ROBERTS v. OUTSIDE THE BOX EDUCATION LLC HICI GO LLC NT (2025)

ORDER

This action was removed from Connecticut Superior Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Whether this court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims depends on the scope of the substantial federal question doctrine, which permits a federal court to adjudicate state causes of action when “the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). For reasons set forth below, the defendants will be required to file a memorandum showing why the action should not be remanded for lack of jurisdiction.

The complaint seeks damages and other relief pursuant to: (1) Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q, which provides a cause of action against an employer who subjects an employee to discipline or discharge for exercising rights guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 5 of article first of the Connecticut Constitution; (2) Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51m, which provides a cause of action to an employee who is discharged for reporting a suspected violation of any state or federal law or regulation to a public body; and (3) Connecticut's common law cause of action for wrongful discharge. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 474, 427 A.2d 385 (1980). Defendants removed the action based on the complaint's allegation that plaintiff was subjected to retaliation for exercising rights under the First Amendment.

The defendants bear the burden of demonstrating the propriety of removal. See Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F. 3d 86, 100 (2d Cir. 2004). “In light of the congressional intent to restrict federal court jurisdiction, as well as the importance of preserving the independence of state governments, federal courts construe the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubts against removability.” Lupo v. Human Affairs Intern., Inc., 28 F. 3d 269, 274 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enters., Inc., 932 F. 2d 1043, 1045-46 (2d Cir. 1991)), superseded on other grounds by Rule as stated by Contino v. United States, 535 F. 3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2008).

The Supreme Court has devised a four-part test to determine whether a federal issue embedded in a state-law claim warrants the exercise of federal question jurisdiction. The federal issue must be (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress. Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013). “Where all four of these requirements are met ․, jurisdiction is proper because there is a ‘serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum,’ which can be vindicated without disrupting Congress's intended division of labor between state and federal courts.” Id. (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313-14, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 L.Ed.2d 257 (2005)). Cases that satisfy the four-part test comprise a category that is “slim.” See Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 701, 126 S.Ct. 2121, 165 L.Ed.2d 131 (2006).

In Bracey v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Bridgeport, 368 F. 3d 108 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit held that the substantial federal question doctrine permitted adjudication in federal court of a claim brought under § 31-51q. That case is clearly distinguishable, however, because the plaintiff was a public employee, not a private employee, and, as the Court explained, Congress had provided a federal cause of action with respect to the plaintiff's First Amendment claim through the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 115. No case has been found where the Second Circuit extended the substantial federal question doctrine to a § 31-51q claim brought by a private employee.

Since the decision in Bracey, moreover, the Connecticut Supreme Court has clarified that the protection afforded to employee speech under the Connecticut Constitution is broader than that provided by the First Amendment. See Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, 319 Conn. 175, 210-11, 216-17, 123 A.3d 1212 (2015). For this reason, a plaintiff's right to relief in a suit under § 31-51q does not necessarily depend on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.

When a state-law claim does necessarily require a construction of federal law, the applicability of the substantial federal question doctrine depends on numerous factors. See Getz v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 3:23-CV-1338(RNC), 2024 WL 1793670, at *5 (April 25, 2024). The relevant factors include the following:

- whether Congress has provided a federal private right of action to enforce the federal law incorporated in the state-law claim;

- whether the federal issue is primarily one of fact or law;

- the relative prominence of the federal issue compared to state law issues (cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1367);

- whether the federal issue is outcome determinative;

- the need for uniformity in interpreting and applying the federal law at issue;

- the degree of federal interest in the litigation; and

- the need for federal forum safeguards (i.e., the degree to which, if at all, adjudicating the issue in federal court is justified by the federal court's relative expertise in matters of federal law, its inherent sensitivity to federal rights and interests, and the judicial independence guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution).

See id., citing 14C Wright & Miller, § 3722.1, nn.62-63 (collecting cases). In view of the decision in Trusz, these factors appear to weigh against the exercise of jurisdiction in this case.

Accordingly, the defendants will submit a memorandum showing why the court has subject matter jurisdiction. The memo may be filed on or before April 21, 2025. Plaintiff may file a response on or before May 12, 2025.

So ordered, this 31st day of March, 2025.

Robert N. Chatigny, United States District Judge