HUMPHREY v. CUMULUS RADIO LLC (2026)

ORDER ON DEFENDANT CUMULUS RADIO LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF. No. 54]

Plaintiff Gerald Humphrey (“Plaintiff” or “Humphrey”) brings this action against his former employer, Cumulus Radio LLC (“Cumulus”), alleging age discrimination in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B (“Chapter 151B”) arising from his termination. Before the Court is the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, [ECF No. 54]. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts are drawn from the parties’ statements of material facts and responses. [ECF Nos. 56, 61-10]. The Court notes that Plaintiff fails to oppose many of the material facts asserted by Defendant in his opposition to summary judgment and his statement of material facts. [Compare ECF Nos. 61, 61-10 with ECF No. 56]. Many of Plaintiff's arguments focus on the framing or character of the material facts asserted and do little to address the pending count of age discrimination before the Court. Local Rule 56.1, D. Mass. 56.1, is “designed to function as a means of ‘focusing a district court's attention on what is—and what is not—genuinely controverted.’ ” Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Calvi v. Knox Cnty., 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir. 2006)). A party claiming that a fact is genuinely disputed must either “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record ․ or show[ ] that the materials cited do not establish the absence ․ of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The factual allegations in a movant's statement of facts “will be deemed ․ admitted by opposing parties unless controverted by the statement required to be served by opposing parties.” D. Mass. 56.1; see, e.g., Stonkus v. City of Brockton Sch. Dep't, 322 F.3d 97, 102 (1st Cir. 2003) (deeming a statement of undisputed material facts admitted that was not controverted by opposing party); Cochran v. Quest Software, Inc., 328 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a plaintiff's failure to contest a date in statement of material facts caused the date to be admitted); Plourde v. Sorin Grp. USA, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 3d 76, 81 (D. Mass. 2021) (“When a party opposing summary judgment fails to dispute the facts presented by the moving party, those facts are deemed admitted.”).

A. Relevant Facts

Cumulus Radio LLC is an audio-first media company that is an indirect subsidiary of Cumulus Media Inc. (“CMI”). [ECF No. 56 ¶ 1]. CMI provides local programming through its owned-and-operated radio stations. [Id.] CMI also provides advertisement and marketing services, full-service audio solutions, and other services. [Id. ¶ 2]. To reach its various markets, CMI employs sales teams consisting of Account Executives. [Id. ¶ 3]. The teams of Account Executives report directly to either the Director of Sales or the General Sale Manager. [Id. ¶ 5].

In February 2011, Cumulus hired Mr. Humphrey, then 49 years old, as an Account Executive at their Worcester location. [Id. ¶¶ 8–9, 18]. He worked under the supervision of Robert Goodell, then 52 years old. [Id.] In 2015, Mr. Humphrey received a promotion to the Director of Sales at the Worcester location. [Id. ¶ 19]. As the Director of Sales, Mr. Humphrey's responsibilities included the development of sales plans and strategies to meet revenue goals, the recruitment of account executives, maintenance of client relations, and management of his team. [Id. ¶ 5].

B. Team Hiring at the Worcester Office

From 2011 to 2015, Mr. Goodell hired six additional Account Executives for the Worcester office. [Id. ¶¶ 9–15]. The team consisted of Account Executives aged 53 years old, 38 years old, 61 years old, 56 years old, 54 years old, and 39 years old at the time of their hiring. [Id.] After Mr. Humphrey's promotion, he and Mr. Goodell hired additional account executives for the Worcester office, including three Account Executives aged 28 years old, 32 years old, and 53 years old at the time of their hiring. [Id. ¶¶ 20–23].

C. Complaints Made Against Mr. Humphrey

In September 2019, approximately eight years into Mr. Humphrey's employment, and in his capacity as the Director of Sales at the Worcester location, Mr. Humphrey had a verbal altercation with one of the Account Executives at the Worcester office. [ECF No. 56 ¶ 36; ECF No. 61-10 ¶ 42]. Following the altercation, members of Mr. Humphrey's team reported to Mr. Goodell that they had a lack of confidence in Mr. Humphrey's leadership capabilities. [ECF No. 56 ¶ 41; ECF No. 61-10 ¶ 46]. Sometime that same year, a client of Cumulus Radio made a complaint to Mr. Goodell about Mr. Humphrey's conduct during a client visit. [ECF No. 56 ¶ 42]. While Mr. Goodell did not witness the incident, the client complained to him that Mr. Humphrey acted in a manner that was condescending and disrespectful. [Id. ¶ 43; ECF No. 61-10 ¶¶ 101–102; Goodell Dep. 229:3-11, ECF No. 61-2].¹ The dealer refused to do business with Cumulus if Mr. Humphrey continued to work for Cumulus. [ECF No. 56 ¶ 43].

Shortly after these incidents, the team separated because of the COVID-19 pandemic. [ECF No. 56 ¶ 44]. When the team returned to the office, a majority of the sales team reported a lack of confidence in Mr. Humphrey. [Id.; Goodell Dep. 220:7–10, ECF No. 56-4 (“․ the closer we got to coming out of COVID, the more resounding feedback I got that they didn't want to work with him anymore.”)]. On April 15, 2021, Mr. Goodell held a meeting with Mr. Humphrey and shared the team's feedback. [ECF No. 56 ¶ 45]. This is the first time Mr. Humphrey became aware of such feedback. [ECF No. 61-10 ¶ 129]. Mr. Goodell did not think Mr. Humphrey could continue as the Director of Sales in Worcester and suggested Mr. Humphrey transfer to the New London office in Connecticut. [ECF No. 56 ¶ 45]. Mr. Humphrey believed such an offer would set him up for failure and declined. [Id. ¶ 46; ECF No. 61-10 ¶ 16].

D. Mr. Humphrey Placed on a Performance Improvement Plan

Due to the feedback from Mr. Humphrey's team and Cumulus’ customers, on April 23, 2021, Cumulus placed Mr. Humphrey on a 30-day Performance-Improvement-Plan (“PIP”). [ECF No. 56 ¶ 48]. The PIP outlined goals and expectations for Mr. Humphrey. [Id.¶ 49]. Mr. Goodell found it difficult to evaluate Mr. Humphrey as to some of the PIP's goals and expectations because they were not clearly quantifiable. [ECF No. 61-10 ¶¶ 21–23]. Nevertheless, while Mr. Humphrey was on the PIP, he failed to provide specific numeric goals or metrics for success in his sales plans, lead organized sales meetings, or provide ideas which benefited the team. [ECF No. 56 ¶¶ 50–52]. Additionally, after the initial meeting on April 15, 2021, Mr. Humphrey declined to conduct one-on-one meetings with his sales team, which necessitated coverage from Mr. Goodell. [Id. ¶ 56].

On May 13, 2021, Mr. Humphrey arrived to a sales meeting with a client on his motorcycle, dressed in an uncollared black shirt and motorcycle boots. [Id. ¶ 53]. During the meeting, Mr. Humphrey forgot his mask and called the client by the wrong name. [Id. ¶¶ 53–54; ECF No. 61-10 ¶ 95]. After hearing of the incident, Mr. Goodell sent a memorandum to Mr. Humphrey expressing that such conduct demonstrated a lack of professionalism and preparedness. [ECF No. 56 ¶ 53].

E. Termination And Replacement

On July 30, 2021, nearly 100 days after the start of the 30-day PIP, Cumulus terminated Mr. Humphrey's employment. [ECF No. 56 ¶ 59]. After Mr. Humphrey's termination, Cumulus condensed the Worcester and New London offices. [Id. ¶ 6]. The position of Director of Sales was eliminated; instead, Account Executives reported to co-General Sales Managers. [Id.] Cumulus promoted Mr. Riggieri, then 47-years-old, and Ms. Manwaring, then 60-years-old, to act as co-General Sales Managers, replacing the position previously held by Mr. Humphrey. [Id. ¶ 26; ECF No. 61-10 ¶ 121]. As co-General Sales Managers, Mr. Riggieri and Ms. Manwaring hired three new Account Executives aged 56 years old, 53 years old, and 58 years old at the time of their hiring. [ECF No. 56 ¶¶ 29–32].

F. Procedural History

Mr. Humphrey filed this action against Cumulus on October 10, 2022, in Worcester Superior Court. [ECF No. 1-1]. Cumulus filed a Notice of Removal on November 29, 2022. [ECF No. 1]. On December 20, 2022, Cumulus then moved for a partial dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as to Humphrey's allegations of retaliation, hostile work environment, and disparagement. [ECF No. 8]. However, the Court issued an electronic order indicating that it was construing the complaint as only asserting a claim of age discrimination, and therefore, denied the partial motion to dismiss as moot. [ECF No. 15].

On July 11, 2025, Cumulus filed a motion for Summary Judgment as to the remaining count of age discrimination. [ECF No. 54]. Mr. Humphrey then filed his Opposition to Cumulus's Motion for Summary Judgment on August 18, 2025. [ECF No. 61]. Cumulus replied to the opposition on September 8, 2025. [ECF No. 62]. This Court held a hearing on the motion on November 19, 2025, taking the motion under advisement. [ECF No. 64].

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A court may grant summary judgment when, making all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the evidence in the record shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Gattineri v. Wynn MA, LLC, 63 F.4th 71, 84 (1st Cir. 2023) (citing Triangle Cayman Asset Co. v. LG & AC, Corp., 52 F.4th 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a))). “An issue is ‘genuine’ when a rational factfinder could resolve it either direction.” Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010)). “A fact is ‘material’ when its (non)existence could change a case's outcome.” Id. at 5 (quoting Borges, 605 F.3d at 5). If a properly supported summary judgment motion is presented, the nonmoving party must then “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine [dispute] for trial,” and may not simply “rest upon mere allegation or denials of [their] pleading,” but must instead “present affirmative evidence.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 256–57, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In reviewing the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Sharp, 692 F. Supp. 3d 9, 10 (D. Mass. 2023) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). “However, ‘[a]t the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a “genuine” dispute as to those facts.’ ” Fernando v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 18-10504-MBB, 2022 WL 773234 at *1, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44315 at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 14, 2022) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c))). To survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must provide evidence that is “significantly probative” and more than “merely colorable.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 264, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A mere objection to the opposition's pleading does not suffice as a genuine dispute of material fact, since “[n]either party may rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated denials, but must identify specific facts derived from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits to demonstrate either the existence or absence of an issue of fact.” Magee v. United States, 121 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) & (e)).

While summary judgment in disparate treatment discrimination cases is generally a “disfavored remedy ․ because the ultimate issue of discriminatory intent is a factual question,” Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 46 N.E.3d 24, 39 (2016) (quoting Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 646 N.E.2d 111, 114 (1995)), courts have granted summary judgment in cases where plaintiffs fail to proffer sufficient evidence of discriminatory animus. See, e.g., Lee v. Howard Hughes Med. Inst., 607 F. Supp. 3d 52, 65 (D. Mass. 2022), appeal dismissed, No. 22-1540, 2023 WL 4544477 (1st Cir. Feb. 8, 2023) (entering summary judgment on a disparate treatment claim where plaintiff's evidence for discriminatory nonrenewal consisted of “speculation about the influence of bias” which was “without more, insufficient to survive summary judgment”). Further, it is not the role of the Court to “substit[ute] judicial judgments for the business judgments of employers.” Arroyo-Audifred v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 527 F.3d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 507 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir. 2007)). Ultimately, it is Humphrey's burden to establish a genuine issue of material fact that Cumulus's “justification is pretextual and the firm's action was, in fact, ‘improperly motivated by discrimination.’ ” Ray v. Ropes & Gray LLP, 799 F.3d 99, 113 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207, 213 (1st Cir. 2003)).

III. DISCUSSION

The Massachusetts antidiscrimination statute, Chapter 151B, prohibits employers in the Commonwealth from discriminating against their employees based on a protected status, including age. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1B). To succeed on a discrimination claim in Massachusetts, a plaintiff must prove four elements: “membership in a protected class, harm, discriminatory animus, and causation.” Dusel v. Factory Mutual Ins. Co., 52 F.4th 495, 503 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34, 825 N.E. 2d 522, 530 (2005)). “Where an employee lacks direct evidence that the employer's actions were motivated by animus, Massachusetts courts apply the burden-shifting framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.” Grol v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 241, 245 (D. Mass. 2018) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)). “Under that framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination which the defendant may rebut by offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. If the defendant does so,” then the “plaintiff must produce evidence demonstrating that defendant's stated reason was a pretext.” Id.

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under Chapter 151B, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that they (1) were over forty years of age, (2) performed their job at an acceptable level, (3) were terminated, and (4) were replaced by a similarly or less qualified younger person.” Logue v. RAND Corp., 668 F. Supp. 3d 53, 61 (D. Mass. 2023) (citing Knight v. Avon Prods., 438 Mass. 413, 780 N.E.2d 1255 (2003)).

To rebut the presumption, “the employer must articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employee's termination.” LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 842 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Lawrence v. Northrop Corp., 980 F.2d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 1992)). Additionally, under Massachusetts law, the reason must be credible. Gautreau v. Hopkinton Pub. Schs., 308 F. Supp. 3d 565, 571 (D. Mass. 2018) (citing Martin v. Envelope Div. of Westvaco Corp., 850 F. Supp. 83, 92–93 (D. Mass. 1994)). “Once the employer produces such a reason, the presumption of discrimination generated by the employee's prima facie case disappears.” Id. (citing Koster v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 24, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1999)).

If the employer successfully rebuts the presumption of discrimination, the Court turns to the final stage of inquiry, in which the burden shifts to the employee. At this stage, the employee “must put forth sufficient facts for a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that [Defendants’] proffered reason for discharging him is a pretext ․” Naimark v. BAE Sys. Info. & Elec. Sys. Integration Inc., No. 20-CV-10138-DJC, 2021 WL 6098728, at *5 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2021) (quoting Melendez v. Autogermana, Inc., 622 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2010)). “The ultimate question becomes whether, on all the evidence of record, a rational factfinder could conclude that age was a determining factor in the employer's decision.” Gautreau, 308 F. Supp. at 571 (quoting Mesnick v. Gen Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 824–25 (1st Cir. 1991)).

A. Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case for Age Discrimination

As articulated above, to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination requires the plaintiff demonstrate “(1) [he was] over forty years of age, (2) performed [his] job at an acceptable level, (3) [was] terminated, and (4) [was] replaced by a similarly or less qualified younger person.” Logue, 668 F. Supp. 3d at 61. It is undisputed that Humphrey is over forty years of age, and that Humphrey was terminated from his employment with Cumulus. [ECF No. 55 at 16; ECF No. 56 ¶ 8]. Therefore, to establish his prima facie case, Mr. Humphrey must demonstrate that factors two and four are satisfied.

In determining whether the plaintiff performed their job at an acceptable level, courts have previously determined this to be a “low standard” to establish prima facie case. Logue, 668 F. Supp. 3d at 61 (finding plaintiff met her burden by showing she was employed for 17 years, received a “Meets Some Expectations” in her performance reviews, was the highest paid CA-III on the team, and, after her FMLA leave was over, was re-assigned all her responsibilities); Acevedo-Parrilla v. Novartis Ex-Lax, Inc., 696 F.3d 128, 139 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding the plaintiff met the low standard by showing he was employed for eleven years, received positive reviews, and was a trained engineer). In the present case, Humphrey was employed by Cumulus for over ten years. [ECF No. 56 ¶ 8; ECF No. 55 at 16]. He received a promotion in 2015 to Director of Sales, and the first mention of his negative performance did not occur until months prior to his termination. [Id. ¶ 46]. As such, plaintiff meets the “low standard” of demonstrating he performed at an acceptable level. Logue, 668 F. Supp 3d at 61.

It is undisputed that two individuals replaced Humphrey after his termination. [ECF No. 56 ¶ 26]. One such individual was younger than Plaintiff by almost thirteen years, while the other was the same age. [Id.] An inference of unlawful discrimination “cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.” Kuznarowis v. Tobey Hosp., 320 F. Supp. 3d 307, 312 (D. Mass. 2018), aff'd, 748 F. App'x 362 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312-13, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996)). When the responsibilities are divided among multiple people, the plaintiff need show only that the employer “sought some form of replacement performance [for the plaintiff's role], demonstrating a continued need for the same services and skills.” Logue, 668 F. Supp. at 61-62 (citing Beaupre v. Seacoast Sales, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 3d 353, 359 (D. Mass. 2020) (internal citations omitted)). Because one of Plaintiff's replacements was significantly younger, almost thirteen years, the fourth prong of his prima facie showing is satisfied.

B. Cumulus Demonstrates Legitimate and Credible Reasons for Termination

Because Humphrey successfully shows a prima facie case of age discrimination, the Court turns to the second stage of the burden shifting framework. “At the second stage, ‘the employer can rebut the presumption created by the prima facie case by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its [employment] decision.’ ” Logue, 668 F. Supp. at 60 (citing Blare, 646 N.E. 2d at 115).

Defendant Cumulus offers legitimate and credible reasons for its decision to terminate Plaintiff. Humphrey engaged in a verbal altercation with his subordinate that resulted in the team losing their faith in his leadership style. [ECF No. 56 ¶¶ 36, 41]. Humphrey's supervisor was informed of several incidents involving the customers which were determined to be serious and unprofessional conduct. [Id. ¶¶ 42, 53–54]. Humphrey failed to fulfill his responsibilities once placed on a PIP and his colleagues needed to step in to complete his responsibilities. [Id. ¶¶ 50–52, 55–56]. The Court concludes that, with these reasons, Defendant demonstrates legitimate and credible reasons for termination, rebutting the presumption of discrimination. Acevedo-Parrilla, 696 F.3d at 140 (finding the employers’ evidence of failure to comply with duties and objectives satisfied the requirement to demonstrate a legitimate reason for termination).

C. Cumulus's Reasons for Termination are not Pretextual

As Defendant Cumulus can successfully demonstrate a legitimate and credible reason for termination, the presumption of discrimination disappears, and Humphrey has the burden to prove that the reason advanced by the employer constituted a mere pretext for unlawful age discrimination. Grol, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 245–46. A plaintiff may avail himself of such circumstantial proof as “statistical evidence showing disparate treatment by the employer of members of the protected class, comments by decisionmakers which denigrate those over forty, the incidence of differential treatment in the workplace, and the deployment of younger replacements.” Gautreau, 308 F. Supp. at 572 (quoting Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 824). To allow an inference of disparate treatment, the plaintiff must identify a “similar situated” comparator such that “a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents, would think them roughly equivalent and the protagonists similarly situated.” Dusel v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 52 F.4th 495, 507 (1st Cir. 2022) (citing Trs. Of Health & Hosps. of Bos., Inc. v. MCAD, 449 Mass. 675, 871 N.E.2d 444, 450 (2007)).

Humphrey fails to provide evidence to demonstrate such disparate treatment. During Plaintiff's time as an Account Executive, Defendant hired Account Executives close in age to Humphrey. [ECF No. 56 ¶¶ 9–15]. After Humphrey's termination, Cumulus again hired Account Executives of similar age to Humphrey, ranging from 50 to 60 years of age. [ECF No. 56 ¶¶ 30–32]. Moreover, one of his replacements shared his same age. [ECF No. 56 ¶ 26]. No comparator is presented by which any prudent person may objectively find the Plaintiff was subject to disparate treatment. Dusel, 52 F.4th at 507.

Humphrey questions the motivations for his placement on the PIP. However, when a plaintiff seeks to show pretext by debunking the stated reason for the adverse employment action, they must present evidence from which a reasonable jury could supportably conclude “that the employer's explanation is not just wrong, but that it is so implausible that the employer more likely than not does not believe it.” Dusel, 52 F.4th at 508 (citing Forsythe v. Wayfair Inc., 27 F.4th 67, 80 (1st Cir. 2022)). The focus during pretext is on the perception of the decision maker. Brader v. Biogen Inc., 983 F.3d 39, 56–57 (1st Cir. 2020). The underlying facts which led his supervisor to place Plaintiff on a PIP are not disputed. Plaintiff's supervisor considered complaints filed by both customers and the sales team. [ECF No. 56 ¶¶ 41–43, 53–56; Goodell Dep. 220:7–10, ECF No. 61-2]. Mr. Goodell delivered a memorandum to the Plaintiff, identifying his lack of professionalism as an area of concern. [Id. ¶¶ 53–54]. Without further evidence, the facts do not debunk Cumulus’ legitimate reasons for terminating Humphrey. Where, as here, the plaintiff fails to rebut the defendant's nondiscriminatory explanation, summary judgement for the defendant is appropriate. Gautreau, 308 F. Supp. at 574.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement, [ECF No. 54], is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Goodell Dep., 223:12–18 (“․ Jerry muttered a profanity, flipped his card, you know, across a desk, it fell on the floor, and they walked out. And the car dealer felt it was very disrespectful and condescending and said that as long as Jerry Humphrey is working for this company, they would never do business with us.”).

GUZMAN,, United States District Judge