proximity to the stop. He stated based on his experience with that investigation, the driver of the vehicle often acted as the “lookout” while the passengers used the electronic equipment to compromise the ATMs. Based on the totality of the circumstances, including Costa's prior experience with these types of thefts, the electronic equipment found within the vehicle, and knowledge that two nearby ATMs were “unlocked” without authorization, it is reasonable that Costa had sufficient information to believe that a crime had been committed and that Defendant was involved in that crime. Flores and Defendant were the only individuals in the vehicle and therefore engaged in a common enterprise, with similar control over the backpacks, gloves, and screwdrivers. Taken together, the court finds probable cause supported Defendant's warrantless arrest.

B. Search Warrant of Defendant's Cell Phone

Defendant next takes issue with the search warrant for his cell phone, arguing that it lacks probable cause and the Leon good faith exception should not apply. In particular, Defendant argues that the supporting affidavit contained statements made “with reckless disregard” for the truth and which were misleading to the authorizing judge as they were overly broad and again not particularized to him. (Filing No. 311, at pp. 106-107). The government argues that the information contained within the four corners of the affidavit provided ample probable cause to support the search of Defendant's phone, and if not, the Leon good faith exception should apply. The court agrees.

Similar to a warrantless arrest, the “[i]ssuance of a search warrant must be supported by probable cause.” United States v. Faulkner, 826 F.3d 1139, 1144 (8th Cir. 2016). “Whether probable cause to issue a search warrant has been established is determined by considering the totality of the circumstances, and resolution of the question by an issuing judge ‘should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.’ ” United States v. Brewer, 588 F.3d 1165, 1170 (8th Cir. 2008). “When the [issuing judge] relied solely upon the supporting affidavit to issue the warrant, ‘only that information which is found within the four corners of the affidavit may be considered in determining the existence of probable cause.’ ” United States v. Etheridge, 165 F.3d 655, 656 (8th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Gladney, 48 F.3d 309, 312 (8th Cir.1995)). The affidavit “should be examined under a common sense approach and not in a hypertechnical fashion.” United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993).

Here, the search warrant and affidavit provided details about the ongoing ATM jackpotting investigation, including how the scheme operates, the stages of completion, and the individuals typically involved. (Ex. 1). It also contained information regarding similar thefts in other jurisdictions, including a jackpotting event in Butler, Missouri, and one in Moravia, Iowa. (Ex. 1, at p. 8-12). The affidavit explained how the black backpack discovered in the Juniata stop was connected to the incident in Iowa. (Ex. 1, at p. 11-12). Although there were no specific allegations implicating Defendant in those prior incidents, the affidavit provided supporting information concerning how the electronics found at this stop were used. The affidavit further reiterated the same statement of facts at issue here, including the inconsistent story Defendant told about why he was in Juniata, NE, and that law enforcement was aware that two ATMs in close proximity to the stop had been “unlocked.”

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, Stigge averred that the information stored on Defendant's cell phone could “provide insight on what malware variant was deployed, as well as the location of subjects and communication with co-conspirators[,]” and that he had reason to believe that the cell phone was “used to store information relevant to this ATM malware deployment, computer crime and bank larceny.” (Ex. 1, at p. 14-15). Law enforcement again suspected that Flores and Defendant were engaged in a common enterprise because they both had dominion and control over the evidence seized. The affidavit provided ample information concerning these suspicions and why officers believed Defendant was involved. On this point, Stigge testified that this type of fraud scheme “requires the retention and exchange of large of amounts of information to include things like usernames and passwords, bank account numbers, and contact information for victims and co-conspirators. This information is obtained, stored, and exchanged frequently with other co-conspirators digitally using electronic devices” and therefore believed that Defendant and Flores possessed relevant evidence on their cell phones. (Ex. 1, at p. 15). Further, the magistrate judge ¹ signed the warrant, thereby finding probable cause existed at that time for the search. See United States v. Proell, 485 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2007) (“After a judge has issued a search warrant upon a finding of probable cause, that finding deserves great deference.”) The court sees no reason why that determination should be challenged now, as it agrees that there was sufficient probable cause for the warrant. Accordingly, the warrant permitting the search of Defendant's cell phone did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

But even presuming the warrant was defective, the court finds that the exception in United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984), applies. In Leon, the court created an exception to the exclusionary rule “if an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope,” even if the court were to later conclude that the warrant was invalid. Id. at 3420. An officer's reliance on a defective warrant may be unreasonable when:

(1) when the affidavit or testimony supporting the warrant contained a false statement made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for its truth, thus misleading the issuing judge;

(2) when the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial role in issuing the warrant;

(3) when the affidavit in support of the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and

(4) when the warrant is so facially deficient that no police officer could reasonably presume the warrant to be valid.

United States v. Long, 797 F.3d 558, 566 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Cannon, 703 F.3d 407, 412 (8th Cir. 2013)).

Defendant takes issue with certain omissions and/or false statements he claims were made to the issuing magistrate judge. The court is not convinced. First, the affiant officer thoroughly explained the ongoing investigation, the findings from the search of the car as well as subsequent interviews with each of the suspects. Because the court has found that the affidavit provides sufficient probable cause of its fact, it need not “look outside the four corners of the affidavit.” See United States v. Dickerman, 954 F. 3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 2020). The court further notes that reliance on the warrant was not unreasonable, as none of the above exceptions apply and the warrant is supported by probable cause.

To the extent that Defendant's Leon argument is an attempt to raise a Franks challenge regarding material omissions outside of the four corners of the affidavit, he has not made the preliminary showing required. “Under Franks, a criminal defendant may request a hearing to challenge a search warrant on the ground that the supporting affidavit contains factual misrepresentations or omissions relevant to the probable cause determination.” United States v. Arnold, 725 F.3d 896, 898 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-156 (1978). But to trigger the right to a Franks hearing, Defendant must make a “substantial preliminary showing” that both (1) “the affiant․knowingly and intentionally made false statements or made them in reckless disregard for the truth” and (2) “if the false information [were] excised (or the omitted information [were] included), the affidavit no longer establishes probable cause” to issue the search warrants. Id. (emphasis added). “The requirement of a substantial preliminary showing is not lightly met[.]” United States v. Mathison, 157 F.3d 541, 548 (8th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted).

Although counsel noted this issue at the beginning of the hearing, the court stated on the record that the preliminary showing under Franks had not been met and is not properly raised here. (Filing No. 311, at p. 100). Defendant concluded the hearing by offering a transcript of his preliminary hearing only for the purposes of analyzing the good faith exception under Leon. The court reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript, Exhibit 101, and concludes that the analysis does not change.

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS RECOMMENDED to the Honorable Brian C. Buescher, United States District Court Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), that Defendant's Motion to Suppress (Filing No. 115) be denied.

The Defendant is notified that failing to file an objection to this recommendation as provided in the local rules of this court may be held to be a waiver of any right to appeal the court's adoption of the recommendation.

Dated this 8th day of January, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Honorable Michael D. Nelson, United States Magistrate Judge

Ryan C. Carson United States Magistrate Judge